

Freedom in the World

Political Rights and Civil Liberties

1982

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Political Rights and Civil Liberties

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Preface

In the past decade the role of ideas and idealism in U.S. foreign policy has emerged again as a primary focus of our relations with allies, non-aligned countries, and foes. In public and private international forums, demands for respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights have become rallying points for peoples of all cultures. Freedom House strives to create through the Comparative Survey of Freedom an evaluative tool that will both express and refine our understanding of these demands. By assessing and publicizing the state of political and civil rights, it serves as a standard of hope for the oppressed and as a reminder of what could be for the free.

This yearbook marks the tenth year of the Comparative Survey and is the fifth edition in the Freedom House series of annual publications.* Previous yearbooks, in addition to focusing on the Comparative Survey, have emphasized different aspects of freedom and human rights. The first yearbook, the 1978 edition, examined basic theoretical issues of freedom and democracy and assessed the record of the Year of Human Rights. The second yearbook reported a conference on the potential internal and external factors promoting liberalization in the Soviet Union. The 1980 yearbook had special sections on press and trade union freedoms, the struggle for democracy in Iran, elections in Zimbabwe, and the relationship between human rights policy and morality. The 1981 yearbook contained essays and discussions from a Freedom House conference on the prospects for freedom in Muslim Central Asia.

The 1982 yearbook examines issues of freedom and human rights from several perspectives. In addition to the presentation of current Survey findings and country descriptions (Parts I and IV), new tables have been added in Part I

*The 1978, 1979, 1980, and 1981 yearbooks are available from Freedom House.

on national leaders and the means by which they have attained and maintained power, and on country ratings since the Survey's inception in 1973. Part II has four essays on specific civil liberties. They include an examination of economic freedoms and their relationship to politico-economic systems; a further exploration of trade union rights in Latin America, which were discussed theoretically in the 1981 edition; an analysis of media freedoms and the potential impact of proposals in UNESCO on the free flow of information; and a preliminary analysis of religious freedom and the relation of religion to freedom.

The main emphasis in this yearbook is on economic freedom, including the relation of economic to political freedoms and of these freedoms to economic growth and development. The basic argument is made in the essay on economic freedoms in Part II, which presents a new table effectively relating these factors. Part III supplements this argument by consideration of the desirability of promoting democracy in the developing world. In many third world countries, political rights have been repressed in the name of fulfilling the basic needs of nutrition, education and health. Yet, the consequences of repression—violence, increased factionalism, political instability—have erected additional barriers to their fulfillment. Three articles examine the many faces of democracy in developing societies, the prerequisites for promoting successfully sustained democratic development, and the problems of measuring democratic growth and modernization. The common argument throughout these essays is that there is an inherent link between economic and political pluralism and the ability of nations to increase their wealth and improve equitably their standards of living.

Part IV examines the human cost of totalitarianism by assessing the status of human rights in Vietnam before and after the reunification of North and South Vietnam. This comparison is often made conversationally and anecdotally, but seldom in detail.

We acknowledge, once again, the contribution made by the advisory panel for the Comparative Survey. The panel consists of:

Robert J. Alexander, Professor of Economics, Rutgers University; Richard W. Cottam, Professor of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh; Herbert J. Ellison, Professor of History, University of Washington; Seymour Martin Lipset, Senior Fellow, the Hoover Institution; Lucian Pye, Professor of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Leslie Rubin, lawyer, professor, and African specialist; Giovanni Sartori, the Albert Schweitzer Professor in the Humanities, Columbia University; and Robert Scalapino and Paul Seabury, Professors of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley.

We express also our appreciation to those foundations whose grants have made possible the year-round functioning of the Comparative Survey of Freedom, and the publication of this yearbook. We are especially grateful for the continuing assistance provided by the J. Howard Pew Freedom Trust. We also

thank the Earhart Foundation and the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation for their grants. The Survey and all Freedom House activities are also assisted by the generous support of individual members of the organization as well as trade unions, corporations, and public foundations which contribute to our general budget. No financial support from any government—now or in the past—has been either solicited or accepted.

We also acknowledge the research and editorial assistance of Jeannette C. Gastil in producing this yearbook.

PART I

The Survey in 1982

Freedom in the Comparative Survey

Published at least annually since January 1973¹ the Comparative Survey of

Freedom has become a standard reference for those concerned with the state of freedom in the world.

Freedom is a basic value of our culture and to a degree of all cultures. Like all values, its expression must be limited in real societies by countervailing values, particularly those of order and responsibility. Too often this simple fact is forgotten by Americans. To the average person freedom may mean lack of restraint, an ability to do as one likes, to escape the interference of those around him. At the extreme, freedom means license and in political-economic terms may be identified as libertarianism.

Freedom is also used to mean freedom from the operation of cause and effect. It implies belief that human beings can individually and in groups decide on their interests and pursue them. "Freedom of the will" is thus juxtaposed to the idea of a deterministic universe in which only statistical variation produces change. Belief in this freedom lies at the root of all human action; without it we could not function. Paradoxically it is impossible to prove the existence of such a freedom.

Freedom also applies to the right of groups to determine their own lives. The Thirteen Colonies wanted to be free from Great Britain in this sense, just as each colony wished to retain as much freedom of this kind from the resulting federal union as it could. To distinguish this freedom of people in groups from more individualistic freedoms the Survey refers to this freedom as "independence"; an independent state is unfortunately not necessarily free in other senses.

The freedoms the Survey primarily addresses are traditional freedoms distinct from the above. To the founding fathers of our republic freedom certainly did not mean escape from social obligations; nor did it mean freedom from scientific or divine determinism. It meant more than simply indepen-

dence from England. Men such as Jefferson and Adams wanted above all a system that would guarantee the people the right to control their own affairs, and that would allow for an open, rational discussion among the people as a precondition for popular control. They wanted, in other words, *political rights* and *civil liberties*. These are likewise the keys to our understanding of freedom.

Yet in the spirit of the founding fathers our concept of freedom also includes aspects of the group freedoms, the existential freedoms, and the social freedoms that we have discussed. Political freedoms must include alongside the rights of an electorate to control a society and the extension of electoral rights to all citizens, the rights of peoples to define the limits of their society, or in other words, rights to at least a modicum of local or regional autonomy, and even to secession. To be meaningful all freedoms must exist against a background of belief in the possibility of self-determination by both individuals and groups. Thoroughgoing philosophical determinism and concern for other human freedoms would co-exist uneasily in any free society. Finally, civil liberties include for the Survey and most advocates of freedom a presumption in favor of noninterference in the affairs of others by either government or neighbors. In a free society everyone is granted a social space of his own. Although the extent to which this space is seen by advocates of freedom as the paramount organizing principle of a society varies widely, this usually implies rights to freedom of conscience or religion, freedom of organization, of employment, travel, education, and many other rights. Such rights play a part in any definition of civil liberties.

Political rights in the Survey are primarily the rights to participate directly or through freely elected representatives in the determination of the nature of law and its administration in a society. In a large modern state this apparently requires competing political parties and ideally several tiers of elected government. The effectiveness of the political equality promised by the system varies from society to society and can never be perfect. But if reasonably extended by experience and law, and judicially protected, a multiparty democracy provides the nearest approximation to political equality that is attainable.

Civil liberties include in the first place those freedoms that make possible the organization and mobilization of new, alternative, or non-official opinions. They include freedom of the news media, and of political, professional, and worker organization. Civil liberties imply that there should be no prisoners of conscience, and certainly no execution and torture for the expression of beliefs or the organization of opposition where these are not directly related to violent attempts against the system. (Torture and execution may also be condemned legitimately as human rights violations quite separately from considerations of civil liberties or the test of prior violence—this is one of the points at which consideration of human rights diverges from that of freedom.) Civil liberties extend beyond these more political domains to questions such as religious freedom and freedom of residence. It can be argued that without

the autonomous individuality such freedoms imply, the other civil liberties cannot be fully developed.

While political liberties may be seen as guaranteeing the rights of the majority, civil liberties may be seen as guaranteeing the rights of the minority, including the individual as minority. In fact the two sets of liberties are complementary, for unless minorities can arise and be heard the majority becomes a false majority, pursuing its objectives in ignorance of the alternatives that a freer society would offer it.

Considering freedom as political and civil freedom the Survey finds only a minority of the world living in fully free states. Even with a very relaxed standard of freedom only a third of the world's peoples can be said to live in "free societies," a classification that runs from societies with fully functioning democratic institutions, such as the United States and Denmark, to societies with serious imperfections in the extension of these institutions, such as India and Colombia.

Well-traveled Americans, accustomed to moving from modern hotel to modern hotel, contacting few beyond the elites of the societies they touch upon, and conditioned by popular cultural relativism and touristic accent on the positive, frequently doubt the value of distinguishing between the levels of freedom that the Survey considers. They see the Survey's categorization in terms of political and civil rights to be an ethnocentric attempt to impose alien values on other cultures, or an irrelevant emphasis on issues quite unimportant for poor societies.

However, concern for civil and political freedoms is universal and affects all classes and nations. We have argued the case often in this series and will return to it below. Here, to make the point, let us consider just one issue, emigration. It illustrates why all classes, from highest to lowest, come to cherish freedom. With very few exceptions refugees flee unfree societies and strive to settle in free societies. The only societies that forcibly prevent people from leaving are unfree societies. At the extreme the governments of countries such as Albania or North Korea allow no movement in or out in an attempt to prevent the movement of ideas or the organization of opposition. Yet all peoples, everywhere, have historically wanted and used the right to cross borders. Most of the ancestors of modern Americans would never have been able to emigrate to America if their governments had sealed their borders in the totalitarian manner of many governments today. Lack of this freedom converts any society into a giant prison camp, with lifetime sentences for all. Of course only a few societies ban all travel. But from many societies only a few are allowed to travel, and an even smaller number to emigrate. In such societies, including the USSR and China, most of the population is sentenced to immobility.

Tyranny is not, of course, confined to communist states or to the question of movement. One unpublicized example is capitalist-oriented Malawi. Hastings Banda helped bring independence to his people but then proceeded to

impose the most frightening autocracy. The horrors of his prisons have lessened in recent years; many political prisoners have been released.² But in this one-party state the party's secretary-general was arrested and hung for treason in 1977, another minister was jailed in 1981 for possessing dissident documents and uttering seditious words. Banda has acknowledged attempts to kill opposition leaders in exile, and on Christmas Eve 1981 arrested another opponent with his wife and child, presumably by kidnapping them across the Zambian border.³

Most one-party states are leftist; in the late twentieth century fascist models have been replaced by communist models for autocracy. Leftist ideologues make claims for one-party systems as alternatives to multiparty "bourgeois democracy." Perhaps one-party states could be functioning democracies. In practice, single-party leftist states are elite-dominated, top-down systems of autocratic rule with only the appearance of a degree of political equality. All candidates must be approved by the ruling party and policy issues must be ignored in campaigning, even when choice is allowed. The press and radio are, of course, not open to alternative views—they generally belong to the government. To take one example of how a leftist one-party system works, in 1982 Zambia expelled a member of parliament elected under a one-party system that is often seen as an African model. This parliamentarian, a prominent union leader, lost his seat after he had been expelled from the single party for political opposition. Since "constitutionally" only party members may be in parliament, he could not "legally" serve. The desire of the electorate in Zambia turned out to mean very little.⁴ This was reminiscent of post-Shah Iran where elected parliamentarians have subsequently been denied their seats because of their views of the emerging order. But even ordinary people do not like their opinions to be rejected. Significantly one Iranian representative denied such a parliamentary seat was at last report leading a violent revolt with the effective backing of his political supporters.⁵

Substantial freedom is never secure when it represents little more than the largesse of despots. To be meaningful it must be created, extended, and institutionalized over a period of years. We read, for example, that having partially lifted censorship on the press in early February, in March President Zia ul-Haq of Pakistan lashed out at the press for raising expectations on an early return to democracy. "[He pointed out that] he could close all the papers down and there would be nothing anyone could do about it."⁶ As the now imprisoned Chinese scholar Hu Ping, who has observed at close hand the ephemeral nature of communist "democracy," says, "No matter how high the kite flies, it is not free, because one end of the string is in the hands of the person who controls it."⁷

Communist China tried to liberalize by introducing elements of democracy in local elections in 1980, yet the purpose of its leaders remained far removed from a genuine sharing of power. An official advocate of direct local elections explained:

A county level leadership cadre produced in this manner will be more able to gain the support and trust of the people, will be better at arousing the enthusiasm of the masses, can guarantee the smooth execution throughout the whole county of the line, directives, and policies of the Party and state, and can successfully complete every county task of socialist construction—all because the leadership arises from the people.⁸

Hu Ping campaigned successfully in these elections on a free speech platform. In his campaign document he argued that it was incorrect to see development as more important than democracy, or even necessary for democracy. He pointed out that in many democracies the industrial revolution followed instead of proceeded democracy, while on the other hand development had not brought a number of countries closer to democracy. He went on to doubt the effectiveness or value of development under dictatorship on two bases:

(1) The economic development made possible by dictatorship is a painful process because it must be accompanied by cruel persecutions of the people; it is abnormal because it is interested only in vainglory at the expense of real prosperity; it tends to be short-lived because it gives no incentive to the spirit of human initiative. A lack of effective self-adjustment will lead to the steady strengthening of the increasingly outlandish machinery of dictatorship. At the height of this development, a military power will emerge to disrupt the development of the people's spiritual and material life. As the time goes on, it becomes stagnant and decadent. In order to survive, it might risk embarking on a foreign adventure or try to reluctantly maintain the status quo as an outwardly strong but inwardly weak power. Ultimately, it cannot escape the fate of self-destruction. In the end, no nation in history which counted on dictatorship to prosper or achieve success has been able to escape this fate. Today this law remains valid, although the cycle of its enforcement has been shortened. Gone are the days when dictatorships could be relied upon to achieve an amazing economic takeoff.

(2) The following questions need to be clarified: Is mankind destined only to develop the economy? Or should it have other, loftier desires to be fulfilled? Democracy has not only the advantage of stimulating production but also other values. It exhibits human dignity, embodies human rights, and reflects an all-round, harmonious, and free development of human personality. This is not empty talk. For this reason, the achievement of economic progress at the expense of democracy will have a harmful impact on countless generations to come.⁹

But the kite was still on the string. Hu Ping is now imprisoned for his stress on democracy.

As President Reagan has pointed out, to campaign for democracy:

...is not cultural imperialism; it is providing the means for genuine self-determination and protection for diversity.... It would be cultural condescension, or worse, to say that any people prefer dictatorship to democracy.

Who would choose not to have the right to vote; decide to purchase government propaganda handouts instead of independent newspapers; prefer government-to worker-controlled unions; opt for land to be owned by the state instead of

those who till it; want government repression of religious liberty, a single political party instead of a free choice, a rigid cultural orthodoxy instead of democratic tolerance and diversity?¹⁰

The Comparative Survey helps to record for open societies the qualities and modes of tyranny that the oppressed of the world's closed societies know only too well. It helps to establish where the lines are today in the ancient struggle of human beings for equality and justice, not as defined by their superiors but as they themselves would define them. But it also shows the essential commonality of all those countries, now over forty in number, that have institutionalized respect for human personality in democratic polities. By pointing to the size and stability and gradual expansion of this "community of democracies" the Survey hopes to make a small contribution to the only international order that can ever secure the peace and well-being of the world.

NOTES

1. The Survey published in January 1973 covered the status of freedom in 1972. The Surveys have appeared yearly since then in *Freedom at Issue*, and since 1978 in this annual series *Freedom in the World* as well.
2. *Amnesty International Report 1977*, pp. 79-81.
3. *African Research Bulletin*, January 1-31, 1982, p. 6319.
4. *African Research Bulletin*, January 1-31, 1982, p. 6311.
5. Khusro Qashqai: as reported in *Iran Times*, April 30, 1982 and other dates.
6. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 2, 1982, pp. 28-29.
7. Hu Ping, "Freedom of Speech," SPEAHRhead, 12/13 Winter/Spring 1982, pp. 35-57 (SPEAHR/USA, P.O. Box 1212, Cathedral Station, New York, New York 10025).
8. Quoted in Brantly Womack, "The 1980 County-Level Elections in China: Experiment in Democratic Modernization," *Asian Survey*, March 1982 (XXII,3): 261-277.
9. Hu Ping, "Freedom of Speech," p. 57.
10. President Reagan's address to the British Parliament, June 8, 1982, as reprinted in *The New York Times*, June 9, 1982.

Survey Ratings and Tables for 1982

In 1981-82 losses and gains were quite evenly balanced. The experiment in Communist freedom in Poland ended, and the renewed attempts of Ghana, Bangladesh, Uganda, and Zimbabwe to establish democracy foundered either through armed coup or a growing and brutal centralization of power. Yet democracy gained strength in Latin America, and people everywhere continued to place its ideal above others.

THE TABULATED RATINGS

The accompanying Table 1 (Independent Nations) and Table 2 (Related Territories) rate each state or territory on seven-point scales for political and civil freedoms, and then provide an overall judgment of each as "free," "partly free," or "not free." In each scale, a rating of (1) is freest and (7) least free. Instead of using absolute standards, standards are comparative—that is, most observers would be likely to judge states rated (1) as freer than those rated (2), and so on. No state, of course, is absolutely free or unfree, but the degree of freedom does make a great deal of difference to the quality of life.¹

In *political rights*, states rated (1) have a fully competitive electoral process and those elected clearly rule. Most West European democracies belong here. Relatively free states may receive a (2) because, although the electoral process works and the elected rule, there are factors which cause us to lower our rating of the effective equality of the process. These factors may include extreme economic inequality, illiteracy, or intimidating violence. They also include the weakening of effective competition that is implied by the absence of periodic shifts in rule from one group or party to another.

Below this level, political ratings of (3) through (5) represent successively less effective implementation of democratic processes. Mexico, for example, has periodic elections and limited opposition, but for many years its govern-

Table 1
Independent Nations:
Comparative Measures of Freedom

	Political Rights ¹	Civil Liberties ¹	Status of Freedom ²	Outlook ³
Afghanistan	7	7	NF	0
Albania	7	7	NF	0
Algeria	6	6	NF	0
Angola	7	7	NF	0
Antigua & Barbuda	2	2	F	0
Argentina	6	5	NF	+
Australia	1	1	F	0
Austria	1	1	F	0
Bahamas	1	2	F	0
Bahrain	5	5	PF	0
Bangladesh	5 -	5 -	PF	+
Barbados	1	1	F	0
Belgium	1	1	F	0
Belize	1	2	F	0
Benin	7	6	NF	0
Bhutan	5	5	PF	0
Bolivia	7	4 +	PF +	+
Botswana	2	3	F	0
Brazil	4	3	PF	+
Bulgaria	7	7	NF	0
Burma	7	6	NF	0
Burundi	7	6	NF	0
Cambodia ⁴	7	7	NF	0
Cameroon	6	6	NF	0
Canada	1	1	F	0
Cape Verde Islands	6	6	NF	0
Central African Rep.	7	5	NF	0
Chad	7	6	NF	0
Chile	6	5	PF	0
China (Mainland)	6	6	NF	-
China (Taiwan)	5	5	PF	0
Colombia	2	3	F	+
Comoro Islands	4	5	PF	0

Notes to the Table

1. The scales use the numbers 1-7, with 1 comparatively offering the highest level of political or civil rights and 7 the lowest. A plus or minus following a rating indicates an improvement or decline in 1981. A rating marked with a period (•) has been changed since the last Survey due to reevaluation by the author. This does not imply any change in the country. For further information on the scale and Survey, see *Freedom in the World, 1978*.
2. A free state is designated by P, a partly free state by PF, and a not-free state by NF.
3. A positive outlook for freedom is indicated by a plus sign, a negative outlook by a minus, and relative stability of ratings by a zero. The outlook for freedom is based on the problems the country is facing, the way the government and people are reacting to these problems, and the longer-run political traditions of the society. A judgment of outlook may also reflect an imminent change, such as the expected adoption of a meaningful new constitution.
4. Also known as Kampuchea.
5. Formerly the New Hebrides Condominium.

	Political Rights¹	Civil Liberties¹	Status of Freedom²	Outlook³
Congo	7	6	NF	0
Costa Rica	1	1	F	0
Cuba	6	6	NF	0
Cyprus (G)	1	2	F	0
Cyprus (T)	4	3	PF	0
Czechoslovakia	7	6	NF	0
Denmark	1	1	F	0
Djibouti	5+—	6+—	NF+—	0
Dominica	2	2	F	0
Dominican Republic	1+	2+	F	0
Ecuador	2	2	F	0
Egypt	5	5+	PF	0
El Salvador	4+	5	PF	0
Equatorial Guinea	7	6	NF	0
Ethiopia	7	7	NF	0
Fiji	2	2	F	0
Finland	2	2	F	+
France	1	2	F	0
Gabon	6	6	NF	0
Gambia	3—	4—	PF—	+
Germany (E)	7	7	NF	0
Germany (W)	1	2	F	0
Ghana	6—	5—	NF—	0
Greece	1	2	F	0
Grenada	6	5	NF	0
Guatemala	6	6	NF	0
Guinea	7	7	NF	0
Guinea-Bissau	6	6	NF	0
Guyana	5	4	PF	0
Haiti	7	6	NF	0
Honduras	2+	3	F+	0
Hungary	6	5	NF	0
Iceland	1	1	F	0
India	2	3	F	0
Indonesia	5	5	PF	0
Iran	6—	6—	NF—	0
Iraq	6	7	NF	0
Ireland	1	1	F	0
Israel	2	2	F	0
Italy	1	2	F	0
Ivory Coast	5	5	PF	0
Jamaica	2	3	F	0
Japan	1	1	F	0
Jordan	6	6	NF	0
Kenya	5	5—	PF	—
Kiribati	2	2	F	0
Korea (N)	7	7	NF	0
Korea (S)	5	5+	PF	+

Table 1 (continued)

	Political Rights ¹	Civil Liberties ¹	Status of Freedom ²	Outlook ³
Kuwait	4+	4	PF	0
Laos	7	7	NF	0
Lebanon	5-	4	PF	0
Lesotho	5	5	PF	0
Liberia	6	6	NF	0
Libya	6	6	NF	0
Luxembourg	1	1	F	0
Madagascar	6	6	NF	0
Malawi	6	7	NF	0
Malaysia	3	4	PF	0
Maldives	5	5	PF	0
Mali	7	6	NF	0
Malta	2	3	F	-
Mauritania	7	6	NF	0
Mauritius	2+	3	F+	0
Mexico	3	4	PF	+
Mongolia	7	7	NF	0
Morocco	4	5-	PF	0
Mozambique	7	7	NF	0
Nauru	2	2	F	0
Nepal	3	4	PF	+
Netherlands	1	1	F	0
New Zealand	1	1	F	0
Nicaragua	6-	5	PF	-
Niger	7	6	NF	0
Nigeria	2	3	F	0
Norway	1	1	F	0
Oman	6	6	NF	0
Pakistan	7	5	NF	0
Panama	5-	5-	PF	0
Papua New Guinea	2	2	F	0
Paraguay	5	5	PF	0
Peru	2	3	F	0
Philippines	5	4+	PF	0
Poland	7-	5-	NF-	0
Portugal	2	2	F	+
Qatar	5	5	PF	0
Romania	7	6	NF	0
Rwanda	6	6	NF	0
St. Lucia	2	2	F	0
St. Vincent	2	2	F	0
Sao Tome and Principe	6	6	NF	0
Saudi Arabia	6	6	NF	0
Senegal	4	4	PF	+

	Political Rights ¹	Civil Liberties ¹	Status of Freedom ²	Outlook ³
Seychelles	6	6	NF	0
Sierra Leone	5	5	PF	0
Singapore	4+	5	PF	0
Solomon Islands	2	2	F	0
Somalia	7	7	NF	0
South Africa	5	6	NF*	0
Spain	2	3	F	0
Sri Lanka	2	3	F	0
Sudan	5	5	PF	0
Suriname	7	5	NF	0
Swaziland	5	5	PF	0
Sweden	1	1	F	0
Switzerland	1	1	F	0
Syria	5	7	NF	0
Tanzania	6	6	NF	0
Thailand	3	4	PF	0
Togo	7	6	NF	0
Tonga	5	3	PF	0
Transkei	5	6	PF	0
Trinidad & Tobago	1+	2	F	0
Tunisia	5+	5	PF	0
Turkey	5	5	PF	+
Tuvalu	1*+	2	F	0
Uganda	5-	5-	PF	-
USSR	6	7	NF	0
United Arab Emirates	5	5	PF	0
United Kingdom	1	1	F	0
United States	1	1	F	0
Upper Volta	6	5	PF	0
Uruguay	5	5	PF	+
Vanuatu ⁵	2	2*+	F	0
Venezuela	1	2	F	0
Vietnam	7	6*	NF	0
Western Samoa	4	3	PF	0
Yemen (N)	6	5	NF	0
Yemen (S)	6	7	NF	0
Yugoslavia	6	5	NF	0
Zaire	6	6	NF	0
Zambia	5	6	PF	0
Zimbabwe	3	5-	PF	-

ments have been selected outside the public view by the leaders of factions within the one dominant Mexican party. Governments of states rated (5) sometimes have no effective voting processes at all, but strive for consensus among a variety of groups in society in a way weakly analogous to those of the democracies. States at (6) do not allow competitive electoral processes that would give the people a chance to voice their desire for a new ruling party or for a change in policy. The rulers of states at this level assume that one person or a small group has the right to decide what is best for the nation, and that no one should be allowed to challenge that right. Such rulers do respond,

Table 2
Related Territories:
Comparative Measures of Freedom

	Political Rights ¹	Civil Liberties ¹	Status of Freedom ²	Outlook ³
Australia				
Christmas Island (in Indian Ocean)	4	2	PF	0
Cocos Islands	4	2	PF	0
Norfolk Island	4	2	PF	0
Chile				
Easter Island	7	5	NF	0
Denmark				
Faroe Islands	2	1	F	0
Greenland	2	1	F	0
France				
French Guiana	3	2	PF	0
French Polynesia	3	2	PF	0
Guadeloupe	3	2	PF	0
Martinique	3	2	PF	0
Mayotte	2	2	F	0
Monaco ⁴	4	2	PF	0
New Caledonia	3	2	F	0
Reunion	3	2	PF	0
Saint Pierre & Miquelon	3	2	PF	0
Wallis and Futuna	4	3	PF	0
Israel				
Occupied Territories	5	5-	PF	0
Italy				
San Marino ⁴	1*	2	F	0
Netherlands				
Neth. Antilles	2	2	F	0
New Zealand				
Cook Islands	2	2	F	0
Niue	2	2	F	0
Tokelau Islands	4	2	PF	0
Portugal				
Azores	2	2	F	0
Macao	3	3	PF	0
Madeira	2	2	F	0
South Africa				
Bophuthatswana ⁵	6	6	NF	0
Ciskei ⁵	6	6	NF	0
South West Africa (Namibia)	5	5	PF	0
Venda ⁵	6	6	NF	0

Notes to the Table

1, 2, 3. See Notes, Table 1.

4. These states are not listed as independent because all have explicit legal forms of dependence on a particular country (or, in the case of Andorra, countries) in the spheres of foreign affairs, defense, etc.

5. The geography and history of these newly "independent" homelands cause us to consider them dependencies.

6. Formed out of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, these territories have achieved a high degree of internal autonomy. "Micronesia" in the table refers to the Federated States of Micronesia.

	Political Rights ¹	Civil Liberties ¹	Status of Freedom ²	Outlook ³
Spain				
Canary Islands	2	3	F	0
Places of Sovereignty in North Africa	2	3	F	+
Switzerland				
Liechtenstein ⁴	4	1	PF	0
United Kingdom				
Anguilla	2	2	F	0
Bermuda	2	1	F	0
Brit. Virgin Islands	3	2	PF	0
Brunei ⁴	6	5	NF	0
Cayman Islands	2	2	F	0
Channel Islands	2	1	F	0
Falkland Islands	2	2	F	0
Gibraltar	1	2	F	0
Hong Kong	4	2	PF	0
Isle of Man	2	1	F	0
Montserrat	2	2	F	0
St. Helena	2	2	F	0
St. Kitts and Nevis	2	3	F	0
Turks and Caicos	2	2	F	0
United States				
American Samoa	2	2	F	0
Belau ⁶	2 +	2	F +	0
Guam	3	2	PF	0
Marshall Islands ⁶	2 +	2	F +	0
Micronesia ⁶	2 +	2	F +	0
Northern Marianas ⁶	2	2	F	0
Puerto Rico	2	1	F	0
Virgin Islands	2	3	F	0
France-Spain Condominium				
Andorra ⁴	3 +	3	PF	0

however, to popular desire in some areas, or respect (and therefore are constrained by) belief systems (for example, Islam) that are the property of the society as a whole. At (7) the political despots at the top appear by their actions to feel little constraint from either public opinion or popular tradition.

Turning to the scale for *civil liberties*, in countries rated (1) publications are not closed because of the expression of rational political opinion, especially when the intent of the expression is to affect the legitimate political process. No major media are simply conduits for government propaganda. The courts protect the individual; persons are not imprisoned for their opinions; private rights and desires in education, occupation, religion, residence, and so on, are generally respected; law-abiding persons do not fear for their lives because of their rational political activities. States at this level include most traditional democracies. There are, of course, flaws in the liberties of all of these states,

and these flaws are significant when measured against the standards these states set themselves.

Movement down from (2) to (7) represents a steady loss of the civil freedoms we have detailed. Compared to (1), the police and courts of states at (2) have more authoritarian traditions. In some cases they may simply have a less institutionalized or secure set of liberties, such as in Portugal or Greece. Those rated (3) or below may have political prisoners and generally varying forms of censorship. Too often their security services practice torture. States rated (6) almost always have political prisoners; usually the legitimate media are completely under government supervision; there is no right of assembly; and, often, travel, residence, and occupation are narrowly restricted. However, at (6) there still may be relative freedom in private conversation, especially in the home; illegal demonstrations do take place; underground literature is published; and so on. At (7) there is pervading fear, little independent expression takes place even in private, almost no public expressions of opposition emerge in the police-state environment, and imprisonment or execution is often swift and sure.

It will be noted that the civil liberties rating in some very violent countries such as Guatemala or El Salvador is not (7), as it is for relatively less violent East Germany, Bulgaria, or Malawi. The 1980 yearbook included a discussion of levels of political terror. This is not included this year. However, since levels of political terror and levels of civil liberty are often confounded by the media, a short discussion is still needed.

Political terror is an attempt by a government or private group to get its way through the use of murder, torture, exile, prevention of departure, police controls, or threats against the family. These weapons are usually directed against the expression of civil liberties. To this extent they surely are a part of the civil liberty "score." Unfortunately, because of their dramatic and newsworthy nature, such denials of civil liberties often become identified in the minds of informed persons with the whole of civil liberties.

In fact political terror is a tool of revolutionary repression of the right or left. When that repression is no longer necessary to achieve the suppression of civil liberties, then political terror is replaced by implacable and well-organized but often less general and newsworthy controls. Of course, there is a certain unfathomable terror in the sealed totalitarian state, yet life can be lived with a normality in these states that is impossible in the more dramatically terrorized. It would be a mistake to dismiss this apparent anomaly as an expression of a Survey bias. For the fact is there is, with all the blood, a much wider range of organized and personal expression of political opinion and judgment in Guatemala and El Salvador than in many other states.

In making the distinction between political terror and civil liberties as a whole we do not imply that the United States should not be urgently concerned with all violations of human rights and perhaps most urgently with those of political terror. Again it must be emphasized that the Survey

is not a rating of relative desirability of societies—but of certain explicit freedoms.

A cumulative judgment of "free," "partly free," or "not free" is made on the basis of the foregoing seven-point ratings, and an understanding of how they were derived. Generally, states rated (1) and (2) will be "free"; those at (3), (4), and (5), "partly free"; and those at (6) and (7), "not free." When the ratings for political rights and civil liberties differ, the status of freedom must be decided by rough averaging. It must be remembered, however, that the ratings are not arithmetical units, but merely categories on arbitrary scales. There are, of course, marginal cases. A (6) and a (5) may lead either to a rating of "not free" or "partly free," depending on whether the (5) and (6) are a high (5) or low (5), a high (6) or low (6).

The tables also included an entry for "outlook." Since we are not in a position to adequately judge the futures of all the societies under review, this column reports many fewer trends than a more detailed study would discover. Primarily, we include cases where a forthcoming election appears likely to improve the freedoms of a country, or a downward trend is in prospect because a retrogressive process underway at the time of the Survey has not yet actually reached fruition. By the nature of the signals we use, more pluses are likely to appear under "outlook" than minuses.

The reporting period covered by this Survey (January 1, 1981, to August 1, 1982) does not correspond with the calendar of short-term events in the countries rated. For this reason the yearly Survey may mask or play down important events that occur during the year.

SIGNIFICANT DECLINES IN FREEDOM

Changes of freedom in the past year have generally been incremental rather than dramatic. In most cases these changes have represented a slide away from freedom. The military in *Bangladesh* shoved aside the elected government and tightened controls on the society, but did not disavow democratic principles. *Djibouti's* rejection of competitive elections and the banning of a new party and arrest of its leaders lowered the country's rating.

Gambia suffered a serious revolt. In its aftermath Senegalese troops essentially took over the securing of the government. Gambia's independence has been compromised; the subsequent confederation with Senegal has been partially imposed. Opposition political activity has been severely constrained by widespread arrests. However, a successful election in 1982 may lead quickly back to democracy. A coup by a military faction in *Ghana* led to initial repression and the promise of more to come. In 1982 *Kenya* officially became a one-party state, lecturers were imprisoned, and the right of dissent seemed officially denied.

The *Iranian* revolution has carried its people further into tyranny. The opposition has been largely silenced within parliament and without, thousands

Table 3 Ranking of Nations by Political Rights

Most Free							Least Free
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Australia	Antigua & Barbuda	Gambia	Brazil	Bahrain	Algeria	Afghanistan	
Austria		Malaysia	Comoro Is.	Bangladesh	Argentina	Albania	
Bahamas	Botswana	Mexico	Cyprus (T)	Bhutan	Cameroon	Angola	
Barbados	Colombia	Nepal	El Salvador	China (Taiwan)	Cape Verde Is.	Benin	
Belgium	Dominica	Thailand	Kuwait	Djibouti	Chile	Bolivia	
Belize	Ecuador	Zimbabwe	Morocco	Egypt	China (Mainland)	Bulgaria	
Canada	Fiji		Senegal	Guyana	Cuba	Burma	
Costa Rica	Finland		Singapore	Indonesia	Gabon	Burundi	
Cyprus (G)	Honduras		Western Samoa	Ivory Coast	Ghana	Cambodia	
Denmark	India			Kenya	Grenada	Central African Republic	
Dominican Republic	Israel			Korea (S)	Guatemala		
France	Jamaica			Lebanon	Guinea-Bissau	Chad	
Germany (W)	Kiribati			Lesotho	Hungary	Congo	
Greece	Malta			Maldives	Iran	Czechoslovakia	
Iceland	Mauritius			Panama	Iraq	Equatorial Guinea	
Ireland	Nauru			Paraguay	Jordan	Ethiopia	
Italy	Nigeria			Philippines	Liberia	Germany (E)	
Japan	Papua New Guinea			Qatar	Libya	Guinea	
Luxembourg	Peru			Sierra Leone	Madagascar	Haiti	
Netherlands	Portugal			South Africa	Malawi	Korea (N)	
New Zealand	St. Lucia			Sudan	Nicaragua	Laos	
Norway	St. Vincent			Swaziland	Oman	Mali	
Sweden	Solomon Is.			Syria	Rwanda	Mauritania	
Switzerland	Spain			Tonga	Sao Tome & Principe	Mongolia	
Trinidad & Tobago	Sri Lanka			Transkei		Mozambique	
Tuvalu	Vanuatu			Tunisia	Saudi Arabia	Niger	
United Kingdom				Turkey	Seychelles	Pakistan	
United States				Uganda	Tanzania	Poland	
Venezuela				United Arab Emirates	USSR	Romania	
				Uruguay	Upper Volta	Somalia	
				Zambia	Yemen (N)	Suriname	
					Yemen (S)	Togo	
					Yugoslavia	Vietnam	
					Zaire		

Table 4 Ranking of Nations by Civil Liberties

Most Free							Least Free
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Australia	Antigua & Barbuda	Botswana	Bolivia	Argentina	Algeria	Afghanistan	
Austria	Bahamas	Brazil	Gambia	Bahrain	Benin	Albania	
Barbados	Belize	Colombia	Guyana	Bangladesh	Burma	Angola	
Belgium	Cyprus (G)	Cyprus (T)	Kuwait	Bhutan	Burundi	Bulgaria	
Canada	Dominica	Honduras	Lebanon	Central African Republic	Cameroon	Cambodia	
Costa Rica	Dominican Republic	India	Malaysia	Chile	Cape Verde Is.	Ethiopia	
Denmark	Ecuador	Jamaica	Mexico	China (Taiwan)	Chad	Germany (E)	
Iceland	Fiji	Malta	Nepal	China (Mainland)	China (Mainland)	Guinea	
Ireland	Finland	Mauritius	Philippines	Comoro Is.	Congo	Iraq	
Japan	Greece	Nigeria	Senegal	El Salvador	Cuba	Korea (N)	
Luxembourg	Germany (W)	Peru	Thailand	Egypt	Czechoslovakia	Laos	
Netherlands	Italy	Spain		Ghana	Djibouti	Malawi	
New Zealand	Kiribati	Sri Lanka		Grenada	Equatorial Guinea	Mongolia	
Norway	Nauru	Tonga		Hungary	Gabon	Mozambique	
Sweden	Papua New Guinea	Western Samoa		Indonesia	Guatemala	Somalia	
Switzerland	Portugal			Ivory Coast	Guinea-Bissau	Syria	
United Kingdom	St. Lucia			Kenya	Haiti	USSR	
United States	St. Vincent			Korea (S)	Iran	Yemen (S)	
	Solomon Is.			Lesotho	Jordan		
	Trinidad & Tobago			Maldives	Liberia		
	Tuvalu			Morocco	Libya		
	Vanuatu			Nicaragua	Madagascar		
	Venezuela			Pakistan	Mali		
				Panama	Mauritania		
				Paraguay	Niger		
				Poland	Oman		
				Qatar	Romania		
				Siena Leone	Rwanda		
				Singapore	Sao Tome & Principe		
				Sudan	Saudi Arabia		
				Suriname	Seychelles		
				Swaziland	South Africa		
				Tunisia	Tanzania		
				Turkey	Togo		
				Uganda	Transkei		
				United Arab Emirates	Vietnam		
				Upper Volta	Zaire		
				Uruguay	Zambia		
				Yemen (N)			
				Yugoslavia			
				Zimbabwe			

have been executed, many more have fled. There are no longer any independent media. Elections occur, but the range of candidates has narrowed to the most reactionary and fanatical groups. Struggle still exists within ruling circles, but such struggles occur, if less publicly, in leading circles in all tyrannies. Controls over the details of private life have become totalitarian.

Self-determination in *Lebanon* was further reduced by foreign intervention. Arrests of opposition leaders further stifled dissent in *Morocco*. *Nicaragua's* ruling junta has largely lost its revolutionary legitimacy and has increasingly pressed its opposition into silence or exile. Persistent closures of the major opposition paper presages further decline. The National Guard reasserted its power in *Panama* by forcing the president's resignation and increasing pressure on the press. Freedom in 1981 gained in *Poland* only to be roughly set back by military intervention. The nearly free media of the best days is crushed, the unions nearly so, and the independent voice of the church much weakened.

Killing and torture by security services and others in *Uganda* has again escalated, thereby reversing the earlier gains of multiparty elections. *Zimbabwe* experienced in 1981-82 a general repression of the media in favor of the state purposes of the ruling party; arrests of opposition political leaders began.

In *Israel's occupied territories* the closure of an Arab university symbolized sharper controls on dissent of all kinds and the continuing threat against the land rights of native Palestinians.

SIGNIFICANT ADVANCES IN FREEDOM

There were several important advances in freedom in 1981-82. In mid-1982 the repression in *Bolivia* was suddenly ended; unions, parties and free expression began to revive. Elections in the *Dominican Republic* and the period leading up to them signaled the firm establishment of democratic institutions in that country. Control of expression and pluralism again eased in *Egypt*. The election in *El Salvador* was more embattled and several potential groups were excluded, or self-excluded, but the competition and high turnout marked a step forward. Elections in *Honduras* reestablished a working democratic system. Pressure eased in *South Korea*, the opposition was again more vocal both in and out of parliament. *Kuwait's* election allowed more organized competition, thereby reestablishing a limited democracy. Freedom advanced in *Mauritius* with a decisive opposition election victory; it was already freer than we had judged it. The ending of martial law and enhanced opposition activity and expression marked an advance in the *Philippines*. *Singapore* permitted election of an opposition legislator for the first time in eighteen years. Elections in *Trinidad and Tobago* and *Tuvalu* enhanced the legitimacy of democratic processes. *Tunisia's* 1981 election marked the end of one-party elections, although the opposition was effectively isolated and won no seats.

Related or dependent territories showed several gains. Following elections


in the French-Spanish condominium of *Andorra* there was further progress toward greater self-determination and internal democracy. The remainder of the Micronesian dependencies of the United States (*Belau*, the *Marshall Islands*, and the *Federated States of Micronesia*) are now ruled largely by their own elected representatives. Although plebescites on the precise nature of their relation to the United States are still to come, past votes have already established their relation to one another and their control over their own futures.

THE REEVALUATION OF SOUTH AFRICA

In this yearbook, South Africa has been placed in the "not free" category for the first time. This is an important reevaluation, but its significance should not be overestimated or misunderstood. The change is a slight one in Survey terms, for South Africa has always been on the edge of the "not free" category, with a (5), (6) rating that could be categorized either way. The change also does not represent a deterioration of conditions in South Africa. In fact, over the last few years there have been significant relaxations in *apartheid* and we expect these to continue.

The reevaluation of South Africa is based primarily on a decision to take more fully into account an aspect of civil liberties that is generally not central to the Survey—freedom to live where one wishes and to move as one wishes. It appeared to us that the scale of interference with the rights of the black majority in this regard has been and remains so massive that it must be more fully acknowledged. The lesser aspect of this denial of freedom is expressed by the "pass laws": violations of these laws lead to sanctions against hundreds of thousands every year and, for a significant percentage of South African families, result in the enforced separation of family members. Even more serious is the enforced movement of a million or more people into often undesirable new rural and urban camps in order to make possible the concentration of blacks into the much too small black "homelands." This movement has continued and perhaps accelerated in the last few years.² No country rated "partly free" in the Survey has an enforced movement of people on a comparable scale. The homelands themselves are not the issue; the ways they are being achieved are.

What we have argued about South Africa previously remains true: no other "not free" state allows the extent of public criticism of its policies, opposition organization, or electoral competition that South Africa does. Yet we make this change because we believe a greater percentage of the population in South Africa must feel, and is, deprived of fundamental human dignity and freedom than, for example, in "not free" Hungary, Yugoslavia, or Algeria. Our emphasis on movement in this regard illustrates once again the mistakes that would result from a purely mechanical application of a numerical system to the ratings. Freedom of movement or residence in a general system would receive a very low total number, and so be unable to weigh decisively in the



Free Nations

8	Antigua & Barbuda
10	Australia
11	Austria
13	Bahamas
16	Barbados
18	Belgium
19	Belize
25	Botswana
33	Canada
45	Colombia
49	Costa Rica
51a	Cypius (G)
53	Denmark
55	Dominica
56	Dominican Republic
58	Ecuador
65	Fiji
66	Finland
67	France
73	Germany, West
76	Greece
86	Honduras
89	Iceland
90	India
94	Ireland
96	Israel
97	Italy
99	Jamaica
100	Japan
104	Kiribati
114	Luxembourg
122	Malta
126	Mauritius
135	Nauru
137	Netherlands
141	New Zealand
144	Nigeria
148	Norway
153	Papua New Guinea
155	Peru
159	Portugal
167	St. Lucia
169	St. Vincent
177	Solomon Islands
181	Spain
182	Sri Lanka
186	Sweden
187	Switzerland
195	Trinidad & Tobago
199	Tuvalu
203	United Kingdom
204	United States
140	Vanuatu
208	Venezuela

Related Territories

4	American Samoa (U.S.)
7	Anguilla (U.K.)
12	Azores (Port.)
21	Bermuda (U.K.)
34	Canary Islands (Sp.)
36	Cayman Islands (U.K.)
39	Channel Islands (U.K.)
48	Cook Islands (N.Z.)
63	Falkland Islands (U.K.)
64	Faroe Islands (Den.)
75	Gibraltar (U.K.)
77	Greenland (Den.)
95	Isle of Man (U.K.)
117	Madeira (Port.)
127	Mayotte (Fr.)
132	Montsenat (U.K.)
138	Netherlands Antilles (Neth.)
139	New Caledonia (Fr.)
145	Niue (N.Z.)
147	Northern Marianas (U.S.)

157	Places of Sovereignty in North Africa (Sp.)
160	Puerto Rico (U.S.)
165	St. Helena (U.K.)
166	St. Kitts and Nevis (U.K.)
170	San Marino (It.)
198	Turks and Caicos (U.K.)
210	Virgin Islands (U.S.)

Partly Free Nations

14	Bahrain
15	Bangladesh
22	Bhutan
23	Bolivia
26	Brazil
40	Chile
42	China, Taiwan
46	Comoro Islands
51b	Cyprus (T)
59	Egypt
60	El Salvador
71	Gambia
84	Guyana
91	Indonesia
98	Ivory Coast
103	Kenya
106	Korea, South
107	Kuwait
109	Lebanon
110	Lesotho
119	Malaysia
120	Maldives
128	Mexico
133	Morocco
136	Nepal
142	Nicaragua

152	Panama
154	Paraguay
156	Philippines
161	Qatar
173	Senegal
175	Sierra Leone
176	Singapore
183	Sudan
185	Swaziland
190	Thailand
193	Tonga
194	Transkei
196	Tunisia
197	Turkey
200	Uganda
202	United Arab Emirates
205	Upper Volta
206	Uruguay
212	Western Samoa
217	Zambia
218	Zimbabwe

Related Territories

5	Andorra (Fr.-Sp.)
17	Belau (U.S.)
27	British Virgin Islands (U.K.)
43	Christmas Island (Aus.)
44	Cocos Islands (Aus.)
68	French Guiana (Fr.)
69	French Polynesia (Fr.)
79	Guadeloupe (Fr.)
80	Guam (U.S.)
87	Hong Kong (U.K.)
113	Liechtenstein (Switz.)
115	Macao (Port.)
123	Marshall Islands (U.S.)
124	Martinique (Fr.)
129	Micronesia, Federated States of (U.S.)
130	Monaco (Fr.)
146	Norfolk Island (Aus.)

149	Occupied Territories (Isr.)
162	Reunion (Fr.)
168	Saint Pierre & Miquelon (Fr.)
180	South West Africa—Namibia (S. Afr.)
192	Tokelau Islands (N.Z.)
211	Wallis and Futuna (Fr.)

Not Free Nations

1	Afghanistan
2	Albania
3	Algeria
6	Angola
9	Argentina
20	Benin
29	Bulgaria
30	Burma
31	Burundi
102	Cambodia
32	Cameroon
35	Cape Verde Islands
37	Central African Republic
38	Chad
41	China, Mainland
47	Congo
50	Cuba
52	Czechoslovakia
54	Djibouti
61	Equatorial Guinea
62	Ethiopia
70	Gabon
72	Germany, East
74	Ghana
78	Grenada
81	Guatemala
82	Guinea
83	Guinea-Bissau
85	Haiti
88	Hungary
92	Iran
93	Iraq
101	Jordan
105	Korea, North
108	Laos
111	Liberia
112	Libya
116	Madagascar
118	Malawi
121	Mali
125	Mauritania
131	Mongolia
134	Mozambique
143	Niger
150	Oman
151	Pakistan
158	Poland
163	Romania
164	Rwanda
171	Sao Tome and Principe
172	Saudi Arabia
174	Seychelles
178	Somalia
179	South Africa
184	Suriname
188	Syria
189	Tanzania
191	Togo
201	USSR
209	Vietnam
213	Yemen, North
214	Yemen, South
215	Yugoslavia
216	Zaire

Related Territories

24	Bophuthatswana (S. Afr.)
28	Bninei (U.K.)
219	Ciskei (S. Afr.)
57	Easter Island (Chile)
207	Venda (S. Afr.)

balance. It is our ability to see how denials of movement affect the whole South African picture for blacks that allows us to place unusual weight on the issue.

FURTHER COMMENT ON TRENDS IN FREEDOM

Other changes in freedom included the granting of full independence to *Antigua and Barbuda* and *Belize*. In neither case do we assume that the political freedoms of those affected were significantly extended. We have decided to consider *Cyprus* as two separate countries—*Cyprus (Greek)* and *Cyprus (Turkish)*. Although neither side accepts the idea of two states, de facto their division is similar to that of Germany, Korea, and China. For some time Cyprus (G) has been a "free" state, and this should be recognized. Cyprus (T) is judged "partly free" largely because of its protectorate status under Turkish occupation. The presidential election in *Finland* suggested a decreasing influence of the USSR on the political process.

In "free" *Spain* and "partly free" *Thailand* the monarchies were able to intervene and preserve free institutions against the threat of military coup.

Elections in *Colombia* led to opposition victory and were marked by an impressive gain in participation. The result is a much less marginal democracy in spite of continuing human rights problems. *Senegal* was moving forward in 1982 toward what might be truly open multiparty elections. *Nepal* continued to follow, with considerable success, its road toward a nonparty democratic system through contested elections.

Malta's ruling party seemed more inclined than ever to repress its opposition, especially through controls over expression.

ELECTIONS AND REFERENDA

Evidence for political freedom is primarily found in the occurrence and nature of elections or referenda. Therefore, as a supplement to our ratings we have attempted in the accompanying Table 5 to summarize those national elections that occurred in independent countries in 1981-82. Other elections are included only in the more important cases. The reader should assume that the electoral process appeared comparatively open and competitive unless our remarks suggest otherwise; extremely one-sided outcomes imply an unacceptable electoral process. Voter participation figures are often not comparable, even when available. Many states compel their citizens to vote, in others it is unclear whether participation is a percentage of those registered or of those of voting age.

THE METHODS OF ATTAINING POWER OF CURRENT LEADERS

The means by which country leaders attain, consolidate, and maintain power shed additional light on political freedom throughout the world. The Table on National Leaders (Table 6) illustrates the numerous methods used by

Table 5
National Elections and Referenda

Nation and Date	Type of Election	Percentage Voting	Results and Remarks
Algeria 3/5/82	parliamentary	72%	single party selects candidates, but some choice
Bahamas 6/10/82	parliamentary	90%	government wins with 55%; more organized opposition emerges
Bangladesh 11/15/81	presidential	55%	incumbent party wins easily in hard fought campaign; coup annuls
Barbados 6/18/81	parliamentary	71% (of registered)	incumbent party wins, but with reduced parliamentary majority
Belgium 11/8/81	parliamentary	87% (compulsory)	many parties changed positions in complex result (8% blank ballots)
Bulgaria 6/7/81	parliamentary	99.9%	99.9% for Front
Burma 10/4-18/81	parliamentary	NA	one party, no choice; need 50% to win
Burundi 11/18/81	referendum	NA	99% approve new constitution, ballot not secret
Cambodia 5/1/81	parliamentary	99%	one party, slight choice
Central African Republic 2/1/81 3/15/81	referendum presidential	NA 77%	97% support new constitution incumbent wins with slim majority and many accusations of illegal interventions; coup annuls
Colombia 3/14/82 5/30/82	parliamentary presidential	35% ca. 54%	disunited incumbent party wins conservative opposition wins in election with unusually high participation
Comoros 3/7-14/82	parliamentary	NA	nonparty; 37 of 38 seats won by government supporters

Nation and Date	Type of Election	Percentage Voting	Results and Remarks
Costa Rica 2/7/82	general	77% (of registered) (compulsory)	opposition wins easily
Cuba 10/11-18/81	municipal assemblies (indirect parliamentary)	94-97%	one party but some individual choice
Cyprus(G) 5/24/81	parliamentary	NA	right and left gain
Cyprus(T) 6/28/81	general	NA	incumbents win with reduced majority
Czechoslovakia 6/5-6/81	general	99.5%	99.9% approve National Front list
Denmark 12/8/81	general	83%	conservative gain, but little change of government
Djibouti 6/12/81 5/21/82	presidential parliamentary	NA 91%	one candidate; incumbent wins with 85% party selection; no choice
Dominican Republic 5/16/82	general	74%	candidate of incumbent party wins presidency
El Salvador 3/28/82	general	ca. 65%	incumbent plurality; opposition forms government; fair but violent
Egypt 9/10/81 10/13/81	referendum presidential	92% (compulsory) 81% (compulsory)	accepted; ballot not secret; count questionable 98.5% support; no opposition
Fiji 7/18/82	general	85%	government narrowly defeats opposition
Finland 1/17-18/82	presidential	87%	electoral college elects prime minister to presidency

France				
4/26/81 & 3/10/81	presidential	81%/86%		opposition wins
		(of registered)		
6/14/81 & 6/21/81	parliamentary	70%/75%		opposition wins
		(of registered)		
Gambia				
5/4-5/82	general]	66%		president wins against jailed opponent; government maintains majority but loses two seats
Germany (E)				
6/14/81	parliamentary	99%		99.8% vote for National Front list
Greece				
10/18/81	general	79%		opposition wins
		(of registered)		
Guatemala				
3/7/82	general]	47%		incumbent party wins; results annulled by coup
Guinea				
5/82	presidential	NA		president wins all but 8 votes
Honduras				
11/29/81	general	80%		fair election, return to democratic process
		(compulsory)		
Indonesia				
5/4/82	general	NA		government party wins easily in stacked contest
Iran				
7/24/81	presidential	63% (?)		pressure to vote; no contest
		(compulsory)		
10/2/81	presidential	ca. 70%		no contest actually allowed
		(compulsory)		
Ireland				
6/11/81	parliamentary	76%		inconclusive; opposition forms government
2/18/82	parliamentary	73%		opposition gains power
Israel				
6/30/81	parliamentary	79%		hard campaign; little change
Italy				
5/17-18/81	referenda	80%		five referenda on crime, terrorism, and abortion easily defeated
Korea (N)				
2/28/82	general	100%		no choice

Nation and Date	Type of Election	Percentage Voting	Results and Remarks
Korea (S) 2/11/81	presidential (indirect)	78%	incumbent wins in stacked contest
3/25/81	parliamentary	75%	government wins; opposition parties had been broken up and leaders excluded
Kuwait 2/23/81	parliamentary	80+% (of registered)	pro-government candidates win easily
Malaysia 4/22/82	general	NA	government wins handily over controlled opposition
Mali 6/13/82	parliamentary	96%	99.7% vote for single slate
Malta 12/12/81	parliamentary	95%	government wins on seats, but opposition on total vote
Mauritius 6/11/82	parliamentary	NA	opposition wins all seats
Mexico 7/4/82	general	70%	government wins against slightly enhanced opposition
Mongolia 6/81	general	99.9%	99.9% vote for official candidates
Nepal 5/9/81	parliamentary	NA	wide choice, but no parties (as result of 1980 referendum)
Netherlands 5/26/81	parliamentary	86%	slight shift to left because of defense issues
New Zealand 11/28/81	parliamentary	90%	government wins narrowly
Norway 9/13-14/81	parliamentary	79%	resulted in change of government
Papua New Guinea 6/82	parliamentary	NA	three weeks; largest party regains dominance; fair but violent

Philippines				
4/7/81	referendum	60 + % (compulsory)		overwhelming approval of new constitution in controlled situation
6/16/81	presidential	80 + % (compulsory)		Marcos wins overwhelmingly against token opposition; compulsion enforced; boycott by main opposition
Rwanda				
12/28/81	parliamentary	NA		one party election
St. Lucia				
5/3/82	parliamentary	64%		opposition returns to power in landslide
Sierra Leone				
5/1/82	parliamentary	NA		one-party; significant choice; widespread violence
South Africa				
4/29/81	general	NA		restricted electorate; government retains controls, with losses to left and right
Switzerland				
4/5/81	referendum	40%		defeated effort to improve status of seasonal foreign workers
6/14/81	referendum	34%		approved improved equality for women and protection of consumer
11/29/81	referendum	30%		approved taxation and financial measure
Syria				
11/9-10/81	parliamentary	NA		government front wins all seats for first time, but ruling party only 60%; no policy choices
Transkei				
9/24/81	parliamentary	NA		government wins nearly all seats in repressive context
Trinidad & Tobago				
11/9/81	parliamentary	56%		government wins majority under new leadership
Tunisia				
11/1/81	parliamentary	85%		government wins all seats; limited opposition allowed for first time since 1959
Tuvalu				
9/8/81	parliamentary	NA		independent opponents of government win
Vietnam				
4/26/81	general	98%		all candidates party selected; slight choice allowed

Table 6 National Leaders: Paths to Power

Competitive Election (CE)		Dominant Party Election (DPE)	Ruling Elite Selection (RES)
<p>Antigua: Bird (80)¹ Australia: Fraser (75) Austria: Kreisky (70) Bahamas: Pindling (67) Barbados: Adams (76) Belgium: Martens (81) Belize: Price (61) Botswana: Masire (80)²</p> <p>Canada: Trudcau (80) Colombia: Betancur (82) Costa Rica: Monge (82) Cyprus (G): Kyprianou (77)³ Cyprus (T): Denktas (75) Denmark: Jorgensen (75) Dominica: Charles (80) Dominican Republic: Blanco (82)</p> <p>Ecuador Hurtado (81)³ El Salvador Magaria (82) Fiji: Mara (66) Finland: Koivisto (81) France: Mitterrand (81) Germany (W): Schmidt (74) Greece: Papandreou (81) Honduras: Suazo (81)</p> <p>Iceland: Thoroddsen (80) India: Gandhi (80) Ireland: Haughey (82) Israel: Begin (77) Italy: Spadolini (81) Jamaica: Seaga (80) Japan: Suzuki (80)</p>	<p>Kiribati: Tabai (79) Lebanon: Sarkis (76) Luxembourg: Werner (79) Malta: Mintoff (71) Mauritius: Jugnauth (82) Nauru: De Roburt (78) Netherlands: Van Agt (77) New Zealand: Muldoon (75) Nigeria: Shagari (79) Norway: Willock (81) Papua New Guinea: Somare (82) Peru: Belaunde (80) Portugal: Balsemao (80) St. Lucia: Compton (82)</p> <p>St. Vincent: Cato (74) Solomons: Mamaloni (82) South Africa: Botha (78) Spain: Calvo Sotelo (81) Sri Lanka: Jayewardene (77) Sweden: Filldin (79) Switzerland: Fed. Council⁴ Trinidad & Tobago: Chambers (81)</p> <p>Tuvalu: Lauti (75) Uganda: Obote (80)⁵ UK: Thatcher (79) USA: Reagan (80) Vanuatu: Lini (79) Venezuela: Herrera (79) W. Samoa: Tupuola (76) Zimbabwe: Mugabe (80)</p>	<p>Gambia: Jawara (62)⁵ Malaysia: Mahathir (81) Mexico: De la Madrid (82) Panama: Espriella (82)³ Senegal: Diouf(81)³ Singapore: Lee (65)</p>	<p>UAE: Zayid (71) Uruguay: Alvarez (81) Vietnam: Collective Yemen (N): Salih (78) Yemen (S): Muhammed (78) Yugoslavia: Collective</p>
		Ruling Elite Selection (RES)	Self Selection (SS)
		<p>Algeria: Bendjedid (79) Angola: Dos Santos (79) Argentina: Junta (76) Bolivia: Viadoso (82) Brazil: Figueiredo (79) Cape Verde: Pereira (75) China (M): Deng (81) China (T): Chiang (78) Congo: Sessou-Nguesso (79)</p> <p>Djibouti: Aptidon (77)⁶ Egypt: Mubarak (81)^{3,6} Germany (E): Honecker (76) Kenya: Moi (78)³ Korea (S): Chun (80) Madagascar Ratsiraka (75) Maldives: Gayoom (78) Mauritania: Haidalla (80)</p> <p>Poland: Jaruzelski (81) Sao Tome & Principe: Costa (75) Thailand: Prem (80)⁷ Transkei: Mantanzima (63)⁶</p>	<p>Albania: Hoxha (44, R⁸) Benin: Kerekou (72, MC) Bulgaria: Zhivkov (62, RES) Burma: Ne Win (62, MC) Burundi: Bagaza (76, MC) Cameroon: Ahidjo (60, CE) Chile: Pinochet (73, MC) Cuba: Castro (59, R⁸) Czechoslovakia: Husak (75, RES) Ethiopia: Mengistu (77, R⁹) Gabon: Bongo (67, RES) Guinea: Touré (58, R⁸) Guyana: Bumham (64, CE) Haiti: Duvalier (71, RES)</p> <p>Hungary: Kadar (56, RES) Indonesia: Suharto (66, MC) Iraq: Hussein (79)³ Ivory Coast: Houphouet-Boigny (59, CE) Korea (N): Kim (45, RES)</p>

	Revohtktn (R)	Hereditary Monarchy (HM)		
<p>Lesotho: Jonathan (66, CE)⁶ Libya: Qadhafi (69, MC) Malawi: Banda (63, CE)</p> <p>Mali: Traoré (68, R⁸) Mongolia: Tsendenbal (32, RES) Mozambique: Machel (75, R⁸) Niger: KountM (74, MC) Pakistan: Zia (77, MC) Paraguay: Stroessner (54, MC)⁶ Philippines: Marcos (65, CE)⁶ Romania: Ceaurescu (65, RES)</p> <p>Rwanda: Habyarimana (73, MC) Siena Leone: Stevens (67, CE) Somalia: Siad (69, MC) Sudan: Numieri (69, R⁹) Syria: Assad (70, R⁹) Tanzania: Nyerere (61, CE) Togo: Eyadema (67, MC) Tunisia: Bourguiba (56, CE) USSR: Brezhnev (64, RES) Zaire: Mobuto (65, MC) Zambia: Kaunda (64, CE)</p>	<p>Chad: Habre (82)⁹ Comoros: Abdallah (78)³ Ghana: Rawlings (81)⁹ Grenada: Bishop (79)⁸ Guatemala: Rios Montt (82)⁹ Iran: Khomeini (79)⁸ Liberia: Doe (80)⁹ Nicaragua: Junta (79)⁸ Suriname: Boutersc (80)⁹</p>	<p>Bahrain: Isa (61) Bhutan: S. Wangchuk (72) Jordan: Hussein (53) Kuwait: Jabir (77) Morocco: Hassan (61) Nepal: Birendra (72)</p>	<p>Oman: Qabus (70) Qatar Khalifa (72) Saudi Arabia: Fahd (82) Swaziland: Sobhuza (21) Tonga: Taufaahau Tupou (65)</p>	
		Military Coup (MC)		
		<p>Bangladesh: Ershad (82) Central African Republic: Kolingba (81) Equatorial Guinea: Obiang (79) Guinea-Bissau: Vieira (80) Seychelles: René (77)¹⁰ Turkey: Evren (80) Upper Volta: Zeriw (80)</p>		
		Foreign Installed (FI)		
	<p>Afghanistan: Karmal (79) Cambodia: Samrin (79) Gambia: Jawara (62)⁵ Laos: Souphanouvang (75) Uganda: Obote (80)⁷</p>			
		<p>Notes to the Table</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Date refers to year of election. 2. Close decision on dominant party election. 3. Originally attained office through death or resignation of predecessor. 4. Presidency routes annually. 5. Returned to power with support of foreign troops. 6. Formally dominant party system. 7. Formally competitive parliamentary system. 8. Popular revolution. 9. Revolution within military structure. 10. Civilian coup. 		

today's leaders to reach the highest posts in their governments, and in many cases to secure their positions once attained. The table identifies eight leadership selection processes, ranging from competitive elections to self-selection and military coup. Leaders are grouped according to the process by which they now hold office. Each leader's name is followed by the date of the beginning of the leader's latest uninterrupted tenure, and in several cases, by an acronym identifying which of the eight selection processes originally was used to attain office, if different from that now used to maintain power.

Competitive elections refer to a multiparty electoral system in which the head of the government is chosen through direct or indirect popular elections occurring at regular intervals. Power tends to shift among parties according to the changing preferences of the populace. Leaders chosen through parliamentary majority and minority elections (as in Austria and Papua New Guinea), two-party elections (as in Barbados and the United States), and traditional nonparty pluralist elections (as in Tuvalu) are included in this category. Leaders who have come to power not through election, but through democratic succession following the death or impeachment of their predecessor are also included under this heading. *Dominant Party Election* refers to a pluralist political system in which one party consistently dominates elections and receives a high proportion of the votes. Other parties or groups may compete openly, but as a result of government control over the media or other controls they receive only minor popular support in elections. Leadership may change hands regularly, as in Mexico where the president is restricted to a single six-year term, but party dominance does not change.

Hereditary Monarchy refers to those systems in which the monarch holds effective power, attained through traditional familial succession. The leaders of Bhutan and Saudi Arabia exercise power through this means. *Ruling Elite Selection* encompasses authoritarian military or civilian political systems in which leaders are selected by a small group of elite or party members. One-party, noncompetitive elections are often held to give a semblance of popular support for the process. The leaders of Argentina and members of the Presidential Council of Yugoslavia have attained power through this process.

Self-Selection refers to a process of monopolization or centralization of power that has permitted many leaders to remain in office indefinitely. In general, leaders in this group obtained office through other means, and consolidated power by repressing or co-opting opponents and by building a powerful contingent of loyal supporters. Cuba's Castro, Philippine's Marcos, and Libya's Qadhafi continue to rule through this process. *Foreign Installed* refers to those leaders who have been put into office primarily by a foreign government and who maintain power through foreign support. Karmal of Afghanistan was installed by the Soviet Union and Obote of Uganda came to power with the aid of Tanzanian troops. It can be argued that the leaders of Eastern Europe and Mongolia rule only with the tacit support of the Soviet Union, but in many ways their method of attaining office more closely corre-

sponds to the ruling elite or self-selection process. *Revolution* groups those leaders who have come to power either through popular, predominantly civilian revolution, as in Iran and Nicaragua, or through a revolution within the military in which the power structure is altered usually in favor of a military faction outside of the current circle of ruling officers, as in Guatemala and Liberia. *Military Coup* refers to a transfer to power, either bloodless or violent, from civilian to military rule. For example, Chile's General Pinochet originally overthrew the civilian government in favor of a military regime.

The table reveals that the leaders of sixty-one countries or thirty-seven percent of the world's leaders have been chosen through democratic, competitive elections. A similar number of leaders (62) have been chosen by a ruling elite or have chosen themselves by consolidating and monopolizing political power once in office. Thirty-five leaders or twenty-one percent have held office for over fifteen years; only four of these have been democratically re-elected at regular intervals.

POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS AND FREEDOM

Table 7 (Political-Economic Systems) fills two needs. It offers the reader additional information about the countries we have rated. For example, readers with libertarian views may wish to raise the relative ratings of capitalist countries, while those who place more value on redistributive systems may wish to raise the ratings of countries toward the socialist end of the spectrum. The table also makes possible an analysis of the relation between political and economic forms and the freedom ratings of the Survey. Perusal of the table will show that freedom is directly related to the existence of multiparty systems: the further a country is from such systems, the less freedom it is likely to have. This could be considered a trivial result, since a publicly competitive political system is one of the criteria of freedom, and political parties are considered evidence for such competition. However, the result is not simply determined by our definitions: we searched for evidence of authentic public competition in countries without competitive parties, and seldom found the search rewarded. Both theoretical and empirical studies indicate the difficulty of effective public political opposition in one-party systems.

The relation between economic systems and freedom is more complicated and, because of our lack of emphasis on economic systems in devising our ratings of freedom, is not predetermined by our methods. Historically, the table suggests that there are three types of societies competing for acceptance in the world. The first, or *traditional* type, is marginal and in retreat, but its adherents have borrowed political and economic bits and pieces from both of the other types. The second and third, the *Euro-American* and *Sino-Soviet* types, are strongest near their points of origin, but have spread by diffusion and active propagation all over the world. The Leninist-socialist style of

Table 7

POLITICAL ▼	Multiparty				Dominant-Party
	Centralized		Decentralized		
◀ ECONOMIC Capitalist	Inclusive	Antigua & Barbuda F	El Salvador ^{1/3} PF		
		Bahamas F	Iceland F		
Noninclusive	Noninclusive	Barbados F	Ireland F	Australia F	
		Belize F	Japan F	Belgium F	
Capitalist-Statist	Inclusive	Colombia ⁴ F	Korea (S) ¹ PF	Canada F	
		Costa Rica F	Luxembourg F	Germany (W) ³ F	Malaysia PF
Noninclusive	Noninclusive	Cyprus (G) F	New Zealand ³ F	Lebanon PF	
		Cyprus (T) PF	St. Lucia ³ F	Switzerland F	
Capitalist-Statist	Non-inclusive	Dominica ⁴ F	St. Vincent ³ F	United States F	
		Dominican Republic ⁴ F	Spain F		
Capitalist-Statist	Non-inclusive	Ecuador F		Botswana F	
		Fiji ⁴ F		Papua New Guinea F	Haiti NF
Capitalist-Statist	Inclusive	Gambia ⁴ PF		Solomon Islands ² F	Lesotho PF
		Honduras ⁴ F			Transkei ⁵ PF
Capitalist-Statist	Non-inclusive	Thailand ¹ PF			
Mixed Capitalist	Inclusive	France F	South Africa NF	Brazil ^{1/3/4} PF	China (Taiwan) PF
		Greece F	Sri Lanka F	Trinidad & Tobago F	Mexico PF
Non-inclusive	Non-inclusive	Italy F	Venezuela F		Panama ^{1/3/4} PF
		Jamaica ³ F			
Mixed Capitalist	Non-inclusive	Malta F			
Mixed Socialist	Inclusive	Morocco ³ PF		India F	Indonesia ^{1/4} PF
		Peru ⁴ F		Nigeria ^{2/4} F	Iran ^{2/4} NF
Mixed Socialist	Non-inclusive	Uganda ^{1/3} PF		Vanuatu F	Paraguay ^{1/3/4} PF
					Philippines PF
Mixed Socialist	Non-inclusive				Zimbabwe ⁴ PF
Socialist	Inclusive	Austria F	Norway F		Senegal ^{3/4} PF
		Denmark F	Portugal F		Singapore PF
Socialist	Noninclusive	Finland F	Sweden F		Tunisia ⁴ PF
		Israel F	U.K. ³ F		
Socialist	Noninclusive	Netherlands F			
Socialist	Noninclusive	Guyana PF			Egypt ^{3/4} PF
					Grenada ² NF
Socialist	Noninclusive				Syria ^{1/4} NF
Notes to the Table					
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Military dominated; all countries in the Nonparty Military column are military dominated. 2. Party relationships anomalous. 3. Close decision along capitalist-to-socialist continuum. 4. Close decision on inclusive/noninclusive dimension. 5. Over 50 percent of income from remittances of persons working in South Africa. 6. Noninclusive. 					

Political-Economic Systems

One-Party				Nonparty					
Socialist		Communist		Nationalist		Military		Nonmilitary	
				Djibouti	NF	Chile ³ Suriname	PF NF	Jordan ^{2/4}	NF
Sierra Leone	PF			Cameroon ³ Gabon Ivory Coast ⁴ Kenya Malawi	NF NF PF PF NF	Chad Guatemala Liberia Niger Upper Volta Yemen (N) ³	NF NF NF NF PF NF	Bhutan ³ Comoro Islands Maldives Nepal ³ Swaziland Tonga Tuvalu Western Samoa	PF PF PF PF PF P PF
						Argentina Ghana Turkey ⁴	NF NF PF	Bahrain Kuwait Nauru Qatar Saudi Arabia United Arab Em.	PF PF P PF NF PF
				Zaire ¹	NF	Bangladesh Bolivia Central Afr. Rep. ³ Equatorial Guinea ³ Mauritania Pakistan ²	PF NF NF NF NF NF	Kiribati Oman	F NF
Burundi ^{1/6} Seychelles ³	NF NF					Uruguay	PF	Nicaragua ^{2/4}	PF
Libya ^{1/2/3}	NF	Poland ¹ Yugoslavia ³	NF NF						
Burma ¹ Cape V.I. ^{3/4} Congo ^{1/3} Somalia ^{1/3} Zambia ³	NF NF NF NF PF			Madagascar ^{1/3} Mali ¹ Rwanda ^{1/3} Sudan ¹ Togo ¹	NF NF NF PF NF				
Algeria ¹ Sao Tome & Prin. ^{3/4}	NF NF	Albania Bulgaria China (M) Cuba Czecho- slovakia Germany (E)	NF NF NF NF NF NF	Hungary Korea (N) Mongolia Romania USSR Vietnam	NF NF NF NF NF				
Angola Benin ^{1/3} Guinea Guinea- Bissau ^{1/3} Iraq ^{1/3/4} Mozambique Tanzania Yemen (S)	NF NF NF NF NF NF NF	Afghanistan Cambodia Laos	NF NF NF			Ethiopia ³	NF		

political organization was exported along with the socialist concept of economic organization, just as constitutional democracy had been exported along with capitalist economic concepts. In this interpretation, the relation of economic systems to freedom found in the table may be an expression of historical chance rather than necessary relationships. Clearly, capitalism does not cause nations to be politically free, nor does socialism cause them to be politically unfree. (See Lindsay Wright's discussion in Part II below.) Still, socialists must be concerned by the empirical relationship between the rating of "not free" and socialism that is found in tables such as this.

In the table, economies are roughly grouped in categories from "capitalist" to "socialist." Labeling economies as capitalist or socialist has a fairly clear significance in the developed world, but it may be doubted that it is very useful to label the mostly poor and largely agrarian societies of the third world in this manner. However, third world states with dual economies, that is, with a modern sector and a preindustrial sector, have economic policies or goals that can be placed along the continuum from socialist to capitalist. A socialist third world state has usually nationalized all of the modern sector—except possibly some foreign investment—and claims central government jurisdiction over the land and its products, with only temporary assignment of land to individuals or cooperatives. The capitalist third world state has a capitalist modern sector and a traditionalist agricultural sector, combined in some cases with new agricultural projects either on family farm or agribusiness models. Third world economies that fall between capitalist and socialist do not have the high taxes of their industrialized equivalents, but they have major nationalized industries (for example, oil) in the modern sector, and their agricultural world may include emphasis on cooperatives or large-scale land reform, as well as more traditional forms.

States with *inclusive capitalist* forms are generally developed states that rely on the operation of the market and on private provision for industrial welfare. Taxes may be high, but they are not confiscatory, while government interference is generally limited to subsidy and regulation. States classified as *noninclusive capitalist*, such as Liberia or Thailand, have not over fifty percent of the population included in a capitalist modern economy, with the remainder of the population still living traditionally. In such states the traditional economy may be individual, communal, or feudal, but the direction of change as development proceeds is capitalistic.

Capitalist states grade over into capitalist-statist or capitalist-socialist nations. *Capitalist-statist* nations are those such as Brazil, Turkey, or Saudi Arabia, that have very large government productive enterprises, either because of an elitist development philosophy or major dependence on a key resource such as oil. Government interferes in the economy in a major way in such states, but not primarily because of egalitarian motives. *Mixed capitalist* systems, such as those in Israel, the Netherlands, or Sweden, provide social services on a large scale through governmental or other nonprofit institutions,

with the result that private control over property is sacrificed to egalitarian purposes. These nations still see capitalism as legitimate, but its legitimacy is accepted grudgingly by many in government. *Mixed socialist* states, such as Syria or Poland, proclaim themselves to be socialist but in fact allow rather large portions of the economy to remain in the private domain. The terms *inclusive* and *noninclusive* are used to distinguish between societies in which the economic activities of most people are organized in accordance with the dominant system and those dual societies in which they remain largely outside.

Socialist economies, on the other hand, strive programmatically to place an entire national economy under direct or indirect government control. States such as the USSR or Cuba may allow some modest private productive property, but this is only by exception, and right to such property can be revoked at any time. The leaders of *noninclusive socialist* states have the same goals as the leaders of inclusive socialist states, but their relatively primitive economies or peoples have not yet been effectively included in the socialist system. Such states generally have a small socialized modern economy and a large preindustrial economy in which the organization of production and trade is still largely traditional. It should be understood that the characterizations in the table are impressionistic; the continuum between capitalist and socialist economies is necessarily cut arbitrarily into categories for this presentation.

Political systems range from democratic multiparty to absolutist one-party systems. Theoretically, the most democratic countries should be those with *decentralized multiparty systems*, for here important powers are held by the people at two or more levels of the political system, and dissent is legitimated and mobilized by opposition parties. More common are *centralized multiparty systems*, such as France or Japan, in which the central government organizes lower levels of government primarily for reasons of efficiency. *Dominant-party* systems allow the forms of democracy, but structure the political process so that opposition groups do not have a realistic chance of achieving power. Such limitations may be through vote fraud, imprisonment of opposition leaders, or other devices.

The now classical form of *one-party* rule is that in states such as the USSR or Vietnam that proclaim themselves to be *communist*. The slightly larger group of *socialist one-party* states are ruled by elites that use Marxist-Leninist rhetoric, organize ruling parties very much along communist lines, but either do not have the disciplined organization of communist states or have explicitly rejected one or another aspect of communism. A final group of *nationalist one-party* states adopts the political form popularized by the communists (and the fascists in the last generation), but the leaders generally reject the revolutionary ideologies of socialist or communist states and fail to develop the totalitarian controls that characterize these states. There are several borderline states that might be switched between socialist and nationalist categories (for example, Libya). "Socialist" is used here to designate a political rather than economic system. A socialist "vanguard party" established along Marxist-

Leninist lines will almost surely develop a socialist economy, but a state with a socialist economy need not be ruled by a vanguard party. It should be pointed out that the totalitarian-libertarian continuum is not directly reflected by the categorization in this table.

Nonparty systems can be democratic, as in the small island of Nauru, but generally they are not. Such systems may be *nonmilitary nonparty* systems ranging from Tonga to Saudi Arabia. Much more important are the many *military nonparty systems*, such as that in Argentina.

THE COURSE OF FREEDOM 1972-1982

The accompanying Table of Ratings of Nations since 1973 (Table 8) allows the reader to roughly trace the course of freedom since the Survey began. (Compare also Table 20 in Part III below.) The reader should be cautioned that changes in information and judgment over the years makes many ratings not strictly comparable from year to year. Nevertheless, this should not affect a general understanding of trends.

Since the Survey was undertaken there have been a number of signal victories in the worldwide struggle for freedom. Most massive has been the turn of mainland China away from the anti-individualist totalitarianism of Mao. This has not led immediately to freedom, but it has led to a widespread interest in freer institutions in China and to a worldwide disillusionment with the idyllic, antirepublican model that China had represented for many journalists and academics.

In Europe, recent gains for democracy have been dramatic. Spain, Portugal, and Greece have joined the community of democracies. Their close connections with the rest of European democracy should support their continued adherence to free institutions. In Latin America a group of Andean states—Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela—has achieved or solidified democracy, while Brazil has made important strides in its direction. With the newsworthy problems of Cuba, Grenada, Nicaragua, and Guatemala dominating the public discussion and the news media, we forget that the Caribbean is overwhelmingly an area of democracy, anchored on the one side by Costa Rica and on the other by Barbados. Both the Dominican Republic and Jamaica have overcome difficult problems in the last few years in establishing or maintaining democracy. The ever-present threat of the military in the Dominican Republic has been greatly reduced by moderate government; in nearby tiny Dominica a new democratic administration has been able to follow the Costa Rican example by disbanding the army.

African democracy has not fared well in recent years. Democracy has been subverted in Upper Volta; Kenya has formally become a one-party autocracy on the right, Zimbabwe is fast approaching one-party rule on the left. Although democracy returned to Ghana and Nigeria, it was again overthrown in Ghana. Since Nigeria is far and away the largest and most powerful black

Table 8
Ratings of Nations Since 1973¹

Country	73	74 ²	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82
Afghanistan	4	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
	5	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	7	7
	PF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Albania	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Algeria	6	6	6	7	6	6	6	6	6	6
	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Angola ³	7		6	6	6	7	7	7	7	7
	6		4	6	6	7	7	7	7	7
	NF		PF	NF*	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Antigua & Barbuda ³	2		2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	3		3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2
	F		F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F*
Argentina	6	2	2	2	6	6	6	6	6	6
	3	2	4	4	5	6	5	5	5	5
	PF	F	PF	PF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Australia	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Austria	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Bahamas	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	F	F*	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Bahrain	6	6	4	6	6	6	6	6	5	5
	5	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	5
	NF	NF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
Bangladesh	2	4	4	7	7	6	4	3	3	3
	4	4	4	5	4	4	4	3	3	4
	PF	PF	PF	NF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
Barbados	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Belgium	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Belize (British Honduras)	2		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	2		2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	F		F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F*

Notes to the Table

- indicates year of independence.
- 1. Ratings are from the January-February issues of *Freedom at Issue*. Ratings for political rights are on the first line, civil liberties are on the second line, and status of freedom are on the third line.
- 2. Ratings for many former dependencies are not available for 1974.
- 3. Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau (formerly Portuguese Guinea) evaluated together as Portugal Colonies (A), and Cape Verde Islands and Sao Tome and Principe evaluated as Portugal (B) until 1975. Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, and St. Lucia evaluated together as West Indies Associated States until 1978; Grenada was also included until 1975. Comoro Islands and Djibouti (formerly French Territory of the Afare and Issas) evaluated as France: Overseas Territories until 1975. Kiribati and Tuvalu evaluated together as Gilbert and Ellice Islands until 1977. Cyprus (G) and Cyprus (T) evaluated together as Cyprus until 1981.
- 4. 1973 ratings for South Africa were (white): 2,3 F and (black): 5,6 NF.
- 5. Ratings for North Vietnam for 1973 through 1976 were 7,7 NF; those for South Vietnam for 1973 through 1975 were 4,5 PF, and for 1976 were 7,7 NF.

Table 8 (continued)

Country	73	74 ²	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82
Benin	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
(Dahomey)	5	5	6	7	7	7	7	6	6	6
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Bhutan	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	5
	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	5
	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
Bolivia	5	5	6	6	6	6	5	3	7	7
	4	4	5	5	4	4	3	3	5	5
	PF	PF	NF	NF	PF	PF	PF	PF	NF	NF
Botswana	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
	PF	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Brazil	5	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
	5	5	4	5	5	5	4	3	3	3
	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
Bulgaria	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Burma	7	7	7	6	6	7	7	7	7	7
	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Burundi	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	7	6	6
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Cambodia (Kampuchea)	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
	5	5	6	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Cameroon	6	6	6	6	7	6	6	6	6	6
	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	6	6	6
	PF	PF	PF	PF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Canada	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Cape Verde Is. ³	5		5	5	6	6	6	6	6	6
	6		5	5	6	6	6	6	6	6
	NF		PF	PF*	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Central African Republic	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	6	6	5
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Chad	6	6	6	7	7	7	6	7	6	7
	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Chile	1	7	7	7	7	7	6	6	6	6
	2	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
	F	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	PF	PF	PF
China (M)	7	7	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	6
	7	7	7	7	7	6	6	5	6	6
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
China (T)	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	5	5
	5	5	5	5	5	4	4	5	6	5
	NF	NF	NF	NF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
Colombia	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Comoros ³	4		2	5	5	4	5	4	4	4
	4		2	3	3	3	4	4	5	5
	PF		F	PF*	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
Congo	7	5	5	5	5	7	7	7	7	7
	7	6	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	6
	NF	PF	PF	PF	PF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF

Country	73	74 ²	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82
Costa Rica	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Cuba	7	7	7	7	7	7	6	6	6	6
	7	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	6	6
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Cyprus (G) ⁴	2	2	4	4	3	3	3	3	3	1
	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	3	2
	F	F	PF	F						
Cyprus (T) ⁴										4
										3
										PF
Czechoslovakia	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	7	6	6
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Denmark	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Djibouti ³	4		4	4	3	2	2	3	3	3
	4		3	3	3	2	3	4	4	5
	PF		PF	PF	PF	F*	F	PF	PF	PF
Dominica ³	2		2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	3		3	3	3	2	3	2	2	2
	F		F	F	F	F	F*	F	F	F
Dominican Republic	3	3	4	4	4	4	2	2	2	2
	2	2	2	2	3	2	2	3	3	3
	F	F	PF	PF	PF	PF	F	F	F	F
Ecuador	7	7	7	7	6	6	5	2	2	2
	3	4	4	4	4	4	3	2	2	2
	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	F	F	F
Egypt	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	5	5
	6	6	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	6
	NF	NF	PF							
El Salvador	2	2	2	2	3	3	4	5	6	5
	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	3	4	5
	F	F	F	F	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
Equatorial Guinea	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	7
	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	6	6	6
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Ethiopia	5	5	6	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
	6	6	5	6	6	7	7	7	7	7
	NF	PF	NF							
Fiji	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Finland	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
France	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2
	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Gabon	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Gambia	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3
	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	4
	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	PF
Germany (E)	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
	7	7	7	7	7	7	6	7	6	7
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF

Table 8 (continued)

Country	73	74 ²	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82
Germany (W)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2
Ghana	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
	6	7	7	7	7	6	6	4	2	2
Greece	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	PF	PF	PF	F	F
	6	7	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1
Grenada	NF	NF	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
	2		2	2	2	2	2	4	5	6
Guatemala	F		4	4	4	3	3	5	5	5
	2	2	4	4	4	4	3	3	5	6
Guinea	F	F	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	NF
	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
Guinea-Bissau ³	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
	7		6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
Guyana	NF		NF*	NF						
	2	4	4	4	3	3	4	4	4	5
Haiti	F	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
	7	6	6	6	6	7	7	6	6	7
Honduras	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
	7	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	4	3
Hungary	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
	6	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	5
Iceland	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
India	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
	2	2	2	2	3	2	2	2	2	2
Indonesia	3	3	3	5	5	2	2	2	3	3
	F	F	F	PF	PF	F	F	F	F	F
Iran	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Iraq	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
	5	5	s	6	6	6	6	5	5	6
Ireland	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	PF	PF	PF	NF
	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	6	6
Israel	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Italy	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1
	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Ivory Coast	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2
	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	1	1
	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2
	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5
	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	PF	PF	PF

Country	73	74 ²	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82
Jamaica	1	1	I	1	1	2	2	2	2	2
	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	3
Japan	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1
Jordan	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
Kenya	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Kiribati ³ (Gilbert Islands)	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	4	4	4
	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
Korea (N)	2		2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	2		2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Korea (S)	F		F	F	F	F	F	F*	F	F
	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
Kuwait	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
	5	4	5	5	5	5	5	4	5	5
Laos	6	6	6	5	6	5	5	5	6	6
	NF	PF	PF	PF	NF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
Lebanon	4	4	4	4	6	6	6	6	6	4
	4	3	3	3	5	4	3	4	4	4
Lesotho	PF	PF	PF	PF	NF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
	5	5	5	6	7	7	7	7	7	7
Liberia	5	5	5	6	7	7	7	7	7	7
	PF	PF	PF	NF						
Libya	2	2	2	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
	2	2	2	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Luxembourg	F	F	F	PF						
	7	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Madagascar (Malagasy Republic)	4	3	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	5
	NF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
Malawi	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
	6	5	3	4	4	4	4	5	6	6
Maldives	NF	NF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	NF	NF
	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	6	6	6
Malta	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1
Malaysia	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
	3	3	3	4	4	4	3	4	4	4
Mali	F	F	PF							
	3	3	3	4	4	4	5	5	5	5
Maldives	2	2	2	4	4	4	5	5	5	5
	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
Mali	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	6	6	6
Malta	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2
Maldives	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	3	3
	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F

Table 8 (continued)

Country	73	74 ²	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82
Mauritania	6	6	5	6	6	6	6	6	7	7
	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Mauritius	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2
	2	2	2	2	2	2	4	4	4	3
	F	F	F	F	F	F	PF	PF	PF	F
Mexico	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	3	3	3
	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	3	4	4
	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
Mongolia	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Morocco	5	5	5	5	5	4	3	3	4	4
	4	5	5	5	5	3	4	4	4	5
	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
Mozambique ³	7		6	6	7	7	7	7	7	7
	6		6	6	7	7	7	7	7	7
	NF		NF	NF*	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Nauru	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Nepal	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	3	3
	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	4	4	4
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	PF	PF	PF
Netherlands	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
New Zealand	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Nicaragua	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	6
	3	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	5
	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
Niger	6	6	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Nigeria	6	6	6	6	6	5	5	2	2	2
	4	4	4	5	4	4	3	3	3	3
	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	F	F	F
Norway	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Oman	7	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	6	6
	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Pakistan	3	3	3	5	4	6	6	6	7	7
	5	5	5	5	5	4	5	6	5	5
	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	NF	NF	NF
Panama	7	7	7	7	7	6	5	5	4	4
	6	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	4	4
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	PF	PF	PF	PF
Papua New Guinea	4		3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2
	2		2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	PF		PF	PF*	F	F	F	F	F	F
Paraguay	4	5	S	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
	6	5	5	5	6	6	5	5	5	5
	PF	PF	PF	PF	NF	NF	PF	PF	PF	PF
Peru	7	7	6	6	6	6	5	5	2	2
	5	5	6	4	4	4	4	4	3	3
	NF	NF	NF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	F	F

Country	73	74 ²	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82
Philippines	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
	6	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Poland	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5
Portugal	6	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	4	4
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	PF	PF	PF	PF
Qatar	5	5	5	5	2	2	2	2	2	2
	6	6	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2
Romania	NF	NF	PF	PF	F	F	F	F	F	F
	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	5	5
Rwanda	NF	NF	NF	NF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
St. Lucia ³	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
St. Vincent	7	7	7	7	7	7	6	6	6	6
	6	6	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	6
Sao Tome & Principe ³	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Saudia Arabia	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2
	F	F	F	F	F	F	F*	F	F	F
Senegal	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Seychelles ³	F	F	F	F	F	F	F*	F	F	F
	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6
Sierra Leone	6	5	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	6
	NF	PF	PF	PF	PF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Singapore	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
Somalia	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
	6	6	6	6	6	5	4	4	4	4
South Africa ⁴	6	6	5	4	4	3	3	3	4	4
	NF	NF	NF	PF						
Spain	3	2	2	1	6	6	6	6	6	6
	2	2	2	2	3	4	5	6	6	6
Sri Lanka	PF	F	F	F*	PF	PF	PF	PF	NF	NF
	4	6	6	6	6	5	6	5	5	5
Sudan	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
Solomon Is.	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	4
	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Somalia	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
	4	4	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
South Africa ⁴	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	PF	PF	PF	F	F	F*	F	F	F	F
Spain	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
	6	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	7	7
Sri Lanka	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5
Sudan	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6
	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	NF
Solomon Is.	5	5	5	5	5	2	2	2	2	2
	6	6	5	5	3	2	3	2	3	3
South Africa ⁴	NF	NF	PF	PF	PF	F	F	F	F	F
	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Spain	3	3	3	4	3	2	3	3	3	3
	F	F	F	PF	F	F	F	F	F	F
Sri Lanka	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	5
	6	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	6
Sudan	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	PF	PF	PF	PF

Table 8 (continued)

Country	73	74 ²	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82
Suriname	2		2	2	2	2	2	2	7	7
	2		2	2	2	2	2	2	5	5
	F		F	F*	F	F	F	F	NF	NF
Swaziland	4	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	5	5
	2	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5
	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
Sweden	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Switzerland	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Syria	7	7	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	5
	7	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	6	6
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	PF	PF	PF	NF	NF
Tanzania	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Thailand	7	6	5	2	6	6	6	4	3	3
	5	3	3	3	6	5	4	3	4	4
	NF	PF	PF	F	NF	NF	PF	PF	PF	PF
Togo	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Tonga	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
Transkei					6	6	5	5	5	5
					5	5	5	6	6	6
					NF*	NF	PF	PF	PF	PF
Trinidad & Tobago	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Tunisia	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5
	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	PF	PF	PF
Turkey	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	5	5
	4	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	5	5
	PF	PF	F	F	F	F	F	F	PF	PF
Tuvalu ³ (Ellice Islands)	2		2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	2		2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	F		F	F	F	F	F*	F	F	F
Uganda	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	6	5	5
	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	6	5	5
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	PF	PF
USSR	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	6	6	6
	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	7	7
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
United Arab Emirates	7	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	5	5
	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
	NF	NF	NF	NF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
United Kingdom	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
United States	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Upper Volta	3	3	6	6	5	5	2	2	6	6
	4	4	4	4	5	4	3	3	5	5
	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	F	F	PF	PF

Country	73	74 ²	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82
Uruguay	3	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	5	5
	4	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	5	5
	PF	PF	PF	PF	NF	NF	NF	NF	PF	PF
Vanuatu	4		4	4	3	3	3	3	2	2
(New Hebrides)	3		3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
	PF		PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	F*	F
Venezuela	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1
	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Vietnam ⁵					7	7	7	7	7	7
					7	7	7	7	7	7
					NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Western Samoa	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	3
	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
Yemen (N)	4	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
	PF	PF	PF	NF						
Yemen (S)	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	6	6	6
	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Yugoslavia	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
	6	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	5
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Zaire	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	6	6	6
	6	6	6	7	6	6	6	6	6	6
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Zambia	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
	5	5	4	5	5	5	5	5	6	6
	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
Zimbabwe (Rhodesia)	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	4	3	3
	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	4	5
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	PF	PF	PF	PF

African state, the eventual success or failure of its democracy will play a vital role in determining the directions of development for Africa as a whole.

Although there are now encouraging signs, democracy made no gains in the Middle East in the seventies. In Asia, India and Sri Lanka maintained their democratic institutions under pressure. In Thailand democratic institutions seem to be gaining a firmer hold. At the other extreme many new democratic states have emerged in the southern Pacific, from Papua New Guinea to the east. Unfortunately, these gains are not enough to counterbalance the destruction of protodemocracies in Indochina, the decimation of democracy in the Philippines, and the arrest of its growth in Taiwan and South Korea. Japan, Australia, and New Zealand continue as the democratic exemplars for East Asia.

CONCLUSION

On the frontiers of democracy, 1981-82 saw the struggle of liberalizing and repressive movements, a struggle that continued to be marked in too many countries by repeated and costly advances and retreats.

The period was again disappointing for those observers too inclined to place their hopes for liberalism on violent third world rebellions against local autocrats or the "agents of imperialism." Iranian opposition circles are now commonly agreed that the oppression in Iran is "much worse than under the Shah." In Grenada Maurice Bishop's repressions have exceeded those of the "tyrant Gairy" from the first day of his regime, and they have grown worse. Nicaragua's more pluralist revolutionaries have moved more slowly, but the level of freedom and effective opposition is now below that achieved under Somoza. Immediately before and after its recent elections Zimbabwe achieved a level of freedom rare in southern Africa, but since then the news media have been put into a new strait jacket and the government seems bent on gradually sacrificing its hard-won constitutional freedoms for the guarantees of the one-party model of too many of its neighbors.

Yet beyond such examples of the continuing attractiveness of despotism to revolutionaries, or the unfortunately predictable crushing of democratic initiatives in Poland, the year showed more instances of democratic progress than decline. This was particularly shown in signs of the increasing maturity of democratic institutions in many parts of the world, among which creditable elections in the Dominican Republic, Colombia, and Mauritius should especially be noted. Dominant party regimes in the Philippines, Singapore, Senegal, and even Mexico seemed to be responding to the ever-growing popular demand for open government. Perhaps President Reagan's claim in his 1982 speech to the British Parliament that "the democratic revolution is gaining new strength"³ was in geopolitical terms overly optimistic. But in terms of the record of the struggle of peoples there was cause for optimism.

NOTES

1. For more discussion of methodology see R. D. Gastil, *Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1978* (New York: Freedom House and G. K. Hall, 1978), especially pp. 7-30.

2. On the quantity and quality of forced movement in South Africa see Gary Thatcher, *The Christian Science Monitor*, September 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18, 1981; and Getiy Mare, *African Population Relocation in South Africa* (South African Institute of Race Relations, 1980).

3. Speech of President Ronald Reagan to the British Parliament, June 8, 1982, as reported in *The New York Times*, June 9, 1982.

PART II

**Analyzing Specific Civil
Liberties**

A Comparative Survey of Economic Freedoms

Lindsay M. Wright

Since the Comparative Survey of Freedom was originated in 1972, it has been based on the belief that the fundamental struggle in the world is not between two economic systems—capitalism and socialism—but between freedom and oppression. At the core of this struggle is an irreconcilable disagreement over how and by whom decisions affecting individuals and society shall be made. The Survey continues to assess comparatively the political side of this opposition; the forces of political oppression are still the primary and most threatening enemies of freedom. The intervening decade has brought little change either in the phraseology used to debate this conflict or in the scope and depth of the conflict itself. It has witnessed an intensification of the struggle between those societies that support in theory and practice the principles of freedom and those that support only in theory and oppress in practice the freedoms of their peoples.

In some societies, oppression knows no bounds. In others, political and civil repression often touch only peripherally or indirectly those activities undertaken by individuals and groups in the economic sphere. The distinction between types of societies in the exercise of *economic freedoms* is the subject of this analysis. It extends the comparative analysis used in the Survey to the economic sphere through an examination of the nature of economic freedoms and their relationship to politico-economic systems and to political and civil rights.

To examine economic freedom is to assess the degree to which persons are free individually and collectively to undertake economic activities of their choice, regardless of political structure. Collectively, a fundamental aspect of this freedom is the extent to which the economic system that controls choice reflects the expressed preferences of the majority of the citizenry rather than

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those of a ruling few. Economic freedoms are vital to the ability of people to influence the direction and rate of individual and societal development both within and outside of the political system that predominates. The fundamental rights of all to determine their personal and collective destinies become most meaningful when people can pursue their economic activities free from arbitrary control and interference by others. No society or people is totally in control of its economic system. But in those societies that guarantee effective participation by the citizenry in the political decision-making process, the nature of the economic system is most likely to reflect the preferences of a majority of the groups in society for certain economic arrangements and relationships. An economy that is responsive to the needs and desires of the people evolves by providing those who are affected by its activities an equal opportunity to establish and change economic priorities and goals, including the fundamental structure of the economy, through open debate and full expression of their preferences.

Economic freedoms existing within a democratic political framework may be called *legitimated* or *voter-approved* economic freedoms, reflecting the participatory and legitimating process by which the range and limits of economic activities are established. The economic system of a democratic polity may similarly be termed a *mandated economy*, indicating the approval or permission that a government has received from its populace to pursue certain economic policies and goals.

Legitimation may occur or be secured through diverse means. In this analysis, the term is used to mean the process by which government rule is sanctioned by frequent and effective citizen participation in the political process. This participation may take many forms, but effective participation means that citizens have the right to propose and decide among alternative policies directly or through competing candidacies. Generally, in this examination, political legitimation is reflected in the extent to which such political rights are respected in practice.

This legitimating framework is not, however, a prerequisite for the existence of some degree of personal economic freedom. Economic freedoms may be present despite restrictions on, or the absence of, popular participation in the economic and political decision-making processes. Economic freedoms that exist under these conditions may be termed *nominal* economic freedoms. Without citizen approval through an effective system of political participation, it is seldom possible to determine whether current economic arrangements and priorities reflect the needs and desires of the people themselves. Most often they reflect the decisions of those in power, and sufficient, effective guarantees against the violation or transgression of existing personal economic freedoms are rarely evident. Nonetheless, nominal economic freedoms may provide members of society with valuable opportunities for making effective economic choices, even within the limits imposed on them by their government.

The degree to which economic freedoms are respected is more dependent on the political structure under which these freedoms exist than on the economic system that predominates. History indicates that protection of political rights generally coincides with the promotion of economic freedoms. Many believe that the presence of economic freedoms places pressure on society to increase political participation where there is none or very little, and diffuses both political and economic power away from the state. Certainly, strong arguments can be made in support of both claims. Because of this complementarity, it is unlikely that complete economic freedom can be exercised where political freedoms have been circumscribed or eliminated. The general validity of this relationship is corroborated by our analysis. Many economic activities have political implications, and are often viewed as a threat to the existing power structure. Trade union formation and criticism of economic policy often challenge a government's authority. Political repression that may be used to reduce this threat inevitably impinges on economic activity.

Similarly, historical evidence strongly suggests that political freedoms cannot be preserved where economic freedoms are severely restricted or no longer exist. No economic system that stringently circumscribes all economic freedoms by investing the state with near absolute control over economic activities has yet existed under a freely functioning democratic political structure. Without the alternative centers of power produced by freedom to associate for economic purposes, to have and control property, to change residences and employment, and to express economic preferences, there is little to check the expansion of the state's authority. Power ultimately becomes monopolistic, centered in the state, and economic life becomes highly politicized.

Because of this complementary relationship between economic freedoms and political-civil rights, it is not surprising that we find that the status of economic freedoms tends to be lower under autocratic regimes that repress political-civil rights than under democratic ones that respect these rights, irrespective of the capitalist-based economy in most of these countries. Nor is it unexpected that thoroughly socialist economies fare the poorest in our analysis given the controlled political systems under which these economies now exist. It should be noted that our analysis does not attempt to identify causal relationships between politico-economic systems and freedom. Nothing in our examination suggests that capitalism or socialism causes either political repression or liberalization. The analysis does reveal that capitalist-oriented countries that have a democratic political system tend to promote economic freedom more than capitalist autocracies. Governments that do not respect the principles of political freedom are usually not dedicated to protecting economic freedom.

Economic freedom is defined quite differently in liberal capitalist and Marxist economic theory. Both interpretations are problematic in their limited views of economic freedom.

Capitalism is based on the belief that maximum economic efficiency and an

optimal distribution of goods and services can best be achieved by allowing market forces rather than government direction to determine supply and demand. Many believe that government intervention through regulation in private economic activities should be strictly curtailed and individual freedom maximized in order to achieve the best economic performance.¹ This capitalist interpretation of economic freedom emphasizes technical efficiency rather than human rights. In terms of human rights, economic freedoms are important in and of themselves, regardless of their efficiency advantages, as rights of people to be free from arbitrary interference by others in their activities. Thus, while capitalism may help to promote the full range of economic freedom, capitalism without the explicit support of a political structure that protects fundamental freedoms, cannot guarantee complete economic freedom. A comprehensive interpretation of economic freedom that adds the political dimension can capture the effects of government political and civil repression on a broad range of economic activities, transcending the conventional emphasis of capitalist theory on the effects of government actions on the distribution of resources.

Marxist economic theory claims that economic freedom can be achieved only when people are released from the exploitative grasp of the economic forces of capitalism. These forces are essentially those that drive people into work-contract relationships, perpetuating class divisions based on individualism and economic inequality. According to Marxist theory, economic freedom (which is synonymous with *freedom*) comes through the "humanization of work" whereby "individuals may express and recognize their existence as social creatures".² Marxists believe that freedom can be realized only through the total transformation of economic relationships from those based on the impersonal forces of private property ownership to those founded on the public direction and coordination of work.

The Marxist interpretation of economic freedom narrowly focuses on a critique of "bourgeois" property rights over labor, income, and the means of production. It ignores the broader spectrum of non-work related economic freedoms of association, movement, and information. Nor is Marxist theory sufficiently aware of the possibility that power can be abused during the transition to socialism and in the actual establishment of a socialist society. Except in extreme cases, the "unobstructed expansion of state power", characteristic of socialist-oriented systems, can be inhibited by the protection of people's basic freedoms, especially their control over their own labor, that is, the rights to withhold their labor for any reason.³ Instead, Marxism chooses to promote "collective" or state power by relegating the individual to a position of economic subservience and acquiescence and by circumscribing the individual's fundamental rights to choose among economic alternatives, to withhold economic support, and to influence economic change.

Rather than confine ourselves to either the liberal capitalist or the Marxist definition of economic freedom, both of which have significant weaknesses,

we have tried to develop a human rights approach that reflects the desires of individuals and groups in the real world to achieve or maintain control over their own lives. For the purposes of the following comparative analysis we consider four basic economic freedoms: 1) freedom to have and control property, 2) freedom of association, 3) freedom of movement, and 4) freedom of information, as they relate to economic activities. We subsequently propose criteria for evaluating the status of economic freedoms on a country-by-country basis within and across politico-economic systems. Based on these criteria 165 countries are ranked on a simple, comparative scale that reflects the relative degree to which economic freedoms exist and are protected in practice. Analysis is predominantly qualitative, though certain statistical information is crucial to our assessment.

FREEDOM TO HAVE PROPERTY

In its broadest interpretation, property refers to 1) the means of production—land, labor, and capital, 2) personal possessions—income from the use of one's own labor and possessions attained through income and labor, and 3) intellectual property—one's thoughts, beliefs, ideas, and conscience.⁴ The freedom to have property and control its use is fundamental to the ability of individuals and groups to make economic choices independent of arbitrary intervention by others. Property freedoms are an essential means of preserving the sovereignty of the individual vis-a-vis the state and of determining the course of economic activity at all levels. In examining the degree to which governments and groups respect the freedom of others to have and control property, one must consider how this freedom is protected, whether the property freedom of all groups are protected equally, and how limits to freedom to property are determined.

Freedom to have property can never be absolute and such absolute freedom has never existed. The universal social contract entails limits to freedom along with responsibilities and obligations by individual members to the whole in order to uphold the contract. In a society that promotes effective popular participation in the political process, people may decide by mutual agreement on the limits to individual property ownership (personal and productive) that are necessary to preserve the rights to property of all. Rights to property may be relinquished to the public sector in exchange for making certain benefits available to all through collective effort or contribution. Property rights may be limited in order to provide for specific social goods and services, such as roads and national defense, to encourage an individual in his use of property to account for actual or probable costs of that use to society, such as those of pollution, or to promote the achievement of broad societal goals, such as a more equitable distribution of income. Differences in individual preferences and utilities can be the basis for promoting change in economic policies and arrangements according to the shifting priorities of the diverse groups in society.

In a mandated economy, that is, one that evolves through popular political participation, there is no "correct" distribution of property ownership between the public and private sectors, particularly of the physical means of production. In theory, such a voter-approved economy enables people to choose among various economic arrangements—socialism, capitalism or a mixed economy—with ownership and control of productive property residing to different degrees in the hands of private individuals, communities, workers, and the state.⁵ All of these forms of ownership co-exist in most democracies today. If popular majorities freely choose the rules of ownership and opportunities to change them remain available to future majorities, then societies may legitimately define limits on both state and private property within a broad range.

Without such limits to safeguard against abuse, both capitalism and socialism tend to destabilize the very structures on which each is based. Many writers are concerned with the trend in some industrialized countries toward concentrated wealth through private corporate ownership.⁶ One theologian notes that the rise of modern industrial capitalism has been "both a blessing and a curse", enabling people to achieve prosperity and dignity through greater societal wealth, but also threatening to destroy the base of democratic pluralism and ecological stability on which it is built.⁷ Similar concern has been expressed over the tendency in socialist-oriented systems for economic power to become centralized in the hands of the state through bureaucratic, nationalized industries. These industries are often inefficient and costly, but more important to us their technocratic managers are unresponsive to the needs of workers and consumers.

Both capitalism and socialism tend toward over-centralization. This tendency can be countered by promoting a mix of property and employment arrangements, including capitalist enterprise, private partnerships, cooperatives, or worker-managed industries. A nationalized enterprise in which decisions and profits are centralized in the hands of the state offers its workers or the greater public few opportunities to influence decisions concerning investment, profit distribution, or the general operations of the enterprise. It has been suggested that where other countervailing forces are weak, state intervention through nationalized corporations differs little from the "collective capitalist planning" that has characterized much of government-corporate relationships in France.⁸ Voluntary producer and consumer cooperatives, such as those common in Switzerland and in agricultural areas in the United States, allow greater individual participation and control over investment and production decisions. Responsibility for both profits and losses is placed in the hands of the cooperatives' members. Although many forms of common ownership can involve greater risks for individual workers, their ability to influence economic decisions is generally greater than under the state-controlled nationalized enterprise. The existence of small- and medium-sized enterprises, although not inherently democratic or cooperative in their internal operational struc-

ture, provide society as a whole with diversity of choice and economic opportunity and with competing centers of economic power. When actively encouraged through legally protected property rights, such organizations can offset the economic power concentrated in large, privately-owned and -controlled corporations under industrial capitalism or in state-owned and -managed enterprises in many statist- and socialist-oriented economies.

Earlier we noted that many who defend the free market system claim that its archenemy is government regulation of the market that disrupts efficiency and curtails creativity. Similarly, those who support socialism claim that capital is the foe of the people and the state that represents them. Under democracy, however, the interests of government and business need not be incompatible. A democratic government promotes the common good by balancing the interests of groups and institutions. Concentrated control of the means of production endangers society most when the government under which the economy operates favors those who control property to the exclusion of other interests. Democratic polities are more likely than others to control monopolistic economic power. *Adequate* regulation can enhance the economic freedoms of many while curtailing those of very few, and can encourage economic activities that coincide with the expressed social goals of the people. *Excessive* regulation of the activities of property holders can destroy the balance of economic power that exists between the government and the people.

The establishment of societal goals requires that the means to achieve these goals must also be defined. Individual and collective property freedoms are usually directly affected by this process. Some countries rely heavily on revenues from state-owned enterprises to fund social programs. In other countries, like Sweden, social goals are financed through high personal and corporate income taxes rather than through public ownership of productive property. Either course entails costs and benefits to society and some loss and gain of freedom for individuals and groups. State control and ownership of the means of production can reduce creativity, innovation and risk-taking, impose significant costs on society if inefficient enterprises are subsidized, limit choice in employment opportunities and arrangements, and increase the economic power of the state over its citizens. If ownership and control is communally rather than state-held, progressive change can be slowed as enterprise decisions become more decentralized and subject to continuous and time-consuming approval by a diversified ownership. Conversely, reliance on state enterprise revenues to fund social programs can provide individuals with greater control over the disposal of personal income. If desired, worker ownership of enterprises can sometimes establish a basis for distributing resources more equitably throughout society and can enhance participation by individual workers in the decision-making processes of the enterprise.

Reliance on income taxes to finance public goods can also be costly. As taxation increases, the amount of net income available for personal use declines and consumption choices effectively become more limited. In some

countries, taxes have become confiscatory, making individual preferences subservient to the ostensibly greater needs of the people as a whole. Government can easily become an interest group in itself and cross the line that differentiates the pursuit of priorities defined by the people from the imposition of priorities on the people. However, if a more equitable distribution of income becomes a publicly approved social goal, a system of progressive personal and corporate income taxation can serve legitimately to narrow income gaps between rich and poor or between geographic regions.

Protecting private control and ownership of property by individuals and groups is an important means of preserving political freedoms. Anthony Downs, in his classic 1957 work, *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, claimed that the appropriate structure of an economy under democracy is virtually impossible to define save that it must be limited by the necessity of government to preserve political freedoms. Downs argued that:

government must not destroy private property rights if it is to guarantee political freedom for its citizens, since they must remain independent of its control. However, private property in this sense does not mean an ownership claim over the means of production, but a legally protected share of their output. If a citizen knows his income depends upon fulfillment of certain well-defined tasks connected with his job, and that the law protects him from income losses resulting from any actions unconnected with that job, he is free to follow his own political inclinations, regardless of whether he works for the state or a private firm.... The government must not abolish both this kind of private property and private ownership of the means of production if political freedom is to exist; therefore government's economic power has some limits.⁹

In any society committed to the principles of freedom, some private control and ownership of personal and productive property should be protected. This is necessary to preserve the ability of minority individual wants and desires, expressed through consumption decisions, to determine some social preferences (rather than the reverse), to promote a balance of power between individuals and the state, and to symbolize personal rights to be free from illegitimate government intervention in private life. Monopolistic concentration of personal and productive property in the hands of private citizens, the state, or some ill-defined "collective" is an abuse of property freedoms and ultimately impinges on other freedoms. Protection from these abuses can best be achieved by promoting effective participation by citizens in the decision-making process. Democratic principles are enhanced if restrictions on property ownership and use through taxation, regulation or other communally-determined means serve to promote economic freedoms for all.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

In the economic sphere, association takes two general forms. Association refers to the ability of people to associate with others in order to exchange

goods and services. Association also refers to the ability of individuals and groups to form and join economic organizations, such as trade unions, commercial and non-commercial enterprises, and cooperatives, without interference from others. In examining the extent to which people are free to undertake either of these activities, one must consider the types of association freedoms that are protected for individuals and groups, whether people are protected from compulsory association, and whether and to what extent economic associations are controlled and manipulated by others.

Freedom of association among individuals and groups is necessary for expressing and pursuing economic interests and goals. The ability of people to organize economic associations, such as cooperatives and trade unions, is especially critical for the majority of people in advanced industrial societies who are not self-employed and whose livelihoods depend on cash or in-kind payments in exchange for labor and services. Although in less developed countries lack of industrial development may inhibit trade union organization, the ability of people to form rural associations that perform similar functions, such as agricultural cooperatives or crafts organizations, are equally important to economic freedom. Similarly, protection against compulsory association (that is, forced membership in any particular economic association) is important to ensure that people can freely choose how best to determine and follow their own economic interests. The freedom of people to buy and sell goods and services without arbitrary interference is an important means for pursuing these interests.

Limits to the freedom of economic association can be defined through consensual agreement among members of society. Some constraints on association may be justified in order to protect and prevent abuse of the equal rights of others. For example, a particular trade union might be dissolved or banned if it persistently uses or advocates the use of violence to force workers to join its union, but all trade unions cannot justifiably be prohibited because of the actions of one. Similarly, a business enterprise might be placed in receivership if its owners or managers attempt to prevent workers who wish to join or form a labor union from doing so. Laws against monopolies have been used legitimately to control abuses of power by both business and labor.

Freedom of association must also be protected from economic and political abuse by the state. As with property freedoms, the ability of citizens to form and control private, corporate, or cooperative enterprises enables its owners and members to pursue, independently from the state, opportunities and goals. Trade unions, and professional, business, and consumer associations which have exclusive control over economic activities can similarly counterbalance and check the power of a state whose authority may be otherwise unchallenged. Without such countervailing forces, the process through which economic decisions are reached and ultimately implemented can become unresponsive to the interests of the populace.

Economic associations, employee and employer organizations alike, must

also be independent of political control and influence by the state. Members must be able to engage in political activities in order to advance effectively their interests both locally and nationally, and to play a role in determining the course of economic development. If they wish, economic associations must be able to pressure both the government and employers to follow policies supported by their members. Because all citizens have a stake through wages, working conditions, and job opportunities in the nation's welfare, they must be able to influence through organized action both current and future economic policy. When they lack the ability to pursue their goals through established political channels, isolated individuals can only passively accept economic conditions as they exist.

The right of individuals and groups to be free from compulsory association is as fundamental as the right of people to pursue collectively economic goals. If people have the freedom to choose the most appropriate method of pursuing opportunities and interests, they must be able to choose not to join organized economic groups. Nonetheless, "free rider" and "collective good" problems arise in enterprises where the majority reaps the benefits for which only a minority have contributed. Closed shop agreements, in which employees are compelled to join a specific union as a condition of employment, have been controversial both among workers within individual establishments and industries and among scholars concerned with the broader aspects of workers' rights. The "right to work" movement in the United States has attempted to publicize this grievance by emphasizing the worker's equal right not to join a trade union in order to gain employment. In Great Britain, the 1980 Employment Act reversed standing laws that supported closed shop contracts by legally protecting those who oppose trade union membership "on grounds of conscientious or other deeply-held convictions". Recent events, however, suggest that the new law has not been strongly enforced. In August 1981, the European Court of Human Rights held in a special case that, under certain circumstances, the closed shop rule in Britain violated the individual's freedom of association.¹⁰ The controversy over a union's right to require compulsory association reflects a classic struggle between the matched rights of minorities and majorities, one that requires recurrent adjudication by the public at large.

PERSONAL AND COLLECTIVE RIGHTS OF LABOR

The preceding discussion of property and association freedoms raises additional issues concerning the rights of the individual to control the use of his own labor. These issues involve a person's freedom to withhold his labor as a condition of his right to have and control property, the circumstances under which individuals have a right as a group to strike for economic and political goals, and the rights of individuals to be free from forced labor.

Much of the power that an individual has over the state lies in his ability to use his property—land, income, real property, and labor—without arbitrary interference by the state. Intrinsic in that control is the individual's right to choose his place and type of employment, to offer his services according to mutual agreement, and to withhold his labor when legitimate grievances have been insufficiently addressed. Individually, withholding labor is a means of registering disapproval of the policies of a particular employer and of pressing for attainment of economic goals concerning wage rates, benefits, and work conditions. Collectively, the right to withhold labor—the right to strike—is considered the most effective tool that workers have for pursuing common economic interests and for countering the economic power of employers, whether private or state.

The legitimate exercise of the right to strike may depend on the purpose and intent of the strike and the political conditions under which strikes occur. In most free countries, the right of private sector workers to strike over economic grievances is accepted as a fundamental right and is protected by law, although some scholars continue to question the moral validity of the right-to-strike concept.¹¹ Strikes are usually undertaken after arbitration has failed to resolve conflicts. In contrast, the right of public sector employees to strike for economic purposes has been highly controversial in many democracies. A strong argument can be made against the right to strike by employees engaged in service occupations whose interruption would jeopardize the security and health of residents in a nation or region. The argument is considerably weaker for prohibiting strikes by employees in nonessential public services and enterprises, such as government office employees, or employees outside the defense and public utility sectors. Strikes by these groups are primarily an inconvenience rather than a security danger for the public as a whole. Without the ability to strike, however, the economic concerns of public sector employees can be neglected and abused. Mandatory, court-enforced negotiation under the direction of a neutral arbitrator should be required to address public sector grievances.

The right of workers to call general strikes across industries and regions has also been widely debated, particularly in democracies where political institutions exist for registering opposition and for pursuing peacefully desired policy changes. The controversy focuses on the purposes of general strikes and their intended effects. It can be argued that a general strike of limited duration can legitimately be used by workers across occupations to punctuate the magnitude of their complaints over economic conditions by focusing public attention and encouraging political debate. If a person has the right to withhold labor for economic reasons, clearly that right should not be denied when individuals choose to act in tandem with others.

Whether the general strike can legitimately be used as a political weapon is less clear. In most democracies there is little question that unions should be free to undertake political activities within the bounds of the established

political structure. Unions may lobby legislators, support political candidates, or offer their own candidates for political office. Where policy changes can be effected through political institutions, society may prohibit general strikes that, if accepted, would amount to an unjustifiable shift of power to a particular minority. However, illegal general strikes like those that occur on nearly a regular basis in India, may be indicative of a breakdown in accessibility by some groups to the political process, of disaffection or uncertainty over the effectiveness of political participation, and of increasing frustration with the often laborious process through which change in democracies is effected. A government's continued inattention to the demands of workers participating in political strikes may itself threaten the stability of existing democratic institutions.

In autocracies, where effective participation by citizens in the political process is proscribed or limited by the government, the use of the general strike by workers may be the only means of protesting government policies and of bringing about changes that reflect the desires of the populace. General strikes called by Bolivian tin miners in 1981-82 were ended through government violence and were unsuccessful initially in bringing about desired political or economic change.¹² Nonetheless, in mid-1982 worker and other pressures led to a general liberalization of the system. General strike actions undertaken by the Solidarity trade union in Poland were in part indicative of frustration over the unresponsiveness of the Polish government to broadly based worker demands and of a fundamental split between the economic goals of union members and the government. The pervasive control and isolation by which the official United Worker's Party has ruled in Poland could only be challenged by the organized and collective decision of workers to withhold their labor.

The third issue raised in the preceding discussions of property and association freedoms concerns the illegitimacy of forced labor and slavery. Slavery, involuntary debt bondage and other forms of forced labor violate the basic freedom of individuals to control the use of their own labor, and to exercise their freedom of association and movement (discussed below). Although some degree of one type of freedom can be exchanged voluntarily or through social agreement for a higher degree of another freedom, no one may ever permanently reject his freedom in its entirety nor may any person or group deny completely the freedom of another.

Despite almost universal condemnation of forced labor, slavery and debt bondage, these practices exist in Mauritania, India and several other countries throughout the world. In August 1981, the Anti-Slavery Society in London released a report estimating that one in three Mauritians is or was a slave or part-slave. In addition to being denied basic civil and political rights, these slaves often receive harsh treatment, and their children are bought, sold and traded as the property of their owners.¹³ Debt bondage, a practice in which landless laborers and small farmers "bond" a relative to a master as collateral for borrowed money, has been reported in many rural areas of India, primarily

among the lowest Indian caste, the Harijans.¹⁴ In both countries, the government has taken legal measures to abolish slavery and debt bondage. However, corruption of local officials, continued acceptance of highly stratified class distinctions in both countries, and entrenched poverty have frustrated enforcement efforts.

The organization of work in inclusive socialist countries often resembles forced labor. In North Korea and Bulgaria, for example, the state is essentially the sole employer. Employment agreements are neither voluntary nor negotiable; citizens are compelled to work for the state. For example, ten to fifteen thousand Vietnamese workers have reportedly been sent to work in the Soviet Union as partial payment on national debts.¹⁵ In these countries, the state assumes the position of master, and workers have no independent power against the government. Workers perform services through involuntary indentured servitude for an indefinite period of time; aside from subsistence their payment is in the collective benefits to society as a whole that are derived from their toil.

Voluntary indentured servitude may not transgress the principles of personal economic freedom. An individual may sell his labor to another for a definite, limited period of time in return for certain positive services, such as learning a trade or acquiring desired shelter and nourishment. To some extent, anyone who enters into a contractual agreement that involves the use of his labor for a given period of time bargains away some freedom in return for promised benefits. Only when contracts are involuntary or coerced (through negative agreements such as threat of personal violence or death) should they be curtailed or abolished.

Some writers claim that another type of forced labor has evolved in more developed countries through high rates of taxation required to finance expanding public sectors. Libertarian philosopher Robert Nozick asserts that taxation is a form of forced labor, for each individual is obliged to work a certain number of hours in order to provide services for others.¹⁶ However, in those systems in which economic policies are legitimated through popular participation, the right of a community to set limits to economic freedoms in order to achieve societal goals may be considered as basic a freedom as that of the individual to the exclusive fruits of his labor. The same is not true in systems that allow citizens little significant influence in determining either the means or the ends of economic development. Limits to economic freedom are unjustifiable if they are imposed by a government that rules by fiat and arbitrary decree and sets societal goals that reflect personal or party elite interests rather than the interests of the people as a whole.

FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

Freedom of movement is fundamental to people's ability to shape and control their economic lives. In the economic sphere, freedom of movement

encompasses physical and socioeconomic mobility. Physical mobility refers to the ability of people to pursue economic opportunities and interests by changing residences or employment without being coerced or restrained by others. The ability to leave one's country temporarily or permanently for economic reasons falls within this category. Physical mobility can be enhanced by job relocation assistance and adequate employment information, and may be limited by requirements to carry internal passports, systems of influx control, regional violence, and discrimination in emigration against women, subordinated ethnic groups, political opponents, or skilled workers. Socioeconomic mobility refers to the ability of individuals and groups to pursue economic opportunities regardless of their financial status, religious practices, ethnic or cultural heritage, race or sex. Socioeconomic mobility may be made freer by enforcing laws against discrimination and actively opening opportunities for disadvantaged groups. Mobility may be constrained by cultural and social traditions that economically discriminate against certain social groups, by corruption among political officials that prevents allocation of funds or services to these groups, and by legal restrictions on association and property freedoms that limit improvement of their standard of living. In examining the degree to which economic freedom of movement is respected and protected, emphasis is placed on the ease of movement on all levels, and on the degree to which political motivations influence government restrictions on economic mobility.

The rights of others can reasonably restrict freedom of movement. Valid limits may be imposed on the physical mobility of individuals and groups to protect private property (for example, to prevent someone from entering another's home without permission) and to prevent harm to others (for example, to prohibit arms and drug smuggling). These morally legitimate protective limits to mobility must be distinguished from illegitimate, long-term restrictions on movement imposed in many autocracies to manipulate labor supplies, prevent emigration of skilled labor, preserve the political status quo, and reduce internal opposition.

Two types of constraints on mobility can be identified. *Negative* restrictions on movement *proscribe* or *inhibit* mobility. Government issuance of internal passports, as in the Soviet Union and South Africa, represents consistent and long-term government policies to control citizens' mobility within and across borders, and particularly in South Africa, across socioeconomic classes. In many countries, institutional barriers, such as "administrative friction"¹⁷ and social and cultural discrimination, effectively inhibit physical and class mobility. *Positive* restrictions on mobility that physically *force* people to move, such as compulsory resettlement and involuntary exile, violate the right of people to live where they choose within their country's borders. Within recent years, the government of many countries, including Paraguay, Tanzania, Vietnam and South Africa, have forcibly resettled some of their populations to new locations. Compulsory emigration has occurred

in the Soviet Union and Argentina; internal exile has been used in Chile to suppress dissent.

Freedom of movement may seem irrelevant for those who lack the means to pursue economic opportunities elsewhere. That some may have few financial resources to undertake desired moves raises other issues of equal ability that should not be ignored. However, freedom of movement as defined here is a potential right for all in a free society.¹⁸ In order to protect this right, governments cannot merely assume the passive role of simply refraining from overt economic intervention, for entrenched social and cultural traditions may openly circumscribe the mobility of some citizens. For example, accepted administrative corruption is a means of securing better employment or special privileges, as in many Communist countries; graft by government bureaucrats can prevent rural farmers or the urban poor from receiving their prescribed share of publicly-provided goods and services. Through social and cultural discrimination, women in many Muslim countries, the lower castes in Hindu societies, and numerous minority religious sects are arbitrarily denied the choice to attempt to improve their financial positions and status. Minorities have a basic right to enjoy the same freedoms as majority groups. These rights are inalienable for all individuals, not merely those in the majority.

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION

A communications network that is free of government censorship and accessible to all interested groups is an indispensable tool for registering individual and group preferences for goods and services, and for expressing support and dissent by the citizenry for economic policies and goals. In the economic realm, freedom of information can be viewed from two perspectives. On one level, freedom of information refers to unconstrained access by the populace to media channels as a method of participating in the economic decision-making process. In examining the status of media freedoms in any given country, emphasis is placed on whether and how the government (and nongovernmental groups) control, influence and manipulate the information that is collected and disseminated by the two formal channels, the print and broadcast media.

On another level, freedom of information refers to the degree to which prices reflect the actual value of goods and services among consumers and producers in the economy. Because of the complex nature of pricing mechanisms in any given economy, it is not within the scope of this paper to examine on a country-by-country basis all the possible consequences for economic freedom of either direct or indirect pricing intervention. In democracies, the causes and effects of government intervention in market economies are far from straight-forward and often paradoxical, reflecting the dilemmas that free and relatively free societies must confront in choosing between personal wants and social goals and between long- and short-term benefits.

For example, it is widely argued that minimum wages disrupt the free flow of economic information by distorting the relative value of labor and exacerbate unemployment and inflation. However, minimum wages have also contributed to higher standards of living for all workers. In some countries, such as the United States and Mexico, guaranteed prices for agricultural products have encouraged production and transferred income to the rural population, though at considerable public expense in the short-term. Price ceilings on food staples in Egypt and numerous less developed countries have benefited all urban consumers—high- and low- income alike—by enabling them to feed themselves at less than true value, but have also greatly disadvantaged rural farmers and have contributed to food shortages in the long-term.

Trade-offs must be made in all economies. Pricing intervention is one possible means by which these trade-offs are effected. It is doubtful that an orthodox libertarian approach to economic policy in which the state's role is minimal is preferred today by the majority in most capitalist-oriented societies. It is equally unlikely that total manipulation of consumer and producer prices and goods under centrally-planned economies is desirable or beneficial in either the short- or long-run. In this examination of economic freedoms, the ability of people to act independently in their economic transactions is reflected primarily in the degree to which they are able to determine what the trade-offs should be. One important method of doing this is through equal and unrestricted access to the print and broadcast media. This aspect of freedom of information becomes therefore the focus of our examination.

Free and open media are vital to the democratic process by which economic policies and arrangements are legitimated. An uncensored press provides the populace with an important forum for discussing the successes and failures of government policies, for presenting alternatives to current policy, and for communicating individual and group preferences for the direction and rate of economic growth and development. On a more personal basis, an unrestricted flow of information via its numerous formal and informal channels can help people to buy, sell and exchange goods, to find better employment opportunities, to discover improved methods of using existing and new technology, and to improve generally their living standards. Democratic governments promote freedom of information by protecting access to the media by all interested groups and by not manipulating through legal or extralegal restrictions the information and opinions presented to the populace. Media freedoms are highest when opposing views can be freely expressed without fear of political or economic retribution.

Some constraints on publication and broadcast freedoms may be justified in a democratic system in order to protect a nation's security or to preserve law and order. Often, however, government-imposed media controls are politically expedient, designed to suppress political dissent, to preserve the government's power and authority, and to mask the mistakes and failures of

government policies. In many autocratic and totalitarian societies, the failed or incompetent implementation of government economic programs are prime targets for strict censorship. Publicizing unsuccessful economic policies might encourage open opposition, undermining any claims the regime might have to legitimacy and support. Smuggled Polish censorship documents covering 1974 to 1977 have revealed the detailed prohibitions imposed by the ruling Communist Party on publishing and disseminating economic information in the national and local media. These documents indicate an overriding concern by the state to cover up government abuses, such as bribery and preferential treatment of state industries and officials, and the command economy's inefficiencies in distributing and allocating commodities. Among other prohibitions, these documents require that:

Any information about any direct threat to people's life and health resulting from industrial (development) and the use of chemicals in agriculture, must be eliminated.... Any publication containing general, integrated figures relating to conditions of safety and hygiene at work, or to professional diseases, must be stopped... No information or mention can be published about the nondeliveries by the farmers to the (compulsory) purchase centers of pigs, cattle, and fodder. No information should be given for publication of the annual scale of coffee consumption in the country, so as to make it impossible to publish the size of re-exports of coffee. No potential criticism can be allowed of decisions relating to wages or of current social policies... Also not allowed are texts critical of housing and market supply policies;... notes about mistakes in the so-called resale of agricultural machinery; critical mentions of mistakes in urban planning, of women's conditions of work, of conditions of life of worker's families, or toy imports, meat consumption, restaurant prices...¹⁹

By withholding and distorting information on the economic activities of the government and other protected groups, Polish authorities prevented citizens from challenging openly and through formal channels the policies pursued by their government. The Polish people have attempted to circumvent these prohibitions through an active underground publishing movement during the 1970s and the use of hand-printed leaflets by the independent trade union, Solidarity, from August 1980 until the imposition of martial law in December 1981.

Precensorship by the government is only one of seemingly endless methods of curtailing media freedoms. In Sri Lanka, censorship guidelines concerning economic information, issued under the Sri Lanka Press Council Law of 1973 were still in effect in 1982. These guidelines prohibit "Publication of Cabinet proceedings, Cabinet documents, and Cabinet decisions unless approved by the Secretary,.. (and) statements relating to monetary, fiscal, exchange control, or import control measures said to be under consideration by the government".²⁰ Such prohibitions are not inconsequential given the direct consequences of most economic policies on employment, credit, prices and general societal welfare. Many military regimes in Latin America and else-

where, while not banning totally criticism of government policies, have harassed and imprisoned journalists, shut down independently-run newspapers and radio stations, and prevented the establishment of opposition journals. Outspoken journalists have been forced into exile in South Africa and Argentina; foreign reporters have in the past been denied entry for extended periods of time in South Korea, Iran and Indonesia. Unrealistic publishing requirements and controls over the distribution of newsprint, as in Guyana and Haiti are equally effective methods of curtailing unwanted criticism.

In recent years, there has been increased concern over the potential effects of private media concentration on press freedoms. In several countries, including West Germany and the United States, ownership of major national newspapers and broadcast stations has become increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few individuals or corporations. It is feared that this economic power may be used to control the content of information disseminated through these media. Clearly, editorial policies are often influenced by those who provide financial backing. However, concentrated media ownership may not always lead to restricted freedom of information if opposing views continue to be freely and openly expressed through other media outlets. In both West Germany and the United States ownership concentration is offset by the proliferation of media alternatives in the form of hundreds of publications and broadcasts reflecting varied religious, social, political and other special interests. Media concentration can become a danger to information freedoms if media access discriminates against groups with competing viewpoints, effectively preventing them from exercising their equal rights to public expression of their opinions, wants and desires. Should this occur, the majority in a democratic society may elect to change or restrict the property rights of media ownership or to use public funds to support the development of media that provide special access to those disadvantaged groups.

Concern has also been expressed over the role of "party media" in non-Communist countries in promoting or limiting freedom of information. In several Western European countries most of the major political parties publish newspapers or journals whose editorial orientations reflect the respective party's political viewpoints and opinions. The Social Democratic Party, which governed Sweden for forty years until its defeat in 1976, was criticized harshly for its tendency to politicize and manipulate news reporting and the direction and breadth of debate over economic and social policies. The bias of the government's newspaper subsidization policy toward socialist-oriented newspapers, despite the apparent "no strings attached" disbursement of aid, added fuel to the criticism.²¹ Although nearly all independent newspapers throughout the world take political stands in their editorials, the focus of concern over trends in the Swedish media is similar to that expressed over the potential dangers of economic concentration. This concern is that powerful parties, especially those that also control the disbursement of public funds, may effectively prevent access to the media by those with opposing political and

economic viewpoints. The threat to press freedoms by party media under democratic systems is by no means as great as that posed by authoritarian or totalitarian repression. Nonetheless, the possibility remains that the media can become an instrument of party propaganda, distorting the manner in which economic information and policy alternatives are presented to the public. Even in stable, established democracies, press freedoms can be threatened by the symbiotic relationship between a free media and a democratic political system that is based on the continuous need by both institutions for credibility and legitimacy.

Finally, the major media in many Western countries have been accused of reflecting primarily homogenized, moderate views in their reporting and editorials, limiting the extent to which the public is exposed to competing viewpoints. It is generally true that nationally-circulated newspapers and major broadcast networks tend to appeal to as broad a spectrum of the population as possible by expressing "average" views and opinions. However, claims that this orientation leads to "false consciousness"—a Marxist phrase that describes a populace's distorted awareness and understanding of the true nature of society and events—are exaggerated. The abundance of alternative media outlets in democracies offer numerous opportunities for dissemination and discussion of varying opinions and interpretations of events. "False consciousness" is likely to be more pervasive in totalitarian societies, such as Bulgaria, Vietnam, China and Albania, where there are no legal alternative or opposition media. By using the media as a mechanism for spreading propaganda, governments in these countries can manipulate, create and falsify news. Citizens are presented with a societal and world vision that is one-dimensional and severely biased. Where freedom of information is respected and protected, any tendencies toward "false consciousness" that may exist are countered by the proliferation of publications and broadcasts that reflect widely diverse positions.

TRADE-OFFS BETWEEN ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND ECONOMIC SECURITY

In the foregoing discussion of economic freedoms, we have emphasized that limits to freedom are inevitable under social contracts. In society, no freedom is absolute; even anarchy must be short-lived. Unlike authoritarian and totalitarian systems, democracy requires its citizens to make frequent compromises and trade-offs between short- and long-term goals, between personal wants and societal needs, between one group's hopes and another's aspirations. The process is not always fair, and the costs and benefits are seldom distributed equitably or equally. Under democracy, however, trade-offs reflect the aggregate results of decisions concerning diverse personal and group interests. Despite its imperfections, democracy enables a consensus to emerge from these often conflicting interests.

Some of the most important compromises at any stage of societal development involve trade-offs in freedom. As the wealth of nations has grown, broadening opportunities and choice, individuals and groups in society have increasingly been confronted with choosing between economic security and economic freedom. One of the primary goals of most democratic governments is to provide for citizens' welfare within a protected framework of freedom. Compromises, however, are often required to achieve this goal. The provision of a minimum standard of living for all citizens may be achieved only at the expense of less economic freedom for some. Conversely, some economic security may be relinquished if greater economic freedom is valued more highly. The choice is not predetermined, and all free societies and those desiring to be free must confront the effects of these decisions on economic freedom.

In a recent article, Thomas Courchene laments the rise of the "protected society" in which group demands for protection against the "vicissitudes of the market economy . . . (lead) almost inevitably to further government intervention; . . . regulation of social and economic activity becomes progressively more personalized and paternalistic".²² Many developed nonsocialist countries such as Australia, France, West Germany and the Scandinavian countries, have established or are implementing comprehensive social welfare systems. This trend reflects the growing willingness of citizens in these countries to relinquish some of their personal control over property for the perceived greater benefits derived from collective protection against the risks of economic uncertainty. There is little doubt that social welfare programs require compulsory membership in schemes that may not be desired by all. All citizens must pay through taxes for some programs from which they may receive few direct benefits. Some loss of freedom over the use and control of personal property is inevitably exchanged for greater economic security.

An examination of developments in Japan and India reveals striking similarities and differences in the trade-offs that many members of each society have made between economic freedom and economic security. In Japan, the employer-employee relationship of lifetime employment and seniority-based promotion and remuneration is based on traditional social norms, rather than legal codes, which dictate a hierarchical structure for nearly all social arrangements.²³ In recent years, this employment system has been augmented, particularly in large firms, by an extension of profit-sharing and worker participation agreements between employer and employee. Although this system has encouraged a sense of mutual dependence between employer and employee, the costs in freedom of movement are not insignificant. Long-term benefits, tied to group fraternity and seniority within the firm may be lost, and psychological penalties such as ostracism by group members may be incurred if an employee decides to change jobs or residences. The employee's ability to pursue other economic opportunities if his or her goals or needs change may be greatly reduced. For the employer, flexibility in determining

promotions and hirings may be restricted. The employee and employer have both exchanged some economic freedom for heightened economic security, reciprocal dependency, and a harmonious co-existence.

The development of feudal relationships within an industrialized economy contrasts sharply with the weakening and in some instances breakdown of long-term feudal relationships in many less developed countries. Whereas more developed countries have traded economic freedom for economic security, less developed countries such as India are grappling with the consequences of trading economic security for economic freedom. The Green Revolution of the past two decades has caused irreversible changes in the social and economic institutions of India's traditional economy. New seed varieties and improved fertilizers have doubled and tripled crop yields in many areas, although improvements in rural incomes and standards of living achieved during the early years has been offset recently by population increases. These forces, coupled with overall rural development, have promoted the replacement of the lord-serf relationship characteristic of rural farming with one based on wage labor. Many Harijans (the social outcasts in Hindu society) have been freed to negotiate terms of employment with old or new employers, to use their income as they please, and to choose where to live and work. Nonetheless, this increase in economic freedom has not been acquired without its costs. According to journalist Richard Critchfield, although many Harijans are still able to reestablish payment-in-kind agreements with former landlords, social ties between landlord and peasant have deteriorated, the sense of common purpose in the harvest has disintegrated, and feelings of mutual dependence and a shared fate have disappeared.²⁴ A trade-off has been made, but not one whose costs and benefits are readily discernible. Security of life under the feudal arrangement has been exchanged for increased economic freedom for the Harijans and, with it, both an increased risk of unemployment and insecurity and a heightened sense of self-reliance, independence, and control over one's own economic destiny.

The exchanges between economic freedom and economic security that have occurred in Japan and India may reflect a process of inevitable socioeconomic change arising from what has been called the "perennial battle between traditional values and economic rationality".²⁵ Fundamentally, though, they reflect the cumulative result of individual decisions. Participation by people in the decision-making process by which the direction of economic development is determined cannot necessarily prevent such change, but can guide that change in a direction that can best meet shared societal goals. Though freedom of property and movement may diminish as economic security increases, loss of freedom in one area can be compensated by an increase of freedom in another. By entering into employment contracts that ensure greater economic security, workers may relinquish some freedom of mobility and control over the use of their own labor. Yet, as employee and employer acquire a vested

interest in this new arrangement, participation in the corporate or cooperative decision-making processes can be enhanced, and control over the use of the means of production may become more decentralized. Conversely, some reductions in economic security may lead to increased freedom of movement, association and control over the use of labor, income and real property. Trade-offs may not be optimal or even equitable, but people have a fundamental right to be able to influence the type of economic arrangements and relationships that their community—local or national—adopts. If in so far as possible economic arrangements are to be freely chosen without government coercion, all members of society must be assured of equal participation in that process and equal opportunity to change the limits to and the priorities of economic development.

EVALUATING ECONOMIC FREEDOM

In the second part of our analysis of economic freedom, we assess on a comparative basis the degree to which economic freedoms exist and are protected in practice. A scale ranging from *high* to *low* is used to rank each of the four economic freedoms (property, association, movement and information) in each country. These individual rankings are then averaged to obtain a single rating of overall economic freedom. Ratings for each of the four economic freedoms may naturally be higher or lower than the overall assessment for any given country. We have purposefully chosen a generalized scale because the statistical and descriptive information we have compiled is not conducive to more detailed or quantitative classification.

In our evaluations, economic freedoms are not rated according to only one or two criteria; rather a more balanced representation of patterns and trends is attained by examining a broad range of economic features and policies. In many instances, limited information from closed or tightly controlled countries such as Albania and Laos has prevented us from acquiring a detailed picture of economic freedoms, but given the general character of life in these countries, it is doubtful that more information would change the ratings significantly. We have also attempted to analyze each type of economic freedom separately, but because the freedoms themselves tend to overlap, some of the information acquired may be applicable to more than one category. Moreover, because all freedoms are naturally limited by society, a high rating does not imply perfect freedom. These ratings attempt to reflect trends and patterns—the dynamics of an economy and the political system under which it exists—rather than static conditions.

The disadvantages of using a generalized scale should also be noted. Because the overall ratings represent an average, countries with dissimilarities in the protection of particular economic freedoms may be placed in the same category. This is true of the medium category, in which combinations of low, medium and high ratings for the four economic freedoms differ among

countries, but may nonetheless result in a "medium" classification of overall economic freedom. Similarly, broad categories applied to a country as a whole tend to obscure potentially wide variations in economic freedoms within countries. Finally, under conditions of civil war or general anarchy, discussion of relative levels of economic freedom loses much of its relevance. In Chad and Uganda, and to a somewhat lesser extent, Guatemala, extreme violence among guerrilla and government factions has severely limited the activities and endangered the lives of all.

This analysis focuses on the economic freedoms of citizens in any given country to the exclusion of immigrant workers and resident aliens regardless of their relative representation in the population or of their length of stay. Although it would be preferable to examine the economic freedoms of non-citizens, the question of the rights of immigrant workers is a complex and as yet unresolved issue. Admittedly, an analysis of the economic freedoms of aliens would enhance our understanding of the relative status of freedom throughout the world, especially in those countries with large immigrant populations.

The criteria used for ranking each of the four economic freedoms are described below.²⁶

Freedom of property. Our examination of freedom of property in different economic systems emphasizes the degree to which individuals and groups control property independent of government restrictions. To assess patterns of land control in countries with large rural populations, information has been gathered on rural landlessness, sharecropping and tenancy; concentration of land use among private individuals, the state (as in collective farms) or certain social or economic groups; and government efforts to redistribute land or improve opportunities for more equitable land use and control. In this analysis, land under traditional communal tenure is generally classified as under private (as compared to state) control. Rights over the use, cultivation and inheritance of land reside with individual members, although land is not saleable to those outside the community and ultimate control is vested in the community as a whole.²⁷ To assess patterns of control over capital and productive property, we examine, for example, private and state formation of businesses and cooperatives; the extent of worker management or participation in privately- or publicly-owned enterprises; and the size of the public sector. State *participation* is distinguished from state *intervention*. State participation is generally restricted to the creation of infrastructure, provision and development of public services, establishment of basic industries whose high costs discourage private investment (primarily in developing countries), and preservation of industries whose potential collapse under private control would threaten economic stability. For our purposes, state intervention is closely analogous to state capitalism, and refers to the replacement or substitution of private enterprises with government-operated and -controlled firms. Intervention through regulation of the type opposed by President Reagan and Britain's

Prime Minister Thatcher may fall under either category depending on its ultimate purpose. Treatment of personal possessions and the general nature of income and non-income taxes are also considered.

A *high* rating for freedom of property, as for Australia and Spain, indicates a respect for private property—personal possessions and productive means—owned and controlled individually and by groups that is protected legally and in practice. There is an absence of highly concentrated control and ownership of land within the limits of available cultivable land in those cases where there is large rural population. Limited state participation may be evident. Taxes are not confiscatory. A *medium* rating, as for Brazil and Sri Lanka, indicates a general respect for private property, but there is a high degree of state capitalism either through numerous state enterprises or nationalization of key industries. Most land is privately owned, but there may be increased concentration of landholdings by the state, private citizens, expatriates or non-resident foreigners, with heightened landlessness. Taxes may be high, close to confiscatory, for states in this category. A *low* rating reflects stringent limits on personal possessions and private control of the means of production (although a very small private sector may be allowed, as in Mainland China). State-owned collective farms and nationalized industries whose operations are managed by state-appointed technocrats dominate the economy. Taxes (including direct government income in command economies) are often confiscatory. This pattern is dominant in Albania and North Korea.

Although much emphasis in our examination of property freedoms is on government interference, other groups in society may play an equally effective role in obstructing freedom. For example, members of the small dominant class in many rural Bangladesh villages have reportedly confiscated land illegally from small farmers, possibly with official acquiescence.²⁸ Both leftist and rightist gangs in El Salvador intimidated and killed peasants who supported or participated in the Duarte government's land reform program. In many countries, however, certain groups' loss of freedom may not have a significant effect on rankings for either property freedoms or overall economic freedom, as the proportion of the population affected may be quite small. Application of this analysis of economic freedom to different social groups within a particular country might capture these variations more accurately.

Finally, limited access to land by large portions of the population in countries like India and Bangladesh may result from a combination of social, cultural and historical factors rather than from interventionist policies by the government. Highly fragmented or marginal land holdings due to inheritance customs, inadequate production incentives, and cultural barriers to consolidation and cooperative farming are certainly constraints to the full exercise of economic freedom that poor farmers and laborers may have at least in theory. Simple government non-interventionism is often an inadequate response to resolving the severe economic problems of large segments of the population

caused by such factors. Government-sponsored progressive reform is necessary to promote economic freedoms for all.

Freedom of association. The analysis of association freedoms focuses on a citizen's ability to enter into economic contracts with others, and to form and join organizations in order to pursue personal and group economic interests. The status of trade unions and similar organizations is particularly important in our examination because of their role in counter-balancing the economic and political power of the state. To determine the level of freedom of association, we examine the predominant methods used to distribute goods and services (that is, whether allocation tends to be left to the market through the choices of individual consumers or controlled by the state). We gather information on the legal and de facto guarantees for and prohibitions on the formation of economic associations, including trade unions, cooperatives and professional associations, as well as voluntary or compulsory membership requirements in these associations. We also examine the ability of worker organizations to bargain collectively, strike, and engage in political activities, and the methods used to restrict these activities, and the degree to which government or other political or economic groups influence and control the internal and external organizational activities of economic associations.

A *high* rating reflects a relative absence of intervention by the government or other groups in the formation and activities of economic associations. The government does not require membership in any organization for any purpose. Participation by economic associations in the political process varies widely among countries in this category, but almost uniformly takes place within the established political framework. Control over the distribution of goods and services is predominantly private. Fiji and West Germany have high ratings for freedom of association. A *medium* rating, as for Tunisia and Jordan, indicates more restricted independence for trade unions and other economic associations. Limited control over association activities may be exerted through state-appointed officials or by a significant role for the government in labor negotiations. Strikes may be illegal for private and public sector employees alike, but wildcat strikes occur usually without government interference. Conversely, legal strikes over legitimate labor problems are occasionally broken up by direct government intervention or indirect sanctions. Some distribution channels may be government-controlled, but other channels remain open. A *low* rating as for Cuba and Syria indicates that economic associations, particularly trade unions, are either strongly controlled or prohibited by the state. Membership in unions or cooperatives tends to be compulsory in practice in order to obtain employment benefits and economic perquisites. Business, professional, and consumer associations in such states are also generally weak, absent or government-controlled. Distribution channels are often controlled exclusively by the state, although an active black market may effectively circumvent state allocation mechanisms.

Rankings for freedom of association are not dependent on political or eco-

conomic strength of organizations in terms of influence or membership, but focus instead on the extent of obstruction by government or non-governmental groups. Emphasis is on whether economic associations are actually prohibited from exercising their rights to organize, lobby, bargain collectively and strike should they wish to. Even in largely subsistence economies where industrial activity is quite limited, opportunities exist for cooperative and communal organization. In those developing countries where industry is growing, often under the financial auspices of the state, a lack of parallel growth in private cooperative, enterprise and union formation may be evidence of government intervention in these activities. The internal structure of economic associations is not a central concern in this analysis, except to the extent that the government or other outsiders interfere in or manipulate internal operations. If a person is free to join an economic association, he must also be free to withdraw his membership if he disagrees with its practices or policies. If membership is mandatory, it is assumed that an association's internal structure reflects a similar degree of compulsion.

A distinction is also made between the methods used to curtail association freedoms. Evidence of physical brutality—imprisonment, torture, assassination—against union leaders or businessmen because of their association activities is likely to induce a lower rating than would less violent measures such as loss of employment. Still, violent and non-violent repression may be equally effective in curtailing association freedoms. Ratings may be the same if the results are similar. Finally, restrictions of association freedoms (and their effectiveness) may vary at local, regional and national levels. National representation of trade unions may be prohibited, but the abilities of plant-level and local unions to organize, bargain and strike may be significant, and therefore influence the ratings for association freedoms.

Freedom of movement. Our examination focuses on citizens' physical and socioeconomic mobility. To assess relative levels of movement, we examine restrictions on internal movement, including requirements to carry internal passports or to clear employment changes with the local authorities, and forced resettlement or coercive employment. We also assess constraints on temporary and permanent emigration through passport or foreign exchange restrictions, controlled borders, or restrictions on emigration of certain groups, such as skilled labor or political activists. Finally, we examine limits on class mobility through enforced discriminatory property, employment or educational laws, social and cultural traditions, or highly regressive tax structures and income redistribution policies.

A *high* rating, as for Denmark and Senegal, indicates unrestricted internal movement for all citizens, and only minimal restrictions on emigration (such as a small passport fee). There is no forced resettlement or employment. Barriers to socioeconomic mobility are relatively low and the government has made a concerted effort to abolish social and cultural discrimination. A *medium* rating as for Nepal and Uruguay reflects some limitations on physical movement usually across borders for specific groups (such as, political oppo-

nents and skilled labor) by denying passports or implicitly requiring bribes to expedite passport processing. Internal movement may be occasionally restricted through security checks along highways. Instances of government-instigated forced resettlement of certain social or cultural groups or compulsory exile of political dissidents may be evident. Entrenched Social barriers may inhibit advancement by women or minority groups despite government attempts to lower the barriers. A *low* rating as for East Germany and Vietnam indicates strict limitations on movement both within and across borders. Forced resettlement and employment is evident through non-negotiable job and residence assignments. Pervasive financial or political corruption may enhance the mobility of some to the great disadvantage of a large portion of the population.

Freedom of information. The analysis of freedom of information focuses on citizens' ability to influence the nature of the economic system and the rate of economic development by expressing their preferences through formal and informal information channels. We examine predominant patterns of control of the print and broadcast media and whether this control restricts media access to specific groups or views to the exclusion of others. We also assess restrictions on or suppression of the presentation of news and opinions, particularly concerning economic policies, through government- or self-censorship, harassment and intimidation of journalists, or outright closures of independent newspapers or broadcast stations.

A *high* rating for freedom of information, as for Belgium and Trinidad and Tobago, indicates the existence of independent and predominantly privately-controlled and -operated media that are free of government censorship and influence. Criticism of government policies, particularly economic, is frequent, often vociferous, and alternatives to current policy are expressed without fear of retribution. Affiliations with political ideologies may exist, but "party media" tend to balance each other and are augmented by an apolitical or non-partisan press. Concentration of ownership, if prevalent, does not impinge on media freedoms. A *medium* rating, as for Mexico and Bangladesh, indicates the presence of state-operated media that exercise some control over reporting and editorials and occasionally over other, independent media. Criticism of government policies by independent media is usually tolerated, but may lead to harassment or temporary shutdowns. Self-censorship is occasionally practiced. A *low* rating as for North Korea and Oman reflects strict government- or self-censorship according to prescribed guidelines. All media are state-controlled, and function in practice as mouthpieces for the government. Opposition groups are regularly denied an opportunity to express their views. Occasionally, criticism of policy implementation surfaces, usually at the instigation of government officials, but economic policy and structure are not questioned in official media.

THE RELATIONSHIP OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM TO OTHER COMPARATIVE MEASURES

The accompanying Table 9 (Comparative Economic Measures) presents the results of our examination of economic freedom, and allows comparison with

Table 9 Comparative Economic Measures

	Economic Freedom	Economic System ¹	Political Legitimacy ²	PQLI ³	1980 GNP Per Capita (\$) ³
Afghanistan	low	socialist ⁿ	low	21	170 ⁴
Albania	low	socialist	low	77	840 ⁴
Algeria	low-medium	socialist	low	48	1,920
Angola	low	socialist ⁿ	low	17	470 ⁴
Antigua & Barbuda	high	capitalist	high	NA	1,000 ⁵
Argentina	medium	capitalist-statist	low	88	2,390
Australia	high	capitalist	high	96	9,820
Austria	high	mixed-capitalist	high	94	10,230
Bahamas	high	capitalist	high	88	3,300 ⁴
Bahrain	medium	capitalist-statist	medium	60	5,560
Bangladesh	medium ⁶	capitalist-statist ⁿ	medium	36	120
Barbados	high	capitalist	high	92	3,040
Belgium	high	capitalist	high	95	12,180
Belize	high	capitalist	high	67	1,080
Benin	low-medium	socialist ⁿ	low	29	300
Bhutan	medium	capitalist ⁿ	medium	23	80 ⁴
Bolivia	medium	capitalist-statist ⁿ	low	49	570
Botswana	medium-high	capitalist ⁿ	high	48	910
Brazil	medium	capitalist-statist	medium	74	2,050
Bulgaria	low	socialist	low	91	3,690 ⁴
Burma	low-medium	mixed-socialist ⁿ	low	55	180
Burundi	low-medium	mixed-capitalist ⁿ	low	33	200

Notes to the Table

n = noninclusive; NA = not available

1. From Table of Political-Economic Systems.

2. Political Legitimacy is equivalent to the political rights scale in the Comparative Survey: high = 1 and 2 on the scale, medium = 3, 4 and 5, and low = 6 and 7.

3. Physical Quality of Life Index and 1980 GNP per capita (\$) from John W. Sewell and the Staff of the Overseas Development Council, *The United States and World Development: Agenda 1982* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982).

4. Tentative.

5. 1980 GDP per capita from *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1981*, Report submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate by the Department of State, February 1982.

6. Close decision between medium and low-medium.

7. Figures are for both Greek and Turkish Cyprus.

8. Close decision between low and low-medium.

9. Figure is for Mainland Tanzania.

Cambodia	low	socialist ^a	low	36	80 ⁴
Cameroon	medium ⁶	capitalist ^a	low	28	670
Canada	high	capitalist	high	96	10,130
Cape Verde Islands	medium ⁶	mixed-socialist ^a	low	52	300 ⁴
Central African Republic	medium	capitalist-statist ^a	low	23	300 ⁴
Chad	low-medium	capitalist ^a	low	24	120
Chile	medium	capitalist	low	84	2,160
China (Mainland)	low	socialist	low	76	290
China (Taiwan)	medium	capitalist-statist	medium	88	2,160
Colombia	medium	capitalist	high	74	1,180
Comoro Islands	low-medium	capitalist ^a	medium	44	300 ⁴
Congo	low-medium	mixed-socialist ^a	low	39	730
Costa Rica	high	capitalist	high	89	1,730
Cuba	low	socialist	low	93	1,410 ⁴
Cyprus (Greek)	high	capitalist	high	87 ⁷	3,560 ⁷
Cyprus (Turkish)	medium-high	capitalist	medium	87 ⁷	3,560 ⁷
Czechoslovakia	low	socialist	low	91	5,290 ⁴
Denmark	high	mixed-capitalist	high	97	12,950
Djibouti	medium-high	capitalist	medium	NA	480 ⁴
Dominica	high	capitalist	high	80	620
Dominican Republic	medium-high	capitalist	high	66	1,140
Ecuador	medium-high	capitalist ^a	high	71	1,220
Egypt	medium	mixed-capitalist ^a	medium	54	580
El Salvador	medium	capitalist	medium	71	590
Equatorial Guinea	low-medium	capitalist-statist ^a	low	30	390
Ethiopia	low	socialist ^a	low	20	140
Fiji	high	capitalist ^a	high	80	1,850
Finland	high	mixed-capitalist	high	95	9,720
France	medium-high	capitalist-statist	high	96	11,730
Gabon	medium	capitalist ^a	low	23	4,440
Gambia	medium-high	capitalist ^a	medium	17	250
Germany (E)	low	socialist	low	94	6,430 ⁴
Germany (W)	high	capitalist	high	94	13,590
Ghana	medium	capitalist-statist	low	40	420
Greece	high	capitalist	high	90	4,520
Grenada	medium	mixed-socialist	low	86	690
Guatemala	low-medium	capitalist ^a	low	59	1,110
Guinea	low-medium	socialist ^a	low	23	290

	Economic Freedom	Economic System¹	Political Legitimacy²	PQLI³	1980 GNP Per Capita (\$) ³
Guinea-Bissau	medium ⁶	socialist ⁿ	low	15	160 ⁴
Guyana	low-medium	mixed-socialist	medium	86	690
Haiti	medium ⁶	capitalist ⁿ	low	39	270
Honduras	medium-high	capitalist ⁿ	high	60	560
Hungary	low-medium	socialist	low	91	3,850 ⁴
Iceland	high	capitalist	high	98	11,330
India	medium	capitalist-statist ⁿ	high	44	240
Indonesia	medium	capitalist-statist ⁿ	medium	55	420
Iran	low-medium	capitalist-statist ⁿ	low	57	2,030 ⁴
Iraq	low-medium	socialist ⁿ	low	47	3,020
Ireland	high	capitalist	high	95	4,880
Israel	medium-high	mixed-capitalist	high	92	4,500
Italy	high	capitalist-statist	high	95	6,480
Ivory Coast	medium	capitalist ⁿ	medium	33	1,150
Jamaica	medium-high	capitalist-statist	high	88	1,030
Japan	high	capitalist	high	98	9,890
Jordan	medium	capitalist	low	63	1,420
Kenya	medium-high	capitalist ⁿ	medium	53	420
Kiribati	high	capitalist-statist ⁿ	high	NA	NA
Korea (N)	low	socialist	low	78	1,130 ⁴
Korea (S)	medium	capitalist	medium	85	1,520
Kuwait	medium-high	capitalist-statist	medium	77	22,840
Laos	low	socialist ⁿ	low	28	100 ⁴
Lebanon	medium-high	capitalist	medium	75	1,740
Lesotho	medium	capitalist ⁿ	medium	50	390 ⁴
Liberia	medium	capitalist ⁿ	low	37	520
Libya	low-medium	mixed-socialist	low	52	8,640
Luxembourg	high	capitalist	high	93	14,510
Madagascar	medium	mixed-socialist ⁿ	low	46	350
Malawi	low-medium	capitalist ⁿ	low	34	230

Malaysia	medium	capitalist	medium	69	1,670
Maldives	medium	capitalist ⁿ	medium	NA	260 ⁴
Mali	low-medium	mixed-socialist ⁿ	low	18	190
Malta	medium-high	capitalist-statist	high	88	3,470
Mauritania	low-medium	capitalist-statist ⁿ	low	23	320
Mauritius	high	capitalist	high	82	1,060
Mexico	medium	capitalist-statist	medium	78	2,130
Mongolia	low	socialist	low	80	730 ⁴
Morocco	medium-high	capitalist-statist ⁿ	medium	45	860
Mozambique	low-medium	socialist ⁿ	low	29	270 ⁴
Nauru	high	capitalist-statist	high	NA	NA
Nepal	medium	capitalist ⁿ	medium	30	140
Netherlands	high	mixed-capitalist	high	98	11,470
New Zealand	high	capitalist	high	95	7,090
Nicaragua	medium	mixed-capitalist	low	66	720
Niger	medium	capitalist ⁿ	low	19	330
Nigeria	medium-high	capitalist-statist ⁿ	high	31	1,010
Norway	high	mixed-capitalist	high	97	12,650
Oman	medium	capitalist-statist ⁿ	low	33	4,380
Pakistan	low-medium	capitalist-statist ⁿ	low	40	300
Panama	medium-high	capitalist-statist	medium	83	1,730
Papua New Guinea	high	capitalist ⁿ	high	42	780
Paraguay	low-medium	capitalist-statist ⁿ	medium	78	1,340
Peru	medium-high	capitalist-statist ⁿ	high	67	930
Philippines	medium	capitalist-statist ⁿ	medium	76	720
Poland	low	mixed-socialist	low	93	3,830
Portugal	medium-high	mixed-capitalist	high	81	2,350
Qatar	medium	capitalist-statist	medium	46	26,080 ⁴
Romania	low	socialist	low	91	1,900
Rwanda	medium	mixed-socialist ⁿ	low	35	200
St. Lucia	high	capitalist	high	84	850
St. Vincent	high	capitalist	high	80	520
Sao Tome & Principe	low-medium	socialist	low	NA	490 ⁴
Saudi Arabia	medium ⁶	capitalist-statist	low	35	11,260
Senegal	medium-high	mixed-capitalist	medium	25	450

	Economic Freedom	Economic System¹	Political Legitimacy²	PQLI³	1980 GNP Per Capita (\$) ³
Seychelles	low-medium	mixed-socialist	low	73	1,770 ⁴
Sierra Leone	medium	capitalist ⁿ	medium	31	270
Singapore	medium	mixed-capitalist	medium	86	4,480
Solomon Islands	high	capitalist ⁿ	high	62	460
Somalia	low-medium	mixed-socialist ⁿ	low	39	140
South Africa	low-medium	capitalist-statist	medium	62	2,290
Spain	high	capitalist	high	92	5,350
Sri Lanka	medium-high	capitalist-statist	high	80	270
Sudan	medium	mixed-socialist ⁿ	medium	32	470
Suriname	low-medium	capitalist	low	84	2,840
Swaziland	medium	capitalist ⁿ	medium	40	680 ⁴
Sweden	high	mixed-capitalist	high	98	13,520
Switzerland	high	capitalist	high	97	16,440
Syria	low-medium	mixed-socialist	medium	64	1,340
Tanzania	low-medium ⁷	socialist ⁿ	low	53	260 ⁹
Thailand	medium-high	capitalist ⁿ	medium	75	670
Togo	low-medium	mixed-socialist ⁿ	low	34	410
Tonga	medium	capitalist ⁿ	medium	NA	520 ⁴
Transkei	medium	capitalist ⁿ	medium	NA	NA
Trinidad & Tobago	high	capitalist	high	90	4,370
Tunisia	medium	mixed-capitalist	medium	59	1,310
Turkey	medium ⁶	capitalist-statist	medium	62	1,460
Tuvalu	high	capitalist ⁿ	high	NA	NA
Uganda	low-medium	capitalist-statist ⁿ	medium	45	280 ⁴
USSR	low	socialist	low	90	4,110 ⁴
United Arab Emirates	medium	capitalist-statist	medium	65	30,070
United Kingdom	high	mixed-capitalist	high	95	7,920
United States	high	capitalist	high	96	11,360
Upper Volta	medium	mixed-socialist ⁿ	low	19	190
Uruguay	low-medium	mixed-capitalist	medium	89	2,820

Vanuatu	medium-high	capitalist-statist ^a	high	NA	525 ⁵
Venezuela	high	capitalist-statist	high	81	3,630
Vietnam	low	socialist	low	73	170 ⁴
Western Samoa	medium-high	capitalist ^a	medium	86	770 ⁴
Yemen (N)	medium	capitalist ^a	low	22	460
Yemen (S)	low	socialist ^a	low	30	420 ⁴
Yugoslavia	medium	mixed-socialist	low	86	2,620
Zaire	low-medium	capitalist-statist ^a	low	28	220
Zambia	medium	mixed-socialist ^a	medium	40	560
Zimbabwe	medium	capitalist-statist ^a	medium	47	630

the nature of the economic system, the political legitimacy of the economic system, socioeconomic development, and economic prosperity. For consistency, the classification of economic systems is identical to that used in Table 7 (Political-Economic Systems) and is explained in the corresponding text on pages 33-38. The rankings for political legitimacy are equivalent to the Survey's scale of political rights, but for comparability are grouped into categories of high (1 and 2 on the political rights scale), medium (3, 4 and 5) and low (6 and 7 on the scale).

The political rights scale is not a precise measure of legitimacy among the populace for the existing economic system, but it is the best available alternative. The political rights scale is based on evaluations of the relative degree of effective citizen participation in the political decision-making process, and thus of citizen influence on economic policies, goals and programs. Legitimacy for an existing economic system, as for the political structure, can be most accurately determined through an established and regular means of public expression and effective political participation, such as competitive elections or referenda. However, economic systems tend to change much more slowly than do political leaders or even political systems. Particularly in democracies, changes in economic structures tend to be evolutionary and subject to repeated rationalization and justification at frequent intervals. Widespread dissatisfaction with current economic arrangements may be evident despite continued approval of the political system as a whole and full protection of political rights. Conversely, a radical change in political system coupled with a shift in fundamental economic theory may bring few changes to the basic economy despite government pronouncements to the contrary. The vast majority of a country's citizenry may continue to uphold the economic system even though the political means of expressing that support have been effectively abridged. This implicit support could exist in any nondemocratic capitalist or socialist system. However, in the absence of an effective method of determining the extent of popular support, there is no reliable means of evaluating legitimacy for the economic system outside of the democracies. Given the lack of a more suitable alternative, the scale of political rights best represents the extent to which an economic system commands the support of any citizenry.

Socioeconomic welfare and economic prosperity are represented in the table by, respectively, the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI) and per capita Gross National Product (GNP). The PQLI was created by the Overseas Development Council in 1979 to measure socioeconomic development. The PQLI is a composite index on a scale of 0 (the most unfavorable performance) to 100 (the best expected performance) that emphasizes the "results of development" based on measurements of infant mortality, life expectancy at age one, and literacy.²⁹ The accuracy of the PQLI is hampered by the difficulties of gathering detailed, standardized information in every country. Literacy is extremely difficult to measure consistently across countries, and births and

deaths of infants may not be reported in rural or impoverished areas or by unmarried women. The resultant index reveals little about the distribution of health and education services by income groups or regions.

Per capita GNP is a frequently used indicator, but is also problematic as an accurate measure of wealth, for it obscures often gross differences in the distribution of income among classes and regions within countries. Generally, per capita GNP only measures income derived from economic activities in the monetized sector. Subsistence farming or food gathering and goods exchanged through barter may be significant, but cannot be adequately estimated. Moreover, aggregate income data do not reflect indirect government transfers through public expenditures on education, health, and food, and do not account for often wide differences in purchasing power within and among countries. Dissatisfaction with both GNP and PQLI as measures of development has led to the creation of numerous alternatives, including the Nordhaus-Tobin measure of human welfare, an index of growth and distribution (GAD) developed by Loehr and Powelson, and a birth- and death-based modernization index (BDMI) developed by Prosterman and Riedinger (see Part III below).³⁰ The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the World Bank have recently begun separate studies to develop an international social indicators system.

The results of our analysis of economic freedom reveal that relatively few countries receive low ratings on overall economic freedom, although a breakdown of each country's ratings would show that a significant number of countries are rated low on one or two of the individual economic freedoms. Despite repressive rule, many autocracies of both the left and right allow a degree of economic freedom, most often in the exercise of some types of property and mobility freedoms. Only the well-established, centrally-planned communist countries have succeeded in controlling most economic activity, and even in these countries, private sector and black market activity exists.

Similarly, many of the countries ranked high on overall economic freedom actually are rated medium-high on one or two of the four economic freedoms. Because the ratings are relative, a high assessment neither implies perfection nor suggests an absence of irregularities in protecting the economic freedoms of all groups in society.

By grouping countries according to their relative degree of political legitimacy and their predominant economic system, patterns and variations in economic freedom can be identified. A distinct relationship is evident between a country's ratings for political legitimacy and economic freedom. The table does not suggest causal relationships, but it does reveal that societies tend to treat freedom similarly across political and economic spheres. Medium-high and high ratings for economic freedom tend to be grouped among politically free countries, whereas politically repressive countries receive medium to low ratings on economic freedom.

This pattern may seem tautological given our definition of economic free-

dom, which encompasses a broad range of economic activities. But a narrow definition cannot capture the important effects of politically motivated repression on individual and particularly group economic activity. Clearly, the political nature of many economic activities influences the relationship between political rights and economic freedoms. Control over property may ultimately vest political as well as economic power in its holder. Forming cooperatives and trade unions becomes not only an economic, but a political means of pursuing common objectives. Repression by autocratic governments is difficult to confine to political activities, given the political ramifications inherent in the exercise of economic freedoms.

The relationship between economic freedoms and economic systems also illustrates the argument that the type of political system under which economies function will probably determine the degree to which economic freedoms exist and are protected. The surprising disparity in economic freedoms among capitalist economies is a function of our definition under which economic activities become more responsive to the direct and indirect effects of a broad range of interventions, restrictions, and controls. Consequently, countries like Chile, South Korea, and the Ivory Coast, that restrict freedom of association and information receive lower ratings on overall economic freedom than they might under a narrower definition of economic freedom that focuses primarily on the degree of government intervention and free market enterprise. This variation in economic freedom among capitalist-based countries (including capitalist, capitalist-statist, and mixed capitalist) suggests capitalism alone is not a sufficient guarantor of freedom in the economic sphere. The comparatively high status of economic freedom under capitalist democracies and its lower status in capitalist autocracies seems to support this claim.

Compared to capitalist economies, countries with truly socialist economic systems fall predominantly at the low end of the economic freedom scale. The one-party political structures and centralized economic planning historically associated with advanced socialism have severely impaired the freedom of economic activity that people might have under a less rigid form of socialism. Mixed socialist countries, which allow greater latitude for private economic activity, fare somewhat better on our scale. On the whole, however, the record of socialist-oriented countries in promoting economic freedoms is discouraging, and should be of concern to those who view socialism as a more desirable economic system.

As the table indicates, countries with largely traditional or noninclusive economies are not at a disadvantage in our analysis because of their low economic development. In fact, several socialist noninclusive countries, such as Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, exhibit slightly more economic freedom than most inclusive socialist countries, in large part because of their governments' inability to incorporate the predominantly subsistence economies into the more socialized modern sectors. However, there does not appear to be any

discernible pattern in economic freedom among inclusive economies compared to noninclusive economies when political and economic systems are held constant. Economic development is clearly not a prerequisite for economic freedom, as evidenced by Botswana, Honduras, Nigeria and Papua New Guinea. Again, the political system appears to be a critical factor in determining economic freedom.

Finally, there is considerable variation in the level of physical welfare (PQLI) and economic performance (per capita GNP) attained under different economic systems and across ratings of economic freedom. Many less developed countries, such as Dominica, Sri Lanka, and Thailand, have high levels of PQLI coupled with relatively low per capita income, whereas the reverse is true for many of the oil-producing countries like Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Both PQLI and per capita income can produce deceiving comparisons because neither provides an historical perspective of the path of development that countries have followed or the changes in political and economic system that have occurred in recent years. For example, much of Grenada's socioeconomic development took place under a multiparty capitalist system rather than under the dominant party mixed-socialist system that it has had since 1979. This is also true of many other African and Caribbean nations whose basic infrastructure was built during colonial rule.

CONCLUSION

In this analysis of economic freedom we have tried to go beyond the conventional liberal capitalist or socialist interpretations of economic freedom. Though both economic theories lie at the base of many political schisms, each fails to deal realistically with the role of the state as both a potential protector and usurper of economic freedom. Modern capitalist theory is limited by its emphasis on efficiency and private enterprise and its view of the state as a dangerous intruder on market forces. Socialist economic theory suffers from its historical focus on collectivization at the expense of the rights of the individual and its perception of the state as the sole vehicle by which the will of the people is expressed. Yet, no concept of economic freedom can ignore the concerns of both theories. Like capitalist theory, we are concerned with the ability of private citizens to voluntarily pursue economic interests, even when those activities are in apparent opposition to the interests of the state or other favored groups. Thus we find throughout the world that people continue to risk personal security and liberty to form trade unions, agricultural cooperatives and local marketing organizations in order to pursue common goals. Like socialist theory, we are concerned with restrictions on the freedom of groups, such as ethnic minorities, peasants and farmers, to choose their place of residence, pursue employment opportunities, and use and control property.

We also recognize the dangers to economic freedom of a state whose elite abuses economic institutions and expropriates wealth for its own gain.

Historically, the state in advanced socialist systems has pursued the interests of a small ruling elite to the exclusion and suppression of the interests of the people it claims to represent. Capitalist systems have a mixed record of protecting and violating the economic freedoms of individuals and groups. Under autocracy, both industrial capitalism and socialism can become as abusive of power as the political system under which each operates; without proper checks, both tend toward centralization and concentration. Ultimately, the exercise of economic freedom under either capitalism or socialism depends on the ability of a country's political system to protect and promote that freedom for all its citizens. Our best hope for advancing economic freedom lies in the strengthening of the rights of all peoples to choose their own government and through that choice to determine the relationships and arrangements that frame economic life.

NOTES

1. See, for example, Robert B. McKenzie, *Bound to Be Free* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1982), George Gilder, *Wealth and Poverty* (New York: Basic Books, 1981), and Robert A. Nozick, *Anarchy, State and Utopia* (New York: Basic Books, 1974).

2. Robert Heilbroner, *Marxism: For and Against* (New York: W.W. Norton Co., 1980), p. 150.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 145.

4. See Karen I. Vaughn, "John Locke's Theory of Property", *Literature of Liberty*, Spring 1980.

5. See Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), p. 12, footnote 9.

6. See Ernest W. Lefever (ed.), *Will Capitalism Survive?* (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, Georgetown University, 1979) for a discussion of this problem.

7. J. Robert Nelson, "Capitalism: Blessing and Curse", in Ernest W. Lefever (ed.), *Will Capitalism Survive?*

8. John D. Stephens, "Impasse and Breakthrough - in Sweden", *Dissent*, Summer 1981, p. 310. Stephens' characterization of the nature of bureaucratized state corporations should not be restricted to capitalist-based economies. State enterprises in many socialist countries have been accused of merely operating under the rubric of social ownership without any manifestation of actual public control. The exceptions may be Hungary and Yugoslavia which have increasingly placed more control of enterprise operations under plant managers and worker committees. Nonetheless, ultimate control over sale and other conditions of ownership are still vested in the state. The independent trade union, Solidarity, called for similar reforms in Polish industry prior to the imposition of martial law in December 1981.

9. Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy*.

10. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, December 11, 1981, pp. 31235-6. The Court found that "such a form of compulsion struck at the very substance of the freedom guaranteed by Article 11 (of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms)". Six of the eighteen judges "expressed the view that the possibility of choice, an indispensable component of freedom of association, did not exist in a closed shop".

11. See, for instance, Emerson P. Schmidt, *Union Power and the Public Interest* (Los Angeles: Nash Publishing, 1973).

12. Bolivian tin miners are one of the most highly politicized groups in Bolivia's recent history, and general strikes have forced the resignation of previous military regimes. See Juan de Onis, "Strikes Continue in Bolivia as Natusch Refuses to Quit", *The New York Times*, November 7, 1979; "Bolivian Miners Resist Takeover by the Military", *The New York Times*, August 1, 1980; and Chris Hedges, "The Night Bolivia's Military Tried to Block Tin Miners", *The Christian Science Monitor*, December 15, 1981.

13. John Gretton, "Desert Slaves are Treated 'Like Dogs'", *The London Times*, August 30, 1981.

14. Victor Zorza, "What Happens When an Indian Village Tries to Escape from 'Bondage'", *The Christian Science Monitor*, June 15, 1981.

15. See "Guest Workers in the Soviet Union", *Foreign Report*, September 17, 1981; and Doan Van Toai, "What's Become of Vietnam?", *The Wall Street Journal*, March 24, 1982.

16. Nozick, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*, pp. 169-172.

17. "Administrative friction" refers to economic constraints that delay or inhibit labor movement, such as inadequate information on employment opportunities in market economies, or a reluctance by managers to permit job relocation or to incur the costs of job retraining in command economies.

18. See P.J.D. Wiles, *Economic Institutions Compared* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1977) and Gerald L. Houseman, *Right of Mobility* (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1979).

19. "Polish Censors' Secret Restrictions Revealed", *Freedom At Issue*, March-April 1978.

20. Victor Gunewardena, "Man, Media, and Development: The Press in Sri Lanka", *Human Rights Quarterly*, Summer 1981, p. 94.

21. Marquis W. Childs, *Sweden: The Middle Way on Trial*, (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1981), p. 41.

22. Thomas J. Courchene, "Towards a Protected Society: the politicization of economic life", *Canadian Journal of Economics*, November 1980, p. 559. See also Dorothy Wilson, *The Welfare State in Sweden: A Study in Comparative Social Administration* (London: Heineman, 1979).

23. See Kanji Haitani, "Changing Characteristics of the Japanese Employment System", *Asian Survey*, October 1978, and Lawrence W. Beer, "Group Rights and Individual Rights in Japan", *Asian Survey*, April 1981.

24. For a discussion of the general effects of the Green Revolution in India, see Francine R. Ffankel, "Compulsion and Social Change: Is Authoritarianism the Solution to India's Economic Development?" *World Politics*, January, 1978. See also Richard Critchfield, *Villages* (New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1981), Chapter 12.

25. Kanji Haitani, "Changing Characteristics of the Japanese Employment System", p. 45.

26. Most of the information on which our analysis is based has been gathered from a variety of sources, including Amnesty International Reports, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1981*, report submitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate and Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, by the Department of State, February 1982, *The Europa Yearbook 1981* (London: Europa Publications, 1981), George Thomas Kurian, *The Encyclopedia of the Third World* (New York: Facts on File, 1981), the Inter-American Press Association, and regional and international journals, such as *The Manchester Guardian*, *The New York Times*, *The Economist*, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, and *Latin America Times*.

27. Although traditional communal tenure protects communities against encroachment by outsiders, the mobility of members is severely circumscribed by their inability to move easily from their own community and into others.

28. See Andreas Uhlig, "Sugar and Salt Against Disease and Corruption", *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, January 1982, p. 17.

29. "The PQLI and the DRR: New Tools for Measuring Development Progress," *Communique*, 1979/4. See also John W. Sewell and the Staff of the Overseas Development Council, *The United States and World Development: Agenda 1982* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982).

30. See P. T. Bauer, *Equality, the Third World and Economic Delusion* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), Chapter 1; John W. Sewell, *op. cit.*; and William Loehr and John P. Powelson, *The Economics of Development and Distribution* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981), pp. 79-121.

Worker Freedoms in Latin America

A critical right for workers everywhere is the right to organize in defense of their interests and to strike to defend these interests. Yet like so many other basic rights, these rights are seldom if ever fully acknowledged. Unfortunately, this denial is at least as common in countries ostensibly dedicated to workers as in those that do not single out any class for special attention in official rhetoric. A beginning was made on the examination of worker rights in the 1980 Yearbook essay, "An Index For Trade Union Freedom." Primarily a theoretical exploration of what such an index should contain, examples were given from a few Latin American countries. This year we apply the index in more detail to Latin America.

Wide variations exist in Latin America today in the degree to which trade union rights are respected. The situation is excellent in some countries and very poor in others, with many variations in between. This is the picture that emerges from ranking the nineteen major countries of Latin America on the Index of Trade Union Freedom presented in the 1980 volume of *FREEDOM IN THE WORLD*.¹ The first four categories of that Index were used, which cover labor's rights to organize, bargain, strike, and take political action. Knowledgeable experts were asked to fill out worksheets with a number of specific questions as to how each right was being observed, in each geographical and occupational sector, in each country, as of November/December, 1981. The details of the scoring will be found in the previous publication.

The first three categories are the classic rights of trade unionism. The right to organize and the right to bargain collectively are also rights on which the International Labor Organization, ILO, has adopted conventions: Number 87, on freedom of association and protection of the right to organize, and Number 98, on the right to organize and collective bargaining, adopted in 1948 and 1949 respectively.

The right to political action was added as a fourth category. If unions are to advance the interests of their members effectively, they must be able to act as powerful pressure groups on the national scene and play a role in determining who governs the nation. In a developing nation, if a traditional elite owns most of the land and factories, controls the government, and receives a large part of the wealth, then unions that are allowed to bargain collectively, but are not allowed to engage in political action, can only bargain about the distribution of whatever crumbs the oligarchy leaves on the table. In a modern, industrialized country, it is the administration in power in the national government that decides on monetary and fiscal policies that affect levels of business activity, employment, and prices. That is, every worker has a stake, in terms of jobs, wages, and prices, in what group holds power nationally and to what extent it reflects the interests of labor or management. Enterprise-level collective bargaining by unions that cannot undertake political action would leave unions playing a game under rules made by others. Workers want a voice in making the rules of the game, and consequently the trade unionist views national politics as a legitimate union activity.

The right to organize (Table 10). This category does not measure the prevalence of trade unions but the prevalence of free unions, that is, ones in which the members can freely elect leaders of their own choice. There are many unions throughout the world, in nations ruled by totalitarian or military dictatorships, that will not show up on this scale. Since our purpose is to measure how many unions exist that can defend workers' interests against the state, state labor fronts and "officialista" unions will not raise a rating.

In this category, and throughout the index, separate scores are required for various union sectors, because of variations in union freedom among them. Urban workers may enjoy more freedom than rural workers, and usually private-sector workers have rights denied to those paid by the state. Throughout the index we have further subdivided the state's employees into two categories—those who work for "autonomous state enterprises" (state-owned factories, railroads, and so forth), and those who are in the public service proper (bureaucrats) and are thus engaged in the administration of the state.

The right to bargain collectively (Table 11). This category measures who can bargain in a nation and what they can bargain about. A major problem arises from the great differences in national practice as to what matters are determined by national legislation and what are left to direct negotiations between unions and management. In some democratic countries with free labor movements, legislation is the major determinant of wages, hours, and welfare benefits. In other democratic nations, such as the United States, workers would consider it a great mistake to let legislators take over such a large portion of the decisions made through private-sector collective bargaining.

Since national preferences and customs vary so widely, the collective bargaining section of the index will *not* measure the division of decision making between bargaining and legislation. Our concern is the freedom of the unions

versus the state. Therefore, the index asks on what topics unions in each sector can bargain for benefits going beyond whatever the national legislation does provide.

Though giving more points to nations without wage controls, we do not presume to judge whether such controls should be applied. The index merely measures the degree to which unions are free to bargain about wages, and ranks countries accordingly. If economic stabilization requires wage controls, there may be a good reason for restricting bargaining rights in this area.

The right to strike (Table 12). This category of the index poses the most troublesome problems of all. First, despite the common usage of the phrase, the *right to strike* is not generally recognized in international covenants as are the rights to organize and bargain. The ILO does not have a convention on the right to strike. No mention of the right to strike is found in the UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, or the OAS American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.

Despite the silence of ILO conventions on the issue, the ILO's Committee of Experts and its Freedom of Association Committee have taken the position that a permanent ban on strikes in all sectors is "inconsistent with the principles of freedom of association," because the strike weapon is "a legitimate means whereby workers' organizations may defend their occupational interests." Given this judgment by an organization that represents management, labor, and government sectors in virtually all nations, plus the emphasis put on the right to strike by trade unionists who view it as the workers' crucial "equalizer" to the influence and position of upper-income groups, we have included use of the strike as a right. Restrictions on this right will lower a country's overall ranking on the index.

Granted this decision, the problem arises as to how much a nation's ranking on the index should suffer if the right to strike is replaced by compulsory arbitration. This has been done in Australia and New Zealand, both fully democratic nations with labor movements generally considered free. Yet, they do not have legal resort to the strike, which has been replaced by arbitration procedures that are impartial and in which the parties concerned can participate at all stages.

Proponents of such participatory arbitration systems might contend that the right that workers possess is not to strike, but to a role of power and influence in the process of dispute settlement. This power might be exerted through the threat of a strike, or through a voice in setting arbitration procedures and selecting arbitrators. By such a definition, Australians might argue that their workers fully enjoy this right. The prevailing international consensus, as expressed through the ILO, does not accept this argument, but it is sufficiently persuasive that we have given democratic arbitration a fairly high ranking in the hierarchy of situations rated under the "right to strike".

The right to political action (Table 13). The primary difficulty in considering this right arises from the broad differences in national practice on types of political action engaged in by trade unions. In most of the world it is common for political movements of a social reformist nature to have two organization arms—a political party and a group of trade unions. Where this fused relationship prevails, the trade unions need not develop machinery for lobbying in the parliament, for the deputies from the movement the unions represent actually constitute a part of the parliament. An example of this pattern is the relationship between the DGB (union) and SPD (party) in West Germany. Where unions and parties remain separate, however, the lobbying function becomes very important, as in the United States, where both the AFL-CIO and most occupational federations maintain large staffs of lobbyists to deal with the Congress and the state legislatures. To German workers, freedom to lobby is not so important, because they have no need to exercise that right, while to U.S. workers the freedom to join with a political party into a single movement is of little concern because such a fusion is considered undesirable.

In the same way, variations in practice exist in regard to running union officers as candidates in national parliamentary elections, or to using the union movement to advocate a complete change in the system of ownership of the means of production. Some unions consider such actions vitally important, while others are totally disinterested in them.

To deal with such variations, the political-action aspect of the index does not measure the extent to which unions in each country engage in each type of political action. That is not the purpose of the index, which seeks instead to measure the degree of freedom allowed by the state. Therefore the index asks, "Are unions in practice free from prohibitions on exercising such of the following forms of political action as appear appropriate to the national circumstances?" If the unions appear free to engage in a certain type of political action, then the country should be given a "yes" answer for that item, even though its trade unions do not choose to undertake that type of activity.

Naturally, the experts disagreed in many cases as to exactly what score a given country should receive on a certain right. However, they concurred on the general placement of the countries on a relative basis. Thus this study is more than impressionistic, but less than scientifically objective. It used an organized format to make relative judgments. The fact that one country scored a few points higher than another country on a given right is not very significant—but whether a country placed in the top quarter or some lower quarter of the list on a certain right is indeed significant, for the disagreements among the experts were not broad enough to move a country more than a couple of slots up or down on most lists.

The results of the ranking exercise are summarized in Tables 10-13 (countries rated "free" in the Comparative Survey are printed in italics). The scores on the four tables for each country were added and averaged in Table 14. This

Table 10 The Right to Organize

<i>Colombia*</i>	100
<i>Costa Rica</i>	100
<i>Ecuador</i>	100
<i>Venezuela</i>	100
<i>Honduras</i>	95
Mexico	95
Panama	95
Peru	95
<i>Dominican Republic</i>	90
Nicaragua	83
Chile	75
Brazil	60
Uruguay	50
Bolivia	45
El Salvador	45
Paraguay	45
Argentina	38
Guatemala	30
Cuba	0

•Countries rated "free" in Table 1 are in italics.

Table 11 The Right to Collective Bargaining

<i>Colombia</i>	94
<i>Ecuador</i>	94
<i>Costa Rica</i>	91
<i>Venezuela</i>	85
Mexico	82
<i>Dominican Republic</i>	75
<i>Honduras</i>	75
Nicaragua	75
Peru	75
El Salvador	56
Panama	50
Paraguay	44
Argentina	33
Brazil	19
Bolivia	0
Chile	0
Cuba	0
Guatemala	0
Uruguay	0

Table 12 The Right to Strike

<i>Peru</i>	65
<i>Venezuela</i>	58
Mexico	53
Panama	50
<i>Colombia</i>	35
<i>Costa Rica</i>	35
<i>Ecuador</i>	35
<i>Honduras</i>	35
<i>Dominican Republic</i>	30
El Salvador	30
Brazil	28
Uruguay	20
Paraguay	10
Argentina	0
Bolivia	0
Chile	0
Cuba	0
Guatemala	0
Nicaragua	0

Table 13 The Right to Political Action

Mexico	92
<i>Venezuela</i>	92
<i>Colombia</i>	86
<i>Ecuador</i>	86
<i>Peru</i>	83
<i>Costa Rica</i>	75
<i>Dominican Republic</i>	69
<i>Honduras</i>	50
Panama	50
Brazil	44
El Salvador	30
Paraguay	27
Uruguay	21
Nicaragua	19
Bolivia	13
Guatemala	6
Argentina	4
Chile	4
Cuba	0

Table 14
Averaged Scores for Trade Union Freedom

<i>Venezuela</i>	84
Mexico	81
<i>Peru</i>	80
<i>Colombia</i>	79
<i>Ecuador</i>	79
<i>Costa Rica</i>	75
<i>Dominican Republic</i>	66
<i>Honduras</i>	64
Panama	61
Nicaragua	44
El Salvador	40
Brazil	38
Paraguay	32
Uruguay	23
Chile	20
Argentina	19
Bolivia	15
Guatemala	9
Cuba	0

table provides a rough idea of how the Latin American countries rank overall on trade union rights.

TRENDS

The picture conveyed by the above tables is of course a "snap shot in time"—it merely shows how labor's rights were faring in each country in October/November 1981. In some countries, political evolutions were under way which were expected to bring about major changes in observance of workers' rights. Elections were held in Honduras at the end of November, 1981, yielding a free, civilian government for the first time in many years in that nation. If the democratic government is able to remain in power, this will offer greatly increased opportunities for political action by Honduran unions, and should produce improvements in labor law and practice regarding bargaining and strike action. In neighboring Nicaragua, the evolution was in the other direction—away from the relative freedom for labor which prevailed after Somoza's fall, and toward a controlled totalitarian labor structure. If this process continues, Nicaragua's score will drop precipitously. In Brazil, the slowly developing "democratic opening" has already improved labor's situation significantly over that which prevailed during the initial and middle years of military rule, particularly in regard to a de facto right to strike. If the "opening" continues, labor in Brazil could soon be freer than at any time since the establishment of Vargas' "Estado Novo" in the late 1930s. Whether the increased labor freedoms in newly democratic Peru and Ecuador can be maintained depends on the fate of democracy in those countries, which is difficult to predict. In El Salvador, the outcome of the armed conflict will have major effects on Salvadoran labor's future exercise of its rights. Liberal-

ization in Bolivia in 1982 should greatly raise its ranking. Thus the status of workers' rights not only varies greatly at the present time, but the trends are also varied, some providing hope for improvement, others foreshadowing difficult times for free trade unions.

BRUTALITY

It should be noted that the tables merely show what governments allow unions to do. The study does not indicate what happens to workers who try to do that which is forbidden. Obviously it makes a great difference to those workers whether they are reprimanded, fired, jailed briefly, imprisoned for long terms, beaten, tortured, or murdered. The degree of brutality employed by governments varies in Latin America just as much as does the degree of union activity allowed, both from country to country, and within a country over time. As of October/November, 1981, the greatest number of atrocities inflicted on workers were occurring in Guatemala and El Salvador, where hundreds of trade unionists have been assassinated, with government complicity in Guatemala, and with ineffective government opposition if not complicity in El Salvador.² The situation regarding brutality continued to be serious in Argentina, although the wave of "disappearances" of labor leaders in the late 1970s has abated. Now arrests, beatings, and some torture are more common than killings of labor leaders.³ In Bolivia, at least until early 1982 brutality continued to figure prominently in the severe repression of labor.

Brutality has diminished significantly in recent years in both Chile and Brazil, where torture and disappearances were common in the earlier years of military rule.⁴ While union freedom remains as restricted as ever in Chile, defiance today means loss of employment more often than loss of one's head. Brazil, as mentioned earlier, is moving toward greater freedom for labor in addition to stopping brutality.

WORKER FREEDOM UNDER DICTATORS

Naturally, respect for trade union rights is greatest in the free nations of Latin America. Dictators and free trade unions are natural political enemies. On all the tables the democratic nations are bunched toward the top. What may be more surprising to some observers, however, is the wide range of scores among the various dictatorships. Panama, although basically under military rule, ranks high on all the tables. Brazil and El Salvador, neither having democratically elected national leadership in 1981, tend toward the middle of the rankings. The other dictatorships severely repress labor, more in keeping with the stereotype of the "right-wing military regime." Just to know that a Latin American nation is under military rule does not tell one much about how free labor is in that nation (nor how brutally restrictions are enforced).

PERMANENCE OF UNION LOCALS

Despite the generally bleak picture for workers' rights in Latin America, in almost every country there exists a significant number of local unions that still freely elect their own leaders. Even when repression lops off labor organization above the local level, many locals survive. Often they cannot do much—the tables show at least five nations in which collective bargaining and strikes were virtually suspended. However, the persistence of the locals allows the often sudden resurgence of Latin America labor movements when repression is eased. The obvious exception is Cuba. In that totalitarian nation, no local union is allowed that does not have leaders selected by the ruling party. When this rule was relaxed briefly in the early 1970s, most of the party-imposed leaders were promptly voted out. Full control was quickly re-imposed.⁵ Thus there is a qualitative difference in the situation of trade unions under totalitarian and authoritarian dictatorships. Authoritarian rulers repress unions—totalitarian own them. Even in Nicaragua where many observers saw a rapid trend toward totalitarianism under way in late 1981, there were still many union locals with leaders of their own choice—hence Nicaragua is given much higher scores than Cuba.

In conclusion, the analysis of labor freedom in Latin America found almost every degree of union freedom spread among democracies, authoritarian dictatorships, brutal authoritarianisms, and even a totalitarian state. For the average worker freedoms remain more potential than realized. Unfortunately, were we to extend this analysis to any other area in the third world we would find the condition of the worker even more unfavorable.

NOTES

1. "An Index For Trade Union Freedom", in Raymond D. Gastil, *Freedom in the World 1980*, (New York: Freedom House, 1980).

2. See William C. Doherty, Jr., "U.S. Labor's Role in El Salvador", *AFL-CIO Free Trade Union News*, February, 1981. See also, Andrew C. McLellan, "Right-Wing Terror Paralyzes Guatemalan Labor," *AFL-CIO Free Trade Union News*, September, 1980.

3. See information on Argentina in *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices*, Report submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs by the Department of State, February 2nd 1981, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981).

4. See Robert J. Alexander, "Chile A Year After the Military Coup", *Freedom At Issue*, November/December, 1974.

5. Jorge I. Dominguez, *Cuba—Order and Revolution* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press, 1978).

The Continuing Struggle for Freedom of Information

Leonard R. Sussman

After a decade of skirmishing between governments and world-news media over the flow of information, this was a year of altered strategies without basic change in objectives or relative power.

A senior information officer of the United Nations stated the fundamental controversy:

Newspapers and magazines such as *Le Monde*, *Newsweek*, the *Economist*, the *New York Times*, *Times* of London have acquired an international status without accepting international accountability. Similarly, radio stations such as the British Broadcasting Corporation, the Voice of America, the Voice of Germany, Radio Moscow, and others have a global impact without global accountability. This monopoly extends also into books, periodicals, movies, and advertising.¹

The UN officer concluded:

The new world information and communication order can come about through a variety of ways, including self-regulation within the communication industry. The dialogue so far does not appear to lead to meaningful self-regulation. International mechanisms may be devised to promote the desired change. If change is not forthcoming, it seems inevitable that governments will proceed with measures of which some may be interpreted as being opposed to the "freedom of the press."²

Such not-so-veiled threats were less apparent this year at intergovernmental debates. There was broader acceptance by both information-rich and -poor countries that the developing nations need far more effective communication infrastructures. Few disagree that they are required to assist economic and

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social development. Communications, however, have many uses. They also can be used to keep restive populations from thinking dissenting thoughts and acting to the detriment of the ruling elite. Communications can also be used to reinforce in this and successor generations the traditional culture of a people or nation.

THE NEW EMPHASIS ON "CULTURE"

Culture, however defined, was becoming in 1981-82 the overarching link in the continuing debate over the role of communication in the world. In years past, some Third World critics of the four dominant world-news services (Associated Press, United Press International, Reuters, Agence-France Presse) had charged the Big Four with "cultural imperialism." Too much of their daily reporting was said to reflect interests, writing styles and the politics of the Big Four's main clients: the industrial societies in the United States, Western Europe, Japan and the English-speakers of the Pacific basin.

Third World critics seemed to believe that the following message sent June 10 to "all points" from the headquarters of one world-news agency was typical of year-round directives that silence news that the developing countries want to hear:

WITH THE MIDDLE EAST, THE FALKLANDS, THE SUMMIT,
ETC. . . . THE REPORT WILL BE EXTREMELY HEAVY TODAY
AND TIME AVAILABLE ON THE WIRE WILL BE AT A MINI-
MUM. THEREFORE, PLS USE EXTREME DISCRETION IN FIL-
ING COPY. . . . CUT DOWN ON ALL BUT THE ESSENTIALS
TO AVOID A FLOOD OF NON-PRIORITY COPY HERE.

The truth is, such blanket messages to correspondents overseas are rare. In this case, extensive coverage of wars in the third world resulted in a sharp reduction in news from everywhere else. If a report of economic-development news had been put on the international wire that day in mid-June it is unlikely it would have been published or broadcast. Critics call this only an extreme example of the domination by a relatively few editors of the news that most of the world will receive.

Yet Third World elites who generally decide what citizens of their countries will or will not read or hear must also have watched developments in the Falklands and the Middle East with great interest; and mainly through the reports of the Big Four. Over time, say these critics, this news-selection procedure results in the cultural domination by the few over the many. *Culture*, this year, gave promise of becoming the new forum in which communication issues—as surrogates for political and economic power—will henceforth be debated.

The main arena for these debates continued to be the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). As a prelude, Director-General Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow divided UNESCO's Culture and Communication Division into two separate arms. This separation emphasized the growing influence that both sectors will have in the already large agency. The change was made in time to concentrate considerable additional energy on the World Conference on Cultural Policies scheduled for Mexico City in late July 1982. It seemed likely that the creation of two divisions, each with a supporting secretariat, would immediately focus more energy on the communication issues within that new sector. In addition, UNESCO's broad anthropological definition of culture facilitates a fresh examination of newsreporting, commercial advertising, book publication, and entertainment in films, cassettes and other forms of communication—including cross-border data flows and business, scientific and transportation information—as forms of "culture" to be examined by governments for possible regulation or control. At the very least, it seemed clear this year that the arenas and the contexts of international discourse on communication and related matters had been both broadened and increased in number.

This institutional change was forecast in the first part of the draft of UNESCO's Medium-Term Plan (1984-1989) signed by Director-General M'Bow. The plan, repeatedly delayed in transmission to UNESCO's executive board, must provide guidance for all of the organization's activities for five years ahead. The thousands of projects that have grown like Topsy through the years were apparently difficult to rationalize for the politically diverse constituencies of UNESCO. The thirty-eight-page introduction, "World Problems and the Lines of Emphasis of the Medium-Term Plan," raised cultural issues to the top level of the organization's concerns. While the reinforcing of peace was the primary motivation of UNESCO's founders, emphasis on all forms of development of nations and their peoples is said to be a major concern at UNESCO today and for the future. And, further, "a growing awareness of the importance of the cultural dimension of development thus emerges as one of the salient facts of our time. . . In other words, culture and development are inseparable."

The uses of culture, in this view, are essentially pragmatic, engineered to advance economic and social development. Development should be envisaged as "an attempt, among other things, to internalize the dynamics of technological change" in the interests of the community, "helping them to achieve their deepest material and spiritual aspirations." Culture, therefore, has a role in "stimulating and organizing of social creativity" on the part of individual citizens.³

The plan observed that in this "increasingly complex world" the sources of friction are on the increase just as the "means of communicating are becoming stronger." In the cultural field, the plan stated, "these contradictory demands of new world relationships are most readily discernible." There is a "standard-

ization of tastes and behavior and homogenization of certain patterns of life, thought and action, of production and consumption." There is also a "renewed, explosive upsurge" from "ethnic, national, rural or urban communities, and cultural or religious entities" endeavoring to assert their own identities. These "contradictory phenomena are spreading in a series of shock waves from one region of the globe to the other,"⁴ the plan stated.

Culture appears to be the new central focus of much UNESCO programming (culture defined in terms of the most vital political, economic and social aspects of societies and the interaction among them). Communication and information, however, are now termed "the nervous system of contemporary societies: they are essential to their activities, particularly in economic matters, and play an essential part in financial transactions and banking and in the development of trade, of land, sea and air transport, of health or public administration systems, and of military systems."⁵ The plan acknowledges that "two distinct groups of problems are to be discerned," that relating to the news media and that relating to specialized information, particularly in science and technology. The UNESCO plan quickly adds, however, that it "is abundantly clear that the two sets of problems are connected." Inherently, the news media are said to represent a "vertical" relationship between those transmitting and those receiving information. The media exert influence over readers, listeners or viewers. Consequently, the plan argued, "in all societies the media are the crucial issue in an endless debate between media professionals and authority in all its forms, and of a constant dialectic between the endeavor to persuade and enlighten, and the endeavor to meet the expectations of the public." Communication is therefore said to be a "power that is still shared unequally, both nationally and internationally."⁶

The medium-term plan argued, then, that the news media and the "cultural industries" have a "decisive role in the future fate of cultures." The institutional separation of the communication and culture sectors of UNESCO are rejoined in the ideological expression of programmatic needs for the next five years. Indeed, two strong thrusts for the period ahead would appear to be the enlarged emphasis on cultural programs and the formulation of a juridical convention on the right to communicate.

The plan stated unequivocally that UNESCO is both an "observatory" and a "think tank" that should "sensitize world public opinion to the way in which world problems are perceived today" and thus "propagate innovative mental attitudes toward the solutions" and a "sense of global solidarity among peoples and nations."⁷

The world conference on cultural policies was the first such world-scale meeting since the initial conference in Venice in 1970. At each preparatory meeting—in Monaco (1967), Budapest (1968) and Dakar (1969)—the definitions of what constitutes culture have been steadily broadened, and the rhetoric on what is needed to alter the national and international development of culture have become increasingly aggressive. The provisional agenda for the

1982 conference described culture as "covering all the distinctive spiritual and material, intellectual and emotional features characterizing a society." Director-General M'Bow, speaking informally to a small group of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO at Columbia, S.C., several months before the conference, implied that virtually all of UNESCO's programs hereafter would be regarded as operating under the rubric of the development of culture. Indeed, the context of culture projects initially a less confrontational mode than education, science or, certainly, communication. In the search for an individual's, people's or nation's cultural identity it becomes essential to discover the core of a culture and pursue its own development, taking sustenance from outside cultures and contributing to other cultures in a process of exchange. This raises basic questions of how concern for national unity can be meshed with domestic cultural pluralism and the flow of cultural elements across national boundaries. This is a primary consideration of the developing countries which are major supporters of cultural analysis as another factor in national development.

Indeed, it seems clear that UNESCO's new emphasis on culture will be regarded as another dimension of economic and social development. Yet the expanding effects, particularly of communication technology, tend to internationalize the flow of elements termed culture. It may soon be argued that the dominant power of the major industrial nations "pollutes" the cultural atmosphere. The agenda asked, "How can we promote a form of development that will be rooted in the cultural identity of each people?"⁸

The mass media are said to offer "considerable potential" for disseminating culture to large audiences. They may also lead to the "impoverishment of certain forms of creative work owing to the wholesale invasion of standardized cultural products." Similarly, the "cultural industries"—books, films, cassettes, television—are said to "encourage mediocrity, to standardize tastes, to distort certain cultural values and to affect the behavior patterns of many population groups." The conference was urged to examine the disadvantages as well as the advantages of using industrial techniques to produce cultural goods.

The Nonaligned movement prepared for the Mexico City conference by meeting in April 1982 in Havana to draft a Third World position for the world meeting. UNESCO provided \$10,000 to enable delegates from the PLO and SWAPO to attend. The Third World objective, according to Prensa Latina, the Cuban news service, was to "determine the role of educational and cultural values in the installation of a New International Economic Order." Cuba's Minister of Culture, opening the sessions, took as his theme the Nonaligned movement's sixth summit declaration that "culture in its widest sense is part of the struggle for political liberation and the economic and social development of our peoples."⁹

The meeting agreed to make an "inventory of the cultural possessions of peoples usurped by colonial powers so as to demand their restoration."

A drafting commission composed of Cuba, India, Zaire, Yugoslavia and the Arab cultural organizations prepared the Nonaligned position for Mexico City. The Nonaligned summarized its position at Havana: "The struggle for peace and the implementation of a new world economic order with a cultural basis that will eliminate the power of the information transnational corporations."¹⁰

The difficulties of the American and related delegations at Mexico City were spotlighted not only by such declarations but also by the fact that the U.S. has not—and cannot have—a Ministry of Culture that determines American policy in that field. That is the price—or the value, if you prefer—of basing a nation and society on individual rights and free choice. Such a system is inconceivable for most of the more than one hundred other delegates. For them, it would not seem inaccurate to describe the Mexican conference as did the Soviet Union's Deputy Minister of Culture when he spoke of the "meeting of Ministers of Culture of all the countries of the world."

THE RIGHT TO COMMUNICATE

Mr. M'Bow, speaking in Brussels in February, enunciated UNESCO's new approach to culture and communication. The report and accompanying one hundred studies of the MacBride Commission (1977-1980) were "merely a starting point," Mr. M'Bow said [see "Freedom of the Press" in the 1980 and 1981 yearbooks for analysis of the MacBride Commission]. The 1980 General Conference mandated by 1983 further examinations of the MacBride findings and an attempt to define a "new world information and communication order." Mr. M'Bow in Brussels defined UNESCO's objective as the "world-wide democratization of information." He called for "increased emphasis on pluralism throughout the world and within each nation." That, he said, "begins with more and more varied sources of information." He referred only to "nations" needing to master the "most sophisticated broadcasting techniques"—no reference to independent media or to a mixed private/public information sector. He cited Pope John Paul II's address to African journalists. The Pope also felt it "important to stress that national sovereignty is safeguarded through the correct use of the communication media precisely because these media can become instruments of ideological pressure." And, the Pope added, "this ideological pressure is more dangerous and insidious than many more abusively coercive means."

Mr. M'Bow then went on to charge a part of the international press with emphasizing the sensational, and covering events that "are likely to stir up, shock or even scandalize public opinion." He termed this "deplorable" and called again for the exercise of "responsibility" along with freedom. The establishment of a new order, he concluded, "presupposes both the creation of mass media managed and run by men and women from all regions of the world and a shared sense of professional responsibility, on the part of those who purvey information, towards the values that we all hold in common."¹¹

As reasonable as such statements appear, they are based on a fundamental fallacy and an equally dangerous premise. It is fallacious to state as fact that "we all" share a common set of values. There are such wide disparities that wars are fought, peoples oppressed, and classes of people or whole peoples eliminated in the name of values allegedly held dear by one or another nation and, conversely, found abhorrent to other nations. Similarly, systems of government reflect diverse national values and, in turn, create information and communication systems in terms of these values.

To expect communicators to display "responsibility" means in most countries that they adhere to those values set forth by the respective system of governance. As between the repressive and the free systems there can be few if any basic values held in common.

That suggests the difficulty of framing a convention on the Right to Communicate. UNESCO has formally placed this subject on its agenda. Individual communications specialists have tussled for some years with this question. Having addressed the *content* of the communication process, UNESCO believes it should also examine the *process* itself. An UNESCO consultation in Bucharest in February 1982 asked whether the right to communicate was adequately protected by existing instruments, notably the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. Its Article 19 provides the most precise expression of such rights. The support shown at Bucharest for the complete rewriting of existing instruments "to reflect the 'right to communicate' as a new core right which is the center of other rights" can only be regarded by libertarians as ominous. The rewriting was "considered urgent, especially to achieve two-way communication." It is, however, doubtful that Article 19 of the Universal Declaration could be approved today given the present climate and voting patterns in the UN. The article states: "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers." Consequently, any rewriting is likely to diminish the real rights vouchsafed in a new instrument. While, indeed, modern communications technology should be rapidly shared with citizens of information-poor countries—and not only for the use of their governments—the process of enlarging the volume and variety of communication should not inhibit its content. Even the best of intentions can be counterproductive. For example, the Bucharest consultation¹² generally agreed that "the right to communicate is a fundamental human right of all individuals and such a right also belongs to groups, communities, peoples and states." Yet the requirement that guarantees an individual or, more likely, a government access to the mass media would open the way for official control of the information process. To be sure, as the accompanying Table 15 suggests three-quarters of the nations already exert such controls over domestic news media.

Table 15
News Media Control by Countries

	Generally Free ¹	Partly Free ¹	Generally Not Free ¹	Gov't News Agency ²	Civil Liberties ³
Afghanistan			PB	X	7
Albania			PB	X	7
Algeria			PB	X	6
Angola			PB	X	7
Antigua & Baibuda		B			2
Argentina		P	B	X	5
Australia	PB			X	1
Austria	PB			X	1
Bahamas	P	B			2
Bahrain			PB	X	5
Bangladesh	P	B		X	5
Barbados	P	B		X	1
Belgium	PB			X	1
Belize	P	B			2
Benin			PB	X	6
Bhutan			P		5
Bolivia		P	B	X	4
Botswana	P	B			3
Brazil		PB		X	3
Bulgaria			PB	X	7
Burma			PB	X	6
Burundi			PB	X	6
Cameroon			PB	X	6
Canada	PB				1
Cape Verde Islands			PB		6
Central African Rep.		PB			5
Chad			PB	X	6
Chile		PB		X	5
China (Mainland)			PB	X	6
China (Taiwan)		PB			5
Colombia	PB			X	3
Congo			PB	X	6
Costa Rica	PB				1
Cuba			PB	X	6
Cyprus (G)	P	B		X	2
Cyprus (T)	P	B			3
Czechoslovakia			PB	X	6
Denmark	PB			X	1
Dominica	PB				2
Dominican Rep.	P	B			2

Notes to the Table

1. P designates print media; B designates broadcast (radio and TV) media. Print media refers primarily to domestic newspapers and news magazines. Countries in which the media are too little developed or for which there is insufficient information to include in this table are: Comoro Islands, Djibouti, Kiribati, Rwanda, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Western Samoa.
2. X designates the presence of a government news agency, with or without the availability of private news services.
3. See Table 1, pp. 10-13.

	Generally Free ¹	Partly Free	Generally Not Free	Gov't News Agency ²	Civil Liberties ³
Ecuador	PB			X	2
Egypt		P	B	X	5
El Salvador		PB			5
Equatorial Guinea			PB		6
Ethiopia			PB	X	7
Fiji	PB				2
Finland	P	B		X	2
France	P	B		X	2
Gabon			PB	X	6
Gambia	PB				4
Germany (E)			PB	X	7
Germany (W)	PB			X	2
Ghana		PB		X	5
Greece	PB?			X	2
Grenada			PB		5
Guatemala		PB		X	6
Guinea			PB		7
Guinea-Bissau			PB		6
Guyana		PB		X	4
Haiti			PB		6
Honduras	PB				3
Hungary			PB	X	5
Iceland	PB				1
India	P	B		X	3
Indonesia		P	B	X	5
Iran			PB	X	6
Iraq			PB	X	7
Ireland	PB				1
Israel	PB				2
Italy	PB			X	2
Ivory Coast		P	B	X	5
Jamaica	P	B			3
Japan	PB			X	1
Jordan			PB	X	6
Kampuchea (Cambodia)			PB	X	7
Kenya		P	B	X	5
Korea (N)			PB	X	7
Korea (S)		P	B	X	5
Kuwait		P	B	X	4
Laos			PB	X	7
Lebanon		PB		X	4
Lesotho		PB			5
Liberia			PB		6
Libya			PB	X	6
Luxembourg	PB				1
Madagascar			PB	X	6
Malawi			PB	X	7
Malaysia		P	B	X	4
Maldives		P	B		5
Mali			PB	X	6

Table 15 (continued)

	Generally Free ¹	Partly Free ¹	Generally Not Free ¹	Gov't News Agency ²	Civil Liberties ³
Malta	P	B		X	3
Mauritania			PB	X	6
Mauritius	PB				3
Mexico		PB		X	4
Mongolia			PB	X	7
Morocco		P	B?	X	5
Mozambique			PB	X	7
Nauru	PB				2
Nepal		P	B	X	4
Netherlands	PB			X	1
New Zealand	PB			X	1
Nicaragua		PB			5
Niger			PB		6
Nigeria	P	B		X	3
Norway	PB			X	1
Oman			PB		6
Pakistan			PB	X	5
Panama		PB		X	5
Papua New Guinea	PB				2
Paraguay		PB			5
Peru	PB			X	3
Philippines		P	B	X	4
Poland		P	B	X	5
Portugal	PB			X	2
Qatar			PB	X	5
Romania			PB	X	6
St. Lucia	PB				2
St. Vincent	P	B?			2
Sao Tome & Principe			PB		6
Saudi Arabia			PB	X	6
Senegal		PB		X	4
Seychelles			PB		6
Sierra Leone			PB		5
Singapore			PB		5
Somalia			PB	X	7
South Africa		P	B		6
Spain	PB			X	3
Sri Lanka	P	B		X	3
Sudan			PB	X	5
Suriname			PB		5
Swaziland			PB		5
Sweden	PB			X	1
Switzerland	PB			X	1
Syria			PB	X	7
Tanzania			PB	X	6
Thailand		P	B	X	4
Togo			PB	X	6
Tonga			PB		3
Transkei			PB		6
Trinidad & Tobago	PB				2

	Generally Free ¹	Partly Free ¹	Generally Not Free ¹	Gov't News Agency ²	Civil Liberties ³
Tunisia		P	B	X	5
Turkey		P	B	X	5
Uganda			PB	X	5
USSR			PB	X	7
United Arab Emirates		P	B	X	5
United Kingdom	PB			X	1
United States	PB				1
Upper Volta		PB		X	5
Uruguay		PB			5
Venezuela	PB			X	2
Vietnam			PB	X	6
Yemen (N)			PB	X	5
Yemen (S)			PB	X	7
Yugoslavia			PB	X	5
Zaire			PB	X	6
Zambia		P	B	X	6
Zimbabwe		P	B		5

Table Summary

	Countries (general rating)		Print Media		Broadcast Media	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Free	49	31	54	34	36	23
Partly free	53	34	37	24	34	22
Not free	55	35	66	42	86	55
	157	100	157	100	156	100

This table suggests that governments in three-fourths of the world have a significant or dominant voice in determining what does or does not appear in the media. The definition of media control does not include regulation such as that practiced by the FCC; government control means control over newspaper or broadcast content. In some countries particular media (often broadcasting) may be government financed and indirectly government-managed like the BBC, but still be regarded as largely free of government control of content.

In only one-fourth of the nations are both the print and broadcast media generally free; the press is free in one-third. Newspapers tend to be freer than radio or TV. The press is partly free in twenty-four percent, not free in forty-two percent; broadcasting is partly free in twenty-two percent, not free in fifty-five percent of the nations.

Nearly a half century ago there were thirty-nine national news services in twenty-eight countries. Seventy percent of these were at least nominally independent of government (Robert Desmond, *The Press and World Affairs*. Appleton-Century, 1937). Today there are 105. The number of government-operated news services has increased rapidly in the past five years in consequence of recommendations made by UNESCO. Sixty-eight percent of the nations have a government news agency; eighty-one percent of the not free, sixty-eight percent of the partly free, and fifty-seven percent of the free countries. Of nations with the lowest civil liberties rating (7), ninety-five percent operate government news agencies. National news agencies often use the world news services of the transnational Western media or TASS. They may then decide what world news may be distributed inside the country. Some national news agencies assign themselves the sole right to secure domestic news for distribution inside or outside the country.

The addition of group rights, however defined, raises the question of whether such rights are democratically determined. A system of democratic governance provides the greater assurance that individuals—whether or not members of a readily distinguishable group—are properly served by a communication system. To enforce a group right is, in effect, to apply governmental power to the communication process.

What is being attempted through the Right to Communicate is the squaring of the circle. Those nations whose juridical systems ostensibly function on the basis of group and not individual rights operate communication systems on a similarly collective basis. This cannot be equated with those democratic systems of governance based fundamentally on the rights guaranteed the individual citizen.

COMMUNICATION DEVELOPMENT

To help more and different voices to be heard around the world, UNESCO this year organized the International Program for the Development of Communication (IPDC). The January 1982 meeting of the IPDC Council announced about \$3 million in pledges to IPDC and another \$5 million in bilateral assistance. Some \$80 million had been requested by Third World countries for communications assistance. By March 15, actual contributions received by IPDC totalled \$347,000 (gifts in the \$100,000-range from Iraq, China and France; lesser amounts from Jamaica, Cameroon, Finland, Gabon, San Marino and Oman).¹³ The United States pledged \$100,000 in bilateral assistance outside the IPDC.

The council approved \$910,000 in grants for fourteen regional and inter-regional projects. The main projects supported were the Pan African News Agency (PANA), the Asia-Pacific News Network (ANN), a Latin American news network (ALASEI), and feasibility studies for a world-wide news satellite service.

No single-nation project was approved though some were submitted. The council agreed that all proposals, including those that would benefit nongovernmental media, must be submitted through a national agency. Moreover, nongovernmental agencies (NGOs) with consultative status in UNESCO could submit projects provided a national agency approves. The council submitted several names to Mr. M'Bow for the new office of IPDC program director. He selected Sarath Amunagowa, then Secretary in the Ministry of State of Sri Lanka. His selection was generally welcomed by the free-press-oriented delegates.

UNESCO's satellite project for the global exchange of information made significant progress this year. Communication specialists from forty-four organizations initiated the discussions on a professional level at Paris in October 1981. Participants included executives and senior practitioners in the print and broadcast media, news agency specialists, telecommunications experts and representatives of satellite systems and UN groups concerned with communi-

cations. It was probably the most representative meeting of telecommunications users and technologists ever held. They recommended studies of the use of news from the agencies of the Third World by the news media of the industrialized countries, and vice versa. They called for the universal application of a \$200 per month tariff for a development press bulletin service operating continuously on a full duplex fifty or seventy-five baud circuit. They also urged the creation of journalistic training programs on a regional as well as national basis. Perhaps the most far-sighted recommendation concerned the broadly expanded use of the satellite communication systems such as INTELSAT and INTERSPUTNIK.¹⁴

The meeting agreed to study the feasibility of leasing half-transponders on the Indian, Pacific and Atlantic INTELSAT satellite on a permanent basis. The study would examine the experience of regional broadcasting unions and the press. The satellites would ultimately carry news and information to and from all countries. This author and Bert Cowlan, a telecommunications consultant, had proposed to the Paris meeting that satellite transmissions be scheduled daily from every country and the flow received continuously by all countries. We particularly urged that the content be prepared and edited on a professional, not a propagandists, basis. Such a system would permit all voices to be heard, though no one can guarantee that any message so delivered would be published or broadcast by any domestic or transnational medium accessible to the general public.

A special mission was sent to Washington the following month to discuss with INTELSAT (International Telecommunications Satellite Organization) the leasing of greater satellite capacity at convenient terms for broadcasting and the press. Funds were provided by the IPDC, UNESCO and others to initiate studies. The satellite coordinators and secretaries-general of international and regional broadcasting unions met in Tunis in March 1982. Participants included broadcast union representatives from the Asia-Pacific area, Arab States, Europe, Africa, and North America. Detailed plans were approved for assessing the support each region might require for participating in an experimental video transmission no later than 1983. Present earth station technical capacities could be sufficient for the test period. But in order to permit most countries to participate after the experimental period, television reception/transmission capacities of earth stations and the terrestrial links to the national broadcasting or news centers would have to be expanded.

Most important, these concrete steps are quietly, without heated rhetoric, bringing together the technologists who can broadcast globally the news and views of many never before heard beyond their own countries, and only limitedly there.

THE CONTINUING IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE

The ideological debates continue inside or outside UNESCO. The muting of the clamor for a new order may be attributed to the organization of the

communication technology- and training-transfer program of the IPDC and the widely publicized counter-offensive mounted in mid-1981 by the World Press Freedom Committee. The WPFC and the Murrow Center of Tufts University's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy sponsored the conference at Talloires, France, that produced an incisive document that appeared not only in the world's press but in a special letter from President Ronald Reagan to the House of Representatives. The President urged the House to pass an amendment that would hereafter mandate the U.S. to cease its financial support of UNESCO "if that organization implements any policy or procedure the effect of which is to license journalists or their publications, to censor or otherwise restrict the free flow of information within or among countries, or to impose mandatory codes of journalistic practice or ethics." The Secretary of State was directed by the Amendment to report to the Congress by February 1 of each year whether UNESCO has taken any action described earlier.

Following approval (372 to 19 with 42 not voting) of this Beard amendment to the State Department authorization bill, the Fenwick-Shamansky amendment was passed. It asks the President to report to the Congress on the activities of UNESCO, the quality of U.S. representation there, and the extent to which the U.S. contribution to UNESCO (twenty-five percent of the organization's budget) serves U.S. national interests.

The Beard amendment doubtless reflects Congressional as well as U.S. journalistic attitudes toward UNESCO. Through it Congress sent a clear message to UNESCO that Americans were discomfited by the decade-long challenges to the world's nongovernmental news-delivery systems. The amendment raised constitutional as well as operational questions. It is doubtful whether a Congressional Act such as the Beard amendment can annul a treaty concluded with Senatorial and Presidential agreement. An agreement with the force of a treaty governs American participation in UNESCO, including payment of dues. UNESCO, moreover, has no power to legislate a licensing or other juridical procedure affecting journalists. UNESCO can and does arrange programs, cast resolutions, and prepare and distribute documents that discuss licensing and many other proposals regarded by libertarians as inimical to independent journalism. Such programs, however, would presumably not be subject to U.S. cut-off under the Beard amendment.

The Declaration of Talloires spelled out these and other dangers, and called on UNESCO to concentrate instead on practical measures to free and broaden the flow of information within as well as between countries that now restrict that flow. (The full text of the historic Declaration of Talloires appeared in *Freedom at Issue* September/October 1981.)

For the first time, leaders of independent national print and broadcast and global news services came together to express with a single voice their commitment to the free flow of information, and opposition to restrictions on that flow. The joint declaration was adopted by the sixty-three delegates from twenty-one countries on six continents. The declaration insisted on "free

access, by the people and the press, to all sources of information, both official and unofficial." The declaration acknowledged that some societies cannot yet afford a variety of independent media, but urged that "existing information channels should reflect different points of view." The declaration expressed deep concern over the "growing tendency in many countries and in international bodies to put government interests above those of the individual, particularly in regard to information." The document stated that "press freedom is a basic human right" and pledged "concerted action to uphold this right."

If the Beard amendment was essentially admonitory, the programs of UNESCO were never simply rhetorical flights without real impact.

It would be a fitting assignment for academic communications researchers to discover the extent to which juridical and behavioristic changes in the relationship of governments to domestic and foreign journalism are a consequence of UNESCO's pervasive concern with communications issues. While it may be difficult to discern the particular motivators for, say, press-control legislation and practices, researchers could expect to discover argumentation and procedures used to alter the flow of information—rhetoric and realities that parallel debates or recommendations in the UNESCO arena. That is not to say that blatant censorship or nationalization of newspapers follow directly from a UNESCO discussion. Rather the rush of countries to license their domestic journalists and newspapers in the past several years is probably a consequence of the widespread discussion of licensing that seemed to make that process a likely procedure for officials frustrated or dissatisfied with what they regard as irresponsible journalists.

Responsibility and licensing have become serious agenda items at scores of UNESCO meetings. Recent actions by the governments of Nicaragua, South Africa and Malta reflect similar trends.

In 1982 the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Nicaragua proposed a "law on social communication." If approved, it would make the practice of independent journalism—already severely restricted—impossible. (*La Prensa*, the only independent newspaper, was closed six times in 1981-82. On one occasion government provocateurs initiated violence in front of *La Prensa* offices, resulting in the three-day suspension of the newspaper. The paper's guards were sentenced to prison and their property confiscated. During February, seven radio news programs were banned.) The proposed law professes to support freedom of expression. Article I defines this objective in unobjectionable libertarian phrases. The next article, however, destroys all such commitments. The draft stipulates that the right to "collective communication" is stringently limited: "Such a right bears the *obligation and responsibility* of the communicators to distribute without pressure or coercion of any kind and with absolute truthfulness necessary and socially useful information, as well as to transmit and propagate with absolute honesty and according to reality, the opinions and interpretations of national and international events" (emphasis added). Other articles require the journalist to contribute to the

"uplifting of (Nicaraguans') political conscience and to reinforce their patriotic, political and democratic feelings."

Clearly, the government will provide the "guidance" by which "responsibilities" can be fulfilled and "realities" defined. To assure that, the Administration of Means of Communication (DMC) would be created. The DMC would "process, pass judgment, and resolve with regard to authorization, suspension, renewal, and cancellation of the permits and licenses for the operation of the means of social communication, as well as the ensuing modifications that in its contents, form and periodicity the same may require." The DMC is mandated "to be vigilant that the means of social communication in its form and contents adjust to what is ordained in this present law."

The law applies to television, films, newspapers, magazines, books, posters and any electronic form of communication. Offices of foreign news media operating in Nicaragua would be required to have Nicaraguan managers. Foreign correspondents would also have to register with the government.

The general purpose may be summed up in Article 24 which states that "every publication or broadcast shall express a *legitimate* preoccupation for the defense of the gains of the revolution, the process of reconstruction... and should not be the instrument of anti-popular interests." On this last account, the draft-law stipulates that the news medium must tell the government agency the full names and addresses of letters or other communications received from the public. The news media must also reveal to the DMC "the sources on which their information is based." The draft gratuitously leaves it to the discretion of the journalist "to *voluntarily* consult with the DMC" over material which "could violate this law."

The bill lists scores of "prohibitions"—stories that must not be reported—regarding the dignity of the individual, morals, customs, laws, economic stability, national values, and order. Penalties range from a reprimand to confiscation. The English version of the draft fills twenty-eight pages.

The South African government's proposed press-control law is still weightier. It comes at the end of a four-volume, 2,560-page report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Mass Media. Judge M. T. Steyn headed the governmental commission which began in July 1980 and concluded in February 1982. The commission decided not to examine the question of freedom of the press because the authorities were said to have committed themselves to maintain press freedom. In any event, the commission argued in its introduction, freedom of the press cannot be an "absolute" (quoting American experts) and "people attach different meanings to 'press freedom.' "

The commission described South Africa, as had an earlier Steyn Commission, as a "developing and expanding democracy." It noted, however, that critics had derided this judgment and termed the country "a racially oppressive 'pigmentocracy' which denied the vast majority of the population (that is, the non-Whites) the right to have a say in decision-making at governmental level." The Steyn report filled many pages discussing the concept of natural

law, social contract and human rights. It also examined extensively the "threat situation"—the Soviet strategy externally and internally—as a consequence of which certain defensive measures were necessary in South Africa.

The report acknowledged that governmental secretiveness and evasion leads to tensions with the news media. They, in turn, were said to be inefficient and guilty of "failure to deal with certain issues in a balanced, *responsible* and even-handed manner" (emphasis added). The press was admonished to distinguish between that which is of overall national importance and that which is partisan by nature. These would be useful guidelines coming from an editor or a journalism professor, but somewhat chilling when uttered by a government-appointed commission. The long report contains many such observations. Some follow the patterns familiar to UNESCO discussions, even though the commission at one point disavows any relationship with the UNESCO debates. The final act of this report, recommending specific legislation, inevitably brings the commission closer to the press-controllers of the world whatever their flag or role at UNESCO.

The objective of the act is said to be to "professionalize the mass media." This is described:

The purpose of such legislation is to regulate the whole journalistic mass media operation by the introduction of standards of journalistic performance to be achieved by way of qualifications for entry into that operation, by the formulation of norms of conduct and the introduction of machinery to enforce such norms as well as by way of disqualifications for continued participation in the operation.

The necessity for such regulation is the need to ensure socially responsible conduct by all members of the journalistic operation and the protection and advancement of journalistic independence.

The method of achieving such regulation is the compulsory professionalization of the whole journalistic operation by way of statute whereby the operation itself is converted into a profession and all journalists are required to become members thereof and to be subjected to its norms of conduct, requirements for qualification and grounds of disqualification, these being matters to be seen to by a main governing body consisting of members of the profession.

This will be done "without loss of 'press freedom,' " says the bill, using quotation marks around press freedom as though it is either indefinable or absent in South Africa. Neither is accurate; the South African white press is generally free though subject to significant restrictions for reasons of national order and security related largely to the defense of its system.

The bill would apply a governmentally supervised code of journalistic conduct. There would be compulsory enrollment or licensing of journalists and their conduct supervised by a government-created council. To continue employment as a journalist one would have to meet governmental standards. Appearance before the press council may be assured "in the same manner as a subpoena in a criminal case issued by a magistrate's court."

Perhaps the crux of the matter appears at the end of the long report. The code of press conduct admonishes journalists to exert "due care and *responsibility*"—that word again—as to "subjects that may cause enmity or give offense in racial.. matters in the Republic or invite persons to contravene the law."

The age-old question: Is the journalist the instigator of resistance to *apartheid* or are the countless indignities, discriminations, and closed doors to the future the cause of black resistance to "peace and good order?"

Similarly, in June 1982 the labor government of Malta proposed a bill aimed at stopping the opposition party from using foreign broadcasting stations. The opposition claims it has been denied access to Malta's government-run television station, and so has used a TV channel in Sicily, 60 miles north. The bill might also limit reporting by foreign news organizations. Foreign journalists in Malta would be subject to government inquisitions. Restrictions are in the air. Even India is planning to tax news reports such as *Time* magazine's emanating from India, presumably on the ground that news is deemed to be a profit-making venture in a market economy such as the U.S. All these restrictions are in the name of expanding the free flow of information!

CONCLUSION

With the Catholic Pope and the Socialist President Mitterand both calling for a "new order" in the world-wide flow of information, the old order continued to demonstrate the gaps and blockages in the information channels. Strict censorship in Argentina, Iran, Iraq, Israel and the United Kingdom blacked out full reporting of their respective wars. In May 1982, two American correspondents were whipped, threatened with worse torture and death, and then released without explanation by the army of Uganda. Journalists were killed in El Salvador. Journalism was still a dangerous profession, particularly when practiced in the Third World. It continued to be a frustrating business throughout the communist world and among the authoritarian or totalitarian states of the right where press controls intimidated and inhibited journalists.

If the international debates on the flow of news are to be focused more realistically the views of one African editor should be carefully heeded:

African journalists and editors are probably the most frustrated in their efforts to inform their people when they have to rely on Western-oriented news and information, ranging from the big political story to the simple crossword and strip cartoon.

African journalists and editors, however, would not be in favor of a new information order that simply meant more government control of news and information.. Perhaps the debate should be on how the Third World governments can provide the necessary capital without interfering with the freedom of the press.

Before such capital and such press freedom can be simultaneously secured, however, Third World governments must display the political will to grant their citizens the right to seek and express diversity. Only then can such instruments as the IPDC expand human freedom; and, flowing from that, economic development.

For its part, the United States this year generated the will to deliver to developing countries and UNESCO a political counter-challenge—but still no significant communications technology.

The uneasy stalemate continues.

NOTES

1. F. Lwanyantika Masha, "Decolonizing Information: Toward a New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO)," *Political Communication and Persuasion*, (New York: Crane Russak, Vol. 1, No. 4, 1982), p. 339.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 342.

3. Draft Medium-Term Plan (1984-1989) First Part, 4XC/4 (Paris: 1982), p. 8.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 15-16.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 33.

8. UNESCO, CLT-82/Mondiacult/1 add. (Paris, April 29, 1982) p. 4.

9. *Prensa Latina*, April 28, 1982, ESP-17.

10. *Prensa Latina*, May 1, 1982, ESP-18.

11. Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow, address at Royal Institute of International Relations, Brussels, February 19, 1982 (DG/82/3).

12. UNESCO, *Right to Communicate: Legal Aspects, A Consultation*, (Bucharest, February 9-12, 1982); draft final report, Paris, April 1982.

13. UNESCO, *International Program for the Development of Communication (IPDC)*, Information Sheet no. 1, COM/DCS: March 1982.

14. UNESCO, *Symposium on Regional and International Mechanisms for the Dissemination and Exchange of Information* (Paris, October 27-30, 1981); CC81/Conf. 803.7, December 22, 1981.

15. Peter Mwaura, editor-in-chief, *The Nation* Newspapers, Nairobi, writing in *World Paper*, January 1982.

A Preliminary Examination of Religious Freedom

George Weigel

At its 37th Session in Geneva during February and March, 1981, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights adopted a "Draft Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief." The Draft Declaration, the fruit of eighteen years of negotiation, is an important statement in both its argumentation and prescriptions, for it hints at the centrality of religious freedom in any meaningful schema of human rights, while at the same time illustrating some of the thorny problems of definition and application that the issue of religious freedom poses.

The Draft Declaration follows the typical pattern of these UN pronouncements, that is, a preamble followed by specific articles. The structure of the argument for religious freedom laid out in the preamble and the articles is worth noting.

First, the Draft Declaration locates religious freedom in the "dignity and equality inherent in all human beings" that is "one of the basic principles of the Charter of the United Nations." In other words, men and women have a right to religious freedom that antecedes the pleasure of the State.

Second, the right of religious freedom is recognized in both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the implementing Covenants, and is thus already part of the fabric (however thin that fabric might be in practice) of international law.

Third, the Draft Declaration recognizes the volatile role of religion in national and international conflict.

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Fourth, and conversely to the third point, the Draft Declaration states that religious freedom, properly understood and exercised, is a fundamental building-block of peace, that is a governed international political community in which law replaces organized mass violence as the means for resolving international conflict. Creating and sustaining such a political community requires standards, or specific protections for the individual against the claims of the State. Religious freedom, the Declaration suggests, is one of the minimum standards required for the kind of transnational political community which the United Nations putatively fosters.

Fifth, the Draft Declaration recognizes that both intolerance and discrimination are violations of religious freedom. The problem of intolerance has to do with the question of religious faith, and, according to the Draft Declaration, individuals must be free to accept or reject religious faith. Beyond that, once the individual has made that decision, and irrespective of the decision arrived at, the believer and the unbeliever should stand equal before the law. Discrimination against unbelievers is a violation of religious freedom, just as is discrimination against believers.

Sixth, the Draft Declaration suggests that the State's role is to check discrimination socially, proscribe it legislatively, and maintain neutrality toward "yes" and "no" answers to the question of faith. Moreover, the State's role in setting standards for religious *practice* must be defined in law, and is limited to "measures necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others."

Seventh, the Draft Declaration asks that States should take particular care to assure that parents are free to transmit their faith to their children.

The prescriptions of the Draft Declaration are meant to be suggestive of minimum standards that would constitute the free exercise of religious faith. Nine specific protections are noted:

1. Freedom to worship, and to establish and maintain places of worship;
2. Freedom to establish religiously based charitable or humanitarian institutions;
3. Freedom to produce, acquire, and use literature and other materials relevant to the practice of religious faith;
4. Freedom to publish and disseminate religious materials to the wider society;
5. Freedom to evangelize, to teach religious faith (it should be noted that this freedom is qualified by the phrase "in places suitable for these purposes," which may suggest some effort to constrain religious proselytization of unbelievers, and would thus come into conflict with many religious institutions' sense of their required *public* mission);
6. Freedom to ask for and receive money and other contributions in support of religious faith and practice;
7. Freedom for a religious institution or community to choose its own leadership without State interference or coercion;

8. Freedom to "observe days of rest and to celebrate holidays and ceremonies" of one's faith;

9. Freedom to associate and communicate with one's co-religionists, nationally and internationally.¹

This Draft Declaration passed the Human Rights Commission by a vote of 33-0, with five abstentions (the USSR, Mongolia, Byelorussia, Bulgaria, and Poland). After being passed by the Economic and Security Council and the Third Committee of the General Assembly, the Declaration was adopted without recorded vote by the General Assembly on 25 November, 1981.

Like many similar UN documents, there is a kind of melancholy air about the Draft Declaration on religious freedom. Although its passage by the General Assembly was surely a major accomplishment in the cause of international human rights, the very defining of minimal religious freedoms points out the gap between the rhetoric of international human rights efforts and the widespread practical contempt in which these rhetorical ideals are held throughout the world.

In just one recent issue of *The Tablet*, an English Catholic weekly that frequently draws on the resources of Keston College to monitor the abuse of religious freedom, particularly in Eastern Europe, we find the following:

* *in Vietnam*—surveillance of Buddhist monasteries and restrictions on the movements of Buddhist monks have resulted in a decrease in vocations to the monasteries; further, some monks have been interned in "re-education" camps, while there are estimates of some 200 Roman Catholic priests and 50 Protestant ministers arrested and interned, including the coadjutor bishop of Ho Chi Minh City.

* *in the People's Republic of China*—twenty priests were arrested for refusing to join the Patriotic Catholic Association, the approved form of Roman Catholicism in China.

* *in Czechoslovakia*—four Roman Catholics (including three priests) were convicted on charges of producing and distributing underground religious literature.

* *in Ethiopia*—officials of the Ethiopian Lutheran Church and Emmanuel Baptist Church were forced out of their facilities, which were expropriated by the State.

* *in Albania*—a Jesuit, Fr. Ndor Luli, was sentenced to "life imprisonment until death" for the crime of baptizing his sister-in-law's newborn twins; the sister-in-law got eight years at hard labor (actually, these cruelties represent a kind of perverse "improvement" in the state of religious freedom in Albania, for in 1972 Father Shtjefen Kurti was executed for baptizing a child, while in 1979 the titular bishop of Shkodra was beaten to death by police in a labor camp after conducting Easter services).²

Such depredations are not exclusive to the Marxist-Leninist world, of course. The fate of religious workers in Central America, or of "heretical" Muslim

sects in many Muslim countries suggest that the problem of religious freedom knows no ideological (or theological) borders.

The range of religious persecution also suggests some of the difficulty of defining and analyzing religious freedom. When a priest is shot for baptizing a child, we are clear that a violation of any conceivably meaningful definition of religious freedom has occurred. But other cases are, if no less humanly poignant, somewhat less analytically clear. When Italy proscribed divorce under pressure from the Vatican, was religious freedom violated (the State coercing social behavior on religious grounds) or abused (the Church coercing the State by threatening to withdraw its implicit blessing of legitimacy)? If majority opinion in Pakistan were to support the imposition of the *jizya*, a traditional tax on non-Muslims in Islamic societies, would religious freedom be violated? If Saudi Arabia lifts such an impost (which was originally a liberalizing element by which residence rights were conferred), has religious freedom gained? Indonesia provides freedom of belief, but discriminates against those who have no religious faith or practice.

The very definition of "religion" itself is, of course, controverted (although in this matter the U.S. Internal Revenue Service has dashed in where theologians, and perhaps even angels, fear to tread). The United Church of Christ, which conducted a 1980-1981 study of religious freedom throughout the world, settled on this definition: "Religion is that which one believes and acts upon in obedience to understandings and impulses presumed by a community to be transcendent in origin."³ As an article in the April issue of *A.D. 1981*, the United Church of Christ magazine, notes, this definition "makes room for Bahais, Jews, and Muslims in their varieties of sects, the thousand 'denominations' and religious societies of Christendom, animists of Africa, Indonesia, and hill-country India, Buddhists, Shintoists, Hindus, and even—to the extent that history can be viewed as transcendent—those old foes of religion, the Marxists."⁴ Here, of course, the argument comes down to a question of metaphysics: what do we mean by transcendent? And might there be "defective" quasi-religious systems whose flawed understanding of the transcendent leads to gross violations of human rights—as in Nazism or Marxism-Leninism?⁵

It is beyond the scope of this essay to settle the argument over definitions of religion. I propose to accept the United Church of Christ's survey definition as a working model, but to go on to other questions more immediately connected to religious freedom as a *human rights concern*, and particularly to the related question of how religious understandings and values shape the political cultures that sustain, or repress, civil liberties and political freedoms.

THE RELATION OF RELIGIOUS SYSTEMS TO DEMOCRACY

People committed to democratic values accept the idea of religious freedom rather easily. While there may be occasional strains within democratic polities over those aspects of religious practice that seem to reduce other civil liber-

ties, the freedom of faith and practice, as well as the freedom *not* to believe or *not* to be coerced into religious practice, has been well integrated into the social, political, and common ideological fabric of virtually all democracies (with exceptions to be noted below). In a commonly held intellectual view of democratic liberties, religious freedom is a subset of the more general freedom of opinion and expression. To believe in God, and act on that belief, is, in this view, similar to believing in vegetarianism, or owning parakeets: a sufficiently privatized expression of personal conviction and will that the State can well afford to tolerate it. As the democratic world has become increasingly secularized (in the sense that religious institutions' monopoly on the value-transmission function in society has been progressively broken over the last two centuries), this understanding of particular religious beliefs as tolerable eccentricities has become widespread.

This is an insufficient understanding of the relationship between religion and human rights (and especially of the relationship between religious freedom and the democratic protection of human rights) on two grounds. First, its overemphasis on the personal and private character of religious faith and practice ignores the fact that virtually all the great world religions have a social dimension that inevitably impinges on the public order, its standards and institutions. Religious belief, in this sense, is no more privatized in its essence than political conviction: it demands expression in community (the church, the party) and in the wider society. Official attempts to restrict religion to the realm of the private and personal are, of course, widespread. It is not difficult to show continuity between a state's attempts to restrict religious freedom in the wider society and its other abuses of human rights. One reason to consider religious freedom a "basic" human right is that its abrogation inevitably leads to the abrogation of other rights.

Secondly, the "eccentric" or "privatized" view of religious freedom ignores the history of the development of those democratic polities whose performance in the protection of civil liberties and political freedoms is so obviously superior, as the Comparative Survey of Freedom suggests. Democracy is, in the long view of human history, an "unnatural" arrangement. Democratic governance requires a set of attitudes, understandings, values, and institutions that have rarely conjoined. Those attitudes, understandings, and, especially, values, have long roots in the West; and the development of a "civic culture" (as distinguished from a "despotic culture" in Wittfogel's terminology)⁶ required that those values be realized through a plurality of social and political institutions, each of which provided a check against any despotic (in the sense of absolutist) claims the others might have wished to make. This plurality of institutional forms grew out of a conviction that politics was a derivative, and hence non-ultimate, activity.

The roots of this unique (or, at the very least, distinctive) experiment in political organization and political philosophy are various. Enlightenment currents of thought, Roman law, and the Greek experiment are obvious,

major "secular" influences. But the values that undergird the entire enterprise are drawn from a set of understandings about the nature of man and society whose ultimate source (in the line of development that led to the North Atlantic democracies) is the Judaeo-Christian tradition. Those, therefore, who understand religious freedom as merely a matter of tolerated private opinion run the risk of profoundly misconstruing the glue of ideas and values that has made the democratic experiment possible, and that has sustained it in its times of greatest peril.

Writing recently in *This World*,⁷ Andover-Newton and Boston College Professor Max Stackhouse has neatly summarized the moral and political-philosophical linkages between the Judaeo-Christian tradition and democracy, and then examined the democratic prospects of three other great "world religions:" Marxism-Leninism, Hinduism, and Islam. A review of Professor Stackhouse's essay is helpful in understanding several important dimensions of religious freedom as a human rights problem, and for understanding the centrality of the realm of values in the construction of those political institutions and social arrangements that do the best job of securing human freedom.

Professor Stackhouse's essay is not a detailed review of the impact of certain currents in the Judaeo-Christian tradition on the development of pluralist democracy in the West; as he rightly notes, that work has been done elsewhere, and at great length. Stackhouse does summarize nicely, however, those primary elements in the Judaeo-Christian tradition's contribution to the development of the civic culture of democratic pluralism. These are worth noting briefly, as they provide a standard against which we can measure the democratic prospects of other religious understandings and systems. Professor Stackhouse writes:

[The] decisive elements of the Western [religious traditions' contributions to the emergence of a civic culture] can be simply stated. All agree that there are universal ethical principles which stand over the actions of individual humans and societies as a whole. No one knows these perfectly; hence, humans must be forever locked in debate to discern their precise nature. Immediate agreement is less important than the common conviction that all parties are under the same truth. In this debate, revelation and reason, faith and experience, all count as evidence. All persons in principle have access to these; hence, all have certain responsibilities, and all in principle may, indeed ought to participate in the edification and the evaluation of others and of the society at large.

In more formal theological terminology, what Professor Stackhouse is pointing to here is the Western traditions' understanding that revelation, the unfolding of God's will for men, is a continuing process in history. It is shaped by its great historical figures, their stories, and the institutions they created (Abraham, Moses, David, Jesus; the covenant, the Law and the synagogue; the Church). But revelation in the Judaeo-Christian tradition opens men to the future of history and society. Because revelation points to an open future that will not be consummated until the coming of the promised kingdom, no one,

in principle, can ever claim to be its final interpreter.⁹ Because the message of the revelation (in both its fixed form, as in Scripture, and its continuing form, as in rabbinic or ecclesiastical teaching) is given to a community, all share responsibilities for its understandings and transmission. And, most importantly, because the origin of the revelation is understood as transcending human history, there is both a standard against which the weaknesses of the present can be measured (and images for social change formed) and no final set of social and political arrangements that can be considered ultimately binding on the human conscience. Revelation, in the Judaeo-Christian view, debunks the absolutist claims of human social institutions, be they familial, tribal, ethnic, or political. It is not that the claims of these institutions have no value; it is that they are not permitted claims to ultimate value. Moreover, the community of faith, a voluntary community entered through one's own volition, becomes, as Stackhouse notes:

[the] central community of identity.. .Thus a new and decisive, if fragile, social space was created in society.

All those obscure and ancient struggles about giving incense to Caesar, about Christians and lions, about distinctions between the sacerdotal authority of bishops compared with the temporal authority of rulers, about the nature and character of celibacy, about the meaning of baptism, about free consent as opposed to patriarchal authority in marriage, served to clarify what had been implied by earlier movements. Membership in the decisive community of life was not to be determined simply by familial or ethnic origins, nor by political fealty and magisterial command.

This fragile root is the historic source of that kind of pluralism in which now flourish churches, cultural and charitable associations, multiple parties, professional societies, guilds and labor unions, academic freedom in universities and schools, and independent presses.. .Each of these now claims, as did the early church, the absolute right to organize, function on its terms, propagate views, and to influence, criticize, join, or leave those "natural" organizations into which one is born. However much any one of these institutions may be undemocratic in its internal structure, their cumulative effect is a democratic pluralism.¹⁰

What the medieval Catholic theologians called the "principle of subsidiarity," then, lies at the bedrock of those understandings which undergird democratic pluralism. The principle of subsidiarity meant that decision-making power should be left at the lowest possible level of a hierarchy, and that those structures which "mediate" between the individual and the larger structures of society have their prior rights to authority within their own spheres of competence.¹¹ Decentralized authority, commensurate with the common good, is preferable to centralized rule. In other words, democratic pluralism is based on an organic relationship among multiple institutions with claims to individual loyalty, ordered together in ways that protect both their prerogatives and the common good. The source of that multiplicity, at the level of understandings and values, is the Judaeo-Christian religious notion that all of these institutions stand under the judgment of a transcendent reality which may be

apprehended through them, and through the individual lives that comprise them, but never finally "captured" by any one temporal reality.

With this sketch in mind, we can look, with Professor Stackhouse, at the democratic prospects of other great world religions.

As noted above, Marxism-Leninism is a kind of religious system in that, as Stackhouse writes, "it is an established, orthodox, metaphysical-social system complete with officially defined dogma, rituals, cultic celebrations, and a certified hierocracy."¹² Marxism-Leninism has made messianic claims: because it alone has understood the fixed dynamics of human history, it alone can be the bearer and shaper of the human future. Because of these structural characteristics, Marxism-Leninism has been attractive to some Christians and Jews, for "the radical hope for a future with justice, peace, and harmony is not, after all, discontinuous with some Jewish and Christian visions. Further, Marxist-Leninist authors have pursued the critique of greed and egocentrism with a tenacity that warms the hearts of many religious critics."¹³ That this enthusiasm for the Marxist-Leninist vision can overwhelm a more careful analysis of its empirical expression can be seen today in the explicit Marxist analysis and acceptance of Marxist-Leninist political structures by certain currents in the Christian "theology of liberation."

But, as Stackhouse rightly and immediately points out, Marxism-Leninism is a defective transcendence, a foreshortened "religious" system because "both in its self-understanding and in actual practice, Marxism-Leninism is more concerned about bringing all aspects of life under political control than it is about preservation of a universal moral law—belief in such a law was viewed as an idealized, ideological abstraction—or of 'social space' for organizations other than those of the state or party."¹⁴ In short, Marxism-Leninism abrogates the two sources of Western religion's contribution to the civic culture of democratic pluralism: it denies the reality of a universal moral law that transcends all human expressions of it, and, because of that denial, it has no room for the plurality of authority and loyalty that marks democratic societies. "Mediating structures" in Marxism-Leninism are not merely a nuisance, to be out-organized; they are a heretical expression of a misunderstanding of the dynamics of history, and are thus to be expunged. If Marxism-Leninism has understood, in a final way, the meaning of human history; and if the bearer of that understanding is a Party elite with absolute claims to authority and public power based on its superior apprehension of the dynamics of the human future; then what need of family (save in procreative terms), guild, labor union, church, synagogue, voluntary association, or private sector economic enterprise? To stand in the way of the Party's claims to authority is to stand in the path of the human future. Gulag is, thus, just over the horizon.

Stackhouse sees the roots of this defective transcendence, this perversely intra-worldly religion, in a line that begins with Machiavelli, and his "analysis of political control as the key to salvation" in the breakdown of late-medieval Christendom. This realism of power, stripped of belief in a universal moral

law, went through transmutations in the hands of Hobbes, Frederick the Great, Rousseau, and Bismark. It was preoccupied with the solidarity of the body politic and led through Rousseau's "civil religion" to the vision of "people's democracy." Marx reworked German dialectical philosophy and British utilitarian economics to create "scientific socialism." Marx wrote that only man was divine. Where communism achieved power, it was only natural that Marxism-Leninism should become the civil religion.¹⁵

The result of this, for religious freedom and for other civil liberties and political freedoms, need not be rehearsed in its bloody fearfulness here. Stackhouse's main point, however, is worth repeating: despite its structural similarities to the Western religions, and despite its appropriation of the democratic vocabulary, Marxism-Leninism is ineluctably fatal to the exercise of "human rights" as we have understood them in the West, because it radically denies the religious roots of that structure of rights: the belief in a universal moral law under which all human enterprises (and especially the political, since it is about the exercise of power) stand judged, and the pluralism of social and political organizations which give expression to our attempts to apprehend and interpret that universal moral law. Without a genuine transcendence in the order of values, and without a genuine pluralism in the ordering of society, human rights in our traditional Western sense, and religious freedom in particular, stand in quicksand. It is only a question of when, and how painfully, they will be sucked into oblivion.

Now, this baleful picture should not be interpreted to mean, as Stackhouse points out, that change is impossible in Marxist-Leninist societies. By replacing earlier cross-and-crown arrangements in Eastern Europe, for example, Marxism-Leninism has, in effect, created its own opposition. The Polish situation is the most obvious example, but in East Germany and elsewhere there is a rethinking of the relation of state and society. In many areas the church and the people, suffering a common adversity, are coming closer together.¹⁶ How precarious that situation can be is painfully illustrated by reading the arrest statistics on religious leaders in the Eastern bloc countries. This means, *inter alia*, that the prospects for civil liberties and political freedom, in even a minimal sense, cannot be held to be very good under the defectively transcendent "religion" of Marxism-Leninism. This is preeminently true of religious freedom, for it poses the most radical challenge to the absolute truth-claims and authority-claims of the Party and the State. Whether these claims and the structures they support will collapse of their own weight and their own social and economic failure, is not a question this essay can address. But, for as long as they can maintain a virtual monopoly on public authority, religious freedom and other human rights will remain gravely threatened throughout the Marxist-Leninist world.

The democratic prospect is shaded quite differently in what Stackhouse calls the "social spirituality" of India. In fact the Indian experiment in democracy, lively and threatened at the same time, is an important laboratory for

determining whether civil liberties and political freedoms on the Western model, can be successfully "grafted onto the stem of another... spirituality,"¹⁷ one with currents that both support and challenge the bases of democracy in the West.

The distinctive characteristics of Hindu spirituality have both laid the groundwork for the functioning of democracy in India, and jeopardized it at times. Polity, the organization of power in society, is clearly not the highest spiritual value, or personal attainment, in the Hindu religious system. As long as the "cosmic order" is not violated, politics "is to be determined by 'non ideological,' pragmatic circumspection. This ancient perspective made Indian leaders immediately sympathetic to the progressive utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill during the Hindu Renaissance, attracted Nehru in his early days to the labor socialism of Harold Laski, and caused his daughter and successor subsequently to adopt the democratic-socialism of Gunnar Myrdal's *Asian Drama* in many areas."¹⁸

India is religiously plural, if overwhelmingly Hindu, and this pluralism has had its effects on the development of Indian democracy. Churches, whether of the ancient missionary efforts or of more modern hues, political parties, and the presence of Islam have worked as a kind of pluralist counterforce to the pervasive claims of caste and those claims' resistance to both innovation and democracy. These elements in Indian society have provided a counterweight to the traditional idea that governance is the preserve of certain castes, whose *Dharma* lies in their responsibility for public order.

This mixed picture, in which the traditional Hindu spirituality has both democratic and contrademocratic tendencies, and other religious and political traditions mitigate against the establishment of a religiously (and hence politically) unitary Hindu state, has resulted in a distinctive form of democracy and a distinctive understanding of human rights. Stackhouse writes: "Freedom in India is essentially 'freedom' to be what one was born. Doctrine or dogma of every stripe is tolerated, so long as it is one's own; but conversion is viewed with skepticism. How can one become what one was not from one's birth?" And, because in Hindu spirituality truth is essentially subjective (both for individuals and for their caste or sub-caste), human rights "are essentially the rights of individuals and of *sib*, in this case, caste, to define their own internal destiny in concert with the spiritual hierarchy of being."¹⁹

The threats, both to religious freedom and to a democratic polity, seem obvious here. Freedom to proselytize and convert is, as we shall see below, an essential component of any meaningful measure of religious freedom. The idea that governance is given to certain groups by reason of their specific *Dharma* is not one with which democracy rests comfortably. If Stackhouse is correct, as I believe he is, in arguing that the idea of a universal moral law that can be objectively (in the sense of publicly) identified and the social pluralism that results from that concept of a transcendent standard by which society is measured are the twin religious pillars of democracy, then Indian democracy

is both strengthened and endangered by the great religious tradition which permeates its social life. Pluralism is not a problem, of course, either theologically or socially. But the subjectivism of Indian spirituality may, under certain pressures, lead to both the threatening of specific religious freedoms (as in the freedom to convert from one religious faith to another, or from faith to agnosticism or atheism), and to the unraveling of democratic governance under the authoritarian claims of rulers who can appeal to the traditional spirituality in defense of their actions (the working out of their *Dharma*), no matter what their real, personal motivations and intentions are.

In Stackhouse's view, the internal question for India is "whether certain accents within the vast panoply of Indian piety and practice can be strengthened to a point where they modify or displace other accents which contradict democracy. Only this... possibility, I suspect, will give the adopted mechanism an inner coherence sufficient to sustain it in the longer future."²⁰ That this experiment has great significance for the democratic prospect throughout the world, particularly given Indian eminence in the nonaligned movement and the genuine successes of Indian democracy since 1948, hardly needs reemphasis here. And, on our specific interest in the religious roots of civil liberties and political freedoms, the Indian experience again illustrates how differing understandings of truth-claims, of history, and of pluralism set the ground on which the polity of democracy can take root, or wither and die.

Events in Iran and Pakistan, where arbitrary arrest and detention, torture, and summary executions are widespread, and often undertaken in the name of the religious purification of the nation, have raised the gravest questions about the relationship between the great culture and religion of Islam, and the cause of human rights. The questions are important not only because of present depredations, but because of the recent history of these two countries in particular: Pakistan, founded in 1948 as a democracy, and Iran where, whatever the Shah's undoubted cruelty and political authoritarianism, a conscious program of modernization through pluralization had been attempted.

Is Islam, which historically is closely related to Christianity and Judaism, capable of sustaining a structure of human rights, and a democratic polity? According to Stackhouse, one must begin by understanding the differences among the three great "Religions of the Book."

First, "Islam favors monolithic structures" in its religious life. There are clearly divergent streams in Islam, which in some cases are accepted as well as acknowledged. Yet "the internal logic of Islam" supports a more pronounced unity than even the most orthodox branches of Judaism. This internal logic has had clear and obvious consequences in the ordering of societies where Muslims have been predominant. The seemingly essential identification of the religious community and the political community in Islam is both its distinguishing characteristic vis-[^]-vis Judaism and Christianity, and the most serious question in considering Islam as a ground for human rights.

Second, the basic spiritual text of Islam was recorded by one man in one

lifetime. Unlike the Koran, the Hebrew and Christian Bibles are historical collections of writings from many times and points of view. The result is that the latter seem to have a basis upon which spiritual pluralism can more easily be accepted.

Third, Islam has never been comfortable with "secular humanism," despite the major contributions of medieval Islamic scholars to the preservation, interpretation, and transmission of the classic philosophical heritage of the Greeks, and in spite of the mystical tradition of the Sufis, with its regard for the development of the individual spiritual consciousness. This has led, according to Stackhouse, to an orthodox Islam which "is in principle not only dogmatically unitary, it is what can only be called 'fundamentalistic,' and given to biblicist literalism."²¹

Finally, Islam, unlike Christianity and Judaism, did not open up new "social space" where a pluralist society could develop. Family and polity were linked in a new, more comprehensive, and more demanding unity.²² Neither Shi'a Islam, with its emphasis on the role of the clergy in governance, nor Sunni Islam, with its emphasis on centralization under powerful "feudal" families, has proven comfortable with either social pluralism, or the political power sharing that is its structural expression, as the examples of Saudi Arabia and revolutionary Iran amply illustrate.

Yet there are currents in Islam which can lead to "democratizing" impulses. Islam's insistence that what counts above all is fidelity to Allah and his revelation in the Koran has been remarkably successful in combatting racism, a quality to which Christianity, historically, cannot lay a similar claim. Further, Islam's contention that "common loyalty to Islam will give a unified voice to the 'will of the people' " has been a check against tyranny on occasion. Then there is Islam's traditional and highly sophisticated appreciation of law, and its heritage of individual appeals to public authority under the rights proclaimed by Islamic law.²³ In many interpretations this regard for equality before the law does not extend to women, but it does hint of that "universal moral law" that, in Christianity and Judaism, stands over against personal claims of authority by public officials, even be they hereditary officials.

Even given these currents, Stackhouse concludes that democracy in the Islamic world is unlikely "without a religious and socio-political revolution of major proportions."²⁴ However, Islam is not monolithic, any more than Marxism-Leninism is, and the democratic impulses found in each system can be supported and strengthened by those whose cause is human rights on the Western democratic model. Nor is Islam, again like Marxism-Leninism, utterly immune from outside influences, either in the form of secularizing tendencies introduced by oil wealth, or political values brought back into Islamic societies by Western-trained leaders. Still, in the present moment, when the crisis of modernization and all its attendant social, religious, and cultural strains is widespread throughout the Islamic world, and particularly in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, it seems likely that the resurgent Islamic fundamentalism that has shaken

Iran and Pakistan will remain a force to be reckoned with for the foreseeable future. Given the monistic and unitary social and political forms this type of Islam has adopted, it is unlikely that civil liberties and political freedoms will flourish in these societies without, as Stackhouse indicates, major and basic changes of understanding and value. The paradox for Islamic countries is that religious freedom, the ground of those human rights which form the skeletal system of democratic pluralism, is severely threatened precisely by the exercise of an authoritarian, single-minded religious purposefulness.

These case studies of the complex relationships among religious understanding, human rights, and religious freedom and the social and political structures conducive to the exercise of that freedom by all members of society illustrate several of the basic intellectual problems that a detailed theory of religious freedom and its relation to a broader scheme of human rights would have to address. And, although these problems can only be mentioned here, they are important to review before going on to the question of how religious freedom might be measured.

In the first place, there seems to be a curiously reciprocal relationship between religious faith and practice and human rights understood as civil liberties and political freedoms. As Max Stackhouse, Peter Berger,²⁵ and others have argued, the essential roots of Western pluralist democracy lie in Judaeo-Christian ideas and the social structures to which these gave rise. Most important among these ideas is that there is a universal moral law, revealed in history and apprehendable by human understanding, but always transcending human history, and standing in judgment on all human institutions and human schemes of justice. This idea has had two crucial sociological ramifications: it has posed a constant tension between how-things-are and how-things-ought-to-be, and thus has provided images and motives for social change in a linear concept of history; and it has given rise to a plurality of forms of human organizations and institutions, many of which serve the crucial function of "mediating" between the individual and public authority.

The most important secondary understanding derived from this notion of the universal moral law and its sociological ramifications, and the understanding central to the creation of a "civic culture," is that *politics is derivative*. The great twentieth-century Protestant theologian Paul Tillich put it succinctly when he wrote that politics is a function of culture, and culture is a function of religious ideas and values.²⁶ In other words, what is most basic in the gathering and ordering of a society is the realm of values; these give rise to a distinctive culture, a patterned system of relationships, values, and institutions; and only out of this culture emerges a politics, in the sense that the culture radically shapes the kind of polity in which public authority in society is exercised. The debunking of the primacy of the political, then, is a crucial contribution of the Judaeo-Christian tradition to the evolution of democracy. This debunking role continues today, since part of the function of religious and other nongovernmental organizations is to maintain a critical stance vis-à-vis the State.

Yet, while the exercise of religion in the West has contributed to the protection of all, believers and unbelievers, through a complex scheme of human rights, this has not been true, or has been less true, with other religious systems, cultures, and polities. The cases of Marxism-Leninism and Islam illustrate the grave difficulties that occur when a monistic view of reality gives rise to a unitary polity in which "human rights" are benefices to be bestowed by public authority, rather than prior claims that the individual has against the power of the State (the problem, of course, being somewhat less acute in some forms of Islam than in others). Indian democracy, on the other hand, with roots in certain Hindu ideas and customs, and yet challenged by other traditional Hindu religious themes, is a reminder that there may be alternative models in which something quite closely resembling human rights on the Western democratic scheme can be achieved by what Stackhouse calls a process of "grafting" onto another religious tradition the structures of Western democratic pluralism.

We should also remind ourselves here that Christianity has no perfect record in setting the ground for pluralism, much less for democracy. Calvin's Geneva and Torquemada's Spain were hardly paragons of human rights, and especially of religious freedom. Conversely, these cases illustrate the evolutionary character of some religious systems, and thereby remind us not to consider one present expression of faith (for example, Khomeini's Islamic fundamentalism, and its political expression) as the final word from any given religious tradition.

The key here seems to lie in the difference between monistic and pluralistic worldviews, and the polities that derive therefrom. The contrasting interpretations of Torah in the great rabbinic debates of the first century between Hillel and Shammai and their schools; the seemingly arcane Christian arguments in the Patristic period over the Trinity—these came to have, over time, profound social and political impacts because they drove home the Judaeo-Christian tension of unity and plurality in understanding the reality of God, the revelation of God, and its marks on human history.²⁷ It is that tension that set the ground for the distinctively *civic* culture of the West (a distinctiveness contributed to, of course, by other cultural currents), with its plurality of authorities within a unity of polity. In assessing the capacity of other religious systems for grounding human rights on the Western model, then, close attention should be paid to this issue of monism/pluralism.

Secondly, it seems that a successful working out of this reciprocal relationship in a polity committed to human rights requires vigorous religious organizations, public authority capable, in theory and in fact, of guarding the social space in which all religious organizations can operate (and, therefore, capable of interdicting the absolutist claims of some), and a structure of both basic (constitutional) and positive law regulating the relationship between "church" and "state." This need not mean "strict separation" on the model of the Hugo Black interpretation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution;

neither the United Kingdom's Established Church nor the Federal Republic of Germany's paying the salaries of clergymen seem overt, or even covert, threats to other religious organizations or to the State, since a body of constitutional and statutory law structures these relationships in a way that is satisfactory to the overwhelming majority. (Whether the impact of being a kept institution is helpful or baleful to religion is another question, of course, but a fascinating one. As noted above, it was precisely when the cross-and-crown arrangements between church and state were broken in Eastern Europe after World War II that these churches revitalized themselves, both in terms of their own faith traditions and as bearers of the national culture in the face of Stalinization.) These legal structures serve several purposes relevant to religious freedom, and expressive of religion's capacity to undergird a structure of human rights. First, they serve as a check on any theocratic or tyrannical ("monistic," if you will) impulses and tendencies in both religious organizations and public authority. In that sense, they reflect the Judaeo-Christian claim that a universal moral law stands over against and in judgment on human structures and laws. And, as noted above, this also serves as a check on any absolutist currents in any one religious tradition in a situation of religious pluralism. In fact, as John Murray Cuddihy has shown, the experience of a legally structured religious pluralism, over time, takes the "edge" off these exclusivist currents, and in fact can compel religious traditions to think through, in the light of new experiences, the theological rationale for their accepting a legally co-equal basis with other denominations and faiths in the same society.²⁸

Freedom of faith and practice, then, seems to be fundamental to creating and sustaining a structure of civil liberties and political freedoms on a pluralist democratic model, both because of religion's present capacity to serve as a check on state power (and thus, with other institutions make politically concrete the social reality of pluralism), and because of the religious understandings and values that have created the civic culture on which democratic governance rests. But these were not general religious understandings and values; they were quite specific. They are not, in principle and in fact, limited to the Judaeo-Christian tradition, although they seem most completely expressed there. Thus, other religious traditions can conceivably be the ground on which democracy can rest. We have some idea of the intellectual and institutional requirements that another tradition would have to meet. Just as clearly, some "religious" traditions, such as Marxism-Leninism, cannot be the ground for democracy and the sustainer of human rights, at least without such fundamental changes in their basic "theological" perspective that one might legitimately ask whether in fact the original tradition remained.

TOWARD AN INDEX FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOMS

In the previous section we looked at the reciprocal relationship between religion and the State: certain religious themes in the Western tradition setting

the ground for not only religious freedom, but the civic culture that supports the democratic protection of many other human rights; and the state's attempts, in some cases to ban, in others to coerce, and in still others to regulate religious faith and practice. Regulation, at least in the sense of providing legal protections for each citizen's personal right of religious freedom, was seen as a legitimate democratic corollary to religion's undergirding of the civic culture.

Now we must turn, in this preliminary reconnaissance, more directly to the issue of state control over religious belief and expression. Can religious freedom be measured? What would be some of the components of that measurement? Should we distinguish between the freedom of religious institutions, and the freedom of individuals to believe and to practice their faith?

Again, as above, what follows will be a sketch of the terrain, so that others more skilled in social science measurement of complex civil liberties and political freedoms can proceed ahead.

The UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, and the United Church of Christ 1980-1981 survey of religious freedom throughout the world,²⁹ both suggest criteria by which one might measure the promise and the fact of religious freedom in any given country. I have taken their criteria, added to or modified them as I thought right, and then set them against a matrix of law and practice, so that one could determine whether in principle, as well as in fact, a country honored this standard of free religious belief and practice. The chart (Table 16) that follows gives, at a minimum, a sense of the range of issues involved in that simple phrase "religious freedom." (*See* page 138.)

This chart is suggestive of the wide range of practices that would comprise "religious freedom" in the most complete sense of the term. Yet within these twenty standards, there are subsets that indicate the difference between institutional religious civil liberties (1-14) and political civil liberties for religious organizations, understood as the right of religious institutions to work, as such, in the public arena so as to affect public policy (IS, 16). Freedoms 17-20 refer to questions of personal civil liberties, while Numbers 1-16 refer to institutional civil liberties.

The distinction between institutional civil liberties and political civil liberties for religious organizations is crucial in measuring the degree to which a country honors "religious freedom." At one extreme, Albania proscribes any religious belief or practice. Totalitarian regimes discriminate against believers, even when the "right" of belief is constitutionally protected, and some measure of institutional freedom (for example, the right to worship) is maintained. Many authoritarian regimes are content to leave religious faith and practice alone, as long as religious institutions and individual believers do not use their institutional base or their personal convictions to make a political challenge to state authority. And, while democracies usually regulate religious practice to some degree (particularly in terms of preventing the expression of religious belief by one denomination or sect from interfering with the similar rights

of other believers, and of unbelievers), they are generally tolerant of political activity by organized religion, seeing in this but another example of the general freedom of association and organization for political ends.

The democratic ideal is, of course, the standard by which I would like to see other instances of religious freedom measured. But we must discriminate between institutional religious civil liberties and political civil freedoms for religious organizations in measuring a country's observance of religious freedom, a distinction which the United Church of Christ survey and other discussions of religious freedom minimize. The probable root of this minimalization is a disinclination to admit the moral difference between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. As a general rule, authoritarian regimes (in Latin America, for example) allow religious freedom for so long as the exercise of this freedom, institutionally or personally, does not challenge the authority of the state. Totalitarian regimes, on the other hand, regularly discriminate against believers in virtually all of the institutional religious liberties noted in the chart. When a country permits the free exercise of worship, tolerates religious schools, allows religious organizations to proselytize, and, in general, does not interfere with the internal functions of religious institutions, it is better off in terms of religious freedom than a country that denies or severely restricts these religious practices, even if the first country, like the second, also persecutes rebellious religious organizations and individuals. An objection to this position would be that the politically critical function is at the heart of the religious mission, and should thus count as much, in any measure of freedom, as the right to worship without harassment. But such an objection makes the very error that religious institutions, understandings, and values have helped the democratic civic culture avoid: the assumption of the primacy of the political. This is neither to denigrate in any way the importance of the realm of politics in the humanization or dehumanization of life in society, nor to condone the gross persecution of individual believers and religious institutions who have challenged state power in the name of higher values.

Apply a simple test here. Is it more important to a Polish factory worker, given the terrible exigencies of living in a virtually occupied country in thrall to the will of a great power, that he be able to raise his children as Catholics, knowing that they will not be discriminated against in building their lives on the basis of their religion, or that he enjoy all of the political freedoms that attend Western democracies? The stance taken by both Solidarity (or at least its mainstream) and the Catholic Church in Poland seems to suggest the Polish answer. Moreover, the Polish experience, whatever its ultimate outcome, has shown that it is precisely by focusing on, demanding, and exercising institutional religious liberties that religiously committed individuals and institutions can begin to crack the facade of the state's monopoly on political power.

There are no easy, simple resolutions of this dilemma. But if one is genuinely interested in religious freedom for its own sake, then I think one has to

Table 16
A Framework for Evaluating Religious Freedom

	LAW				PRACTICE			
	guaranteed in basic (constitutional) law	guaranteed in statutory law	denied by basic law	denied by statutory law	rigorously protected	generally allowed	generally restricted	denied
1. freedom to worship, and to assemble for worship								
2. freedom to maintain places of worship								
3. freedom to proselytize								
4. freedom to receive contributions of money and other gifts to advance religious purposes								
5. freedom to establish and maintain charitable or humanitarian institutions								
6. freedom to write, publish, and otherwise disseminate religious opinion								
7. freedom to train and select clergy and other religious leadership								
8. freedom to observe religious holidays								

9. freedom to maintain communications with co-religionists, at home and abroad							
10. freedom to make, acquire, and use materials and articles related to rites or customs of faith							
11. freedom from governmental licensing							
12. freedom from rules requiring disclosure							
13. freedom to travel on religious business							
14. freedom to conduct schools							
15. freedom to criticize government policy							
16. freedom to criticize the economic and social systems of the country							
17. freedom to change religion							
18. freedom to deny religion							
19. freedom from educational and employment discrimination on grounds of belief or practice							
20. freedom to conscientiously object from military service on grounds of belief							

admit the priority, if not the exclusivity, of institutional religious liberties for believers and religious organizations in any schema of religious freedom. Thus, in working with the chart of religious freedom outlined above, one ought to give particular mathematical weight, in measuring religious freedom, to those liberties, and especially to the personal freedoms, that provide the preconditions for religion's functioning in the public policy arena.

NOTES

1. For the text of the Declaration, as well as a picture of the U.S. policy position in the UN Human Rights Commission in 1981, see *Rethinking Human Rights: Speeches by the U.S. Delegation at the 37th Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights* (Washington, D.C.: The Foundation for Democratic Education, Inc.).

2. *The Tablet*, 235:7379, December 12, 1981.

3. *A.D. 1981*, April 1981, p. 27.

4. *Ibid.*

5. The French sociologist Emile Durkheim's work on the symbolic structures that provide both the sinews of society and images for social change within societies is relevant here; the "Introduction" to Durkheim's classic, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, provides a succinct summary of Durkheim's position. In recent years, the Durkheimian perspective has been brought to bear on the American scene by University of California sociologist Robert Bellah in his work on the American "civil religion." Bellah's thesis, that the complex body of texts, institutions, shrines, symbols, and holidays which constitute, in his mind, an authentically American "civil religion" that provides a measure of transcendence (and thus critique) to the national life, has been controverted. My positive appraisal of Bellah's thesis may be found in "The Common Covenant: Catholic Theology and American Civil Religion," *Chicago Studies* 15:2 (Summer 1976), pp. 211-231.

6. Cf. Karl Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1957).

7. Max L. Stackhouse, "Democracy and the World's Religions", *This World* 1 (Winter/Spring 1982), pp. 108-120.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 109.

9. Catholicism's claim of infallibility for the Bishop of Rome, for example, is a negative claim, that is, that when teaching *ex cathedra* on matters of faith and morals, the Pope is protected from fundamental error because of the presence of the Holy Spirit in the Church. Such a claim about the doctrinal authority of a religious leader does not mitigate, theologically, Catholicism's affirmation of the open-endedness of history, and the unfolding understanding of revelation.

10. Stackhouse, "Democracy and the World's Religions," pp. 109-110.

11. See Peter L. Berger and Richard John Neuhaus's contemporary reinterpretation of this idea in *To Empower People: The Role of Mediating Structures in Public Policy* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978).

12. Stackhouse, "Democracy and the World's Religions," p. 110.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 111.

14. *Ibid.*

15. *Ibid.*, pp. 111-112.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 113.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 117.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 115.

19. Ibid., p. 116.
20. Ibid., p. 117.
21. Ibid. On Islam and democracy see also the discussions in the 1981 yearbook on Supporting Freedom in Muslim Central Asia, especially pp. 281-84, 308-309.
22. Ibid., pp. 118-119.
23. Ibid., pp. 119-120.
24. Ibid.
25. See Peter L. Berger, "Are Human Rights Universal?" *Commentary*, September 1977, pp. 60-63.
26. See Paul Tillich, *The Protestant Era* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948).
27. See Stackhouse, "Democracy and the World's Religions," p. 118.
28. See John Murray Cuddihy, *No Offense: Civil Religion and Protestant Taste* (New York: Seabury Press, 1978).
29. See *A.D. 1981*, magazine of the United Church of Christ, April 1981, pp. 26-30.

PART III

**Democracy
and Development**

Democracy in Developing Societies

Charles R. Beitz

According to the international doctrine of human rights, all societies should be political democracies, regardless of their level of development.¹ Should we accept this view? . . . My approach to this problem derives from the fact that we can take it as a settled part of our moral outlook that relatively developed industrial societies should be politically democratic. . . . This fact gives us some purchase on the more difficult and less familiar question of whether it is morally right to hold the political institutions of developing societies to the same standard. If there is any reason not to—if it is either morally permissible or morally required that the institutions of (some or all) developing societies *not* be democratic—then that reason should emerge in a comparison of the social, economic, and cultural characteristics of developing and developed societies. We must ask how the accepted justifications of democratic institutions in developed societies are affected by varying the empirical assumptions on which these justifications rest. . . .

We need a definition [of democracy] that is sufficiently definite to rule out flagrant misunderstanding, but sufficiently flexible to comprehend variations in institutional detail that would be required in application to societies with different political histories and cultural traditions.

Schumpeter's definition provides a helpful starting point . . . : Political democracy is an "institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote."² This definition clearly includes three ele-

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ments that are common to all forms of representative democracy. First, political decisions are determined by the expression of individual preferences in a system of periodic voting for public officials. Second, this determination is not, as it were, accidental, but rather is to be explained with reference to the institutional mechanisms of democracy. Third, this mechanism is competitive. It is presupposed that various alternative candidates or parties will contend for votes within a structure of rules defining the political rights of the participants. The most important of these rights are the right to vote for representatives whose decisions are final and authoritative; the right to participate in fair competition for public office and for positions of authority within political associations such as parties; the rights associated with freedom of expression, at least so far as they concern political discussion; and the right to organize and participate in political associations.

. . . It is important that in democracies there are *rights* to participate in politics. We do not say that societies are democratic when it simply happens to be a fact that people participate in politics, as, for example, if an authoritarian ruler permits a plebiscite to be held to ascertain the citizens' views. Procedures allowing citizens to influence political decisions involve *rights* only if the mechanisms defined by those procedures are regularly available to all citizens regardless of the wishes of any particular government. Indeed, this is the moral distinctiveness of democracy: It provides a peaceful, dependable, and fair means of contesting a government's claim to authority.

DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL EQUALITY

The justification of political democracy begins with a principle of political equality: To be morally acceptable, political institutions should be arranged so that all members are treated as equals. This principle is a first principle of political morality. As such, it is not defended within the theory of democracy but is presupposed by it. The theory of democracy argues that a system of political rights is required to assure that institutions respect the political equality of their members; it does not supply the support for the principle itself.

But the principle of political equality is notoriously vague, since it is hardly clear what it means to treat persons as equals. We must resolve the ambiguity in order to see why it is usually supposed that democratic institutions provide the best defense of political equality. The principle can be understood either procedurally or substantively. The procedural interpretation holds that institutions should give each person the opportunity to exert equal effective influence in the choice of government policies (or in the choice of those who will make government policy); the substantive interpretation holds that political institutions should be arranged so as to produce results that satisfy some criterion (such as a principle of social justice or the common good) that accords equal weight to each person's prospects. Even at this level of abstraction it is clear that these interpretations are not necessarily consistent. There is

no guarantee that a decision procedure (such as majority rule) that allows each person to exert equal effective influence will produce choices that are just, or that accord with the common good. This is not primarily because the common good . . . may be constructed from mysterious "real interests" that are unconnected with people's actual wants and needs; even on a relatively benign conception of "interest" (for example, something that will increase a person's level of want-satisfaction³) the common interest and the will of the majority may diverge, as they would, for example, if a majority failed to understand why some complex economic strategy would be most likely to maximize the satisfaction of their wants.

It might seem that the procedural interpretation of political equality is the more fundamental in the sense that egalitarian procedures are immune from moral objection on the ground that they regularly yield morally unacceptable results. However, I do not believe that this is correct. For one thing, even if the procedural interpretation is understood as requiring equal effective influence (as against merely formal equality), there is still no guarantee that democratic procedures will produce policies that accord with social justice or the common good. In at least some cases of conflict, as when a majority prefers severe deprivation for a few rather than trifling sacrifice for many, it seems to me that we want to criticize democratic procedures for producing outcomes that do not treat everyone equally in a substantive sense. A more basic reason for denying the primacy of the procedural interpretation is that it is difficult to defend with general arguments that do not appeal to results. To explain why institutions should distribute influence equally to their members, we need to say something about why equality of influence assures equality of respect for persons as sources of claims, and this turns out to depend on contingent hypotheses concerning moral psychology and political economy. The substantive interpretation of political equality therefore appears to be more fundamental.⁴

A theory of democratic justification that begins with a substantive principle of political equality unavoidably contains two kinds of complexity. The first and more obvious kind arises from a general property of result-oriented arguments. Roughly speaking, such arguments connect means and ends, but any argument of this form requires empirical premises about what would be the case if certain contingent conditions were to be met. This kind of complexity in the justification of democratic institutions is my main concern in this chapter; I shall be asking whether and to what extent the empirical characteristics of developing societies draw into question the premises required in the familiar justification of democracy. But we will encounter a second kind of complexity as well. Any plausible interpretation of the (substantive) principle of political equality will involve a number of features that may not always be consistent. These features identify the various ends or purposes that should be served by political institutions that treat their members equally as sources of claims. Since there is no guarantee that these ends or purposes can be achieved

simultaneously, some mechanism for balancing them will be required when conflicts occur and a compromise among them is necessary. In principle, the problem of conflicting ends could arise in democratic theory regardless of the particular circumstances of the societies to which the theory is addressed; in practice, however, the problem is more pressing in developing societies than elsewhere, since their resources are relatively more limited.

Both types of complexity are present in the traditional justification of democracy. According to it, the desirability of democracy rests on several independent but mutually reinforcing sets of considerations, three of which I shall discuss below. These are best explained as three separate arguments, but it should be borne in mind that the special persuasiveness of the traditional justification is due to the combined force of all three. Each can be understood as identifying one of the ends that egalitarian political institutions should pursue, and as asserting that this end is more likely to be secured under democratic institutions than under any others

One set of justifying reasons for democratic institutions connects political liberties with self-respect: Political institutions should avoid interfering with, and when possible contribute to, their citizens' respect for themselves and one another as persons capable of making deliberate choices about their own situations and of carrying out these choices in action.

Democratic liberties may be connected with self-respect in several ways. Most obviously, the fact that opportunities to influence political decisions are available to everyone assures that those so motivated will be enabled to defend their interests and promote their ideals. They will be able to exercise some degree of control over those aspects of their lives affected by political decisions and need not passively accept those decisions as *faits accomplis* that are beyond challenge. Moreover, because participation is a right, its exercise does not require the consent or acquiescence of higher authorities. One can decide for oneself whether to press one's claims on political decision-makers rather than be demeaned in petitioning for their attention. A separate point is that democratic politics requires public discussion and debate, and so supports a political culture with incentives for investigation and criticism of government, and for the public presentation of opposing political views. Such a culture both encourages and enables the exercise of reasoned judgment about public affairs. Finally (and relatedly), the public recognition of political liberty is a form of "communal acknowledgement of individual worth," contributing to the sense that one is regarded by others as a person whose choices deserve to be taken into account.⁵

Another set of justifying reasons links democratic institutions with particular characteristics of political decisions. Most generally, it might be said that democratic procedures are more likely than any others to yield policies and official practices that take equal account of everyone's legitimate claims. Such an argument requires an interpretation of the "equal account" formula that can serve as a criterion by which political outcomes can be evaluated, and

asserts as an empirical hypothesis that democratic procedures—perhaps in combination with such conditions as agreement on procedural norms—are most likely to satisfy this criterion. For example, J. S. Mill argues that representative government, by allowing citizens to protect their interests through political activity, maximizes the probability that political decisions will satisfy the utility principle (as Mill understands it).⁶ Similarly, John Rawls claims that participatory procedures operating in a society regulated by a sense of justice are most likely to bring about political decisions consistent with principles of justice.⁷ There are many ways to fill out this argument, but the simplest (and most persuasive) is Mill's claim that "in the absence of its natural defenders, the interest of the excluded is always in danger of being overlooked . . ."⁸ Part of what Mill has in mind is that the electoral sanction is necessary to motivate rulers to pay attention to all of the citizens' interests; but he also means that the excluded groups are likely to have a different and more accurate perception of their interests than any ruler.⁹

Finally, political liberty can be justified in terms of the effects of its exercise on character, and in particular, its tendency to increase the level of competence and the sense of political efficacy of the citizens. Broader claims for the developmental value of political participation have also been made—by Rousseau and J. S. Mill, for example, both of whom argue that participation in politics encourages the development of civic virtue—but these claims might be regarded as unnecessarily broad because they appeal to an ideal of the citizen the justification of which reaches beyond the requirements of democratic government. By contrast, political competence and the sense of efficacy are features of individual character that help citizens effectively to participate in politics, and so increase the chances that democratic government will attend to everyone's interests.

I shall not develop these traditional arguments further now. Before moving on to considerations about developing societies, however, one final point should be made. A theory of government is only a part of a more general theory of social justice, although it is an important part. Thus to show that democratic institutions have value because they serve the ends associated with political equality is not finally to justify democracy. It would still be necessary to see how democratic institutions fit into the larger framework of a just society, or, to put it another way, to explore the extent to which they affect the prospects for effective recognition of other basic rights that constitute social justice. This question has received less attention from democratic theorists, although, clearly, they must suppose that the costs of democracy, consisting mostly of various types of inefficiency, are not sufficient to outweigh its benefits. And it must be added that democratic institutions may actually improve the prospects for effective recognition of other rights, such as personal liberties and freedom of expression, by providing an electoral sanction to deter official abuse of these rights.

CONDITIONS AND REQUISITES

We are now in a position to consider the relevance to democratic theory of some empirical differences between developing and developed societies. Assuming that the justification of democracy in developed, industrial societies represents a fixed point in our political outlook, we must ask whether the different circumstances of poor and developing societies lead to different conclusions about the type of government that would be most appropriate for them from a moral point of view.

The obvious contrast with developed societies is also clearly the most crucial. Developing societies are marked by average levels of material well-being dramatically less than those familiar in the industrial world. Moreover, this cannot be explained by inefficiency or distributive considerations; due to scarcities of technology, education, and capital, the production possibilities of developing economies are simply very low in relation to their populations.

The position taken by the international declarations—which we might regard as the view of orthodox human rights doctrine—is that democratic rights have universal application: All societies, regardless of level of development, should be political democracies. However, the extensive literature concerning "social requisites" or "preconditions" of democracy is unanimous in the conclusion, roughly, that level of development (normally measured by gross domestic product) is positively and strongly correlated with the incidence of democratic institutions.¹⁰ Some of these studies (in particular, those of Lipset and Cutright) are of little value for our purposes because their operational definitions of "democracy" tend to emphasize stability and complexity more than extent of political participation or of effective recognition of political rights. The characteristics emphasized are neither necessary elements of the concept of democracy nor likely to be found in less-developed political systems.¹¹ The other studies are less susceptible to this criticism. They yield the conclusion that there is a curvilinear relationship between socioeconomic development and democracy.¹² Before some point in the development of the societies studied, democratic institutions have occurred only rarely; after that point has been passed, the incidence of democracy is more frequent, but often at the cost of a reduction in the rate of economic growth (a point I shall discuss further below). While one cannot define this threshold with any reasonable reliability, a very rough approximation suggested by another study locates it at the division between the lowest third and the next-highest third of poor countries ranked by level of development.¹³

What is the relevance of these findings? The language used in many of these studies ("social requisites" or "preconditions" of democracy) suggests something like this: A common moral precept is "ought implies can"; accepting this, the idea might be that where democratic institutions are impossible, we cannot regard it as a moral requirement that institutions respect political rights.

The difficulty here, of course, is that the studies cited above do not support such an extreme conclusion. All of these studies rely on cross-national, aggregate-data analysis; as such they do not prove anything about the *impossibility* of democracy in poor societies. Moreover, as Dahl notes, there are a number of counterexamples, such as India, Turkey, and the Philippines (before 1972), to name a few. "The evidence simply does not sustain the hypothesis that a high level of socioeconomic development is either a necessary or a sufficient condition for competitive politics."¹⁴ In fact, these studies establish only that there is a significantly higher probability that political democracy will be found in societies meeting the preconditions than in societies not meeting them.

But perhaps this regularity suggests that a more detailed analysis might identify more complex conditions that really are necessary for the flourishing of democratic institutions. Even so, this would not be enough to sustain an argument along the lines of "ought implies can." Whether anything of relevance to moral issues follows depends on what the conditions are and how they can be explained historically. Some historical outcomes (for example, states of affairs in which some "precondition" of democracy does not exist) result from contingent human choices among alternative courses of action; other outcomes are determined by structural features of a society that no person or group has the power to change.¹⁵ While we may regret outcomes in the second class, we cannot reasonably blame those whose actions brought them about, nor can people reasonably expect to influence the outcomes significantly by their own actions. Thus in societies (if there are any) where structural factors make democracy impossible, it could not be a moral requirement. But where the absence of the preconditions has the other sort of explanation—where it results from human choices that might have been otherwise—there the observation that democracy has preconditions must find its moral relevance, if at all, in some other way (for example, those appropriately placed might have obligations to help bring the preconditions into existence).

This last point, however, is academic in the absence of a theory of political development sufficiently sophisticated to offer genuinely necessary conditions of democracy. Perhaps no such account is possible in any event. Still, it may be that the relatively low probability that democratic institutions will be found in poor societies indicates something of importance about these societies that should be taken into account in assessing the human rights orthodoxy. The most convenient way of exploring this possibility, in the absence of a systematic theory, is to consider some more particular differences between developed and developing societies that have been pointed to by various commentators who have suggested that democracy is inappropriate in the latter.

CULTURAL DIFFERENCES

Many contemporary developing societies lack certain cultural features that are present in the Western industrial democracies and appear to be related to

their political stability and efficiency. These features have been characterized in several ways in the empirical literature. For example, Almond and Verba describe "the civic culture" of democracy as a "mixed political culture" in which there is a large stratum of politically active citizens who regard political decisions as significant determinants of social welfare, believe that citizens generally can and should influence these decisions, accept the procedural rules of political democracy, tolerate political disagreement, and are favorably disposed toward their institutions. These are the characteristics of "participant" citizenship. These features are not uniformly possessed by everyone nor, even in the politically active stratum, do they entirely eclipse the more parochial and passive attitudes found in traditional societies. But "participant" attitudes are essential to motivate and regulate democratic political activity and to ensure widespread acceptance of its outcomes.¹⁶ Although their study concentrates on five Western democracies, Almond and Verba hold that civic cultures are not found in most developing societies ("new nations") and claim that creation of such a culture is a prerequisite for the development of political democracy.¹⁷

In a study focusing explicitly on the political cultures of developing societies, Daniel Lerner finds that a principal difference between "traditional" and "modern" societies is that "traditional society is nonparticipant."¹⁸ In a "non-participant" society, the dominant personality type is passive and deferential; society is organized in kinship groups in which it is believed to be more important to carry out the tasks assigned to one's role than to attempt to improve one's status; and "people's horizons are limited by locale and their decisions involve only other *known* people in *known* situations."¹⁹ Consequently, few are moved to follow political events or to "have opinions" about them. Most importantly, there is a lack of "empathy," something that Lerner thinks essential in democracies.²⁰

Assuming for the moment that these observations about the political cultures of developing societies are true, or in any event sometimes true, what is their relevance? For reasons discussed earlier, it would be a mistake to conclude that democratic politics cannot survive, or operate with stability and efficiency, in the absence of a "civic culture" or widespread "participant attitudes." The fact that a "civic culture" is present in democracies and absent in nondemocracies does not show that it is a necessary condition of democracy. Surely *some* sort of consensus on procedural norms is necessary for democratic institutions to persist once they are created, and to govern effectively without widespread problems of noncompliance. But the necessary cultural support might take a variety of forms, so that the absence of the type of political culture associated with democracy in the West does not prove that stable democracy in non-Western societies is impossible. Beyond this, two further points should be noticed. First, a unique feature of democratic politics is that participation often contributes to the development of procedural consensus. So it may be that views like those of the political-culture school are

too pessimistic about the prospects of democracy where it is relatively new and its cultural support is correspondingly weak. Second, concentrating on cultural variables may deflect attention from other social factors more germane to the prospects of democratic institutions in developing societies. It seems likely that democratic institutions can govern with relative stability even if their cultural support is comparatively weak, provided that they serve the interests of a dominant coalition of social groups. Conversely, as the Chilean example suggests, even democracies with substantial cultural support are vulnerable to subversion by some social groups whose interests are not well served by them. If so, the explanation of the correlation of low levels of development and democratic instability may have more to do with the political economies of developing societies than with their political cultures.

These considerations counsel agnosticism about the type and extent of cultural support required for stable democracy. However, even if stable democracy is possible where a "civic culture" is absent, the observations of the political-culture writers might be relevant to democratic theory in other ways. Indeed, all three of the traditional justifications of democracy are affected by them. The argument from self-respect is undercut by the claim that, in traditional cultures, political activity is not viewed as an important means of control over one's living conditions, and therefore that opportunities to participate are not regarded as a form of "communal acknowledgement of individual worth." In these cultures self-respect is secured in other ways; for example, by carrying out one's assigned role in a social hierarchy, and by the communal acceptance that flows from the public knowledge that one does so willingly. As a representative of Indira Gandhi put it during the "emergency": "For the vast majority of people in [poor] countries the democratic freedoms, which so delight the hearts of the Western-influenced urban intellectual, have no meaning whatsoever."²¹

The argument that democratic institutions promote outcomes that take account of everyone's interests is also compromised. The argument supposes that political rights enable people to defend their interests; but where the political process is not regarded as important, the motivation to participate will be weak or nonexistent. If so, in cultural conditions typically found in developing societies democratic institutions are unlikely to ensure that all interests will be taken into account.²²

The third argument, concerning the educative or developmental value of democratic participation, is damaged in the most straightforward way, since the educative benefits of political rights (increased political competence and a heightened sense of efficacy) accrue largely to those who actually make use of these rights, but by hypothesis, few do so.

These are the most pressing implications for democratic theory of the analysis based on political culture of the fact that democratic institutions are found more often in developed than in developing societies. But there are several reasons why the position I have sketched—which apparently repre-

sents a widely held view among social scientists—should be rejected in favor of a more subtle view. Even if the political-culture analysis is true, it does not necessarily follow that authoritarian institutions are to be preferred, from a moral point of view, to democratic ones. And the analysis itself is considerably less plausible than it might at first appear.

Suppose for a moment more that the analysis is true. The force of the resulting argument against democratic institutions depends partly on the supposition that some other type of institutions—let us say, authoritarian ones—are more likely successfully to implement egalitarian policies. But this is not proved by showing that democratic institutions, owing to the absence of widespread participant attitudes, would not do so; the same might be true of authoritarian institutions. The important question is whether a particular authoritarian government is committed to policies that take account of everyone's interests and represents a coalition of social forces that would benefit from them, and this is not a matter that can be generalized about. One cannot avoid an analysis of the history and structure of particular societies, since the desirability of democratic institutions (assuming that the political-culture analysis is true) will turn on the chances that democratic institutions as compared with the likely authoritarian alternatives will produce the more desirable results.

However, there is controversy about whether the political-culture analysis of nonparticipation in developing societies is adequate. A number of recent studies contend that the vast bulk of "nonparticipants" in developing societies—peasants—should be understood as responding rationally to the structure of opportunities and costs inherent in subsistence agrarian economies.²³ Political passivity appears to be a risk-minimizing strategy in a hierarchically ordered subsistence economy in which the peasant's main concern is bare survival. Unless this is seriously threatened, the costs of political activity, with its associated uncertainty and the threat of disruption of agriculture, are simply too great. Peasant nonparticipation, in short, is a maximin strategy in circumstances in which the maximin rule is clearly appropriate.

I cannot explore this controversy in detail here, but it is worth noting one reason why the revisionist view seems more plausible. It makes possible an explanation of instances of peasant participation that appears anomalous on the political-culture view. When the prospects of survival become sufficiently bleak, or when opportunities for political activism can be seized without excessive cost and risk (possibly because of effective political organization by revolutionary forces), peasants may become participants much more quickly than the political-culture view would predict.²⁴ Thus, for example, peasant political organizations in the Philippines worked vigorously to defeat landlord interests in the postindependence elections, with considerable success in some regions.²⁵

If the revisionist understanding of peasant attitudes toward political participation is closer to the truth, the argument for democracy is stronger than it appears to be on the political-culture analysis. Most importantly, the interest

in self-respect is not so easily disregarded, because the absence of participant attitudes can no longer be portrayed simply as a cultural artifact. Instead, it is a response to structural features of economic life. Changing these structural features may elicit participant behavior even in the absence of what the political-culture writers would regard as social modernization. Thus it should not be inferred that political rights would have little value to people who do not share the political attitudes associated with a "civic culture."

This conclusion results in a dilemma regarding the desirability of democracy in developing societies, for even supposing that nonparticipation can be explained without postulating deep differences about the sources of self-respect, it is still the case that rates of participation are often quite low. This, while the revisionist understanding of nonparticipation lends renewed strength to the argument from self-respect to democracy, it does nothing to rehabilitate the argument from egalitarian outcomes. Indeed, there may be a fundamental conflict in the justification of democracy with respect to poor countries between concern for self-respect and for outcomes that take account of everyone's interests. This problem arises even more sharply in connection with the dynamics of economic growth, which I consider below.

INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS

The political institutions of developing societies tend to be weaker than those of developed societies in terms of variables such as adaptability to varying types of challenge, organizational complexity, autonomy from other social groupings, and consensus on basic operating procedures. As a result, the political institutions typically found in developing countries are comparatively inefficient and unreliable. They perform their principal functions poorly (including, importantly, the maintenance of public order), and they do so at great cost.

The implications of this observation depend on joining it to a theory of political change. Samuel P. Huntington's discussion in *Political Order in Changing Societies*²⁶ is the most clearly articulated and sophisticated formulation of these implications. He argues that the process of political change includes two stages. One is the creation of authoritative political institutions; the other, the growth of political participation. The sequence of these component processes matters. Huntington holds that the more important process in developing societies is the creation of political institutions, which is undermined by the premature expansion of opportunities for political participation. It is necessary to have strong, widely accepted, and efficient political institutions before people can be permitted to participate in politics; otherwise, he claims, governments will be unstable and inefficient. The political order will decay and contending social groups will take to the streets to settle their claims.

This view of the relationship between institutionalization and participation

is set forth in the context of an explanatory theory of political change, but it has a definite if largely unacknowledged bearing on the question of whether and when democracy is morally desirable in developing societies. This is clear in connection with Huntington's remarkable conception of "the public interest":

The public interest... is not something which exists a priori in natural law or the will of the people. Rather it is whatever strengthens governmental institutions. The public interest is the interest of public institutions.²⁷

The reason, apparently, is that people "cannot have liberty without order," and they cannot have order without developed institutions. But institutions cannot develop "in those modernizing countries where government is at the mercy of alienated intellectuals, rambunctious colonels, and rioting students."²⁸ The development of authoritative institutions, then, must precede the creation of mechanisms for political participation such as those characteristic of democracy.

This view—which, again, is representative of those of many students of development²⁹—does not question whether the ends identified by the three traditional arguments are desirable, nor does it question whether democratic institutions would promote these ends in developing societies. We might say that the view grants the *prima facie* desirability of democracy, and in this respect it differs from the positions of those who emphasize cultural differences. Rather, the Huntington view holds that the costs of democracy at early stages of the process of political modernization are excessive: Premature creation of participatory institutions will endanger other human rights, such as the right to security of the person, and reduce the efficiency with which government performs its other functions.

Huntington's position has been questioned on several grounds: One might wonder, for example, if experience bears out the hypothesis that the political institutions of prematurely participatory societies tend to decay rather than to develop. It might also be asked whether the fact that political order is a prerequisite of personal liberty in the sense of being logically necessary for it implies that creating political order should take priority over respect for personal liberty. "It might be preferable to create authority and safeguard freedom simultaneously."³⁰ And it is certainly true that the absence of participatory mechanisms such as a system of political rights is no guarantee of successful institutional development. Indeed, authoritarian regimes often appear to create their own obstacles to orderly institutional development, such as widespread administrative corruption and recurrent succession crises.³¹

But the fundamental difficulty is that Huntington's view regards political institutions as excessively autonomous of dominant social forces, and so invites the conclusion that institutional stability is to be valued regardless of the social bases of authority. This ignores the fact that institutions do not develop in a social vacuum; no significant increase in their authority is likely

if they threaten the dominant coalition of interests. The successful development of political institutions is likely to result not only in an increase in the authority of those institutions but also in an increase in the political power of the underlying coalition of social forces vis-ik-vis the rest of society. Because it ignores this fact, Huntington's view might justify a government in suppressing personal liberties in order to protect the most regressive of social interests. Ironically, this would undermine his own argument that the political order flowing from institutional authority is a prerequisite for liberty: If the new order benefits a regressive elite by excluding the majority from political influence, it may reduce rather than enhance the prospects of liberty.

If it matters *which* interests a government serves—as, surely, it does—then Huntington's view is too simple. Whether institutional development should be promoted at the expense of political rights cannot be answered independently of an evaluation of the policies that would be carried out by those forces whose positions would be enhanced by institutional development in specific contexts. It is myopic to value institutional development without considering which social groups would benefit from it. Strong institutions that perpetuate the rule of traditional elites may have little to recommend them if a period of political disorder would allow a realignment of social forces and the emergence of a more progressive elite. Thus, if Huntington's empirical hypothesis is true (that is, institutional development is hampered by premature expansion of opportunities for political participation), the argument that democratic institutions are inappropriate in a society would be plausible only if alternative institutions would be more likely, in that society, to promote shifts in social structure and government policy that would satisfy such substantive moral criteria as social justice or the common interest. Clearly, prediction is not easy in these matters. But that is not a reason to fall back on a theory that uncritically invites support for authoritarian institutions regardless of their social bases.

Two final comments: First, as suggested earlier, there is room for doubt about the truth of Huntington's hypothesis, and one would like to have better evidence than is currently available before accepting it. Second, we should recall that nothing in Huntington's view questions the *prima facie* desirability of democratic institutions in developing societies; rather, he draws attention to their likely costs. Among other things, this means that we should take account of the effects of institutional change in the present on the prospects for democratic reforms in the future. One of the traditional justifications of democracy is that the experience of political participation has educative value: It enhances political competence and the sense of efficacy. There is some evidence that this is true in developing societies as well as in developed ones.³² If so, the costs of effective recognition of political rights, such as institutional inefficiency, might be counterbalanced by the contribution of their exercise to the future stability of democratic institutions.

THE DYNAMICS OF GROWTH

By definition, the developing societies have production possibilities vastly below those of developed societies, and so are much less able to satisfy the needs of their people. At the same time, their rates of population growth are comparatively very high. For both reasons economic growth is correspondingly more important for them. A common view among economists (and some others as well) is that democratic politics tends to reduce the rate of growth, whether in developed or in developing societies. What might be called the "growth first" argument holds that rapid growth, being a more urgent goal in developing societies, justifies suppression of political rights in those societies.³³

The argument runs as follows: Growth is primarily a process of capital formation, which is a prerequisite for a sustained trend toward higher income, since, normally, total production in a poor economy cannot be increased very rapidly without building new factories, improving education, developing infrastructure services such as communications and transportation, and introducing new productive technologies. The rate of capital formation is a function of the rate of savings. According to this view, since the rich have a higher marginal propensity to save, the larger share of national income, and of increments due to growth, should be directed toward those who are already well off in order to maximize the rate of social savings.³⁴ But democratic institutions tend to reduce the share of national income of the upper classes, thereby skewing the allocation of national income toward consumption and away from saving. Thus, it is claimed, economic growth can best be promoted by authoritarian regimes without democratic incentives to depress the rate of savings below its optimal level.

The idea that successful economic growth may require large distributive inequalities—perhaps even larger than those characteristic of traditional societies—seems to be confirmed by the experience of Western European societies during their own periods of industrialization.³⁵ In the long run, of course, the economic modernization of Europe has resulted in dramatic decreases in economic inequalities as well as in dramatic increases in average standards of living. In the short run, however, the implications for developing countries are ominous. As Simon Kuznets put the dilemma:

How can either the institutional or political framework of the underdeveloped societies or the process of economic growth and industrialization be modified to favor a sustained rise to higher levels of economic performance and yet avoid the fatally simple remedy of an authoritarian regime that would use the population as cannon fodder in the fight for economic achievement?³⁶

To many observers, there is no obvious alternative to such a "fatally simple remedy," and so the "growth first" argument against democracy in poor countries may seem to be the strongest. Economic modernization, whatever

its structural characteristics, clearly requires a reduction in consumption relative to savings; and it appears to be well supported that *maximizing* the rate of growth in a developing economy requires a degree of restraint in consumption that virtually no democratic government could tolerate.³⁷ In this restricted sense, there is certainly a "trade-off" between growth and democracy.³⁸

It is less clear that this "trade-off" should be resolved in favor of economic growth. At least, it is not clear if the goal of economic growth is not qualified by distributive considerations. It is now generally recognized that development strategies based on maximizing the growth of national income have in fact often resulted in growing income inequalities and, in some countries, in *absolute* declines in the real income of the bottom half of the population ranked by income.³⁹ Economic-growth strategies unconstrained by distributive considerations will not necessarily reduce the worst forms of poverty.

The conventional view is that the increasing inequalities due to growth, and the decline in real income for the most impoverished groups that may be associated with it, are unavoidable but temporary problems. In the long run, everyone benefits from industrialization. But this, too, is uncertain. As noted above, confidence that growth leads in its later stages to improvements in the welfare of those most impoverished rests on the analogy with the industrialization of Western Europe. But the analogy is faulty in several respects. In particular, as a result of the interplay of differing demographic and public-health trends, the higher level of technological development, and the greater concentration and integration of finance, the modern sectors in present-day developing societies do not seem likely to absorb surplus agricultural labor to the extent characteristic of European societies during industrialization. Even if an organized industrial proletariat develops, it is therefore less likely to identify its interests with those of the most impoverished, and so, less likely to play the crucial redistributive roles played by labor in the social reform movements of the newly industrialized societies of nineteenth-century Europe.⁴⁰ In short, the pursuit in developing societies today of unconstrained growth policies may result in the development of a domestic class structure resistant to future equalizing adjustments in the distribution of income. Maximizing growth in the present may not only fail to help the worst off now, but also may make it more difficult politically to improve their situation later.⁴¹

I will not pursue these familiar points further here. What is to be emphasized is that these speculative observations are of more than pragmatic interest. They require a fundamental qualification of the "growth first" argument. W. Arthur Lewis once asked the question (rare in the literature of development economics), "Is Economic Growth Desirable?"⁴² While acknowledging that "the rate of economic growth can be too high for the health of society," Lewis explained the desirability of economic growth, despite the associated sacrifices of personal and political liberty, as follows: "It is one of the presuppositions of [economic growth] that the effect will be greatly to increase both the material and the cultural standards of the people involved, and that they

themselves will in due course prefer the new way of life to the old."⁴³ In view of the evidence that rapid growth in the developing countries will not necessarily result in a better life for everyone, Lewis's own criterion—that the people "themselves will in due course prefer the new way of life to the old"—suggests that the "growth first" argument, as it stands, should be rejected. It should be rejected because it fails to recognize that what is important is not promoting growth per se, but promoting equitable growth: growth that helps to alleviate the worst forms of poverty in the present and that promises to increase rather than decrease the expectations of the worst-off in the future.⁴⁴

If something like the "growth first" argument could ever be persuasive, it must depend in part upon an affirmative answer to the question whether authoritarian governments are likely to be more successful than democratic governments in promoting equitable development. Here, again, the historical circumstances of various developing societies will compel varying conclusions. But there is more reason here than in the arguments discussed earlier for anticipating that the anti-democratic considerations could still be especially weighty.

Before developing this point, let me recapitulate briefly. The difficulty with the "growth first" argument as originally formulated is that it makes no reference to the distribution of the gains from growth. Moreover, it does not imply that any of the traditional justifications of democracy are inapplicable to developing societies. The argument must draw its force from a comparison of the importance or urgency of the ends served by democracy and of the ends served by growth. It seems implausible that growth is necessarily more urgent precisely because there is no guarantee that the gains from growth will be shared with those whose most urgent interests would go unprotected in the absence of democracy. However, if the argument is reformulated as suggested above by including a distributive element, it becomes more plausible that certain types of authoritarian regimes would be preferable to democracy. By hypothesis, such regimes would be more likely to pursue egalitarian development policies; a fortiori they would be more likely to satisfy the material needs of the worst-off social groups.

Why anticipate that authoritarian regimes could be more successful in this respect? There are two complementary reasons, both of which illustrate ways in which democratic institutions operating in poor societies can fail to attend to everyone's interests. First, there is comparative evidence that in democratic regimes the material position of the rural peasantry (normally the least-advantaged social group) declines as scarce resources are shifted to urban groups, which are better informed and better organized and thus are more effective in pressing their claims.⁴⁵ We can understand such cases as cases in which political rights, although they are formally available to everyone, benefit some more than others as a result of inequalities in the distribution of the resources necessary for taking advantage of them—for example, education, organizational capacities, and wealth. The second point, which is related, is that

electoral mechanisms among peasants are especially prone to manipulation by traditional elites, who mobilize uninformed and frequently illiterate peasant constituencies by offering selective incentives in return for electoral support.⁴⁶ In both cases the second of the traditional justifications of democracy—that democratic institutions make available to everyone the means to protect their interests—would be insecure, since social-background inequalities would be reflected in large inequalities of political influence, and those most in need of protection would be least able to obtain it through political means. In the long run, of course, the appropriate remedy is to increase educational and material resources at least up to a level at which reasonably equal influence in the political process is assured. But this long-run solution is still elusive in the developed societies, and it is close to hopeless in many developing societies. The alternative short-run solution would be pursued by a nondemocratic regime of policies designed to produce a more desirable distribution of income or to induce structural changes in the political economy having this effect.

In discussing cultural differences, I observed that a conflict might arise within the justifying theory of democracy as applied to poor societies between concerns for self-respect and equity. Such a conflict seems more likely in view of the findings just mentioned. There is nothing in either version of the "growth first" argument to question whether democratic institutions in poor societies would promote the values associated with self-respect. Yet it is plausible that under some circumstances democratic politics would promote a less desirable distribution of income as well as a lower rate of growth than some nondemocratic alternatives. When those circumstances exist, an argument that the nondemocratic alternative would be better, on the whole, might be persuasive if it were based on a comparison of the importance of the interests in self-respect and equity from the point of view of those whose interests are involved. This is the thought behind Berlin's remark that "to offer political rights... to men who are half-naked, illiterate, underfed, and diseased is to mock their condition..."⁴⁷ But of course we should observe once again that it is not because a nondemocratic regime is *nondemocratic* that it is more desirable in these circumstances; it is because the regime pursues policies that more adequately satisfy the requirements of substantive political equality by protecting urgent interests unlikely to be protected in a democracy.

CONCLUSION

A generation of social-science research concerning the differences between developed and developing societies has yielded a number of arguments entailing or suggesting that democratic institutions are morally inappropriate to developing societies. I would like to conclude this discussion with some general observations about where these arguments go wrong and what truths remain. Ideally, these observations need to be integrated into a more systematic theory, but that task remains for the future.

It is clear that none of the anti-democratic arguments support the general conclusion that democratic institutions are inappropriate in developing societies. Aside from the variety of questionable empirical premises employed in these arguments, they all suffer from two problems. One is an unwarranted *a priori* belief that authoritarian regimes can be expected to govern more successfully than democratic ones; the other, which is related, is a failure to distinguish among the patterns of outcomes likely to be produced by authoritarian governments operating in societies with varying economic structures and political circumstances. Authoritarian governments are not created equal: some are competent and some are incompetent; some respect personal rights and some are ruthlessly repressive; some have the support of disadvantaged social groups and some represent privileged interests. If there are any cases in which we should accept the suppression of democratic institutions in favor of authoritarian ones, surely these differences matter.

But the human rights orthodoxy cannot be accepted either. There are several ways in which democratic governments might be less likely to respect their members equally as sources of claims than some nondemocratic alternative. It might be that the human interests that democracy has traditionally been thought to protect are either unimportant or not endangered in nondemocratic, developing societies; it might be that, notwithstanding their importance, these interests would be unlikely to be secured through a system of political rights; or it might be that implementation of such a system would inevitably incur intolerable costs, calculated in terms of the most urgent or morally important interests in society. Only the political-culture analysis raises the first possibility, and we have seen that the evidence in this regard is both incomplete and, perhaps, irrelevant. The more pressing issues about the justification of democracy in developing societies involve the second and third possibilities. Democratic governments might fail to respect their members equally as sources of claims because (1) inequalities in the distribution of the material resources necessary to make effective use of political rights permit already advantaged social groups to use the machinery of democracy to advance their interests at the expense of those less advantaged; or (2) owing to lack of education, literacy, and political competence, some groups are systematically unable to defend their interests through democratic processes. In either case, the result would be to concentrate income and wealth in upper and middle social groups while leaving the most urgent needs of the least advantaged unsatisfied. For example, discontinuous policy shifts that would benefit everyone in the long run might be effectively resisted through democratic mechanisms by the beneficiaries of the old order, resulting in a long-term failure to satisfy the most urgent needs of the population.⁴⁸ The operation of democratic institutions might also involve intolerable costs, for example, when (3) because of an absence of procedural consensus or widespread commitment to democratic norms, political decisions democratically arrived at cannot be implemented due to failures of compliance.

In a theory of democratic justification with applications to poor societies, these might appear as necessary conditions of the acceptability, from a moral point of view, of nondemocratic regimes; for then democratic institutions would not promote (some of) the interests on the basis of which they are normally justified. The arguments connecting the principle of political equality with democratic institutional forms would be insecure. But these conditions could not be sufficient. There are two further points. First, there would have to be some reason to believe that an alternative regime would be more successful in the respects in which the democratic regime failed. As I have been emphasizing, this is not something that can be known a priori, but requires an analysis of the social bases of support for particular regimes. Second, there would have to be some reason to believe that an alternative regime would not be morally deficient in other ways, for example, by turning to brutal and repressive means for securing the compliance of the population or for discouraging dissent. These are both tall orders, and it is, to say the least, most unlikely that very many actual authoritarian regimes would pass these tests.

I would like to end on a less philosophical point. My topic is a disagreeable one for two reasons. First, it concerns political choices about conditions under which other people should live, and so seems to involve an attitude of paternalistic superiority. As [such] it invites the response: Who are we to say? Second, in considering the substantive arguments about when and why democratic institutions are morally desirable, one quickly encounters empirical issues that are extremely complex and about which, despite a good deal of social-science research, we are unable to draw conclusions with much confidence.... The first concern seems to me to be misplaced. It is not the wish to be paternalistic, or the sense of Western moral superiority, that prompts concern with this topic, but rather the realization that it cannot responsibly be avoided. The United States, together with other industrial nations, will be confronted with choices bearing on the prospects of democracy in developing societies for many years to come, and it would be better to confront these choices with a clear understanding of the moral issues involved than with the dogmatic and uncritical views found in much of the recent literature. This is hardly to say that the industrial countries should become the self-appointed advocates of democracy throughout the world; but they must not be blinded to the unavoidable political consequences of foreign-policy decisions that may be taken with entirely different ends in view. About the second concern I cannot be as sanguine. The record of Western social science with respect to socioeconomic and political development is not inspiring. In economics, the overwhelming concern with maximizing the rate of growth regardless of the distributional consequences, and in political science, the concern with stability and institutional modernization, have prompted students of development to make a number of contrary-to-fact empirical assumptions that may have played a significant role in the current crises of inequitable

growth and repressive authoritarianism throughout the developing world. Whether a social science based on a more discriminating comprehension of the moral stakes involved in the development of the poor countries can do better remains to be seen; but again, a precondition of any such effort would seem to be a more coherent and defensible account of what the stakes are.

NOTES

1. See, for example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 21; and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 25. Both are reprinted in Ian Brownlie, ed., *Basic Documents on Human Rights* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), pp. 110 and 221, resp.
2. Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, 3rd ed. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950), p. 269.
3. For such a conception, see Brian Barry, *Political Argument* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), pp. 176ff.
4. Since I have discussed this issue elsewhere, I shall not pursue it further here. See "Democracy and Political Equality" (forthcoming).
5. The phrase is from Jack Lively, *Democracy* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975), pp. 134-35. The connection with self-respect is clearest in Rousseau. See *The Social Contract*, Bk. I, Chaps. 8-9, and Bk. II, Chaps. 2-3.
6. John Stuart Mill, *Considerations on Representative Government* (London: Longman's, Green and Co., 1865), Chap. 3.
7. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 228-32.
8. Mill, *Considerations on Representative Government*, Chap. 3.
9. For a discussion, see Dennis F. Thompson, *John Stuart Mill and Representative Government* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 18-21.
10. The main sources are Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review* 53, No. 1 (March 1959): 69-105; Phillips Cutright, "National Political Development: Measurement and Analysis," *American Sociological Review* 28, No. 2 (April 1963): 253-64; Deane E. Neubauer, "Some Conditions of Democracy," *American Political Science Review* 61, No. 4 (December 1967): 1,002-9; Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 62-80; Robert W. Jackman, *Politics and Social Equality: A Comparative Analysis* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1975), pp. 66-73; Philip Coulter, *Social Mobilization and Liberal Democracy* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1975), pp. 23ff.
11. There is a helpful critique of these studies in Lively, *Democracy*, pp. 73-88.
12. Neubauer, "Some Conditions of Democracy," p. 1,007; Jackman, *Politics and Social Equality*, pp. 71-73.
13. Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris, *Economic Growth and Social Equity in Developing Countries* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1973), pp. 190-92. On the apparent trade-off between democracy and growth, see Irma Adelman, Marsha Geier, and Cynthia Taft Morris, "Instruments and Goals in Economic Development," *American Economic Review* 59, No. 2 (May 1969): 416-18; Samuel P. Huntington and Jorge I. Domínguez, "Political Development," *Handbook of Political Science*, ed. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975, Vol. 3, p. 60; and Samuel P. Huntington and Joan M. Nelson, *No Easy Choice* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 21-25.

14. Dahl, *Polyarchy*, p. 71.
15. There are difficulties in drawing this distinction precisely that I cannot resolve at present. But the distinction should be clear enough for present purposes. For example, we do not need much philosophical precision to recognize how outrageous was Congressman Robert Bauman's remark, in 1975, that South African blacks should continue to be excluded from politics because they lack "the education which would allow an intelligent exercise of political rights" (quoted in *The Nation*, April 19, 1980, p. 457).
16. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*, abr. ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), esp. pp. 11-30, 337-65.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 368-70. See also David E. Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), esp. Chaps. 2, 12.
18. Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* (New York: The Free Press, 1958), pp. 49-50.
19. *Ibid.* Emphases in original.
20. *Ibid.* For a similar view, see Edward Shils, *Political Development in the New States* (The Hague: Mouton, 1962).
21. Quoted in Ved Mehta, "Reflections: Democracy in a Poor Country," *The New Yorker* (March 22, 1976), p. 97.
22. J. S. Mill anticipated, and apparently endorsed, such a view. *Considerations on Representative Government*, Chaps. 3-4.
23. See, for example, Joel S. Migdal, *Peasants, Politics and Revolution* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 14-22. The theme that patterns of peasant political activity may be explained with reference to the "subsistence ethic" is developed in James C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1976), esp. Chaps. 1 and 7. The "moral economy" approach is criticized by Samuel L. Popkin in *The Rational Peasant* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), esp. Chap. 1, but the critique does not damage the general point about political-culture analyses in the text above.
24. See, for example, Migdal, *Peasants*, Chap. 10; Scott, *Moral Economy*, Chaps. 5, 7.
25. Benedict J. Kerkvliet, *The Huk Rebellion* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 133-38.
26. Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968), Chap. 1. For a further discussion of the theory of political change set out in this book, see Samuel P. Huntington, "The Change to Change," *Comparative Politics* 3, No. 3 (April 1971): esp. 301-5 and 314ff.
27. Huntington, *Political Order*, p. 25.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
29. A broadly similar view may be found in Leonard Binder and others, *Crises and Sequences in Political Development* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971). For a critical discussion of both Huntington and Binder, see Mark Kesselman, "Order or Movement? The Literature of Political Development as Ideology," *World Politics* 26, No. 1 (October 1973): 139-54.
30. Kesselman, "Order or Movement?" p. 146.
31. Social scientists have consistently overestimated the potential of authoritarian regimes for establishing the authority of governmental institutions and for unifying and integrating their populations. For a discussion drawing on African cases, see Conway W. Henderson, "Underdevelopment and Political Rights: A Revisionist Challenge," *Government and Opposition* 12, No. 3 (Summer 1977): esp. 278-83.
32. See, for example, John Mathiason and John Powell, "Participation and Efficacy," *Comparative Politics* 4, No. 3 (April 1972): 303-29.
33. This argument is made explicitly by Daniel Chirot, *Social Change in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977), pp. 222-26. The argument generalizes a

point made by Barrington Moore in his analysis of democracy in India. See his *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), pp. 406-10.

34. See, for example, W. Arthur Lewis, *The Theory of Economic Growth* (Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, 1955), Chap. 5.

35. Simon Kuznets, "Economic Growth and Income Inequality," *American Economic Review* 45, No. 1 (March 1955): esp. 18.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

37. For a discussion and review of some of the literature, see Sylvia Ann Hewlett, *The Cruel Dilemmas of Development* (New York: Basic Books, 1980), Chaps. 1-2.

38. For a contrasting view, see Robert E. Goodin, "The Development-Rights Trade-Off: Some Unwarranted Economic and Political Assumptions," *Universal Human Rights* 1, No. 2 (April-June 1979): esp. 33-34. Goodin fails to appreciate the great differences between the growth-economic rights and growth-political rights "trade-offs."

39. Felix Paukert, "Income Distribution at Different Levels of Development," *International Labour Review* 196, Nos. 2-3 (August-September 1973): 116-22; and Adelman and Morris, *Economic Growth*, pp. 160, 179. For a discussion and critique of these findings, see Deepak Lai, "Distribution and Development," *World Development* 4, No. 9 (September 1976): 725-38.

40. Hewlett, *Cruel Dilemmas*, pp. 18-26.

41. Adelman and Morris, *Economic Growth*, p. 170. See also Richard R. Fagen, "Equity in the South in the Context of North-South Relations," in Albert Fishlow and others, *Rich and Poor Nations in the World Economy* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978), pp. 165-99.

42. Lewis's essay is reprinted in *The Theory of Economic Growth*, pp. 420-35.

43. *Ibid.*, pp. 429, 431.

44. Lewis himself has recently discussed the structural requirements of equitable development strategies. See W. Arthur Lewis, *The Evolution of the International Economic Order* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978), Chaps. 10-11.

45. Joan M. Nelson, *Access to Power* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 390ff; Huntington and Nelson, *No Easy Choice*, pp. 75-76; Adelman and Morris, *Economic Growth*, p. 170. For a provocative discussion with special reference to the failure of democracy in India to serve the interests of peasants, see Atul Kohli, "Democracy, Economic Growth, and Inequality in India's Development," *World Politics* 32, No. 4 (July 1980): 623-38.

46. There is an extensive literature documenting instances of the "mobilization" of electoral support in peasant societies. For a summary, see Huntington and Nelson, *No Easy Choice*, Chap. 2. There is a detailed discussion in James C. Scott, "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia," *American Political Science Review* 66, No. 1 (March 1972): 109-13.

47. Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," in *Four Essays on Liberty* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 124.

48. This possibility is explored in Albert O. Hirschman, "The Turn to Authoritarianism in Latin America and the Search for Its Economic Determinants," in David Collier, ed., *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 87-97.

The Democratic Prerequisites of Development

Grace Goodell and John P. Powelson

A persistent theme of the third world is that it cannot wait. Europe took fourteen centuries to industrialize, if one counts from the end of the Roman Empire. Somehow this slowness is explained by Europe not knowing where it was going. We know, say third world leaders; so, with planning, let us compress history. Implied in this compression is a belief that "Europe has little to tell us; we must develop in our own way."

But the question is not whether the third world will develop in "Europe's way" or in its "own way." Rather, in what ways will its development be similar and in what ways different? Economic development can be likened to steel-making. There are hundreds of ways of making steel, but every one of them requires iron and fuel. Likewise, there are many ways for countries to develop, and the third world will surely select its own patterns. But there are common elements in all those ways—the "iron and fuel" of development. To find them, we must look where development has occurred. Both Europe and Japan come to mind.

Capital, high technology, science, and entrepreneurship are the typical explanations of economists for growth. Of course, third world leaders know these are requisites. But they are elements of development, not causes of it. Many third world leaders mean that they and their technocrats will create and then manage these elements, rather than simply letting them emerge as in the past; this requires centralized planning and a "big push." Other third world leaders advocate economic pluralism as the fastest way to development; but this, they

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say, requires a firm authoritarian framework. In either case, political pluralism should wait until later. Many western economists, sent to advise third-world governments and international agencies, acquiesce in these arguments or may even agree with them.

We will argue the opposite. Both economic and political pluralism are essential to sustained development. Economic pluralism is required so that innovativeness will come from many sources. Political pluralism is required for economic pluralism to be sustained. We are talking about the long run: a century or more. Any central government can build steel plants, airports, and other monuments if it can entice or compel laborers to do so and can acquire funds. But this is not economic development.

In most of the third world, the general public participates but little in the decisions that most affect their lives. We argue that this failure may indefinitely impair the foundations and building blocks for sustained growth. Those who insist on a strong central hand appear to us like the "enlightened" despots of the eighteenth century in Europe, such as Catherine the Great of Russia, Maria Theresa and Joseph II of Austria, Charles III of Naples, and Frederick the Great of Prussia. These were hardworking sovereigns who promoted government bureaucracies, national transportation systems, industrial infrastructure, great cities around their palaces, prestigious industrial plants, scientific farming, and justice. Although they loved their peasants, craftsmen, and merchants, they had only contempt for the intellectual and organizational capacities of these groups, and no confidence in their economic enterprise or political common sense.

In Japan, the corresponding period followed immediately after the Meiji Restoration, when government was dominated by the oligarchs of Satsuma and Choshu, whose concept of authority held over from the Tokugawa era. They too believed that the groups "below" them had to be directed from above.

Both Europe and Japan, however, had emerged from feudal periods with very strong norms, institutions, and skills, spread widely among the people, which enabled them to enter into contracts holding one another and their rulers accountable. This accountability, which was political as well as economic, worked both ways. The peasants bound their lords to contract just as the lords demanded services and taxes of the peasants. The contract may not have been between social and economic equals, and it may not have been fair in a modern sense. But the fundamental dynamics of contract were there: the dynamics of impersonal yet binding agreements; of corporate organization which would enable whole groups to enter into such agreements; of political leverage even at the bottom of society, which was necessary to make those contracts hold.

From these, the tools and normative expectations of mutually acceptable compromise evolved. Within this perduring framework, innovation, efficient production, and equitable distribution of income might be negotiated, and were negotiated over the centuries. No other feudal system anywhere in the

world shared these attributes, which in Japan were firmly in place long before exposure to Western technology and capitalism.

Out of these fundamentals, economic and political pluralism reinforced each other, in both the West and Japan. We posit that this complementarity explains why these two societies have launched and sustained vigorous economic development. "Enlightened despots" there may have been, but they ruled in the context of institutions and widely accepted social norms of mutual accountability. These contrast with the norms and institutions of coercion and control, so widespread in the third world today.

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PLURALISM

Economic pluralism consists of the freedom to buy, sell, and use resources in any way that does not harm others or restrict their similar freedoms. We call this condition "pluralism" because it enables many different persons or institutions to produce and trade competitively. It is a requisite to economic growth because only through this freedom will innovative and competitive technologies come on to the market place.

But economic pluralism is not a sufficient condition. Rigorous and open competition, and impersonal predictability, are required as well. These latter attributes come about only with the participation of many organized groups in the political process, which we call political pluralism.

In this essay, we will first present our argument theoretically. Then we will discuss the main shortcomings of the opposing argument, which advocates centralization, the centralization of rightist governments that claim to protect free enterprise and of leftist governments that advocate central planning. Finally, we will illustrate our case from Western and Japanese history.

THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS

Economic pluralism is essential to economic efficiency ("the biggest bang for the buck"). Efficiency in turn favors economic growth. We take the latter as self-evident, for growth cannot occur if resources are grossly wasted. But the former requires explanation.

This explanation is found in the so-called "Austrian" school of economists, which developed in the nineteenth century. The "Austrians" proved mathematically that the most efficient allocation of resources is one in which prices of inputs (such as land, labor, capital) are proportional to their incremental contribution to output; the prices of consumer goods depend on their costs; and the quantities of consumer goods depend on relative demands. The explanation is a technical one, well-known to first-year students of economics, but difficult to explain in lay terms. It is summarized by the adage that free competition causes inputs to be deployed to the products that people most want, while taking into account their relative costs.

But efficiency does not necessarily lead to economic growth. Capital and technical skills are also essential. An economy may be totally efficient, but if its constituents choose to consume all their output, setting aside nothing for capital, or if they do not invent and adopt new techniques, it will not grow. The centralization argument rests on the assumption that given free choice a people will not select enough capital goods rather than consumption goods and will not provide enough educational facilities at a local level. Therefore, some central authority must coerce them into that selection.

Our challenge to this argument begins with the observation (to be defended below) that centralization leads to inefficiency. Momentarily, the third world stands at an impasse. Both efficiency and capital are required for growth; free competition provides efficiency, but (others argue) it may not provide capital and education. Centralization, on the other hand, provides capital and education but (we argue) not efficiency. We plan to break the impasse by showing that economies that have "chosen" not to accumulate capital or education have failed to do so precisely *because* of heavy-handed centralization, and certainly not because of competition.

WHY COMPETITION DEPENDS UPON POLITICAL PLURALISM

Historically, free competition and political pluralism have gone together. In the early stages of development, the economic life of each geographical region, or each social class, is usually dominated by certain elites: Schumpeter's leading entrepreneurs, or even Toynbee's creative minorities. In the great urban centers, small coteries of an upper class, usually relatives of the ruler, begin to increase the productivity of some of society's primary endowments, to enrich themselves through trade with others. In provinces, villages, and even large families, the same process is found: lesser elites at each level hustling to compete with one another to gain advantage over their peers. All these interactions constitute "the market."

However vigorous such economic competition may be at the outset, in time this pioneering cadre of elites exhausts its own potential and drive, or new players compete against them for the same rewards, wanting "their share of the pie." Perhaps these upstarts have learned from the elites how to manage an operation and now want to work for themselves; or they may know a better way to organize a firm, which they are willing to launch with their own savings. Naturally, the elites resist the new players. If left on their own, elites consolidate forces at every level, through alliances such as marriage, through manipulating law or even religion, through encouraging crises, and by restricting trade or markets.

We see examples of this in many countries. In the Philippines, the upper middle classes have been excluded from important markets they want to enter, which are dominated by a small coterie of ruling elites above them (*Wall*

Street Journal, October 29, 1981). In Brazil, favored investors are subsidized to the exclusion of others, then unable to compete when subsidies are withdrawn (*Latin America Weekly Report*, March 26, 1982); in Egypt price manipulation by the government undermines the peasants' good crop. These examples were found by a quick flip through our files. We could go on and on, with countless illustrations of governments using their political apparatus to reserve participation for the elites. The same narrowing of the competitive arena occurred at other social levels in British Ireland of the nineteenth century, where most of the population was excluded from any economic initiative at all, or even from attempts at self-betterment. In contemporary India, land reform had to be implemented before village- and provincial-level markets were accessible to the peasantry.

How can society assure itself of the rigorous and open competition it needs for efficiency? Only by political pluralism. In the end, new players gain entrance to the market only through political bargaining, and only if the political institutions provide channels for such bargaining.

WHY PREDICTABILITY ALSO REQUIRES POLITICAL PLURALISM

In addition to competition, we have said that economic pluralism requires predictability, and that this can be gained only through political participation. By predictability, we mean a general atmosphere of trust, of commonly accepted norms and expectations among the population at large. These in turn depend on institutions of mutual accountability, which back up trust with concrete checks and balances. This trust must extend beyond one's colleagues and social equals, to include the predictability of authority itself.

Without such predictability, competition—however vigorous from the outset—will take the form of short-term speculation rather than long-term investment. It retreats into secret, personalistic dealings, because it is unable to select the best option on an open market. Without institutions of mutual accountability no competitive arena can open itself to participation by strangers—hence to new players. In addition, without such institutions, new players will not *want* to compete, lest those already in the market change the rules on them. Finally, without impersonal predictability, economic organization, and even trade, is limited to partners who know each other through years of familiarity or through shared social networks. Economic development requires speedy and far-ranging transactions not constrained by such limitations of time and space.

Furthermore, the seeming predictability of personalistic ties between people who are unequal, such as landlord and tenant, old and young, rich man and poor cousin, often favors the more powerful; thus it may in fact be arbitrary as well as inefficient. New players must have access to institutions through which they can hold accountable even those whom they never successfully challenge through personal links.

HOW ARE INSTITUTIONS OF TRUST ESTABLISHED?

There is no clear-cut road to establishing institutions of impersonal trust. Many areas have gone without them for centuries and still do. There are, however, conditions under which they are less likely to be formed than others.

Consider a hierarchical society in which the elites of each social level consolidate to make rules that they perceive to be "best for society." Even if they are enlightened, such power tends to be arbitrary. When arbitrary power becomes institutionalized at the top level, this precludes predictability at lower levels. There is no one to check the government itself. When the imbalance in society has evolved that far, institutions of impersonal trust cannot be imposed by the elites who themselves constitute the government. Nyerere's bureaucrats cannot convert ujamaa villages into Tanzanian communities, though these peasant villages were communities before they were uprooted. Egyptian nationalism has not made Egyptians trust one another, nor has it enabled the fellah to hold Cairo bureaucrats accountable.

Instead, only through prolonged and frequently repeated interactions of mutual benefit do such values and the institutions underpinning them emerge. But without political participation those interactive patterns that do become routinized cannot crystallize into national institutions. Seeds for orderly participation are confined to special enclaves: the highly-efficient legal system of Jewish merchants in Mexico; the communal-entrepreneurial structures of Chinese in Southeast Asia; the stable democracy of traditional Iranian village life, and similar ones elsewhere.

In fact, these promising forms are often considered illegal. Street merchants are swept away, urban slums are bulldozed, and businesses are harassed by authoritarian governments. Yet only if these forms, which spring up naturally, are allowed access to the market place will the nascent patterns of trust and predictability become institutionalized.

Finally, inasmuch as economic development can spring only from accumulation (of investment, expertise, trust, etc.), it requires a conserving social order. Political pluralism is the most effective means yet discovered for avoiding the destructiveness of revolution. Institutions of mutual accountability, growing out of give-and-take, promote resolution of differences rather than endemic and often violent factional conflict.

In summary, sustained economic development requires economic pluralism based on rigorous competition ever ready to expand for new players and mutual accountability extending beyond personalistic claims. Elites on their own will not continually open the market for all who would challenge them. Only through political pluralism can an economic system remain competitive, predictable, and stable.

How CENTRALIZED POWER OBSTRUCTS ECONOMIC PLURALISM

Every society needs a coordinational directive, a "governor." Thus economic development requires an authority to enforce contracts, ensure law and order, and champion free trade when it is threatened (by, for example, monopolies). But third world elites go much further in their supposition that economic development will not occur unless it is commanded, in all its details, by the center. They assume that industries will not form or grow rapidly unless they are owned by the government; that resources will not find their proper channels without tax incentives, subsidies, and price controls; that private borrowers will not respond unless interest rates are kept artificially low; and that foreign exchange will not flow adequately unless the government alone buys it and sells it, at an exchange rate set by itself.

Unfortunately, even an honest governor cannot have the expertise or resources to manage the myriad decisions implied in setting prices of countless products, allocating investment in rural districts far from the capital, or in fixing exchange rates that will distinguish between goods that can be produced more cheaply at home than abroad, or vice-versa.

Planning based on such centralized decisions has created modern industry in urban islands, but it has done little for agriculture, handicrafts, or the small-scale rural or urban economy. Instead, it has deprived these poorer sectors, which have elsewhere been the backbone of economic growth, by concentrating scarce national resources in the wrong industries. Once a space is reserved for government initiative, private initiative is kept out by discriminatory taxes, licensing, or outright prohibition. This has been so, even if the space is not actually occupied by government, but only held in reserve. Consequently, a needed service may be produced by no one.

One consequence of political centralization is the relative deprivation of what has come to be known as the "informal sector." This consists of the myriad small businesses, street hawkers, craftspeople, and merchants in both city and rural markets. In Asia, it is known as "the bazaar." In earlier Europe and in Tokugawa Japan, this sector was the spearhead of development. Out of it arose the early inventions of the industrial revolution. Today, however, the term is pejorative. In most of the third world, bias against the "informal" sector leads planners to divert capital away from it. Infrastructure is provided for the "modern" sections of a city but not for the "traditional." Sometimes opposition takes a more active form, as "informal" industries and housing are bulldozed out of town.

Another consequence is the so-called "Barton gap." Often in the third world one will find a size gap in enterprise. There will be tiny family businesses, too small to be noticed by tax and regulatory officials, as well as companies of, say fifty employees or more, but little in between. The first are

too small for the tax-collector or licenser to harass, while the second are able to fight back, either through bribes or legal process. Rather than expand into the "in-between," where he will be vulnerable, the small entrepreneur will invest his resources in other tiny, "non-observable" businesses. Surely this is an inefficient use of resources. The Barton gap, often reported informally, is difficult to document statistically, because the information will be hidden for the same reasons that the phenomenon occurs.

CORRUPTION

These diseconomies in centrally-planned development occur because the weak—the peasants, the provinces, the informal sector, the small businesses—cannot express their demands politically. Only through political pluralism can they come to participate effectively. The right to allocate goods and positions essential to the lives of others, or simply desired by others, without political accountability, leads inevitably to corruption. The temptation to award a license, a loan, a favorable price or interest rate, or other prize, is over the long run irresistible. It may be combatted by a strong personality, such as Nyerere of Tanzania or Castro of Cuba, or by harsh reprisals including execution, but these inhibitors neither last forever nor are evenly effective.

Endemic corruption interferes with the rational operation of the market, it saps society of its material accumulation, and it endangers its cohesion and common purpose, as well as its institutions of trust. Yet Western theories of economic development either underestimate or ignore the pervasive role of corruption in many third world societies. There is no place for it in economists' models of economic growth. It is of course in the interest of elites to dismiss the phenomenon as "inevitable" or "unimportant."

To combat the debilitating effects of corruption, at best the West joins in pathetic efforts to increase and upgrade bureaucratic training, devise new bureaucratic monitoring systems, and restructure bureaucratic organization according to the latest in Western management science. But it is futile to train people to do what they do not want to do in the first place or for which no one can hold them accountable. Often, we suspect, such training is accepted as a sop to donor agencies to keep them functioning. Without political participation to ferret out and punish corruption, no bureaucracy can over the long run maintain its integrity.

CENTRAL AUTHORITY AND THE POOR

It is often argued that centralized authority—as in socialist governments—is essential in order to succor the poor. But the history of authoritarianism gives a mixed picture. In Cuba, South Korea, and Taiwan, everyone is now decently fed, housed, and perhaps made literate. All have authoritarian governments. But other authoritarian governments have not achieved as much,

while less authoritarian governments, such as Japan, have outstripped the countries mentioned. If one bases the case on socialism rather than authoritarianism, the results are also mixed. The conclusion is that neither authoritarianism nor socialism is essential to achieve these results.

When we go beyond these essentials, the case for authoritarianism to help the poor dims further. After attending to these trappings, central planners rarely direct substantial resources to the poor; more often they deprive them of resources, through (say) farm prices pegged low to satisfy urban rather than rural interests. In third world countries, little assistance is usually allocated to small-scale agriculture or home industries (particularly those employing women), to the landless, or to urban lower classes. Instead, agricultural development, slum clearance, programs for import substitution and the development of natural resources, and other projects said to be for the poor are in fact translated into assistance to large-scale farmers, urban land speculators and construction companies, tourism, or parastatal corporations which largely enrich their managers. Funds allocated to medical assistance for the poor end up in fancy centers for heart by-pass operations, while the expensively-trained medical profession ignores widespread malaria or malnutrition. The poor may see these misdirections clearly, but deprived of genuine political participation they futilely depend on the vagaries of moral propaganda—launched by others—to make their presence felt.

We do not suggest that participation by the poor is an easy accomplishment. In many places, the poor are intimidated and inexperienced in political participation, or they lack the institutional framework for channeling their demands. We only conclude that the resolution of these obstacles eventually must be managed by the poor themselves, with whatever outside assistance is possible.

EXCEPTIONS

Those authoritarian governments—such as Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore—that are successfully husbanding economic development may appear to belie our argument. We have three comments on these.

First, our discussion has taken a long view. In the countries just mentioned, success has been too recent for extrapolations of development prospects over the long run, and in some cases there may be the beginnings of political pluralism at lower levels. Brazil under the junta, Colombia, and Iran under the Shah were also touted as showcases of development, only to taper off later.

Second, these four successful economies have been able to count on the exceptional loyalties of either an extremely poor and largely immigrant population or of people recovering from war. The utter indigence from which they began, their high morale, and their sense of shared isolation (if not common purpose) may have buffered them, temporarily, from costly inefficiencies and

political reverses. In each of these cases also, the rudiments of political pluralism have been established. But if the dynamics we have mentioned do not emerge in the coming generation, the "big push" may have been in vain.

Finally, those who believe that authoritarian regimes will lead via development to political pluralism do not, we believe, give sufficient weight to the persistence of power once entrenched or to the inability of poor people to offset it once their nascent institutions have been destroyed. Nor do they recognize the many times in history when new governments, dedicated to helping the poor in authoritarian ways, have in fact despoiled the poor as soon as their original protagonists had passed from the scene. The current examples of Poland and Iran illustrate how difficult it is for a society based on authoritarian direction to shift to political pluralism. Surely it is far less costly to evolve participatory norms and institutions all along, rather than to try to call them into being all of a sudden.

CONCLUSION

There have been three stages of political-economic centralization in history. The first occurred in most early states and empires: a period of great mistrust outside one's own clan, in which the ruler usurped authority over others and enforced it militarily. The second, a tendency toward liberalism, occurred in Europe and Japan from the tenth to the nineteenth centuries. The third—in the twentieth century in Europe and America—is a move toward greater power for the central government. This may have certain justifications, such as the management of full employment or the use of government as arbiter over monopoly power. But in both the West and Japan, strong safeguards have been introduced to prevent the government from abusing its authority. The same safeguards have simply not emerged in most third world societies, which—it seems to us—are still in the first of the three stages.

Unfortunately, advisors from industrialized countries and international agencies often confuse the first stage of the countries in which they serve with the third stage in the countries from which they come. They fail to recognize that controls to hold these governments accountable have not yet evolved to restrain the power of those to whom they teach central planning. This is a grave error, not only for over all economic development, but also for the immediate welfare of the poor.

Toward an Index of Democratic Development

Roy L. Prosterman and Jeffrey M. Riedinger

Sixty percent of the world's population is still counted as "rural," and half of all the world's families still make their living directly from the soil. Thus, the relationship to land and the productivity of that land define critical elements of the conditions of life for most people.

Many episodes of massive violence in the less-developed world can be traced to settings where a high proportion of families do not own the land upon which they depend for a livelihood. Likewise, grave strictures on agricultural production appear to exist where there are unsatisfactory tenure arrangements—an inadequate relationship between people and the land they work.

The grievances of the landless—tenants, sharecroppers and agricultural laborers in our definition—have been central to providing rank-and-file support for revolutions in a host of twentieth-century societies. We emphasize that we speak of landless peasants as providing the essential popular support.

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We include the following essay for three reasons. First, it offers a complementary perspective to Wright's discussion in Part II of the relation of economic freedom to political and civil liberties. Secondly, it develops an argument complementary to those of Beitz and Goodell and Powelson that there is not a tradeoff between stability and freedom. It argues that a fundamental aspect of stability is dispersed and democratic control over land. Finally we offer this essay because for over a decade Roy Prosterman's campaign for freedom and peace through land reform has constituted one of the more exciting attempts to apply American ideals to a central problem of the developing world. It was time to present a report from this effort.

They have been the foot soldiers or "spear-carriers" of the revolutionary movements, not their initial catalyzers, leaders, or "vanguard".

In the decades before World War II, the land ownership issue was vitally important in the Mexican and Russian revolutions and in the Spanish Civil War. It was also significant in the Irish struggle for independence. Since World War II, it has played a major role in successful revolutions in China, Bolivia, Vietnam, Cuba, Algeria, Ethiopia, and Zimbabwe (Rhodesia), as well as being of substantial significance in the Shah's debacle in Iran (where, contrary to the promises of the "White Revolution", fewer than 30 percent of the landless received land, and even some of that was later taken back). The land ownership issue has been central to episodes of large-scale violence, short of successful revolution, in Malaya and Kenya under British rule, and in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Guatemala. Further, it has figured prominently in at least a dozen other countries in the overthrow of governments or in episodes of civil strife.

It appears that seventeen societies in this century have had landless populations that constituted one-third or more of their total population (eighteen if one counts Java separately from Indonesia). Until now, ten of these societies have experienced revolutions or massive internal upheavals in the wake of which they have dealt with their land-tenure problem; one more is the special case of Iran. The ten upheavals include the extremely violent successful revolutions in Mexico, Russia, China, and Vietnam; the less-violent successful revolutions in Bolivia, Cuba, Ethiopia and Nicaragua; the current conflict in El Salvador; and—one instance in which there was little or no violence—the overthrow of the monarchy in Egypt. In addition, nonviolent solutions were found in Taiwan and South Korea, in the major land reforms carried out after World War II.

The remaining four or five countries—none of which has yet dealt in a significant way with its land-tenure problems—are the three populous nations of the Indian subcontinent, plus the Philippines (and Java). All have in fact experienced episodes of violence (most dramatically in India at partition, and in Indonesia in communal violence in 1965), but not yet revolution or—save for the Philippines—protracted conflict in which the landlords were the enemy and land was the issue.

It might also be mentioned that pre-Civil War Spain came close to these levels of landlessness, with over one-quarter of its total population landless. No further contemporary societies are this high, although the northeastern region of Brazil, if considered separately, would be over 30 percent, and South Africa and (surprisingly) Costa Rica are both over 20 percent landless.

The evidence suggests that absence of an adequate relation to land presages not only violence, but a relative absence of productive results from agriculture. The latter serves to predict, in turn, serious problems for the entire development process, when "development" is defined in almost any terms other than the windfall of oil-based income.

However, the relation to land, or the kind or degree of amelioration in that relation that may be sufficient to forestall violence is not necessarily equivalent to that which is sufficient to catalyze and support the higher ranges of productivity or economic and social benefits from land. Ownership or ownership-like tenure, and possibly collectivization, may both be responses to the grievances of the landless that are adequate to prevent violence,¹ but neither may be sufficient to achieve even moderate levels of productivity without collateral measures, and they may not have equivalent potential with such measures in place.

THE COMPONENTS OF THE INDEX

Given these concerns this essay develops a reasonably sensitive and comprehensive measure of how well-off people in a society are, both in terms of their physical well-being and control over their lives. This "Index of Democratic Development" provides a broad measurement in several dimensions. It encompasses the extent of people's effective control over their own livelihoods, the success of their further efforts to produce that livelihood, feed their families, and generate surplus income, the degree to which they meet and sustain their most basic physical needs, and the presence of a framework of civil and political freedoms for their activities.

To create the overall Index, we present data initially in four sub-indexes that can also be used independently. The "Land-Ownership Index" (LOI) and "Land-Productivity Index" (LPI) relate directly to the issues of land ownership and agricultural productivity, particularly fundamental in those countries where half or more of the population still makes its living from the land. The "Birth-and-Death-Based Modernization Index" (BDMI) is based on two other fundamental sets of facts—the infant death rate and crude birth rate for each society—which give a more "end-result-oriented" measurement of well-being than the two land related indexes. The "Civil and Political Liberties Index" (CPLI) is adapted directly from the quantified assessments of civil and political freedoms on a one to seven scale which have been prepared and published annually for ten years by R. D. Gastil for Freedom House. This adds a political and behavioral dimension to the assessment of a people's well-being.

The four sub-indexes—LOI, LPI, BDMI, and CPLI—are then combined into a single "Index of Democratic Development" (IDD).

LAND OWNERSHIP (LOI) AND LAND PRODUCTIVITY (LPI) INDEXES

If one is to assess that aspect of "development" or "modernization" having to do with the rural sector—both from the point of view of the rural population's lack of proclivity towards violent upheaval and control over its own destiny, and from that of the agricultural production actually achieved—it seems that the assessment should include, separately, data on the extent of

individual ownership or ownership-like tenure of land and on the per-hectare production actually achieved. The former provides a broad positive measure both of lack of violence-proneness and of grass-roots participation in and control over the development process.² The latter provides, tenure conditions aside, a measure of how well the agricultural system is actually performing.

We therefore begin by looking at basic data on the agricultural sector, contained in the two tables that follow.

Table 17 gives detailed data on participation in ownership and control of the land resource. For seventy-four societies which together contain ninety percent of the world's population, and for which reasonably adequate data is available, it shows the percentage of the agricultural population that owns and operates its own individual farm, together with (parenthetically) whatever additional percentage of that population is on collective or state farms.³ Regional figures are also given in three cases of special interest, as well as pre- and post-land reform figures for El Salvador. The remaining agricultural families—the reciprocal percentage—are the tenants and agricultural laborers, constituting the landless.⁴

Table 18 gives basic data on productivity per hectare in various countries (including nearly all the same seventy-four, as well as additional countries for which productivity data is available). Productivity is shown for corn, wheat, rice, grain sorghum, and barley, the world's five leading grain crops. We have here considered each country in relation to its productivity per hectare for whichever two of the five leading grains are most widely sown in that particular country, considering also the third grain crop if it is relatively significant.⁵ We have then expressed productivity for each nation, by crop, as a percentage of the highest per-hectare productivity achieved by any nation for that crop,⁶ and, finally, have combined the figures for the two (or three) most widely planted crops, among the five, for that country into a single *percentage-of-best* number, weighted for the areas planted in each of the two (or three) crops. The data included is comprehensive, altogether covering a total of 591 million hectares, equal to about ninety-three percent of all the world's land devoted to these five grain crops. Data on ownership is repeated, for facility of comparison, in the left-hand column.

Looking at the most productive agricultures as shown in Table 18, side by side with the data on ownership, it is clear that the system of small owner-operator farming, and that system alone, has consistently demonstrated an ability to achieve productivity results in the highest range. Among the dozen countries which have achieved productivity results that are 75 percent-of-best or higher,⁷ ten (eight Western European, two Asian) are countries in which the system of small owner-operators is dominant. Of the remaining two, one (the United Kingdom) is a system of somewhat larger, one-family, owner-operated farms,⁸ while the other (North Korea) is a collective system.

Not until productivity in the low-70 percent range is considered are collective farming systems significantly represented: among the nine countries that

Table 17
Owner-Operators (and Collective or
State Farmers) as a Percentage of
all Agricultural Families

Chad	96	Jamaica	70
Netherlands	95	Egypt	70
Togo	94	Peru	67 (9)
Finland	94	Namibia	67
Norway	94	Portugal	67 (11)
Japan	93	Indonesia	66
Central African Repub.	93	United States	65
Congo	93	Turkey	64 (3)
West Germany	92	Colombia	64
Belgium	91	Spain	63
Greece	91	Mexico	63 2)
Malawi	90	Australia	60
Nigeria	90	New Zealand	60
Zambia	89	Iraq	57
Sweden	89	South Africa	54
Yugoslavia	89 (4)	[Java]	[52]
Algeria	89 (11)	Argentina	50
Kenya	85	Dominican Republic	49
Taiwan	85	Uruguay	45
Zaire	84	Pakistan	45
Ireland	83	India	45
Denmark	82	Costa Rica	42
Canada	81	Bangladesh	41
South Korea	80	Jordan	38
France	79	Brazil	36
Italy	79	Vietnam	35 (61)
Lesotho	79	Philippines	33
El Salvador (post-reform)	79	Puerto Rico	30
Malaysia	78	El Salvador (pre-reform)	29
Venezuela	77	Cuba	29 (71)
Bolivia	77	Panama	13
[Vietnam, southern reg.]	[77] (15)	Czechoslovakia	13 (77)
Sierra Leone	76	Romania	6 (94)
Austria	76	East Germany	6 (94)
Thailand	75	Hungary	6(94)
Ghana	75	Bulgaria	6(94)
Switzerland	75	China	6 (94)
Poland	74 (13)	North Korea	5 (95)
Saudi Arabia	74	[Vietnam, northern reg.]	[5](95)
Guatemala	71	USSR	3 (97)
United Kingdom	70		

Note: The percentage of collective or state farmers as a percentage of all agricultural families is shown in parentheses after the owner-operator figure. The percentages for owner-operators plus collective and state farmers together represent all families not categorized as landless or omitted as squatters. For several highly urbanized and industrialized countries, we treat as having ownerlike tenure rather than as traditional tenants, certain well-situated and highly protected farmers denominated "tenants" who have enjoyed a protected status at least during all or nearly all of the post-World War II period. The only less-industrialized country which has successfully achieved similar ownershiplike status for its "tenants" is Egypt, and we treat it similarly.

Table 18
Productivity of Grains as a Percentage of Best Achieved by any Country

Owner-operator families as % of agr. fam. (and % collective fam.)*	Tenure Classification [†]	Country	Productivity per ha., %-of-best	Leading grain crops
95	A	Netherlands	99	wheat, barley
93	A	Japan	93	wheat, rice
5(95)	C	Korea, North	91	corn, rice
91	A	Belgium-Luxembourg	90	wheat, barley
83	A	Ireland	86	wheat, barley
70	B	United Kingdom	86	wheat, barley
92	A	Germany, West	85	wheat, barley
80	A	Korea, South	84	rice, barley
75	A	Switzerland	82	wheat, barley
82	A	Denmark	80	wheat, barley
79	A	France	79	wheat, barley, com
76	A	Austria	77	wheat, barley, com
6(94)	C	Germany, East	73	wheat, barley
13(77)	C	Czechoslovakia	72	wheat, barley
89	A	Sweden	72	wheat, barley
6(94)	C	Hungary	71	wheat, corn
85	A	Taiwan	70	com, rice
94	A	Norway	69	wheat, barley
60	B	New Zealand	67	wheat, barley
70	A	Egypt	65	wheat, com, rice
65	B	United States	65	wheat, com
89(4)	A	Yugoslavia	58	wheat, com
6(94)	C	Bulgaria	57	wheat, com, barley
79	A	Italy	55	wheat, com
94	A	Finland	52	wheat, barley
74	A	Poland	51	wheat, barley
6(94)	C	China	48	wheat, rice, com
91	A	Greece	47	wheat, barley
6(94)	C	Romania	46	wheat, com
—	—	Sri Lanka	46	rice only
49(15)	A/D	Dominican Rep.	45	com, rice
66	A**	Indonesia	45	com, rice

* As a percent of agricultural families, the landless are the reciprocal of the combined percentages for owner-operators, collective-farm families and—for the four countries where we have noted such a figure—"squatter" families. "Squatter" percentages are shown in brackets.

+ Letter-codes indicate the generally predominant group or groups (broadly speaking, where there is a small-owner-operator segment, it represents an even higher share of grain producers than of agricultural families generally, but we have insufficient data to take this into account): A = small owner-operators; B = large owner-operators; C = collective farmers; D = laborers on large plantations (that is, laborers paid to assist on large farms); E = laborers on small plantations (laborers paid to assist on small farms); F = tenant farmers; C = squatters.

** Java is predominantly "A," plus a category that is more appropriately described as laborers working for small owner-operators than as "E," "laborers on small plantations."

+ + Prior to the 1980 land reform, approximately 29 percent of agricultural families were owner-operators.

78	A	Malaysia	44	corn, rice
64	A	Colombia	41	corn, rice
50	B/D	Argentina	38	wheat, corn, sorghum
63	A	Spain	38	wheat, barley
—	—	Zimbabwe	36	wheat, corn
—	—	Burma	35	corn, rice, wheat
42	D	Costa Rica	35	corn, rice
81	B	Canada	34	wheat, barley
—	—	Trinidad-Tobago	34	corn, rice
35 (61)	C	Vietnam	34	corn, rice
41	E/F	Bangladesh	33	wheat, rice
29 (71)	C	Cuba	33	corn, rice
—	—	Albania	32	wheat, corn
—	—	Chile	32	wheat, corn
75 [5-10]	A	Thailand	32	corn, rice
—	—	Madagascar	31	corn, rice
—	—	Ecuador	30	corn, rice
—	—	Israel	30	wheat, barley
77	A	Venezuela	30	corn, sorghum
—	—	Nepal	29	corn, rice
64 (3)	A	Turkey	29	wheat, barley
3 (97)	C	U.S.S.R.	28	wheat, barley
45	F	Pakistan	27	wheat, rice
74	A	Saudi Arabia	27	wheat, sorghum
54	A/D	South Africa	27	wheat, corn
++	—	El Salvador	26	corn, sorghum
45	E/F	India	26	wheat, rice, sorghum
71	A	Guatemala	25	wheat, corn, sorghum
85	A	Kenya	25	wheat, corn
63 (2)	A	Mexico	25	corn, sorghum, wheat
13 [50]	G/D	Panama	25	corn, rice
33	D/F	Philippines	25	corn, rice
36 [10]	D	Brazil	24	corn, rice
—	—	Laos	24	rice only
60	B	Australia	23	wheat, barley
—	—	Paraguay	22	corn, rice, wheat
67 (9)	A	Peru	22	corn, barley
—	—	Liberia	21	rice only
—	—	Senegal	21	corn, rice
76	A	Sierra Leone	21	rice only
—	—	Morocco	20	wheat, barley
—	—	Cameroon	19	corn, rice
—	—	Mali	19	corn, rice
—	—	Rwanda	19	corn, sorghum
—	—	Sudan	19	wheat, sorghum
—	—	Afghanistan	18	wheat, corn

Owner-operator families as % of agr. fam. (and % collective fam.) [*]	Tenure Classification ⁺	Country	Productivity per ha., %-of-best	Leading grain crops
77	A	Bolivia	18	corn, barley
—	—	Uganda	18	corn, sorghum
—	—	Yemen, South	18	wheat, sorghum
—	—	Burundi	17	corn, sorghum
—	—	Cambodia	17	corn, rice
96	A	Chad	17	rice only
—	—	Ethiopia	17	corn, barley, sorghum
70	A	Jamaica	17	corn, rice
67 (11)	A	Portugal	17	wheat, corn
—	—	Bhutan	16	wheat, corn
—	—	Haiti	16	corn, sorghum
—	—	Honduras	16	corn, sorghum
—	—	Iran	16	wheat, barley
—	—	Malawi	16	corn only
—	—	Nicaragua	16	corn, sorghum
—	—	Syria	16	wheat, barley
45	D/F	Uruguay	14	wheat, corn
—	—	Guinea	13	rice only
57	A/F	Iraq	13	wheat, barley
38	E	Jordan	13	wheat, barley
—	—	Libya	13	wheat, barley
89	A	Zambia	13	corn, sorghum
—	—	Yemen, North	13	wheat, sorghum, corn
—	—	Benin (Dahomey)	12	corn, sorghum
75	A	Ghana	12	corn, sorghum
—	—	Ivory Coast	12	corn, rice
90	A	Nigeria	12	corn, sorghum
—	—	Tanzania	11	corn, sorghum
—	—	Tunisia	11	wheat, barley
84	A	Zaire	11	corn, rice
89 (11)	A	Algeria	10	wheat, barley
—	—	Mozambique	10	corn, sorghum
—	—	Upper Volta	10	rice, sorghum
—	—	Angola	9	corn, rice, wheat
—	—	Niger	8	sorghum only
—	—	Somalia	8	corn, sorghum

perform between 65 and 75 percent-of-best, four are small owner-operator systems, three are collective systems grouped in the 71 to 73 percent range, and two are what we may denominate large owner-operator systems—ones in which farms operated by a single family with little hired labor predominate, but in which median farm size is twenty hectares or greater.⁹ The best performing among these, (apart from the substantial large-estate sector in the United Kingdom), are New Zealand and the United States, at 67 and 65 percent-of-best, respectively.

Thus, of all twenty-one countries that perform at 65 percent-of-best or better, fourteen are small owner-operator systems, three are large owner-operator systems, and four are collective systems.

There is a seven-point gap between this group and the next highest country at 58 percent-of-best (of the nine systems between 46 and 58 percent-of-best, five are small owner-operator systems and three—including China, at least until very recently—are collective).

Tenant and plantation systems do poorly: the highest rating for any system in which the landless proportion of the agricultural population is fifty percent or greater is *38 percent-of-best* for Argentina, followed by 35 percent-of-best for Costa Rica and 33 percent-of-best for Bangladesh.¹⁰

A number of other points of interest emerge from Table 18. The six countries having the greatest endowment of land that can be planted in grain crops relative to population (three people or less per hectare) are, in descending order of productivity, Denmark, the United States, Argentina, Canada, the USSR, and Australia.¹¹ The United States, Canada, Argentina, and Australia are major exporters of grain; Denmark feeds its surplus grain to animals, and is a major exporter of meat and dairy products.

Among these six land-rich countries, Russia's low productivity carries a unique cost: the need to import grain. Looking at potential Soviet performance in relation to the "climate" issue, it is interesting to compare Russia's 28 percent-of-best with the record of the two agricultures with the most comparable problems of cold weather and short growing seasons: Canada is at 34 percent-of-best, while Finland, under a system of small owner-operated farms, is at 52 percent-of-best. For all three countries, wheat and barley are the principal grain crops.

For the world's four most populous countries, which are also the four with the largest land areas devoted to cultivating grains, the performance levels are quite disparate: the United States is at 65 percent-of-best under a system of large owner-operated farms; China is at 48 percent-of-best under a system (until now) of collective farming; Russia is at 28 percent-of-best under another system of collective farming; and India is at 26 percent-of-best under a system in which tenancy and laborers working on small plantations predominate.

Also of some interest is the average productivity performance of the EEC countries and the European members of COMECON (exclusive of Poland and Russia), which is 79 versus 64. Similarly, Taiwan is 70 percent-of-best to

China's 48, and West Germany is twelve points above East Germany. North Korea—by far the most productive of all collectivized systems—outperforms South Korea 91 to 84. A further review of these two agricultures, and others, leads to the important observation that the simple, grain-based "productivity index" probably *understates* the overall advantage of the small-owner systems. What makes this highly likely is that there seems to be much greater diversification of agricultural production in the small-owner systems than in collectivized or tenant/laborer systems.¹²

For example, when non-grain, and especially higher-value agricultural products, like vegetables, meat, milk, and eggs are considered, the small apparent advantage of North Korean agriculture in value of per-hectare production is almost certainly replaced by a substantial advantage in favor of the South. While exact data are impossible to obtain, including data on multiple-cropping in which different crops are grown on the same hectare during a given year, it is at least strongly suggestive that, while North and South Korea have roughly the same amount of arable land, the advantage is clearly with the South in non-grain crops. The South produces one-third more potatoes, roots, and tubers, and over two-and-one-half times the quantity of vegetables, fruits, and nuts. The North produces far more beans, but the South produces several times more milk, meat, and eggs, giving it a decided overall advantage in protein foods as well. All this, moreover, ignores the fact that much—and quite likely most—of the "diversification" that does occur in the North reflects production on the roughly five percent of its arable land that is farmed as individual private plots.

Table 18 underscores some of the most shocking and disappointing performances among collectivized systems: Russia at 28 percent-of-best, Vietnam at 34 (and productivity is probably several points lower in the collectivized northern region if considered separately), and Cuba at 33.¹³

Equally worthy of note is that the tenant/laborer agricultures have not been able to demonstrate any even moderate successes, *and that even the most highly publicized "Green Revolution" interventions have not worked well in settings of high landlessness, when they are judged in the cold light of comparative-productivity analysis.* The Philippines, where HYV (high yield variety) "miracle rice" was first introduced, is getting rice yields of just over two tons per hectare, which leaves it at only 36 percent-of-best if we consider data just for that crop. Pakistan and India, beneficiaries of the highly touted introduction of HYV wheat, are still averaging less than *IV*2 tons per hectare, leaving them at 23 and 24 percent-of-best, respectively, for that crop.

Looking at the relative *potential* of different systems of organization of agriculture, we get the following by averaging the results of the top four countries producing under each of the three major tenure systems:

Owner-Operated Farms (Netherlands,
Japan, Belgium-Luxembourg, Ireland):

92

Collective Farms (North Korea, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary):	77
Tenant Farm/Agricultural Laborer Systems (Java, Argentina, Costa Rica, Bangladesh):	38

While the small owner-operated farm has thus demonstrated the greatest *potential* among the three major tenure systems—and while the tenant/laborer agricultures have demonstrated a striking lack of potential—it must be emphasized that we are speaking of "potential" which requires more than mere ownership to be realized. Some form of ownership by the cultivator is vital, essentially a *sine qua non*, it would seem, for achievement of the highest levels of productivity. But the data make it clear that such ownership alone is not sufficient.

One has only to look at the disaster area that is African small-owner farming to recognize that ownership alone is not enough, and that owner-farmers utterly bereft of access to improved seed, fertilizers, pesticides, credit, technical advice, storage, and marketing facilities will produce at a very low level.¹⁴

Some of the productivity data comprehended by the index is a reflection of sheer physical limits on a particular country's agricultural land resources, such as, absence of both rainfall and irrigation potential in some very dry countries, or extreme fragility and lack of nutrients characteristic of tropical soils in some very hot ones. But the tremendous relevance of the *potentialities* shown above, for many of the most significant less-developed countries whose present agricultural performance falls short of those potentialities, is reflected in comments such as the following:

The potential means of Pakistan's development continues to be 33 million acres of irrigated land and over 100 million acre feet of irrigation water. This, the world's largest irrigation system, could produce over five times as much as it does now.¹⁵

The world's principal unrealized potential for expanding food production is now concentrated in the developing countries. Although soil quality in Bangladesh is as good as in Japan, rice yields are only one third of those attained in Japan. India's area of cropland is roughly comparable to that of the United States, yet it harvests only 100 million tons of grain, while the United States harvests 250 million tons. And com yields in Brazil and Thailand are still less than one third of those of the United States.¹⁶

With incentives to improve.. [it], the capacity of the land would be increased in most parts of the world much more than it has been to date. In this important sense, cropland is not the critical limiting factor in expanding food production.

The original soils of western Europe, except for the Po Valley and some parts of France, were, in general, very poor in quality. They are now highly productive. The original soils of Finland were less productive than most of the nearby parts of the Soviet Union, yet today the croplands of Finland are far superior. The original croplands of Japan were inferior to those of Northern India. Presently, the difference between them is greatly in favor of Japan. There are estimates that the Gangetic Plains of India could, with appropriate investments, produce enough food for a billion people....

Harsh, raw land is what farmers since time immemorial have started with; what matters most over time, however, are the investments that are made to enhance the productivity of cropland.¹⁷

BIRTH-AND-DEATH-BASED MODERNIZATION INDEX

A host of indicators or measurements have been popular at various times in the effort to assess development or modernization. Each has been found to suffer from grave defects. "Per capita Gross National Product" has had its vogue, particularly among some bankers and economists, but it is rife with problems, most fundamental of which is that income distribution can be skewed in extreme ratios. Thus, an average income figure may totally obscure the fact that poverty persists among a great fraction of the total population. A variety of other measurements have been tried or suggested: for example, "hospital beds" or "physicians" per 1000 population, which, however, obscures the fact that such high-quality, "curative" medical care may be far more relevant to the degenerative diseases of the rich and aging than to the health problems of poor and youthful populations; "literacy," which is quite difficult to measure; "proportion of school age children in school," which may be somewhat easier to measure, but is no assurance either of the quality of the education they will receive, or of the availability of jobs when they get out; "unemployment," which can rarely be measured meaningfully in less-developed societies, but requires assessment of "under employment" as well, which is notoriously difficult; and estimates of such factors as "housing availability," "sanitation facilities," and "access to safe water," which get the investigator into a swamp of qualitative judgments, including assessments of the cultural setting and the effectiveness with which facilities are used.

Perhaps the most successful attempt so far to create an index that relates directly to the basic position of the mass of the population has been the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI) created by the Overseas Development Council,¹⁸ which combines figures for infant mortality, life expectancy after age one, and literacy into a single index number, after first laying each of them out on a percentage-of-best scale in which zero represents the worst-performing country as of 1950, and 100 represents the best-performing country as of the late 1970s.

What we propose here as the next portion of our own effort to assess progress in "democratic development" partially overlaps the PQLI approach.

It is a "Birth-and-Death-Based Modernization Index," giving equal weight to relative infant mortality rate and relative crude birth rate.

But why not just stop with the Land Ownership and Land Productivity Indexes?" The answer to that is threefold: First, the LOI and the LPI indexes may be said to be precursors of results rather than measures of all or even most of the desired results. Just as ownership of land may be regarded as a precursor of higher agricultural productivity rather than leading inevitably to such higher productivity, higher productivity itself may be merely a precursor of lower infant mortality rather than leading inevitably to such lower infant mortality (for example, such further variables as size of holdings may play a role—though perhaps a more limited one than might be guessed—making direct extrapolation difficult; cultural factors relating to relative "sharing out" within the family may play a role; and "premature modernization", such as unwisely selling some of the increased production to pay for baby formula, may play a role). Second, the LOI and LPI clearly have less and less direct relevance as a measure of people's wellbeing as a society gets less and less agrarian. A measure is needed that can take up the slack in more urbanized, industrialized societies. And, finally, since births and deaths are probably events of greater importance to the people concerned than any other events, and are vital to predicting the future course of any society, it seems appropriate to measure them directly.

Then there is another threshold question: Why not use the PQLI itself? Here the answer is twofold: First, we do not trust the quality or usefulness of the "literacy" figures that make up one-third of the PQLI. Unlike deaths, or births, "literacy" is a far more ambiguous status, difficult to measure; nor is it, in quite the same fundamental sense, a final outcome of the development process. Furthermore, we think birth rates should be included both as a critical predictor of a society's likely future, and as a paramount indicator of whether a further step in the modernization process—the so-called "demographic transition"—*is* taking place, rather than only its usual "precursors" being in place.

Table 19 presents both the raw data on infant mortality and crude birth rates (both in approximate ascending order), as combined in a single, percentage-of-best, "Birth-and-Death Based Modernization Index," shown in descending order of "BDMI" numbers (especially-tentative figures are shown in brackets).¹⁹

We have divided the table into five groups, showing total population within each group. The first group includes those countries with a rating of 90 or above, and may, with a few significant exceptions, be said to be the "long-time developed countries." This group includes all of the Western democracies (except for Ireland which is at 87), plus Japan. All of the countries included have infant mortality rates below 25 per 1000 infants under one year of age, and crude birth rates less than 18 per 1000 population.

A second group, with a rating of 70 to 89, may be said to have made it most of the way toward full modernization in terms of this set of measurements—

Table 19
The Birth-And-Death-Based
Measurement of Modernization

Population (Millions)	Country	BDMI	IMR*	CBR⁺
8.3	Sweden	98	7	12
14.2	Netherlands	98	8	12
61.3	West Germany	98	15	10
4.8	Finland	97	8	13
5.1	Denmark	97	9	12
6.3	Switzerland	97	9	12
7.5	Austria	97	15	11
117.8	Japan	96	8	14
4.1	Norway	96	9	13
57.2	Italy	96	15	12
9.9	Belgium	95	12	13
53.9	France	95	10	14
55.9	U.K.	95	13	13
16.7	East Germany	94	13	14
24.1	Canada	93	12	15
14.8	Australia	92	12	16
229.8	United States	92	13	16
37.8	Spain	92	13	16
9.8	Cuba	91	19	15
2.4	Singapore	90	13	17
5.0	Hong Kong	90	13	17
3.1	New Zealand	90	14	17
9.6	Greece	90	19	16
8.9	Bulgaria	90	22	16
{ 779.0}	Hungary	90	24	15
15.4	Czechoslovakia	88	19	18
3.4	Ireland	87	15	20
22.5	Yugoslavia	86	32	17

*Infant mortality rate: deaths per 1000 infants less than 1 year of age.

+Crude birth rate: births per 1000 total population.

10.0	Portugal	86	39	15
36.0	Poland	85	22	20
22.4	Romania	85	30	18
3.2	Puerto Rico	84	18	22
268.0	USSR	84	36	18
3.9	Israel	81	16	25
18.2	Taiwan	79	25	25
11.2	Chile	79	38	22
2.9	Uruguay	79	48	20
985.0	China	79	56	18
2.2	Jamaica	78	16	27
1.2	Trinidad and Tobago	78	24	26
38.9	South Korea	79	37	23
28.2	Argentina	75	41	25
1.0	Mauritius	73	34	28
2.3	Costa Rica	71	22	32
15.3	Sri Lanka	70	42	29
{ 1493.1}	Panama	70	47	28
14.3	Malaysia	67	44	31
48.6	Thailand	65	68	28
3.2	Lebanon	63	45	34
27.8	Colombia	62	77	29
15.5	Venezuela	61	45	36
3.3	Paraguay	60	58	34
69.3	Mexico	59	70	33
18.3	North Korea	59	70	33
1.4	Kuwait	57	39	41
121.4	Brazil	57	84	32
48.9	Philippines	155]	180]	34
1.0	United Arab Emirates	55	65	37
1.7	Mongolia	53	70	38
{ 523.5}	Indonesia	52	91	35
4.9	El Salvador	[49]	[80]	39
29.0	South Africa	49	97	36
8.2	Ecuador	48	70	42
5.6	Dominican Republic	48	96	37
7.5	Guatemala	47	69	43
18.1	Peru	47	92	39
46.2	Turkey	47	125	32
9.3	Syria	46	81	42

Population (Millions)	Country	BDMI	IMR*	CBR ⁺
6.6	Tunisia	46	123	33
54.9	Vietnam	43	115	37
1.4	Lesotho	40	114	40
688.6	India	40	134	36
13.6	Iraq	37	92	47
3.3	Jordan	37	97	46
8.8	Madagascar	37	102	45
1.0	Namibia	37	107	44
39.8	Iran	36	112	44
35.2	Burma	36	140	39
3.9	Honduras	35	103	47
43.5	Egypt	[33]	[140]	41
16.5	Kenya	32	83	53
3.3	Papua New Guinea	32	128	44
21.8	Morocco	32	133	43
12.0	Ghana	31	115	48
19.2	Tanzania	31	125	46
14.4	Nepal	31	133	44
6.0	Haiti	[30]	[150]	42
2.5	Nicaragua	30	122	47
19.3	Algeria	30	127	46
10.4	Saudi Arabia	29	118	49
7.6	Zimbabwe	29	129	47
88.9	Pakistan	29	142	44
1.3	Bhutan	29	147	43
2.5	Togo	28	121	49
3.1	Libya	28	130	47
3.6	Siena Leone	28	136	46
8.7	Cameroon	28	157	42
92.8	Bangladesh	27	139	46
10.7	Mozambique	27	148	45
5.3	Rwanda	26	127	50
4.2	Burundi	26	140	47
{1403.2} 19.6	Sudan	25	141	48

5.5	Cambodia	[24]	150	[47]
14.1	Uganda	[24]	[160]	45
8.5	Ivory Coast	23	138	50
6.0	Zambia	23	144	49
5.5	Bolivia	23	168	44
1.9	Liberia	21	148	50
3.8	Benin	21	149	49
3.6	Laos	21	175	44
6.2	Malawi	20	142	52
5.4	Yemen, North	20	160	48
5.8	Senegal	20	160	48
30.1	Zaire	20	171	46
2.4	Central African Rep.	20	190	42
79.7	Nigeria	19	157	50
1.6	Congo	19	180	45
2.0	Yemen, South	18	170	48
4.6	Chad	17	190	44
3.8	Somalia	16	177	48
7.1	Upper Volta	15	182	48
33.5	Ethiopia	14	178	50
16.4	Afghanistan	14	185	48
6.7	Angola	13	192	48
1.7	Mauritania	11	187	50
5.1	Guinea	8	220	46
5.7	Niger	7	200	51
{ 293.2} 6.8	Mali	4	210	52

they have all come at least two-thirds of the distance from the infant-mortality levels of the less-well-off countries to those of the long-time developed countries, and at least half the distance from the birth-rate levels of the less-well-off to those of the long-time developed countries (some have come essentially all the way on one measure or the other: for example, Israel and Jamaica on infant-mortality rates; Portugal, Russia, and China on birth rates). All of these countries have infant mortality rates in the mid-50's per 1,000 or less, and crude birth rates (with the exception of Costa Rica) below 30 per 1,000.

It is useful to compare the proportions of the world's population in these two groups of comparatively successful countries with those in the remaining three groups: countries that may be regarded as "transitional" in terms of the index, countries that are still very badly off, and those that may be said to be the least "modernized":

<i>BDMI Level</i>	<i>Characterization</i>	<i>Pop. (Mil.)</i>	<i>% of World Pop.</i>	<i>Cumulative % of World Pop.</i>
90-100	Long-time developed (and a few equivalent)	779.0	17.3	17.3
70-89	Most of the way to same status	1493.1	33.2	50.5
50-69	Transitional—substantial progress	523.5	11.7	62.2
25-49	Less well-off—some progress	1403.2	31.2	93.5
0-24	Least well-off	293.2	6.5	100.0

Together, the forty-six countries exhibiting BDMI levels of 70 or better encompass just over half the world's total population. The majority of these have made the bulk of their progress in the years since World War II, and fourteen additional countries with close to one-eighth of the world's population have made substantial progress during that period.

If one compares the births and infant deaths experienced by the one-half of the world's population which lives in the forty-six "more modernized" or "more developed" countries with those experienced by the other half, the result is as follows:

<i>BDMI</i>	<i>Characterization</i>	<i>Pop. (Mil.)</i>	<i>Infant Deaths (Mil.)</i>	<i>Births (Mil.)</i>	<i>Proportion of infants dying (per 1000 live births)</i>	<i>Proportion of births (per 1000 total population)</i>
70-100	"more developed"	2,272.1	1.4	39.5	37	17
0-69	"less developed"	2,219.9	10.8	86.4	125	39

Clearly, there is a high correlation indicated between reduction in infant mortality rate and reduction in crude birth rate. What may lie behind this

correlation we shall discuss briefly below. For the present, we merely note that virtually every country with an infant mortality rate under 60 per 1000 has achieved a crude birth rate of less than 30 per 1000 population. The exceptions to that statement are Costa Rica, Malaysia, Lebanon, Venezuela, Paraguay, and Kuwait, a series of small Latin and Muslim states with a total population of only 40 million. Conversely, only two countries with a crude birth rate under 30 per 1000 population are found *not* to have an infant mortality rate under 60 per 1000—Thailand and Colombia—and both of them have infant-mortality rates under 80.

The countries closest to being strong exceptions to this general pattern of correlation are Turkey, which has achieved a crude birth rate as low as 32 while its infant mortality rate is still as high as 125 per 1000, and Kenya, which has the highest crude birth rate in the world (S3) although the infant mortality rate is now down to 83 per 1000.

An important feature of the long list of relative successes—the forty-six countries that have achieved an index rating of 70 or above—is the diversities they reflect. We shall have more to say below about the political complexion of the countries that have achieved this level of success (and more to say about their "LOI" and "LPI" status as well). For those who might predict that success in BDMI terms would not be possible absent achievement of a fairly high per capita GNP, it is worth noting that such success has been achieved by countries with very low per capita GNP's, such as China and Sri Lanka, each around \$230, as well as other countries whose per-capita income levels were quite low in the earlier days when much or most of their progress in reducing death rates and birth rates was being achieved: including South Korea, Panama, Cuba, Taiwan, Japan, Greece, Costa Rica, and Jamaica.²⁰

On the other hand, there are countries with very high per capita GNP's that have been unsuccessful, thus far, in translating such wealth into the kinds of grass-roots well-being reflected in the BDMI. Saudi Arabia and Libya are the most glaring examples, with per capita GNP levels over \$7,000 but index ratings still under 30; Iraq, Iran, and Algeria also deserve mention, with per capita GNP levels between \$1,500 and \$2,500 and index ratings all under 40. Countries at roughly the same level of per capita GNP may also have very different index values: for example, in the \$1000 to \$1300 GNP/capita range compare Turkey and Brazil (47 and 57) with Costa Rica and Taiwan (71 and 79).

For others who might predict that success in BDMI terms would be confined to countries of "temperate" climate, the data is also instructive. However temperate is defined, the results are mixed. While most "temperate" societies have achieved combinations of infant death and crude birth rates sufficiently low to be at or above 70 on the index, a number have not—Mexico, which is bisected by the Tropic of Cancer, and has a large, temperate, high plateau; Bolivia, Kenya and Zimbabwe, though technically within the tropics, have largely temperate climates because of their high plateaus; South Africa

and the North African countries are outside the tropics (though summers are extremely hot, winters are moderate), but they have clearly not achieved great success in terms of the BDMI.²¹ On the other hand, about a dozen tropical or near-tropical societies have achieved index levels of 70 or better, all since World War II: Cuba, Singapore, Hong Kong, Puerto Rico, Israel, Taiwan (bisected by the Tropic of Cancer), Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Mauritius, Costa Rica, Sri Lanka, and Panama. Quite clearly, a "tropical climate" is not a bar to basic development as measured by the BDMI; yet there are special factors at work in major portions of the tropics—notably problems associated with disease, insects, and soil formation—that require specific compensatory attention.

On the issue of whether "island societies" fare better in achieving the kind of success which the BDMI measures, it may be noted that a number of these societies are indeed found among the post-World War II successes as measured by the BDMI. But that is not, in itself, assurance of success, as Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Papua New Guinea and Zanzibar (now part of Tanzania) all attest.

As to the possible suggestion that race may be a bar to development, or more particularly, that black societies are somehow incapable of realizing such success, the BDMI also belies that notion. It is true that no black society in Africa has yet achieved even a position on our "transitional" list (of major black-governed African societies, Kenya is closest), but predominantly black societies outside of Africa have achieved successes in BDMI terms: Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago.²²

In terms of the framework that religion may provide for development, it is clear that a number of predominantly Catholic societies, including Italy, have lowered not only infant mortality but birth rates, and achieved very high index ratings. On the other hand, no predominantly Muslim society has yet achieved a high measure of success in the terms of the index. This is true even of the more "liberalized" or non-fundamentalist Muslim societies, and appears to be true of the more fundamentalist Islamic nations to an even greater degree. Malaysia and Lebanon, both mixed societies about fifty percent Muslim, are in the higher ranges of the group of nations we have called "transitional." Among predominantly Muslim nations, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, both only in the lower ranges of the "transitional" group, are the closest; while Indonesia, lowest in our "transitional" group, is the closest among major Islamic nations. (Considering the two components of the index separately, Kuwait has the lowest infant-mortality rate among Muslim nations, 39 per 1000, while Turkey has the lowest birth rate, 32 per 1000 population: a "composite" of these two would give an index rating of 67. Turkey and Kuwait, as well as the others just listed, are among the most non-traditionalist of Muslim states.) It is also noteworthy that three of the world's four worst-off societies, in index terms, are predominantly Muslim: Mauritania, Niger, and Mali.

Of all the possible regularities or possible coincidences that make up the correlations we have been discussing, between different variables and successes as measured by the BDMI, this correlation with Islamic societies may be the most worrisome.²³ Attitudes toward the status of women, toward education, toward intra-familial distribution of income, may be just a few of the factors that need ultimately to be considered for their possible relevance as underlying explanatory factors.

Provisionally, we must consider the Muslim and part-Muslim countries already in the "transitional" group to be a sufficient response to any threshold contention that such societies are somehow inherently incapable of achieving any vast measure of grass-roots progress of the kind measured in the BDMI. At most, it may be said that such an assertion—while quite clearly disproven in the case of parallel contentions as to low-income societies, tropical societies, black societies, or Catholic societies—stands simply as "not proven" in the case of Muslim societies.

We might also look briefly at comparisons between the BDMI and our previous land productivity index. It would seem of considerable interest that twenty-eight out of the thirty countries that have developed a sophisticated-enough agriculture to at least be above the 45 percent-of-best on the Land Productivity Index are at 70 or above on the BDMI—the only exceptions are North Korea and Egypt.

Conversely, of the forty-nine countries that are below 25 percent-of-best on the productivity index, only *four*—Australia, Jamaica, Portugal, and Uruguay—have made it into the charmed circle of those who are at 70 or higher on the BDMI.

However, beyond these four, the forty-six nations that have reached 70 or above on the BDMI include ten more which have achieved only mediocre productivity performance, ranging from 25 to 38 percent-of-best on the productivity index. Thus, while substantially all those that have achieved high productivity are also high on the BDMI, there is a significant group of others that are high on the BDMI as well: one *can* say, "countries that do well in agricultural productivity do well on the births-and-deaths index," but cannot say that *only* those countries do well.

THE CIVIL AND POLITICAL LIBERTIES INDEX (CPLI)

The last of our sub-indexes, CPLI is drawn directly from the annual Freedom House rankings. To permit comparison with our other indexes, the results are translated from the seven-point (1 = best to 7 = worst) scale, to a 100-point scale, inverting them (100 = best, 0 = worst). We combine the separate civil and political rights ratings in a single index number, and because these can sometimes change rapidly, we use a 5-year estimate, based on the figures for 1976, 1978, and 1980 (published in 1977, 1979, and 1981). Table 20 presents combined results (alphabetically within each category).

Table 20
Civil and Political Liberties Index
(5 year average, based on Gastil/Freedom House ratings
for 3 years 1976, 1978 and 1980)*

Index Group	Countries
100	Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, U.K., U.S.
94 –	France, Japan, West Germany
92 –	(Puerto Rico), Venezuela
89 –	Italy
83 –	Finland, Greece, Papua New Guinea, Portugal, Trinidad and Tobago
80 –	Israel
78 –	Jamaica
75 –	Colombia, Sri Lanka
72 –	Dominican Republic, (Hong Kong)
69 –	India, Mauritius
67 –	Spain
61 –	Malaysia, Turkey [33]
56 –	Ecuador
53 –	Mexico, Nigeria
50 –	Bangladesh, Brazil, El Salvador [33], Peru
47 –	Guatemala [25], Honduras, Morocco, Senegal
44 –	Upper Volta [25]
42 –	Ghana, Zimbabwe
39 –	Lesotho
36 –	Egypt, Kenya, Nepal, Thailand
33	Bolivia [17], Indonesia, Kuwait, Nicaragua, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, United Arab Emirates
30 –	Namibia, Panama, Paraguay, South Africa, Zambia
28 –	Liberia [17], Pakistan [17], Sierra Leone, South Korea, Sudan
25 –	Argentina, Iran, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Poland, Tunisia, North Yemen
22 –	Chile, Hungary, Syria, Uruguay, Yugoslavia
20 –	Cameroon, Rwanda
17 –	Algeria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Tanzania
14 –	Chad, Cuba, Haiti, Libya, Mauritania
11 –	Burundi, China, Congo, Malawi, Uganda, Burma
8 –	Czechoslovakia, Niger, Romania, Togo, USSR, Zaire
6 –	Angola, East Germany, Iraq
3 –	Afghanistan, Benin, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Mali, South Yemen
0	Albania, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Guinea, Kampuchea, North Korea, Laos, Mongolia, Mozambique, Somalia, Vietnam

Seven countries had suffered a recent decline in their liberties so severe that the 1980 figure was more than 10 points below the average for 1976, 1978 and 1980 taken together. To flag these cases, the 1980 figure appears in brackets after the country.

Societies having combined (single-year) ratings of 75 or better coincide with that category of nations which the Freedom House ratings denominate as "free"—those below 75 fall into the two additional broad categories of "partly free" and "not free." Of the twenty-nine countries shown above that have been able to sustain a five-year average of 75 or above, *twenty-six score at 70 or better on our BDMI*. The only exceptions are Venezuela, Papua New Guinea, and Colombia; and Venezuela and Colombia are at least in the group we have called "transitional," with BDMI ratings in the low 60's. Papua New Guinea, with its BDMI rating of 32, is thus the clearest exception to the rule that those societies that have had free institutions functioning for some time are also found to have achieved great progress in relation to deaths and births. But more important exceptions are India and Turkey, both of which have had a substantial level of freedom for two decades or more—interrupted by recent periods of more authoritarian rule which bring their five-year averages somewhat below the "75" level—yet both of which have BDMI ratings in the 40's. Thus, while there appears to be a high correlation between long-term freedom and progress of the kind measured by the BDMI (and the LOI and LPI),²⁴ the correlation is not absolute.

It is worth noting, moreover, that free societies that are or were very poor are included in the list of BDMI successes: Sri Lanka, as well as Kerala state (with a current BDMI of at least 68), still have an extremely low per-capita GNP, while Japan, Greece, Costa Rica, and Jamaica were all quite poor countries—and free—when much or most of their progress in reducing death rates and birth rates was being achieved.²⁵ These stand as exemplars for the vital proposition that societies which are very poor and are functioning democratically, without totalitarianism or authoritarianism of either the left or the right, can achieve the kind of grass-roots progress measured in the BDMI.

Only one of the seventeen countries that have a five-year rating of 0 or 3 on the score of civil and political freedoms is found at the level of 70 or above on the BDMI: Bulgaria, at 90. The next highest is North Korea, at 59; Mongolia is also "transitional," on the BDMI, at 53.²⁶ The others all range downward from the low 40's, with ten of these least-free countries at a BDMI level of 21 or below.

A number of marxist or non-democratic socialist societies with scores of 6 to 25 on the civil and political liberties index have achieved respectable BDMI ratings: Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Cuba, China, Czechoslovakia, Romania, the USSR, and East Germany.²⁷ But such BDMI ratings have also been achieved by a number of authoritarian societies hostile to marxism: Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore (the last three are listed at slightly higher freedom-index levels of 28 to 33). Spain and Portugal also had achieved most of their progress in reducing deaths and births while under authoritarian rule.²⁸

Clearly, too, a number of marxist and non-democratic socialist societies remain well below the 70 BDMI level. This includes not only societies in

which this system has come to prevail within the past decade, such as Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Cambodia, and South Yemen, but countries in which Marxism-Leninism has prevailed for two decades or more, such as the Congo, Algeria, (North) Vietnam, Mongolia, and North Korea.

Thus a high level of civil and political liberties, even in countries that are very poor, appears to be perfectly consistent with the kind of progress measured by the BDMI. Non-marxist as well as marxist authoritarian or totalitarian systems can also coexist with that kind of progress, but both—as well as systems with a high degree of freedom—can likewise coexist over an extended period of time, in the late twentieth century, with very inadequate BDMI levels.

THE INDEX OF DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT (IDD)

We have now explored four separate sub-indexes, relating to land ownership and productivity, births-and-deaths, and freedoms. Table 21 presents the results, side-by-side, and combined into a single overall "Index of Democratic Development" for eighty-one countries and geopolitical entities containing over ninety percent of the world's population. The LOI and LPI receive weights in the overall Index in relation to the percentage of the population in agriculture.²⁹

We recognize that this summary Index combines a number of elements that are often thought of as disparate. We also readily concede that the question of relative weighting of these elements (as distinct from the simple observation of correlations when the various sub-indexes are laid down side by side) raises difficult questions of value judgment. Nonetheless, we find the overall index worthy of a few comments before we go on to a more disaggregated approach to the data.

We were, we think, as shocked as anyone to find Saudi Arabia to be the "anchor-man" among all societies for which data were available—clearly, if "per capita GNP" were the measure being used, the results would look far different.

There are seventeen countries at 35 and below on the combined IDD, concentrated in Africa and the mideast. Vietnam and North Korea also join this not-very-distinguished circle, the sole Asian representatives other than Pakistan. The only Western Hemisphere country for which data were available that is at or below 35 is Bolivia.

The USSR, China, and South Africa, interestingly, all ended with the same index number: 40. Cuba was at 48, India and Brazil both at 49. Poland, Taiwan, South Korea, and Yugoslavia make a somewhat intriguing grouping between 57 and 61, the latter being the highest rating for any Marxist society. Of the twenty-nine countries shown at 63 and above on the IDD, none has either a BDMI or a CPLI below 60. Above that level, there are no real surprises—except, perhaps, to find Venezuela (after Puerto Rico) the highest-ranked Spanish-speaking nation, rather than Spain or Costa Rica.

Table 21
The Index of Democratic Development

Country	IDD*	LOI	LPI	BDMI	CPLI
Netherlands	99	95	99(0)	98	100
Sweden	99	89	72(0)	98	100
Switzerland	99	75	82(0)	87	100
Denmark	99	82	80(0)	97	100
Norway	98	94	69(0)	96	100
Belgium	98	91	90(0)	95	100
U.K.	98	70	86(0)	95	100
Canada	97	81	34(0)	93	100
U.S.	96	65	65(0)	92	100
Australia	96	60	23(0)	92	100
W. Germany	96	92	85(0)	98	94
Austria	96	76	70 ^(1/4)	97	100
Japan	95	93	93(0)	96	94
New Zealand	95	60	67(0)	90	100
France	94	79	79(0)	95	94
Ireland	92	83	86 ^(1/2)	87	100
Finland	88	94	52 ^(1/4)	97	83
Puerto Rico	88	30	- (0)	84	92
Italy	87	79	55 ^(1/2)	96	89
Greece	82	91	47 ^(3/4)	90	83
Hong Kong	81	—	- (0)	90	72
Israel	81	—	30(0)	81	80
Venezuela	77	77	30(0)	61	92
Spain	76	63	38 ^(1/4)	92	67
Portugal	76	67	17 ^(1/2)	86	83
Costa Rica	73	42	35 ^(3/4)	71	100
Jamaica	69	70	17 ^(3/4)	78	78
Colombia	64	64	41 ^(3/4)	62	75
Malaysia	63	78	44(1)	67	61
Singapore	62	—	- (0)	90	33
Yugoslavia	61	89	58 (1)	86	22

* Where there had been a sharp recent decline in civil and political liberties, the bracketed alternative calculation of the CPLI (see p. 197) is also used in a [bracketed] alternative IDD calculation. Very recent changes, such as those in Poland, are not included.

* Pre-land reform LOI was approximately 29, giving an IDD figure of 45. Assuming no reversal of the Phase I and Decree 207 aspects of the land reform, current LOI is approximately 79, which, with the recent decline in CPLI (noted in brackets), would give IDD figures of 53 [47].

** If "squatter" holdings were instead counted as equivalent to owner-operated, LOI would be 88 and IDD 51.

** In the Shah's last year, assuming an LOI of 48, the IDD was around 31.

Country	IDD*	LOI	LPI	BDMI	CPLI
S. Korea	59	80	84 (1/2)	78	28
Taiwan	58	85	70 (1/4)	79	33
Poland	57	74	51 (1/2)	85	25
Dominican Republic	56	49	45 (3/4)	48	72
Mexico	55	63	24 (1/4)	59	53
Hungary	53	6	71 (1/2)	90	22
El Salvador	+	—	26 (1)	56	50 [33]
Thailand	52	75	32 (1)	65	36
Turkey	52 [42]	64	29 (3/4)	47	61 [33]
Uruguay	51	45	14 (0)	79	22
Argentina	50	50	38 (0)	75	25
E. Germany	49	6	73 (1/4)	94	6
Brazil	49	36	24 (1/2)	57	50
India	49	45	29 (1)	40	69
Cuba	48	29	33 (1/4)	91	14
Peru	48	67	22 (1/2)	47	50
Czechoslovakia	47	13	72 (1/2)	88	8
Indonesia	47	66	45 (1)	52	33
Guatemala	47 [40]	71	24 (1)	47	47 [25]
Kuwait	45	—	(0)	57	33
Panama	44	13 ⁺⁺	25 (1/4)	70	30
Egypt	44	70	65 (3/4)	33	36
Bulgaria	42	6	58 (1/2)	90	0
Lesotho	42	79	15 (1)	40	39
Romania	41	6	46 (3/4)	85	8
Kenya	41	85	25 (1)	32	36
Nigeria	41	90	12 (1)	19	53
USSR	40	3	28 (1/2)	84	8
China	40	6	52 (1)	79	11
S. Africa	40	54	27 (1)	49	30
Philippines	39	33	26 (1)	55	33
Ghana	39	75	12 (1)	31	42
Bangladesh	38	41	33 (1)	27	50
Namibia	35	67	7 (1)	37	30
Sierra Leone	35	76	21 (1)	28	28
Bolivia	35 [29]	77	18 (1)	23	33 [17]

Zambia	35	89	13 (1)	23	30
N. Korea	33	5	91 (½)	59	0
Pakistan	32 [29]	45	34 (1)	29	28 [17]
Iran	--	--	16 (¾)	36	25
Chad	29	96	17 (1)	17	14
Malawi	28	90	16 (1)	20	11
Jordan	27	38	13 (¼)	37	17
Congo	27	93	9 (1)	19	11
Vietnam	26	35	34 (1)	43	0
Algeria	26	89	10 (¼)	30	17
Zaire	25	84	11 (1)	20	8
Iraq	24	57	13 (½)	37	6
Cent. Afr. Rep.	24	93	7 (1)	20	3
Saudi Arabia	23	74	27 (0)	29	17

BASIC MODELS OF DEVELOPMENT

We have noted previously that twenty-eight of the thirty countries that have been sufficiently successful in intensive agricultural production to be above 45 percent-of-best on our productivity index also receive a BDMI rating of 70 or better.

Of those twenty-eight countries, twenty-one represent owner-operator agricultures (eighteen small owner-operators, three large owner-operators); seventeen of the owner-operator agricultures, in turn, are at the highest range of the civil and political liberties index.³⁰

These seventeen countries also represent a majority of the twenty-nine countries found at a level of 75 or better on the civil and political liberties index and of the twenty-six found at the overall level of 70 or better on our combined Index of Democratic Development. The other countries found at that level of the IDD include two more with highly successful agricultures that constituted the major sector of the economy during much of the period of development: the large owner-operated systems of Canada and Australia, both with vast amounts of land that allow heavy exports of grain even though per-hectare productivity is relatively low.

But the forty-six countries which have achieved a BDMI level of 70 or better include—beyond the twenty-eight high-productivity agricultures—eighteen other countries or entities, fourteen with lower-productivity agricultures (38 percent-of-best and lower), two with virtually no food-crop production, and two with virtually no agricultural sector at all. Of these eighteen, there are nine (including Canada and Australia) found at the 75 or better range of the civil and political liberties index, and seven at the level of 70 or better on the overall IDD.³¹

In attempting to sort out all of this information—concerning the (largely overlapping) thirty most productive countries, forty-six with lowest birth and infant death rates, and twenty-six freest politically—into patterns and relationships which illuminate how these countries have reached their present state, and how others may hope to follow them there, we believe that seven fairly distinct models or variants of models emerge. We cast them in terms of the patterns which emerge for the forty-six countries that are at the higher reaches of the BDMI, the most inclusive of our indexes. They are:³²

1. Successful owner-operated farming systems combined with generally long-time political democracy which had already achieved a high degree of all the kinds of development our indexes measure before World War II.³³

Netherlands	Austria
Belgium	Sweden
Ireland	Norway
West Germany	New Zealand

Switzerland	Finland
Denmark	Canada
France	Australia
United States	

Referring to these fifteen countries, we shall speak of the "historic family-farm model."

Adding to these the special situation of the United Kingdom, and the cases of Czechoslovakia and East Germany, we have the entire group of eighteen countries that may be called "long-time developed countries."³⁴

2. Successful owner-operated farming systems combined with political democracy which achieved a high degree of all the kinds of development our indexes measure subsequent to World War II:

Japan
Italy
Greece

Referring to these three countries, we shall speak of the "*democratic family-farm model*."

All of the further models described likewise refer to successes achieved since World War II.

3. Successful owner-operated farming systems combined with authoritarian or totalitarian political systems, that achieved a high degree of development *except* as measured in the civil and political liberties index:

South Korea
Taiwan
Yugoslavia
Poland

Referring to these four countries, we shall speak of the "*non-democratic family-farm model*."

Speaking of groups 1-3 together, we shall sometimes use the overall term, the *family-farm model*.³⁵

4. Successful collectivized farming systems combined with authoritarian or, usually, totalitarian political systems, that achieved a high degree of development *except* as measured on the land-ownership and civil and political liberties index:

Hungary
Bulgaria
China
Romania
USSR

We include the USSR on this list, by analogy to the inclusion of Canada and Australia in Group 1. The Soviet agricultural system performs at only 28 percent-of-best, but the amount of land is so vast that even at that level of productivity, agriculture has nonetheless provided an "engine" for development. Unlike Canada and Australia, the Russians import grain rather than exporting it, but this is done almost entirely to feed animals whose products provide a relatively rich dietary standard.

Referring to these five countries, we shall speak simply of the *collective model*.

Speaking of groups 1-4 together, we shall use the broad term, "agriculture-based development models."

5. Populist-based distributive systems combined with political democracy that achieved a high degree of development *except* as measured on the agricultural productivity index (and they may or may not stand well on the land-ownership index, where data are available):³⁶

Sri Lanka
Costa Rica
Chile
Uruguay

Chile and Uruguay were democratic during the time periods when much of their reduction in birth and infant-death rates was achieved, though they subsequently came under authoritarian rule. In addition, such a populist approach combined with authoritarian rule is exemplified by Argentina during the Peronist period.

Referring to the four countries other than Argentina, we shall speak of the "*democratic populist model*." If referring to all five countries, we shall speak simply of the *populist model*.

6. Grass-roots income-receiving systems combined with political democracy that achieved a high degree of development *except* as measured on the agricultural productivity index (including situations where there is little or no agriculture; also, they may or may not stand well on the land-ownership index, where data are available):³⁷

Trinidad and Tobago^(a,b)
Israel^(a,c,d)
Jamaica^(a,b,c)
Hong Kong^(ac)
Mauritius^(c)
Puerto Rico^(a,b,d)

Referring to these six countries, we shall speak of the "*democratic external-funding model*."

7. The same as 6, except in authoritarian or totalitarian settings:

Spain^(a,b)
 Cuba^{(a,c)/(i)38}
 Panama^(b,c,d)
 Portugal^(ab)
 Singapore^(c)

Spain and Portugal were under authoritarian rule during the time periods when much of their progress as measured on the BDMI was achieved; they subsequently came under democratic rule. Referring to these five countries, we shall speak of the "*non-democratic external-funding model*," and referring to Groups 6-7 together, the *external funding model*.

Speaking of groups 5-7 together, we shall use the broad term, "non-agriculture-based development models."

Essentially, then, we have the *family-farm* model, the *collective* model, the *populist* model, and the *external-funding* model, with the first and the last model each having both a democratic and a non-democratic variant, the second model always—and inherently, it would seem, if it is to maintain the involuntary collectivization of agriculture—being nondemocratic, and the third model thus far (except for Argentina under Peron) being democratic.

The "*family-farm*" approach (twenty-two countries, with a total population of 750 million). In nearly all countries early in their development experience, as most of the less-developed countries today, the large majority of the population was rural, and agricultural land was the chief productive resource and the direct means of livelihood for most of the population. In countries exemplifying the family-farm pattern, it appears that two vital factors have come together with respect to this productive asset: first, agricultural land is held in ownership or ownership-like tenure by the great majority of the cultivators (either because there is already such an "egalitarian" tenure system, or because such a tenure system is deliberately introduced through land reform); second, there is basic support—some minimum critical combination of credit, inputs, extension, and marketing support—made available to this mass of owner-cultivators, through some combination of government initiative and private-sector performance.

With these two factors—motivation to enhance the productivity of this most basic of productive resources, land, achieved through ownership and the assurance of the benefits of increased production, and supplementation of the means of doing so—agricultural production shows strong increases, increases which are substantially more rapid than the increases in demand reflected in population growth. These increases, moreover, are readily accessible to the mass of the population: to the cultivators themselves, and to non-cultivators in the village communities to whom, in the first instance, the surplus is typically traded (directly or as cash wages after sale) in return for their labor in providing widely desired consumer goods and services.

A general improvement in nutrition, thus achieved, combines with other basic "social overhead" facilities that the village surplus can provide, such as safe water and sanitation facilities, other basic health facilities, and basic education facilities, to produce sharp declines in infant and child mortality rates. The assurance of survival of children, old-age security provided by ownership of the land, together with the changes in educational and employment patterns that have been triggered (such as education for female children, who now have the prospect of jobs in the growing village and regional economy), catalyzes a sharp decline in birth rates. The positive gap between increased food production and population growth widens still more, and a self-sustaining cycle of development affecting the bulk of the population continues and amplifies.

The *collective* approach (five countries, with a total population of 1.27 billion—including China with 985 million.)³⁹ In countries exemplifying this pattern, the process has followed essentially the same sequence as in the "family farm" approach, except that it has occurred with predominantly group (or state) ownership of the basic productive resource of agricultural land, rather than ownership by individual families. Typically, there has also been more active government intervention in the distribution of the additional food produced than in the family farm model, including more direct government determination of the uses of portions of the surplus to support particular outlays for social overhead items, consumer goods, or capital investment.

The *populist* approach (five countries, with a total population of 60 million). Here, a quite different path has been followed. In the countries exemplifying this model, a central-government decision has been made, and carried through with reasonable effectiveness, to allocate a major portion of the budget to measures of grass-roots wellbeing, typically to food distribution, basic health services and education.⁴⁰ The resulting sharply-reduced infant and child mortality, and other changes such as the education of women, have then combined to lay the groundwork for sharp reduction in birth rates. While these fundamental consequences seem to endure, there may be some question as to how frequently further "amplifications" of development processes in other directions—such as stimulation of the growth of a diversified non-agricultural sector—grow out of this model, or at least as to the rapidity of such "amplification."

The *external-funding* approach (eleven countries with a total population of 78 million).⁴¹ In the countries exemplifying this approach, an incremental and substantial source of income, very often amounting to several hundred 1981 dollars per capita per year, has become directly available to a large proportion of the population. Typically this has involved massive job-generation and income generation either within the country through tourism, or outside the country through large-scale emigration of workers who then make large remittances to their families back home. It has also involved exceptional opportunities for export of, usually, labor-intensive-products, or extremely large resource

transfers from either governmental or private sources abroad.⁴² Enough of this externally-derived resource then gets transmuted into improved diet and improved health facilities to set in motion a sharp decline in infant and child mortality rates, and this combined with other changes such as education and job opportunities for women in the (often) newly-awakened local economy, sets in motion, in turn, a sharp reduction in birth rates.

In practice, no single approach applies in "pure" form. The development of Israel, for example, can be said to have involved significant elements of all four of the approaches delineated, although the "external funding" approach probably reflects the single most significant element. A number of those countries that exemplify the external funding pattern also reflect elements of the family-farm pattern, often exhibiting the feature of family ownership of the land, but without the further feature of complementary farmer-support measures. Many of the countries that have built basically on the institution of the family farm have also reflected significant elements of the populist approach, and the doctrines guiding policy in the five successful collectivized states virtually subsume major elements of what we have separately called populism. We are then, in every case, talking about the primary approach that seems to have guided each successful country's development experience.

The two primarily non-agriculture based development strategies have reached comparatively few people—even counting the U.K., they have affected fewer than 10 percent as many people as have been reached by the two primarily agriculture-based strategies. It is also well to bear in mind that one of them, the external funding pattern, permits relatively little in the way of deliberate planning or government investment. Chiefly, it turns on such accidents as physical proximity to highly-developed and labor-importing countries, or to tourist-exporting countries, or on holding a politically and strategically crucial location. In the final decades of this century, this approach seems unlikely to reach very many additional countries, especially among those more-populous countries where the great majority of the world's poor and hungry dwell.

One may also question the extent to which the populist approach will be of significance for the future. It has affected the fewest countries and fewest people of any, and its application to a series of very populous countries over an extended period of time seems somewhat unlikely. Argentina, the largest country that it has thus far affected, has fewer than 30 million people. It may be asked whether the populist model is truly sustainable, either in terms of social gains or freedoms, or may at best represent a set of transitional measures to be followed by a development process which emphasizes indigenous agriculture. Costa Rica is near bankruptcy, and almost certainly must resolve its long-neglected agricultural tenure and productivity problems beyond whatever brief "bail-out" it may receive from the U.S. or the international banks. Uruguay has paid with its democracy, as has Chile. Sri Lanka may actually be well into the transition to a democratic family farm model (though exact tenure data are unavailable). Argentina has espoused a "nondemocratic popu-

lism" which has not only largely eliminated freedoms, but has foregone much of the opportunity to develop its bountiful natural endowment.

Thus, it seems that it is to the agriculture-based development strategies that one must largely look. But one of these strategies, involving involuntary collectivization, appears inherently incompatible with any high measure of political and civil freedoms, and incompatible with agriculturalists having effective participation in and control over the decisions that most affect their lives. Hence, it would appear that the family-farm model must be the principal focus of any global development strategy which is to be supportive of civil and political freedoms at the same time that grass-roots economic improvement is achieved; that is, for any development strategy that aims at simultaneous improvement in all of the indicators which comprise the Index of Democratic Development.

NOTES

1. It is not clear, from the historical record, whether this is true of collectivization, or not: *all* the successful communist revolutions, without exception, initially promised individual holdings to the landless. (This was not done in Spain, Malaya, or, so far, in El Salvador, but in none of these has the far left been successful.) After varying degrees of delay following their victory—ranging from more than a decade in Russia to barely a year in North Vietnam—all, except so far in the southern region of Vietnam, have collectivized the land. (In one non-revolutionary setting, Yugoslavia, collectivization was not seriously pursued, and Poland decollectivized in 1956.) In each case, collectivization has been unpopular with the peasantry, whether opposed sullenly or more actively. The two interesting, but not-yet-answerable questions that arise, are: Could the same revolutions have succeeded by promising only collectivization *ab initio*? And, can land-reform measures in a non-communist setting that promise only state or collective farming for program "beneficiaries" succeed in forestalling revolution?

2. We thus exclude, although separately showing the relevant data, involuntary collectives and state farms. Even assuming that these represent an alteration of conditions sufficient so that people no longer will revolt, because they can no longer identify someone (a landlord or plantation owner) who is sufficiently to blame for their situation, nonetheless they do not reflect the actual preferences of the bulk of families involved; and they do not afford effective means to those families of gaining control over their own destinies (on the contrary, they are viewed by the governments as affording an important means of indoctrination and control). Moreover, as we shall see, they do not demonstrate the capability of regularly achieving the highest reaches of productivity.

There is also, of course, the very factor of highly organized state power that is characteristic of all the countries where collective or state farms have predominated over a period of time. The resistance to collectivization in Russia or North Vietnam, and the successful efforts for decollectivization in Poland, Laos, and Tanzania, all suggest that considerable animosity can develop against the state and its bureaucrats as perceived landlords or landlord-surrogates. But open revolt may be significantly less possible than under a politically-more-inefficient landlord-dominated government.

3. While Table 17 allows us to estimate the landless as a percentage of agricultural population, a more direct predictive measure of the likelihood of large-scale violence resulting from land-tenure grievances can be based on landless families as a percentage of *total* population, as is suggested in our discussion on page 178 of the text.

Data for Table 17 are drawn principally from the country-by-county results of the 1970 and (with projections) 1960 rounds of the FAO World Census of Agriculture. Collateral estimates have been used in some cases, where we judged them adequate. All data presented in this essay exclude countries and geopolitical entities with populations of less than one million.

4. Plus "squatters" present in particularly high proportions in four countries—Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Thailand, and Panama—who are categorized neither as "landless" nor as "owner-operators." In these countries, squatters represent, respectively, approximately 10%, 15%, 5-10%, and 50%, of agricultural families.

5. One hectare = 2.47 acres. Relative rankings whether expressed per-hectare or per-acre are, of course, identical. We omit millet, oats, and rye. Millet occupies about as many hectares as grain sorghum globally (though less is produced), but virtually none of it is grown in the more-developed agricultures of the world, so it is very difficult to assess productivity against any commercially achieved target level. The few African countries for which millet is uniquely significant are not included in our figures. Oats are the sixth most important grain in quantity produced, but it is grown primarily in the more-developed agricultures, so the crop has little significance in assessing the productivity of the less-developed agricultures, now or in the future. We omit rye, the least important of the world's grain crops, for the same reason.

Also omitted is any country for which the total area sown in the two leading grains is less than 10,000 hectares.

We have included the third-most-widely planted crop for those few countries where it occupies two-thirds or more of the area of the second-most-widely planted crop.

Data are from the 1978-80 grain production reports of the U.S. Department of Agriculture.

6. Three-year average, 1978-80, highest producer planting 50,000 hectares or more.

7. It is important to keep in mind that these are not percentile ratings, in which 25 percent of the members of the set under discussion perform at "75 percent" or better level, but instead are percentages relative to a definite standard (the productivity-per-hectare of the world's highest producer for each grain). Only a small minority of nations have achieved 75 percent-or-better performance—twelve out of the 117 nations for which satisfactory U.S. Department of Agriculture data are available, and only those twelve, almost certainly, out of all the world's 160-odd nations (no society for which data are not available is believed to be anywhere close to the best agricultural performers).

8. It is under this system that Britain's principal productivity increases have been achieved—for example, from 2.26 metric tons of wheat per hectare in 1935-39, to 5.69 tons in 1980. Great Britain also has, as another substantial sector of its agriculture, by far the world's most sophisticated version of the type of holding on which hired labor plays a significantly larger role than family labor. Because of the high wages and guarantees of working conditions for English agricultural workers (the great majority are full-time permanent workers, rather than temporary or seasonal), the situation on that country's large estates may be taken as somewhat similar to that on the world's best-run and most successful state farms.

9. Median farm size in the U.K. is around 25 hectares, despite the presence of a sector of over-100-hectare farms which contain about 60% of the land in farms and employ roughly half the agricultural laborers. Median farm size in the EEC countries, other than England, ranges from around 16-17 hectares in Denmark and Ireland, down to about 12 hectares in France and the Netherlands, 10 hectares in West Germany and Belgium, and 2 hectares in Italy. Switzerland's median farm is about 6 hectares, Norway's about 5. The U.S. median is around 57 hectares; Japan's, South Korea's and Taiwan's median are all less than 1 hectare. See UNFAO, Report on the *1970 World Census of Agriculture—Results by Countries* (intermittent, Jan. 1973—Feb. 1979); and EEC, *The Agricultural Situation in the Community—1978 Report*, at pp. 290-91 (Brussels, 1979).

10. The landless figure for Java alone is calculated at 48 percent. The available productivity data is for Indonesia as a whole, and not for Java alone, but if Java were assumed to be at 50% landless, and the all-Indonesia productivity figures were used, Java would exceed Argentina at 45-percent-of-best. Java's agriculture, however, is predominantly that of small owner-operators, with the agricultural laborers who constitute the bulk of the landless playing a very circumscribed role, and the owners a more active agricultural role, than in other countries where we have described laborers as engaged on "small plantations."

Other countries with 50% or more of their agricultural families landless show the following percentages-of-best for productivity: Pakistan 27; El Salvador (pre-reform) 26; India 26; Philippines 25; Brazil 24; Nicaragua (pre-reform) 16; Uruguay 14; Jordan 13.

11. For planted area, see U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, *Foreign Agricultural Circular, Reference Tables on Area-Yield-Production of All Grains*, Dec. 16, 1980. Current population figures will be found in numerous sources, for example, Population Reference Bureau, *1981 World Population Data Sheet*.

12. This is without regard, moreover, to the fact that much of the "diversified" production that does take place in collectivized agriculture does not occur on the collectivized lands at all, but on the very small proportion of land that is allocated in private plots to individual families. In the Soviet Union, about 3% of the farmland is held in private plots, and produces over 20% of the total value of Soviet agricultural production. The cultivators of the private-sector land—most of them collective farmers as well—have concentrated on the production of high value, labor-intensive crops. As of 1969, the private plots produced an estimated 56% of Russia's eggs, 35% of its meat, 37% of its milk, and 39% of its vegetables, as well as 67% of its potatoes. For potatoes, vegetables, corn, berries, fruit, and grapes, "yields per hectare of private plots are from one-third to two-thirds higher than in the public sector." (Karl-Eugen Wadekin, *The Private Sector in Soviet Agriculture*, Second Edition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), p. 65. See *id.* Table at p. 64, Otto Schiller, "The Agrarian Question: Communist Experience and its Implication for Developing Countries," in W.A. Douglas Jackson, ed., *Agrarian Policies and Problems in Communist and Non-Communist Countries* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1971).) There were other striking differences. For example, the slaughter-weight of pigs that the farmers owned themselves averaged 50% higher than for pigs belonging to the collectives (Wadekin, p. 65).

The same phenomenon appears to occur in the other collectivized agricultures: in China, about 5% of the land has been held in private plots, and has produced an estimated minimum of 15 to 20 percent of the income of the average commune household, quite apart from what is consumed by them at home. (Thomas G. Rawski, *Economic Growth and Employment in China*, p. 78 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979); Jan S. Prybly, *The Chinese Economy, Problems and Policies*, pp. 57-58 (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1978).) Under the recent move toward the "responsibility system," the proportion of individually-farmed land has increased dramatically, perhaps to 40% or more. (See, e.g., *The New York Times*, October 25, 1981; *Time*, November 23, 1981.)

13. In Latin America, Cuba's grain-productivity performance is exceeded even by the poorly-run mixed system (with small owners and squatters predominating) of the Dominican Republic (45) and poorly-run small-owner system of Colombia (41), as well as by Argentina (38), and Costa Rica (35), both systems where large plantations predominate. Cuba is also lowest among all significant Latin American producers in per-hectare productivity of sugarcane.

14. The remedy, however, is to provide a modicum of these facilities. It is not to collectivize; as Tanzania discovered in its ill-starred attempt to collectivize the production of small African farmers in the *Ujamaa* system: "Even the most casual overview of the Tanzanian scene suggests a direct connection between the policy of socialist villageization and plummeting food production. Tanzania has always had to import a certain proportion of its food requirements: but during the early years of independence, the costs of these imports were small and the imported items consisted primarily of processed foods for which local production facilities were either inadequate or unavailable. Moreover, before the introduction of the *Ujamaa* program, Tanzania's annual rate of increase in food production was among the highest in Africa. Since the start of collectivization, however, local food production has fallen increasingly short of satisfying the country's requirements. Each step forward in the number and population of the collective villages has been accompanied by a corresponding increase in the annual costs and volume of imported goods. The most significant feature of Tanzania's current food imports is that they consist overwhelmingly of basic grains which can be grown successfully on Tanzanian farms." Michael F. Lofchie, "Agrarian Socialism in the Third World—the Tanzanian Case," *Comparative Politics* 8, no. 3, 479 at 484 (April 1976).

15. Agency for International Development, *Fiscal Year 1977 Submission to the Congress-Asian Programs*, p. 93 (Feb. 1976).

16. Lester Brown, *By Bread Alone*, p. 13 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974).

17. Theodore W. Schultz, "The Food Alternatives Before Us: An Economic Perspective," *Agricultural Economics*, University of Chicago, paper no. 75:6, May 25, 1974, quoted in D.

Gale Johnson, *World Food Problems and Prospects*, note at p. 46 (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978).

18. See, for example, James P. Grant, *Disparity Reduction Rates in Social Indicators—A Proposal for Measuring and Targeting Progress in Meeting Basic Needs* (Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council, 1978).

19. For the "Birth-and-Death-Based Modernization Index," we lay infant-mortality and crude-birth-rate data out on separate percentage-of-best scales, using as "100" the lowest 1981 infant-death rate (7 per 1000 infants) and the lowest birth rate (10 per 1000 population). However, there is no equivalent, virtually-automatic "zero" point for either scale (as 0-tons-per-hectare is the obvious limiting point for the agricultural productivity index number). An infant mortality of 100%, that is, 1000 per 1000 infants, could be used, but is far beyond any experienced, and would give even the worst-off country a relative rating close to "80" on a 100 scale. There is no logical "highest" number for births—only the biological maximum, which is probably just about where the highest-birth-rate countries currently are. Thus, as is done in the "PQLI," we use the worst-performing countries as "zero" points: in this case, 220 deaths per 1000 infants and 53 births per 1000 population each represent zero.

For infant-mortality, our zero and 100 "end-points" differ very slightly from the PQLI's, since we use the 1981 infant-mortality range of 7 to 220, while they use a range of 7 to 229 (the latter from 1950).

Except for the bracketed figures, where specific consideration of other data led to a departure, we have used the figures from the Population Reference Bureau's *1981 World Population Data Sheet*.

20. Kerala, an Indian state with a population of about 25 million, has achieved an infant mortality rate now in the mid-50's or lower, and a crude birth rate currently in the high 20's. See United Nations, *Poverty, Unemployment, and Development Policy—A Case Study of Selected Issues with Reference to Kerala*, pp. 134, 143 (New York, 1975), and Overseas Development Council, *The United States and World Development: Agenda 1977* (Washington, 1977). Considered separately, Kerala would receive a current BDMI rating of 68 or higher (versus India's over all rate of 40). This is in a state that has no more than the current all-India average income, with a gross domestic product under \$200.

21. Albania, a temperate European country of 2.8 million, is probably also well short of the 70 level. Albania's latest crude birth rate is around 29 per 1000, but it has a fairly high infant-death rate. This was estimated at 87 per 1000 with the Population Reference Bureau's *1980 World Population Data Sheet*, but for 1981 is shown as unknown.

22. Barbados, which is below the one-million-population cutoff level for our list, would also be well above the 70 level if included.

23. It will be recalled that three of the five countries having the most acute problems of land tenure—Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Indonesia—are also Muslim. See pp. 178 and 187 above.

24. Nine of the ten small owner-operator systems found at the highest levels of productivity are also at 94 or above on the CPLI. The exception is South Korea.

25. Barbados and Fiji likewise fit this description, but fall below the million-population cutoff at which we are presenting data.

26. Albania would probably also be somewhere around 60, if current infant-mortality data were available.

27. Czechoslovakia and East Germany, however, had both achieved BDMI ratings of 70 or better before Marxist governments came to power. Cuba had achieved an already respectable BDMI rating under the authoritarian pre-Castro government, with a 1950 infant mortality rate of about 39 (reflected also in a 1950-55 life expectancy at birth of 68 years), and a crude birth rate around 30 per 1000 population. See James P. Grant, *Disparity Reduction Rates in Social Indicators*, at p. 20 (Overseas Development Council, Sept. 1978); and "Population Brief: Latin America," in *Population and Devel. Rev.*, Vol. 6, No. 1, p. 126 at 131 and 136 (March, 1980). Thus, even nine years before Mr. Castro took power in 1959, Cuba already appears to have reached a BDMI level of 69.

28. 1975 BDMI ratings for Spain and Portugal, respectively, would have been around 88 and 80. See Population Reference Bureau, *1975 World Population Data Sheet*.

29. Fractions shown after the LPI index number indicate the lesser weight we give it and the LOI in highly-urbanized societies: the LOI and LPI will in combination get equal weighting with the BDMI, and with the CPLI, when agricultural families equal 50% or more of the total population; when such families are 40% or more but less than 50%, those two indices together will get 3/4 as much weight as each of the other two indices; where 30% or more but less than 40%, 1/2 as much; where 20% or more but less than 30%, 1/4 as much; and where such families are under 20% of the total population, the LOI and LPI figures will be shown separately but not included in the calculation of the over all index. Where an "IDD" rating is shown despite the fact that either the LOI or LPI data are missing, it is because the latter indices have a "0" weight for that country. Thus, the basic ratio of the four indices is 1:1:2:2, changing gradually to 0:0:2:2 as agriculture decreases in relative importance.

30. No collectivized agricultures are found at the mid or higher ranges of the CPLI—a reflection of the degree of coercion required to impose and maintain such an organization of farming against the wishes of most of the cultivators.

31. Two—Sri Lanka and Trinidad and Tobago—are not included on the IDD because their agricultural population is large enough to require inclusion of land-ownership in the calculation but adequate tenure data are not available.

32. Throughout the following, countries have been listed in descending order of agricultural productivity—those without significant area cultivated in cereals, for which no productivity-index figure has been given (Singapore, Hong Kong, Mauritius, Puerto Rico), are shown at the end of whatever list they appear on.

33. All of the "long-time developed countries" listed in this section had infant-mortality and birth rates that gave a BDMI rating of 70 or better in 1938-39 (we have taken the better figure of the two years, because of the effect of the war on some countries in 1939):

<i>Country</i>	<i>[MR</i>	<i>CBR</i>	<i>1938-39</i> <i>BDMI</i>
Norway	37	15	87
Sweden	39	15	86
Switzerland	43	15	85
New Zealand	31	18	85
Australia	38	17	84
U.K.	54	15	83
U.S.	48	17	82
Netherlands	34	21	81
Austria	73	14	80
France	68	15	79
Denmark	58	18	78
Germany	60	20	76
Belgium	82	16	75
Canada	61	20	75
Ireland	67	19	75
Finland	68	21	72
Czechoslovakia	98	17	70

Source: *United Nations Demographic Yearbook*, 1951 and 1952 editions.

Germany, it should be noted, had already achieved a BDMI level of 73 in the early 1930s under the Weimar democracy; there was little "progress" under the Nazis. Only Czechoslovakia, and to a lesser degree Belgium, exhibits infant-mortality rates which, separately considered, would be significantly below 70 on the index.

34. To a considerable degree, the development of both East Germany and Czechoslovakia can also be ascribed to the pre-war period and the "family farm model," but to avoid confusion, we shall simply call them "long-time developed countries."

35. This term excludes the U.K., East Germany, and Czechoslovakia.

36. Sri Lanka is at the lower limit of what might be considered "successful" cereal-farming systems, with productivity at 46-percent-of-best, but the process she has followed strongly suggests inclusion in this category rather than any other. Adequate tenure data is not available for Sri Lanka or Chile.

37. We have very broadly broken down the source of the "income" that is being received at the grass-roots according to four categories, indicating which appear to apply principally in each case:

- a = extensive tourism
- b = large number of nationals working abroad
- c = goods/services being exported under circumstances that create substantial employment
- d = very substantial subsidies being received from public or private foreign sources (to whatever extent the subsidy goes in the first instance to the government, this also implies a "populist" orientation in its redistribution).

38. The first (a,c) refers to the Batista period, the second (d) to the Castro period.

39. If one were to include the post-war experience of East Germany and Czechoslovakia under this approach, it would be 7 countries, and a further 32 million people.

40. An analogous measure in recent United States policy has been the Food Stamp program. In the "populist" development model, such programs become an early and central element in the development process, with allocation of resources that are very large relative to the total government budget.

41. It is possible that one might here include the U.K., which would raise this to 12 countries, with a further 56 million people. England is the one "long-time developed" country that may be said to have achieved its early development largely through this approach, using a further colonial variation. Unlike the other major colonizing powers, France and Spain, England had colonies—those in North America—to which a large out-migration of her own population was encouraged, rather than mere exploitation under the supervision of a small cadre of adventurers and administrators. Between 1750 and 1800 alone, the population of North America rose from two to seven million, chiefly because of this out-migration from England. When the Scottish lords enclosed the Highlands for sheep-raising in the nineteenth century, it was deliberate accompanying policy to send the displaced small farmers to North America. (The enclosures were the subject of a famous article by Karl Marx in the *New York Herald*, which did not, however, go on to trace the farmers to the New World and examine the relative prosperity they found there.)

There were also significant elements of a fairly-sophisticated "populism" fairly early in England's development experience, utilizing government revenues to provide for basic needs.

42. Soviet assistance to Cuba, for example, probably comes to around \$200 per capita per year, and has continued for many years. By contrast, few countries have received ordinary "foreign aid" amounting to more than \$25-50 per capita for any extended period of time, and total development assistance, in relation to the population of the less-developed countries, averages around \$10 per capita per year.

PART IV

**The Human Costs
of the
Totalitarian Alternative**

Human Rights in Vietnam Under Two Regimes

Stephen J. Morris

In making important policy choices, the statesman often has to deal with two distinct problems: the problem of choosing morally appropriate or just ends and the problem of choosing the right means to realize those ends. Neither choice is necessarily simple, though it is often the choice of means which poses the greatest moral complexity.

In the controversial history of American involvement in Vietnam, much of the debate revolved around the question of the relationship between means and ends: Was American military power an effective means for achieving the political end of a noncommunist South Vietnam? Was the moral cost of the scale and type of military power employed proportionate to the ends being pursued? The "unwinnable war" thesis, the view that the American desire to preserve a noncommunist South Vietnam was inherently unattainable because of the weakness of the regime, was always the dominant argument of mainstream critics of the American commitment to South Vietnam.¹ But latent in the moral perception of Vietnam by critics of American policy was the view, explicitly held by some, that South Vietnam wasn't morally worth defending. For example, as North Vietnam completed its final offensive against South Vietnam, one popular writer, Ronald Steel, found it distasteful that Henry Kissinger was "whining to Congress about his 'moral commitments' to a venal regime of torturers and war profiteers."²

Underlying this critical view of American foreign policy were two separate objections to the defense of South Vietnam. The first was that one should not soil one's hands by supporting a regime which committed immoral acts. For

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the moral absolutists raising this objection, discussion of the consequences of action or inaction were not germane; thus discussion of likely alternatives to the South Vietnamese government, and the morality of supporting a lesser evil, was ruled out of court a priori.³ The second objection, which was equally common, was predicated on an empirical claim about the balance of evil in North and South Vietnam, which was presumed to refute the "lesser evil" argument. One very influential expositor of this position was the French-American journalist Bernard Fall:

There simply is not yet enough of a difference between the two regimes, in their relations between themselves and their citizens... to make the citizens of the South rally to its defence. That is why there can be no genuine comparison between the Berlin Wall and the 17th Parallel: in Berlin the barrier separates a total dictatorship from the true working democracy; in Vietnam it separates two systems practising virtually the same rituals but invoking different deities.⁴

Fall's analysis challenges any claim that there were important human rights issues at stake in the American intervention in Vietnam. Since the argument is dependent upon matters of fact, it can be tested empirically.

This paper analyzes the human rights policies of the former governments of South Vietnam and North Vietnam which were fighting each other for control of the South until the North's victory in April 1975. This paper does not pretend to provide a comprehensive account of the morality of American intervention in Vietnam, since it does not evaluate the worth of all the ends pursued, and it does not approach the very complex issues concerning the relationship between the means applied and the ends. This paper does not consider those human rights issues which were a specific direct consequence of the military operations of the United States, South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and the Vietcong guerillas (e.g., bombardment of civilian-inhabited areas by both sides). Such issues are central to any broader evaluation of the moral position of each of the parties to the conflict. But they are properly considered within a discussion of the morality of the means, or the relation between means and ends. Still, the paper is relevant to any more general consideration of the morality of American intervention since it addresses the empirical basis for the important argument as to whether or not American intervention was defending human rights for the people of South Vietnam.

Three assumptions underlie this study.

The first assumption is that the most important human rights are those which we call civil and political rights (e.g., freedom from arbitrary arrest, torture, or execution and freedom of belief, speech, association and movement). This is not to say that they are the only human rights. There also exist social and economic rights (e.g., the right to work for a living, the right to an education, and the right to proper health care). But even if one rejects the *primacy* of the civil and political rights, one cannot deny their *centrality*. After all, civil and political rights are an integral part of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as of the working or sym-

bolic constitutions of democratic and communist states alike. Furthermore, though the arguments for the *moral* primacy of civil and political rights cannot be presented here, an argument for their emphasis as our *analytical* focus can be: insofar as human rights has been a central concern of American foreign policy in recent years, the concern has been oriented mainly toward civil and political rights.

The second assumption is that one can draw a useful distinction between a liberal, an authoritarian, and a totalitarian state. This distinction has been a popular one among some political thinkers, though it has been drawn in many different ways.⁵ It is most useful to think of the three concepts as points along a continuum which expresses the degree of state control of social action. On this continuum the liberal and the totalitarian states represent polar extremes while the authoritarian state stands somewhere between the other two. I will define the three concepts as follows:

1. A liberal state is one that allows (a) the proliferation of a multiplicity of independent social institutions and (b) the unhindered flow of social ideas and information.
2. An authoritarian state is one that allows (a) the proliferation of a multiplicity of independent social institutions, with the exception of political institutions, which can only exist within a single centrally directed framework, and (b) the unhindered flow of all social ideas and information other than political ideas and information, whose flow is strictly regulated by the state.
3. A totalitarian state is one that directs (a) a single institutional framework into which all social behavior is integrated and (b) a strict regulation of the flow of all social ideas and information.

Some political scientists argue that these distinctions were satisfactory for political analysis during the Stalin era but cannot be used to analyze all the new types of communist regimes that have emerged in the post-Stalin era.⁶ This argument, however, is not decisive. It only amounts to a claim that the previous distinctions are insufficient, not inapplicable. A serious theorist would thus attempt to solve the problems posed by modifying (i.e., expanding) the taxonomy, rather than automatically abandon it.⁷ Furthermore, this argument does not really bear upon the problems being addressed here; as we will see, in the context of Vietnamese politics (and, I would argue, in the context of Southeast Asian politics generally) the various alternative regimes can be analyzed with the taxonomy presented.

The final assumption underlying this study is that the previously presented taxonomy is a most useful way of distinguishing qualitatively the extent to which states violate civil and political human rights. That is, authoritarian states are qualitatively greater violators of these rights than liberal states, and totalitarian states are qualitatively greater violators than authoritarian states. Of course, the taxonomy will not account for *all* the civil and political human

rights violations which occur in any particular society over a period of time. For example, it does not take account of those violations which are perpetrated by private individuals or groups (e.g., business corporations, paramilitary political groups, or common criminals). Nor does the taxonomy take account of aberrant events such as major violations of human rights which result directly from a violent struggle for power (either a revolution or a coup, successful or aborted). But the taxonomy is still important in that it distinguishes the alternative conditions of civil and political human rights which are *systematically derived from the nature of the state*.

A moral relativist might argue that the values underlying this analytical framework are those of liberal pluralism. Liberal-pluralist values have specific roots in Western culture but have none in non-Western cultures such as Vietnam's. Thus, it is argued, evaluation of the relative merits of the North and South Vietnamese political systems in terms of the framework I have presented is narrowly ethnocentric and irrelevant to the values of the Vietnamese themselves. Such a relativist, however, might be hard put to provide any standards at all for evaluating human rights.

Cultural relativism would be a superficially plausible basis for criticism if one's analysis was confined to the specific procedures of one electoral system or another. But it can hardly apply to an evaluation of the range of values which are implicitly contained in theories of pluralism or totalitarianism, especially freedom of association, freedom of movement, and freedom of religion. It is hard to believe that a Vietnamese peasant, accustomed to taking his surplus produce to market, would not value freedom of movement or the right to private property. And it certainly strains credibility to argue that a practicing Buddhist or Catholic does not regard freedom of religion as one of his most basic rights. What common sense tells us is confirmed by the platform of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, the front organization established by the Vietnamese communists for the purpose of winning the support of Vietnamese peasants. In its Ten Point Manifesto of December 1960 the NLF promised:

We will abolish the present constitution of the Ngo Dinh Diem dictatorial government and with universal suffrage elect a new National Assembly. Freedom of expression, press, assembly, association, travel, religion and other democratic liberties will be promulgated. Religious, political and patriotic organisations will be permitted freedom of activity regardless of beliefs and tendencies. There will be a general amnesty for all political detainees, the concentration camps dissolved.... Illegal arrests, illegal imprisonment, torture, and corporal punishment shall be forbidden.⁸

HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM, 1967-1975

The South Vietnamese government of Nguyen Van Thieu cannot be easily categorized. It was neither clearly liberal nor clearly authoritarian. It con-

tained elements of both concepts. The complex mixture of characteristics of the regime enabled partisans of opposing views on the Vietnam war to portray it in terms of one or the other. But however one located the Thieu government on a continuum it was somewhere between the points of liberalism and authoritarianism.

Because the Thieu regime's policies toward political freedom were complex, few unqualified generalizations can be made about them. To say without qualification that there were free elections, freedom to form political organizations, freedom to hold demonstrations, and freedom of the press would be to utter a falsehood. But, at the same time, to say that there were no free elections, no freedom to form political organizations, no freedom to hold demonstrations and no freedom of the press would be to utter an even greater falsehood.⁹ There were freedoms in all of these areas, but they were freedoms with limitations, and the extent of these limitations varied over time.

Elections and Representative Institutions. In 1966, millions of Vietnamese participated in the election of a Constituent Assembly whose purpose was to draw up a constitution and prepare the foundations of a democratic society. These goals were never fully realized. But South Vietnam did enjoy a degree of democratization based on increased and meaningful popular participation in the selection of local, regional, and national leaders. As Theresa Tull suggested:

From 1967 to 1971 the average Vietnamese had opportunity to vote in nine elections. He chose officials to run his hamlet and to govern his country. He voted for his hamlet chief, his village council, twice selected an entire Lower House of the National Assembly, elected an initial sixty-man Senate for the National Assembly and initiated the triennial replacement of one half of that body, and twice voted for a President and Vice President.¹⁰

These exercises did not mean that South Vietnam was a model of democracy. As Charles Joiner has pointed out, the South Vietnamese president was personally authoritarian and refused to recognize the spirit of the separation of powers. He also manipulated the 1971 presidential election in order to maintain himself in power; in effect, it became a one-man "election." Furthermore, the National Assembly had little effective power over the broad issues of national policy. Village councils were sometimes hand-picked by the government rather than selected by open election. And the all-important position of province chief was never subject to election, instead being appointed by the national government. The holders of such positions, usually military men, often impeded democratization by manipulating village elections and provincial council decisions.¹¹

Nevertheless, there was a considerable degree of genuine popular choice in the electoral process. Noncommunist politicians opposed to Thieu were allowed to run for office and were elected at all levels of the political system in

considerable number. For example, in the 1970 Senate elections the An Quang Buddhist opposition slate, headed by Vu Van Mau, ran and came in clearly in first place.¹² Again in the 1971 elections for the lower house, candidates with An Quang Buddhist affiliations did well, winning twenty-five seats, the largest win by any political group.¹³ Elections themselves and the legislative bodies thus created were not totally bogus from the point of view of political representation.

But even more important was the fact that the representative bodies became forums for public discussion and criticism of national leadership and policy. The Thieu government was conscious of, and restrained by, public opinion at home and abroad. Thus, representative bodies, particularly at the national level, operated as a brake on executive power. Representative bodies were instrumental in the preservation of a degree of political freedom.

Political Organizations. Vietnam had a plethora of political organizations, many of them with a long history of involvement in nationalist politics. The Vietnamese Nationalist Party (VNQDD) had been formed in the 1920s to oppose French colonialism. The Dai Viet Nationalist Party appeared during World War II, inspired by the success of the Japanese in driving Western influence out of Asia. Two other important political groups were the major political-religious sects of the Mekong Delta, the Hoa Hao and the Cao Dai, which had a mass base in particular regions of the countryside.

All of these political forces survived into the era of the American involvement in Vietnam and organized themselves politically during the Ky and Thieu administrations. After their original formation, however, under the pressure first of French repression and after World War II of communist assassinations, these parties lost most of their effective leadership and split into smaller factions. These factions were joined by more recently formed political groupings, some based on religious affiliation, others on personal networks or institutional ties (e.g., civil servants or trade union members), to form the complex maze of political organizations which attempted to influence political life in South Vietnam. Under the Thieu administration, some of these groups supported the president's actions consistently. Others were alternately critical and supportive. A third segment was consistently hostile to the president and his policies.

Presidential Decree 009 issued in 1969 allowed the legal formation of twenty-six political parties.¹⁴ Thieu's initial ruling strategy was to co-opt many of these political parties, in the form of a progovernment coalition of six parties which he named the National Socialist Revolutionary Alliance. Thieu's plan, however, collapsed as individual party leaders could not agree on the distribution of positions on the 1970 Senate election slate.¹⁵ South Vietnamese party politics thus continued on its normal fragmented and chaotic course through the end of 1971 when Thieu issued a new decree on party organization (Decree 060, 27 December 1972) which aimed to dissolve the existing

small, often urban or regionally based political parties and replace them with a smaller number of more nationally based political organizations. The ostensible idea was to rationalize the political process by creating coalitions of the more limited and fragmented groups which would then resemble national parties in both membership and electoral support.¹⁶

A few of the existing political organizations accepted the new decree with reluctance. Apart from Thieu's Democracy Party, two other coalitions were formed in accordance with the new decree: a largely Catholic-oriented grouping known as the Freedom Party, led by Senate President Nguyen Van Huyen, and the Democratic Socialist Alliance, formed by the coalition of several parties around the Worker Farmer Party of trade union leader Tran Quoc Buu. To implement the new party law the Ministry of the Interior issued decrees on 16 May 1973 dissolving the twenty-six parties charted under the 1969 decree. From October 1973 only three political parties—the Democracy Party, the Freedom Party, and the Democratic Socialist Alliance—were authorized to participate in national elections.

The response of most political parties to the new decrees was defiance.¹⁷ Even the newly formed independent coalitions boycotted the 1973 Senate elections, which degenerated into a competition among several government-sponsored slates. Opposition members of the Senate and House attempted to amend the provisions of the new decrees but had limited success. In spite of Thieu's success in getting his own way from the point of view of the law, however, most of the previously legal parties continued to operate into 1975.¹⁸

Apart from the networks of political parties, there existed a multitude of single-issue interest groups opposed to the government. Some were formed to represent the interests of war veterans or students. More important still was the nationally organized trade union movement (CVT). And then there was the multiplicity of "moral renewal" movements, some of which were fronts for the Communist Party, others of which were anticommunist in their beliefs. The most famous of the latter was the People's Movement Against Corruption led by the Catholic priest Tran Huu Thanh. Most of these interest groups expressed themselves politically through street demonstrations, with attendant press publicity.

In general it is true to say that, despite periodic government harassment, formation of political organizations independent of and opposed to the government was legal and possible under the Thieu administration. This did not mean that the population in general had easy, open access to the institution of power. But it did mean that political dissent was a legal and practical possibility.

Demonstrations. The right of South Vietnamese citizens to demonstrate publicly was guaranteed in Article 13 of the Constitution:

- a. Every citizen has the right to meet and form associations within the framework of the law.

- b. The state respects the political rights of all citizens, including the right to petition freely and engage in overt, non-violent and legal opposition.¹⁹

The practical application of that article varied according to who was demonstrating. Trade unionists and war veterans often demonstrated about economic conditions and social welfare services. Their demonstrations were not directly political and the police rarely prevented them.

The catch was that people wishing to demonstrate had to acquire police permission, specifying how many people were demonstrating and what they were demonstrating against.²⁰ In the absence of permission a demonstration would be considered illegal. Saigon students were treated differently from workers and war veterans. The students never applied for police permission, according to one of their former leaders, because they thought they would never get it, or because, if they did, other students would say they were lackeys of the government.²¹ Saigon police always broke up student demonstrations. They would surround the demonstration to prevent a march. Arrests would not be made if opposition politicians or the mass media supported the students.²²

When students were arrested, it usually involved a short period of detention, a few days or weeks. The longest time Doan Van Toai, the vice president of the Saigon students' union, was in prison was for two months. If the police had no evidence that the student was a communist or working with the communists, he would not be kept for a long period.²³

Press Freedom. One of the most interesting aspects of political freedom in South Vietnam under Thieu is the role and fluctuating status of the press, particularly newspapers. South Vietnam possessed an enormous number of independent newspapers, the number published varying from thirty to fifty at any one time. Many had limited appeal, and for financial reasons were unable to publish indefinitely. Yet there was a solid core of newspapers which published continuously under the Thieu administration and which became quite well known nationally. The spectrum of opinion expressed in South Vietnamese newspapers ranged from progovernment (e.g., *Dan Y, Xay Dung*) to independent (e.g., *Cap Tien, Hoa Binh, Chinh Luan*) to radical opposition (e.g., *Tin Sang, Dien Tin*).

The Press Law of 1969 provided the legal basis both for the freedoms which existed and for the restrictions on those freedoms. The law prohibited press censorship and provided that no publication could be suspended without judicial action. The law also provided, under Article 24, "the right to criticize government policies and projects, provided that the criticism is not aimed at propagandizing for communism or pro-Communist neutrality."²⁴ The main provisions restraining press freedom were Articles 27, 28, and 29. Article 27 forbade incitement to violence and incitement of people to "violate domestic or external security" or the urging of "military men to disobey military disci-

pline." Under Article 28 the press was forbidden to jeopardize national security, public order, the economy, military morale, and discipline. It was also forbidden to "sow division between religions, localities and races."²⁵ Finally, under Article 29 the press was prohibited from "publicising or extolling communism" or "pro-communist neutralism." Defense of the reputation of private persons was contained in Article 31. Articles 32 and 33 prohibited insult of major public officials or visiting foreign officials. Article 35 contained an antipornography clause.²⁶ Articles 27, 28, and 29 were most important because under them the courts could order suspension of publications and impose jail sentences on newspaper officials. It is important, however, to note how this aspect of government control took place within the framework of a legal process. While a trial or appeal against penalties was pending, a newspaper could not be shut down nor could the editor be jailed.²⁷

How were these legal provisions applied in practice? The simple answer is that application varied over time, being more restrictive during the communist offensives of 1972 and 1975. But in general, government controls over the press were never as extensive as they might have been given the wartime situation. For most of its time in office the Thieu administration did not impose censorship of the press. The main ways in which it limited freedom of the press were by confiscating copies from newsstands, controlling the supply and price of newsprint, and, from 1972 on, forcing newspapers to post bonds of tens of thousands of dollars to ensure payment of government fines imposed for violation of the press law.

Most confiscations occurred under Article 28. A smaller number of confiscations occurred under the antipornography Article 35.²⁸ The number of confiscations varied on a monthly basis. Howard Penniman reports that in the twelve months preceding the 1971 presidential election in South Vietnam the number of confiscations ranged from a low of fourteen in October 1970 to highs of eighty-two in June 1971 when the Laotian offensive was still in progress and eighty-three in September 1971 just before the election.²⁹ Penniman also points out that the confiscations did not fall evenly across the range of independent and antigovernment newspapers, but tended to be concentrated on a few.³⁰

To get an idea of the extent to which freedom of the press did exist in South Vietnam, it is worth quoting at length from the editorials³¹ of two of the newspapers radically opposed to the Thieu administration. From "Is 'Protect South Vietnam' a Just Cause?" (*Tin Sang*, 20 April 1971):

Never before have U.S. peace-loving forces been so united as they are today to speak out with the voice of reason about ending the war. Thousands of Vietnam war veterans have joined this movement. This fact unveils the true nature of the so-called just cause that U.S. officials have long used to sow death and mourning here. To protect South Vietnam? Or is it only to protect a minority which gets top honors thanks to the blood of the Vietnamese people? We are sure that those veterans who fought in Vietnam know this better than anyone else.

President Nixon may have thought that when he referred to the "just cause of protecting South Vietnam" he would give America some kind of noble mission that only an invincible America can carry out. But he was wrong because he had not the courage to find out, through his men who have fought in Vietnam, whether South Vietnam has anything worth protecting at the cost of U.S. honor.

It is certain that President Nixon now stands at a cross-road as President De Gaulle did 13 years ago in Algeria. . . . Faced with French difficulties at that time, De Gaulle acted like a genuine leader, clear-sighted enough to see through the evolution of the situation, and did what the honor of a traditionally democratic France demanded. . . . Has President Nixon the makings of such a leader to move in that direction?

From "May 1—The Mea-Culpa Day of Exploiting Classes" (*Dien Tin*, 30 April 1971; by-line, Ly Qui Chung):

Labor day reminds the government that such slogans as Welfare, Peace, Freedom of the international working class are still buried down in some filing cabinet of the Labor Ministry. . . . The presence of half a million of U.S. troops have made the rich richer but did not change the workers' lot one iota. On the contrary, now that the Americans leave one by one those who are earning their living by their bare hands are poorer than ever.

May Day also reminds the incumbent leaders that peace is what the workers and the whole population cherish most after food and clothing. Our leaders should ask themselves what they have done until this moment in favor of peace. Is peace-through-victory the kind of peace that the laboring class and the entire people are longing for? And does freedom inherent to any regime called free actually exist here? Are our leaders proceeding to any reforms or will they continue to distort it in behalf of their dark schemes?

What will the workers do for their Welfare, Peace, Freedom slogan? Certainly they cannot wait and see with their arms folded; nor can they submit to the leadership of "labor middlemen" who are but agents of either the government or the foreigners. No one serves better their own interests than the workers themselves.

The Issue of Political Prisoners. One of the most publicized aspects of the human rights record of the Thieu regime was its holding of political prisoners. This issue came to the fore in the United States and Europe after the signing of the Paris Peace Agreements in January 1973. The reason for its prominence after this date was the supposed ending of the war and the transformation of the power struggle in Vietnam to a primarily political phase. The North Vietnamese desperately needed the assistance of their imprisoned southern cadres and thus began to orchestrate an international campaign against Thieu's holding of civilian prisoners, all of whom were termed "political" prisoners, without exception. The campaign, couched in impeccably liberal terms, thus gained the support of a large number of noncommunist groups and individuals in the West. Yet it originated in Hanoi. The number of people being held prisoner was frequently cited at 200,000 but this figure is devoid of any evidential basis. It was originated in Hanoi and was widely disseminated by Father Chan Tin, a Catholic priest who, after 1975, revealed himself as an

undercover communist agent.³² Moreover, the individual prisoners whose cases were continually emphasized mostly turned out to be not "Third Force" activists but members of the Communist Party or NLF apparatus.

Amnesty International produced a major report on the subject which received considerable publicity and respect on account of the prestige of that organization.³³ Unfortunately, Amnesty's account of the Vietnamese political prisoner problem is almost worthless for several reasons.

First, the Amnesty report lumped together in its definition of "political prisoners" both members of the NLF infrastructure and non-NLF opponents of the government.³⁴ This lumping together is rather difficult to defend given our common understanding and usage of the term "political prisoner." After all, members of the NLF infrastructure were the political auxiliaries, the "eyes and ears," of the military forces attempting to overthrow the government of South Vietnam. They were in some sense civilians but in no sense pacifist, nonpartisan, or nonsubversive civilians. It could hardly be argued that a member of the NLF being held in prison was being held for his political beliefs, or merely for expressing nonviolent political opposition to the government. He was, in fact, an integral part of a violent revolutionary movement which was engaged in the assassination and kidnapping of government officials; he was also a conscious or unconscious agent of a state with which the government of South Vietnam was at war.

Second, Amnesty estimated the number of prisoners being held in South Vietnam at 70,000 to 100,000.³⁵ Earlier, Amnesty had noted that South Vietnamese prisons contained four distinct categories of inmates: common criminals, military personnel who were prisoners of war, members of the NLF infrastructure, and non-NLF opponents of the government.³⁶ Yet in speaking of the total number of prisoners it ignored these earlier distinctions and never attempted to delineate even a rough percentage in each category. Thus Amnesty failed to indicate how many of the total number of prisoners being held were actually "political prisoners," even in terms of its own broad, misleading definition. This oversight was helpful to Hanoi's friends around the world, who publicized the "fact" that "the respected Amnesty International in London estimates at least 100,000" political prisoners were being held in South Vietnam.³⁷ Amnesty was not dependent upon candid interviews with South Vietnamese government officials in order to acquire evidence on this difficult factual matter. Amnesty's analysts could have referred to their own antigovernment sources. One of them, Ho Ngoc Nhuan, did provide a possible basis for such an estimate in a statement quoted in the body of Amnesty's own report. Speaking of the people to be found in Chi Hoa prison, Mr. Nhuan wrote:

The prison contains 7,500 inmates, of which only *half are common criminals* [italics mine]... two thousand are military prisoners, draft dodgers and minor regulation violators who would normally be out of sight at the Go Vap military prison on the outskirts of Saigon. But that institution is terribly overcrowded (as are most of Vietnam's prisons now) so they are here... Chi Hoa also contains

from 450 to 500 children between the ages of twelve and fifteen whose crimes are stealing and petty theft and drug offenses. Like the military prisoners they are the overflow, for the Thu Due Juvenile Center can handle no more.³⁸

On the basis of Nhuan's direct eyewitness report, the evidence suggests that of 7,500 prisoners being held in Chi Hoa, only 1300 at the very most were possibly "political," even in Amnesty's broad (and as I have suggested, misleading) sense of the term. That is, there were only 1,300 who were either NLF or non-NLF civilian political prisoners. If this sample of category breakdown was typical of the whole prison system, then the total number of NLF and non-NLF prisoners would stand at 13,000 to 17,500. One former inmate of Chi Hoa claims that the ratio of NLF to noncommunist opponents of the regime was nine to one.³⁹ If this estimate was correct and Nhuan's analysis of Chi Hoa was typical of the entire system, it would mean that there were approximately 1,300 to 1,750 non-NLF, noncommunist political prisoners in all of South Vietnam.

The third, and possibly the most serious, charge that can be levelled against the Amnesty report concerns its highlighting of the cases of many NLF prisoners and its misleading characterization of them as nonviolent critics of the South Vietnamese government "who support neither of the warring sides."⁴⁰ In the appendix to its report, Amnesty listed some individual prisoners of the South Vietnamese government, gave an outline of what it believed their offenses were, and told us that they were typical prisoners.⁴¹

I have tried to check Amnesty's description of each of the prisoners mentioned in material published since the end of the war and in an interview with one prominent member of the Saigon University Students Association at the time. This student had been actively opposed to Thieu, was imprisoned several times by the South Vietnamese police, and was in a position to know many of Amnesty's cases personally. I have only been able to uncover independent sources of information for six of the sixteen cases Amnesty highlighted. These six, however, include most of the widely publicized cases of "political" imprisonment. Of these six, one was a lawyer, Nguyen Long, who specialized in defending NLF prisoners and whose actual relationship with the NLF was unclear.⁴² Two were actively working for the NLF, two were highly important activists on behalf of the NLF who may actually have been members of the communist party, and the sixth was a self-confessed terrorist and assassin working with the NLF underground.

Each of these cases was described by Amnesty not as what he was but as a person persecuted for expressing his opinions. Take the well-known case of Huynh Tan Mam. He was the president of the General Association of Saigon Students. According to Amnesty:

He has consistently opposed the policies of the Saigon government, and voiced his criticism of the American presence in Vietnam. As a result he has been constantly in and out of jail during the past few years.⁴³

But according to his former deputy, Doan Van Toai, who at the time organized student demonstrations throughout South Vietnam to protest Mam's imprisonment, Mam was in fact a member of the National Liberation Front.⁴⁴ At the end of the war Mam became a spokesperson for the new regime, denying the extensive evidence of any repression under the communists.⁴⁵ (During the war it was widely believed in South Vietnam that Mam had received training from the communists. Amnesty never bothered to mention, let alone check the accuracy of, these charges.)⁴⁶

Another, even more prominent case was that of Madame Ngo Ba Thanh. Her imprisonment, once, according to Amnesty, for assaulting a judge and once in 1971 for engaging in activities harmful to the national security and for organizing an "illegal demonstration," caused an international uproar at the time. Amnesty noted that the "Saigon police claimed to have documentary evidence showing her connections with the NLF."⁴⁷ But Amnesty did not pursue the matter of Mme Thanh's NLF connections, regarding it as a matter of no consequence. The Hanoi regime felt differently, however. At the end of the war it gave her a position in the rubber-stamp Vietnamese National Assembly and made her a principal spokesperson for the regime in its dealings with Western countries. One of Mme Thanh's most important functions has been to defend, and cover up the scale of, Hanoi's postwar repression.⁴⁸

Two other prisoners mentioned by Amnesty were students at Saigon University. In neither one of these cases, Nguyen Thi Yen and Le Cong Giau, did Amnesty mention the reason for the arrest. It did mention allegations of torture, but refused to name its source. According to the aforementioned Toai, both individuals worked for the NLF and indeed had probably been tortured. **Le Cong Giau, claims Toai, was the man who gave orders to Huynh Tan Mam on behalf of the Front.**⁴⁹

The case most damaging to the credibility of Amnesty's report is that of Nguyen Huu Thai. A former student of architecture, Thai had been arrested several times by the South Vietnamese government, the last time in October 1972. In spite of his dubious record, Thai had been inducted into the army of the Republic of Vietnam in 1968, and at the time of his final arrest was a captain instructing at the Army Centre for Political Warfare. Amnesty's report spoke of Thai in the following terms: "He was imprisoned in 1964, and again from 1966 to 1968, apparently because of his involvement in the student peace movement."⁵⁰

At the end of the war, in an interview with pro-NLF Italian journalist Tiziano Terzani, Thai explained his arrests differently:

I then made contact with an urban guerilla group in Saigon and was part of the unit that instigated the first attacks on American installations and civilians in reprisal for the bombings over Hanoi. The leader was a student like myself; some of the others were little Saigonese gangsters who had been converted to revolution. There was a spy among us and we all got arrested. There wasn't enough proof against me, and so I was never taken into court. But by a simple administrative expedient they kept me in jail for two years.⁵¹

Amnesty was convinced at the time that Nguyen Huu Thai was a pacifist:

He has written for several prominent Saigon newspapers that have reflected his non-violent, anti-war views, and has been widely regarded as an anti-war leader since his student days in spite of his subsequent army work.⁵²

The Amnesty analysts apparently did not find it significant that a South Vietnamese army captain, instructing in political warfare, should have been arrested by his own military security police. Thai later explained the reason for his arrest to Terzani and in so doing demonstrated the depth of what Amnesty described as his "non-violent, anti-war views":

It was my cell that organized an attempt on the life of Tran Quoc Buu, the CIA man who controlled the reactionary trade unions on behalf of the regime, but we failed twice. We succeeded however in our coup against Nguyen Van Bong, a former Vietminh who had gone over to the CIA when the Party sent him on a mission to Paris.

Bong was very influential in the leadership of the Administrative Institute, and there was a good possibility that he might become Prime Minister in place of Khiem. It was important to eliminate him; other groups had tried, without success.⁵³

In other words, Thai was not a peaceful political activist, but the murderer of such people. (Yet after a trial, Thai was given a sentence of only two years in prison. The president of the court was Thai's cousin and a former classmate. Thus the convicted assassin was released from prison in 1974 and continued to work secretly on behalf of the NLF, being on hand for the final victory of April 1975.)⁵⁴

The only question that remains to be asked about Amnesty's report is, How could such a respected organization produce such an apocryphal piece of analysis? Part of the answer should have been apparent at the outset, as the four-page section of the report apologizing for Viet Cong repression clearly indicated. The authors were clearly sympathetic to the plight of the "victimized" NLF. Thus the massacre of thousands of civilians by the Viet Cong occupiers of Hue in 1968 was described as a manifestation of "the merciless tradition of the war."⁵⁵ Furthermore, the writers of Amnesty's report had no qualms about using as evidence of repression in South Vietnam the reports of unqualifiedly partisan supporters of Hanoi, people like Alexander Casella, Michael Morrow of the New Left Dispatch News Service, Michael Klare, Don Luce of the American Friends Service Committee (now a vigorous denier of Hanoi's repressiveness), and Fred Branfman, who at the time was the brother-in-law of the aforementioned assassin Nguyen Huu Thai.⁵⁶ Amnesty's analysts also accepted uncritically the testimony of procommunist Vietnamese in Paris, describing them misleadingly as "the Vietnamese Community in Paris." Furthermore, Amnesty continually quoted as evidence "reliable sources in Saigon." At the end of the war at least one, if not all, of these "reliable

sources" turned out to be the ubiquitous Father Chan Tin, an undercover member of the NLF.⁵⁷

If Amnesty's report was virtually worthless, then what was the actual situation regarding political prisoners in South Vietnam?

First, on the question of numbers, a study carried out by the United States Embassy in Saigon claimed that the total number of prisoners *of all types* in South Vietnam was 35,000.⁵⁸ The approximate accuracy of this figure is shown by looking at the breakdown of figures for Chi Hoa prison, where we have independent evidence available. The embassy study claimed that there were 7,911 prisoners in Chi Hoa, a figure slightly higher than the figure of 7,500 attested to by anti-Thieu deputy Ho Ngoc Nhuan. Further confirmation of the credibility of the American study is provided by the pro-NLF journalist Terzani, who claimed that in 1975, at the time of the communist victory, the 7,000 prisoners in Chi Hoa were freed.⁵⁹ Since Chi Hoa held more than 20 percent of the total prison population, it seems reasonable to assume that there were approximately 35,000 prisoners *of all types* in South Vietnam. Unless one makes the strange assumption that South Vietnam had no common criminals in its prisons, one would have to make allowance for these as an important percentage of the 35,000. Nhuan's own analysis of Chi Hoa claimed that half the inmates in that institution were criminals. It is hard to tell how typical Chi Hoa was of prisons in the rest of the country, but as one of the two main prisons in Saigon it constitutes a good sample. If it was typical, then one would have to conclude that the probable maximum number of NLF *and* non-NLF who were not common criminals was approximately 17,500.

Second, it is likely that a percentage of those detained as communists or supporters of the NLF were not in fact such. This was for two reasons: (1) faulty information provided to officials under the Phoenix program by civilians who were envious or hostile toward their neighbors and (2) abuse of power by local officials, who often arrested local critics on false charges of assisting the NLF.⁶⁰ Thus many of the prisoners held as supporters of the NLF may well have been innocent. The only estimate I have been able to uncover by someone in a position to know is the estimate of Doan Van Toai, previously cited, which puts the NLF to non-NLF ratio at nine to one.⁶¹ This ratio would mean that there were less than 2,000 prisoners who were neither criminals nor supporters of the armed revolution. Certainly the number of genuine political prisoners could not have come close to the total of 17,500 who were not common criminals.

One important aspect of human rights abuse by the Thieu regime, as far as prisoners were concerned, was the use of torture. Here the evidence is less tainted and more convincing.⁶² It has been argued that torture was widely used in South Vietnamese prisons. One former inmate has claimed that the South Vietnamese authorities drew a clear distinction between those they had good reason to believe were active supporters of the NLF and those they knew to be non-NLF, independent opponents of the government. Only the former, it was

claimed, were subjected to torture.⁶³ But this does not even seem to be a general rule since the prominent Hanoi activist Mme Ngo Ba Thanh was not mistreated during her time in prison. In any case, there is good reason to believe that torture was used, and undoubtedly in many, if not most, instances it could not be defended even as an exigency of civil war.⁶⁴

Economic and Social Freedom in South Vietnam. South Vietnam's economic system was a relatively liberal but not laissez-faire one. Most of the commercial sector, and the tiny industrial sector, were in private hands. So too was agriculture. Land ownership was not concentrated in the hands of a small number of large landowners, at least not during the latter half of the Thieu government's tenure. Following the promulgation of a land reform law by the administration in 1970, land was peacefully and legally transferred to the majority of peasants. By 1972 being a peasant in the fertile paddy fields of the Mekong Delta was synonymous with self-sufficiency in regard to food, a rising living standard, and a degree of trade with towns and cities.⁶⁵ Before the South Vietnamese political and economic systems collapsed in 1975, it was projected that the country would shortly become a major exporter of rice and other crops.⁶⁶ In stark contrast with the mythologies generated by Hanoi and its supporters in the West, South Vietnam's agricultural system was not permanently devastated by American bombing but capable of growth. Much fertile land remained unexploited. One of the projected tasks of the South Vietnamese government was to try to move peasants from the overcrowded, arid lands of central Vietnam to the delta. Thus, where the government interfered with economic life in the agricultural sector, it was in many instances in order to ameliorate the plight of the poor.

Government interference in the commercial and international trade sectors of the economy was somewhat less benign. The granting of import licences was a principal source of corruption for high government officials.⁶⁷

South Vietnamese society was highly pluralistic, and the Thieu government made no attempt to curb this natural pluralism. Freedom of religion, guaranteed in the constitution, was fully respected in practice. Buddhists, Catholics, Hoa Hao, and Cao Dai all enjoyed full communal and civil rights. Under the Thieu administration there was little, if any, tension between religious groups. Each of the churches was free to train priests and monks and to run its own schools and welfare institutions, including orphanages.⁶⁸ Most of the churches also organized their own youth movements, such as the Buddhist Boy Scouts.⁶⁹

Intellectual and cultural life was totally unrestricted by the state. There were no ideological dogmas of any kind guiding the work of writers, poets, and other creative artists. Traditional Vietnamese forms of culture coexisted with Western forms. The study of history and society was pursued without any serious interference from the state.

Education was free at all levels; schools and universities were sponsored by both church and state. South Vietnam's performance in providing basic edu-

cation for its children was more than a match for its northern neighbor, just in terms of numbers of students,⁷⁰ not to mention the greater liberality of content.

Finally, there was freedom of movement for South Vietnamese. Not only was there freedom to travel abroad, for those beyond draft age, there was also freedom of movement within Vietnam.

HUMAN RIGHTS IN NORTH VIETNAM, 1954-1975

In contrast to the complex and often confused political processes of South Vietnam, the political system of North Vietnam was quite simple. North Vietnam was neither liberal nor authoritarian, but rather totalitarian. Its Communist Party leaders attempted to control not only political life but economic and social life as well.

All organized social activities were integrated into a single institutional framework, controlled by the Party leadership directly or indirectly. The flow of information and ideas was strictly controlled in order to support not only the existing official state ideology of Marxism-Leninism, but also to sustain, in a broader sense, the official "world view" of the Party.

There was nothing historically unique about the North Vietnamese totalitarian system. All of its institutional structure, and most of its more important policies, were derived from the institutions and policies of its northern neighbor, China, and to a lesser extent from the Soviet Union during its Stalinist phase.

The First Manifestation of the Vietnamese Communist Attitude toward Human Rights: The Vietminh, 1945-1954.

All men are created equal. They are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. (Declaration of Independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam)⁷¹

On 2 September 1945 in Hanoi, the former Comintern operative Ho Chi Minh, now in command of one small segment of Vietnamese nationalists, seized upon the power vacuum created by the Japanese surrender to proclaim the creation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Ho inserted into his Declaration of Independence passages from the American Declaration, partly in order to win over American policy makers and their local Office of Strategic Services representatives. But Ho's action was nothing more than a charade. He and his fellow communists shared none of the values of the American republic. In order to forestall a loss of power at the hands of the occupying Chinese Nationalist Army, Ho had accepted some noncommunist nationalists into his new government. But political tolerance based on military necessity sat very uncomfortably with the underlying values of the Vietnamese communists. As politburo member Truong Chinh made clear later:

Because we failed to carry out a thorough suppression of our own reactionaries, the French reactionaries and the international reactionaries have been able to create difficulties for the revolutionary authorities and to divide the ranks of our people. We must ask ourselves: "Why, when it was first established, did the Cochinchinese Executive Committee not imprison immediately the traitorous pro-French clique of Nguyen Van Thinh, the most dangerous and cunning of the pro-French traitors, and those specialists in subversion, the Trotskyists, but allowed them to prepare the way for the return of the French by their provocations before and during Independence Day (September 2, 1945)?" We must ask ourselves, "Why were so many Vietnamese traitors, treacherous pro-Japanese and the lackeys of foreigners, permitted to remain at large once the People's Government had been established in the capital?"⁷²

Truong Chinh's anxieties were doubtlessly eased somewhat by the performance, during 1945-46, of his party's assassination squads. While the pro-Chinese nationalists were given a reprieve, pending the departure of their powerful patrons, other noncommunist Vietnamese nationalists were not so lucky. Party assassination teams secretly liquidated some of the most prominent figures in Vietnamese political life, sometimes, as in the case of Ngo Dinh Diem's brother Ngo Dinh Khoi, after an unsuccessful attempt to recruit the leader into the communist-led Vietminh Front.⁷³ Particular attention was paid to "those specialists in subversion," the Trotskyites, who during the Popular Front era of the 1930s had always gained more votes than Ho's Stalinists in local elections.⁷⁴ Then, once the returning French had negotiated the departure of the Chinese, the Vietnamese communists turned against their other political rivals in northern Vietnam. Having convinced the naive French negotiators that the Vietminh were a moderate force, prepared to discuss union with France, and that the other Vietnamese nationalists were fanatical extremists, Ho Chi Minh managed to secure the military assistance of France for the repression of those "Vietnamese traitors" and "lackeys of foreigners," as Truong Chinh so eloquently described them. Backed by French armored personnel carriers, Interior Minister Vo Nguyen Giap neutralized all the armed nationalist opposition groups, killed or imprisoned most of their leaders, and seized control of their newspaper, *Viet Nam*.⁷⁵ The repression even struck at the National Assembly, whose election had been rigged by the Vietminh.⁷⁶

These events of 1946 reflect the conception of political freedom which the Vietnamese communists have always pursued. During the period 1947-54, after a decision was made to pursue armed struggle in the countryside against French colonial rule, the Vietnamese communists continued their policy of eliminating all independent political leaders. These included the charismatic leader of the Hoa Hao sect, Huynh Phu So, and countless secular nationalists. These acts of repression were carried out in spite of the fact that the victims were allies in the struggle against the French colonialism. Even the rural Catholic communities of North Vietnam, the bishoprics of Phat Diem and Bui Chu, which were vehemently anti-French, were subjected to an unprovoked military attack.⁷⁷ These assaults upon allies in what was supposedly the pri-

mary struggle, against the French colonial power, expended limited military resources. The assaults also drove the survivors, particularly the mass-based Hoa Hao and the rural Catholics, into an alliance with the French. If we assume that nationalist anticolonialism was the *primary* goal of the Vietnamese communists, then their behavior toward their erstwhile allies makes no political or military sense. It is only when we recognize the primacy of unchallenged total power as the ultimate goal of the Vietnamese communists that their actions do make sense.

Political Freedom in North Vietnam, 1954-1975. All political activities in North Vietnam were initiated and controlled by the Communist Party (then known as the Workers Party, Vietnam Lao Dong). North Vietnam possessed no independent political organizations. Apart from the Communist Party there existed only the front organizations known as the Democratic Party and the Socialist Party, artificial creations of the Communist Party,⁷⁸ which served no function other than to harness the activities of fellow travelling intellectuals at home and create the illusion of pluralism for the more gullible of foreign visitors. This attempt at political deception was copied from the pattern applied throughout the "people's democracies" of Eastern Europe after World War II.⁷⁹

The supposed parliament of North Vietnam, the National Assembly, was a bogus institution "elected" on the basis of a Party-controlled slate of candidates. It met infrequently for the purpose of approving the policies already formulated and decided upon by the Party leadership.⁸⁰

All political activities in North Vietnam which involved mass mobilization were carried out by various Party-controlled organizations such as the Women's Union and the labor, youth and peasant associations—all integrated into the Party-controlled Fatherland Front. Almost everybody in North Vietnam belonged to at least one functional association which was part of the Fatherland Front and thus under direct supervision by the Party.⁸¹

The press did not operate to provide news and information or to provide a vehicle for public criticism of the government. The function of the press was to support the Party's goals of "raising the consciousness of the masses" and thereby more effectively realize the Party's policy objectives. The Vietnamese communists were quite explicit about this:

In propagandising, disseminating the Party's policies and lines and guiding, encouraging and organising all cadres and people in carrying out revolutionary tasks, the press issued by the Party, the various mass organisations and branches plays an important role. In the current situation the people and the armed forces are urgently advancing towards completely defeating the US aggressors and successfully building socialism. Therefore we must develop more vigorously the task of the press in mobilising and organising the masses in fulfilling their tasks.⁸²

Economic and Social Freedom in North Vietnam: The "Land Reform" Campaign of 1953-1956. In the process of establishing its domination over North Vietnamese society, the Communist Party of North Vietnam unleashed a reign of terror against the civilian population in the rural areas. This terror, known as the Land Reform campaign, constituted one of the most massive violations of human rights ever recorded in modern Vietnamese history.⁸³ The campaign, like so many other Vietnamese communist programs, was an exact replica of an earlier campaign carried out by Mao Tse-tung in China, and was in fact supervised by Chinese communist cadres. The campaign had three discrete but related elements. First, the population of each village was classified into artificially imposed class categories: "landlord," "rich peasant," "middle peasant," "poor peasant," and "landless laborer." They were applied in each village, regardless of the fact that many villages had no landlords and the gap between the wealthiest and the poorest peasant was extremely small in most of Tonkin. Second, wealth was redistributed from the "richer" classes to the poorer. Third, those arbitrarily designated "landlords" were denounced by poorer members of the community (sometimes relatives of the victims), and these "landlords" and other "class enemies" were punished by execution or isolation. Isolation was a virtual death sentence for those "landlords" not executed outright, and for the families of all such people so labelled. According to Hoang Van Chi:

Nobody was permitted to talk with them or have any contact with them. For more than a year, from the beginning of the first campaign to the end of the second, members of landlords' families were prevented from working. In consequence the majority of them died of starvation, children and old people first, and eventually the others.⁸⁴

The Land Reform campaign was not really motivated by its ostensible objective of providing "land-to-the-tiller," since the reform was abolished shortly after its inception in favor of agricultural collectivization. Collectivization had always been the ultimate goal of the Vietnamese communists, just as it had been for the Soviet and Chinese communists. The "land reform" was merely a pretext for other noneconomic objectives. This reign of terror, which took about 100,000 lives, aimed at eliminating the "natural" local leadership of the Vietnamese villages.⁸⁵ It also demonstrated the unrestrained power of the new order and thus intimidated the population into accepting the will of the Party, especially with regard to the forthcoming unpopular policy of collectivization. It mobilized new supporters among the rural population by encouraging those with personal grudges or other social resentments to participate in the terror.⁸⁶ Finally, the reign of terror integrated some of the potentially recalcitrant members of the rural community into the new order, by forcing many of them to denounce their relatives or friends as "landlords" or "exploiters," and thus tied them to the regime by "bloodguilt."⁸⁷

After the killing was over, the regime publicly admitted that some "excesses" had occurred and that these were a result of the excessive zeal of lower-level cadres who had "mistakenly" classified innocent peasants as "landlords" or other "class enemies." Some Party members at the lower levels were purged, and Truong Chinh, the Party leader identified with the program, was forced to resign from his position as secretary-general of the Party (while keeping his position on the politburo and Central Committee). These confessions of "error" have led many people in the West to believe that the Vietnamese communists didn't really mean to kill innocent people, that lower-level cadres had not followed instructions, and that the whole enterprise was ill-informed and a dreadful mistake.⁸⁸ Yet this interpretation cannot be sustained. Recall that it was Stalin, during the Soviet collectivization and dekulakization terror of the 1930s, who first struck upon the idea of apologizing for the massacres he had organized and encouraged, publicly blaming lower-level cadres for them.⁸⁹ Mao Tse-tung, always alert to the successful methods of other tyrants, used the tactic to deflect popular hatred away from his regime after the Chinese "land reform" terror of 1947-48 and 1950-53. The Vietnamese communists, disciples of both Stalin and Mao, emulated the Chinese not only in the bogus class classification of the countryside, show-trials, and the fomenting of "mass" involvement in the killings but also in the cover-up of their own direct responsibility.

Economic and Social Freedom in North Vietnam: Institutional Structure. Collectivization of agriculture in North Vietnam began in earnest in 1958 and was completed in 1961.⁹⁰ Under this system the peasantry spent their normal workday engaged in production for the Party-administered collective farms. As in the Soviet Union, however, very small plots of land were allowed to remain in private hands to supplement the collective output. Collectivized agriculture had never been part of the communists' policy platforms during the years of the Vietminh resistance; in fact, it ran counter to the agriculture program that had been promised. Collectivization of economic enterprises, therefore, was not carried out voluntarily but coercively. The process, however, did not require the level of violence which occurred during the Soviet collectivization of the 1929-30 period since—as had been the case in Maoist China—the population had already been effectively intimidated by the "land reform" terror.

Collectivized agriculture has been no more successful in North Vietnam than in any other communist country.⁹¹ But the purpose of agricultural collectivization there, as elsewhere, has not been economic efficiency. Instead it has functioned to ensure the Party's control over the means of production, over the distribution of output, and of course over political behavior.

Nationalization of all economic enterprises in the urban sector meant that the state was the only employer of labor, and could thus wield effective

economic sanctions against individuals or groups whom it wished to punish (usually the families of people declared to be "enemies of the people").

Near total control over the urban population of North Vietnam was realized by the creation of "Street and Inhabitant Protection Committees." These Party-controlled committees served propaganda and social control functions. Their officials had to ensure that "everyone turns out for elections, for spontaneous greetings to visiting foreign communist dignitaries, for "Hate America" Week, or for any other collective move the regime deems useful."⁹² The other main instrument of social control was the political police, the Public Security apparatus, which with its networks of secret informers created a climate of suspicion and fear. "The surveillance and denunciation of neighbours, friends and parents were encouraged, children, for whom President Ho Chi Minh has always demonstrated the most tender affection, being widely employed for those distasteful and demoralising tasks."⁹³

Preventing political opposition was not the only reason for the Party's encouragement of denunciations. They also served the purpose of destroying existing primary group loyalties and replacing them with loyalty to the Party-state. In so doing, the Party was attempting to realize the most profound kind of social revolution.

Religion was subjected to repression in North Vietnam. In 1961 all foreign priests and nuns were expelled from the country. By 1962 there were only five Vietnamese bishops and 320 priests left to minister to the 750,000 Catholics of North Vietnam.⁹⁴ By the late 1960s most churches had been forced to close, only a few in Hanoi and Haiphong remaining open as showpieces for foreign visitors. In the countryside religious worship had to be carried out in private homes.⁹⁵ As in other communist countries, the party attempted to establish its political authority over the religious communities by establishing organizations of "Progressive Catholics" and "Progressive Buddhists."⁹⁶ These organizations were also created for foreign consumption, to propagate the myths of religious freedom and of a harmony of interests between churches and the Communist Party state.

Intellectuals, writers, and creative artists were a special target of the Party's attention. A large part of the Vietnamese intelligentsia had supported the Vietminh's war against the French. But the Party did not respond with reciprocal trust. The Communist Party, desperately needing the services of the educated segments of the population in order to operate the basic administrative and technical services of the country, had initially treated their intelligentsia with some liberality.⁹⁷ This did not last. The Hungarian revolution and the simultaneous peasant revolt in Nghe-An province during November 1956 were followed by the reestablishment of strict Party controls over the intelligentsia at the end of that year.⁹⁸ The Party demanded not merely that intellectuals refrain from criticizing it and its policies but that they positively affirm its program and outlook. The Vietnamese communists adopted the Chinese communists' "Four Principles for Reforming Intellectuals." Intellectuals, critics and writers were required to:

1. Change their old philosophy of life and develop a revolutionary philosophy.
2. Adopt the standpoint of the proletariat.
3. Study Marxism-Leninism and the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung.
4. Harden themselves by manual labour.

The most severe crackdown began in January 1958. At the same time that China was undergoing its own severely repressive phase of Party repression of intellectuals North Vietnam was experiencing an identical repression. A "reeducation campaign" along Maoist lines, complete with study sessions and struggle meetings, continued for six months.¹⁰⁰ During this time many famous intellectuals were arrested and imprisoned. Some were brought to trial before people's courts in early 1960 and sentenced to prison or "reeducation camps." Others, such as the elderly writer Phan Khoi, died before coming to trial. Courses on "study through manual labour" were the prizes awarded to those writers considered most subversive. The same "reeducation" course was given to all 3,175 secondary teachers in North Vietnam beginning in June 1958.¹⁰¹ Thus, by 1960 the Vietnamese communists had ensured the servility of the majority of that stratum whom Stalin had described as the "engineers of human souls."

The humbling of the intellectuals, along with strict Party supervision over the content of the education system and the mass media, was still no guarantee that young minds would not stray from the path of correct thinking. Even as late as 1971 Hanoi newspapers expressed concern about the dangerous effects of unsupervised reading:

Keeping up on the situation, we see that there are a number of students who read fairly disorderly books. Some of them pass back and forth among themselves old books published during the period when the French temporarily occupied Hanoi, such as spy and adventure stories and romantic novels. Where do these books come from? Some families, because they do not see the damage being done, keep this type of book to read and permit their children to read them and lend them to friends. Also, the youths go into odds-and-ends shops and buy bad books.

And, there are instances of the youths reading good books but the books were not written for youths. They are foreign books that have been translated for adults. Some fifth grade students have completely read *Anna Karenina*, *Resurrection* and so on that their parents left on the table. This reading is harmful to the children: they lose lots of study time... and they do not comprehend the meaning of the work—they misunderstand it and begin deviate and complex thinking.¹⁰²

The final aspect of Party-state control over society, and perhaps the most important, concerns control over freedom of movement. The North Vietnamese regime effectively prevented the population from leaving the country. Even during the 300-day period of 1955 set aside by the Geneva Agreements of 1954 for free movement between communist and noncommunist zones of Vietnam, there was no freedom of movement out of communist-controlled

areas. Although it is frequently pointed out that in 1955 nearly a million Vietnamese fled from the north to the south, while only 60,000 went from south to north, this north-to-south migration figure understates the unpopularity of the Vietnamese communists. The only people who were able to leave the north in 1955 were those in zones not yet occupied by the communists. In the Vietminh areas, bureaucratic obstruction and outright intimidation prevented peasants from exercising the basic right decreed by the Geneva Agreements.¹⁰³ If this occurred under circumstances of supposed international monitoring of freedom of movement (in the form of the International Committee of Control and Supervision), then it is not hard to see how the North Vietnamese could ensure total control over the population after the ICCS had departed.

All internal movement within North Vietnam was strictly controlled by the regime. Movement from one district to another could only be carried out with the permission of the Public Security officials, after a satisfactory explanation of the purpose of one's journey had been given to them.¹⁰⁴ All contact with foreigners was forbidden, unless previously organized under the supervision of the government.¹⁰⁵

HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM SINCE 1975

The collapse of the Republic of Vietnam on 30 April 1975 was a disaster for the South Vietnamese people. War and government corruption did not disappear. They were now supplemented by a deterioration in the standard of living of all citizens. More important, a massive decline in the most basic human rights set in.

In spite of promises made in the Paris Peace Agreements, solemnly signed in January 1973, and promises contained in programs of the National Liberation Front for over fifteen years, the new regime immediately began a campaign of repression. It introduced executions, internment of hundreds of thousands in forced labor camps and prisons, deportation of probably more than one million people to exile in barren "New Economic Zones," and the expulsion of half a million ethnic Chinese by land and sea. The purpose of this repression seems to have been two-fold: (1) revenge against the defeated government and its armed forces, and (2) creation of a totalitarian state modelled on that already existing in the North.

The structure of the system Hanoi is trying to create in the South has been analyzed earlier in this paper. I wish here only to summarize very briefly some of the mechanisms of repression in South Vietnam. While space does not allow a fuller documentation, at least the enormity of the scale of repression can be suggested.

Mass Executions in Vietnam. During the years of the Vietnam war U.S. administration officials frequently referred to the likelihood of large-scale executions in Vietnam should the communists win the war. The scenario of a

"bloodbath," based upon communist behavior after their coming to power in North Vietnam in the 1950s, as well as during the occupation of Hue in 1968 and Binh Dinh in 1972, was reiterated during the final stages of the war, most notably by President Ford and Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger.

On examining the record of the communists since April 1975, it is clear that these predictions have not been confirmed, at least not on the scale predicted. All the same, there has been a substantial number of executions carried out by the victors. Information provided by defectors and refugees indicates that the communists pursued a policy of reprisal, killing on a large scale in the provinces of central Vietnam during April 1975. In the southern provinces of Vietnam, captured at the end of the month, a carefully selected policy of public executions was pursued, mainly in the rural areas.¹⁰⁶ What seems clear, however, is that most of those previously considered likely victims of execution have instead been sent to the so-called reeducation camps.

Hanoi's War Reprisals: The "Reeducation Camp" System. The "reeducation camp" system is the best-known but least understood part of Hanoi's apparatus of repression. It is a complex network of detention centers which vary in condition according to the category of the inmates. The camps, on the whole, are forced labor camps, employing political indoctrination to different degrees. All of the inmates are people who had certain positions or affiliations with the former Republic of Vietnam. It seems that independent political, religious, and intellectual figures are not detained in the camps but instead are assigned to the prison system.

These "reeducation camps" are modelled on a similar institution developed in Maoist China.¹⁰⁷ The inmates include not only military, police, and intelligence officers, former government officials, and cadres of noncommunist political parties but also common criminals, ordinary citizens apprehended during attempts to flee the country, and, it appears, the entire membership of the elite ARVN units (the marines, the Rangers, paratroopers, and Green Berets), participants in the Phoenix program, and village chiefs. That the camps contain more than a few senior officers was actually admitted by a leading spokesperson for the new regime.¹⁰⁸

Members of the reeducation camp system have never been charged with any crime. In fact the whole process of arrest and detention in these reeducation camps lacks any legal basis.¹⁰⁹ For the majority of people sent to reeducation camps, the term of incarceration has been indefinite.

Food supplies in the camps are totally inadequate, even for a person undertaking light work. By late 1978 the rice ration had dropped to between 400 and 470 grams per day; meat and fish were only supplied on national holidays. Medical supplies are virtually nonexistent. Thus malnutrition and disease are slowly killing off the inmates.

How many people are still confined in the camps? There can be no definite answer. The best, educated guess is that provided by Nguyen Cong Hoan

who, as a "representative" of the province of Phu Khanh in the rubberstamp Vietnamese National Assembly, was able to visit several of the camps in his province. Extrapolating from his province to South Vietnam as a whole, he estimated that in 1977 there were possibly as many as 340,000 prisoners in the camps, with 200,000 as an absolute minimum estimate.¹¹⁰

Mass Arrests and the Prison System. Hanoi's campaign to suppress all existing noncommunist organizations is not a mere bureaucratic reorganization of the country. It has entailed the arrest of tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands of political figures, priests, monks, artists, writers, journalists, and lawyers. In fact, a sizeable chunk of what might be called the intelligentsia of southern Vietnam has been arrested and incarcerated in Vietnam's prison system. Their attitude and behavior toward the former regime is irrelevant to the new authorities. Thus, people politically supportive of the former regime, who were not members of the army or civil service, find themselves herded together with Thieu's most vehement critics. For example, Father Tran Huu Thanh, president of the People's Anti-Corruption Movement, a man who organized street demonstrations against Thieu in 1974-75, is one well-known political prisoner. Many other human rights activists, such as Pham Ba Cam and Thai Lang Nghiem are also in prison.

Not only conservative, liberal, and social democratic critics of Thieu are in prison. Many members of the communist-led National Liberation Front, and even the North Vietnamese army are also incarcerated. According to refugees, their reversal of fortunes occurred because these idealistic revolutionaries dared to express concern about unfulfilled promises of liberty and equality. Former "Third Force" student activist Doan Van Toai escaped from Vietnam with two partial lists of such people.¹¹¹

Conditions in the communist prisons are far worse than under Thieu, simply on the score of overcrowding. It is believed by many, including those who have been imprisoned under both Thieu and the communists, that there are several times more people in each prison now than there were before.¹¹²

Torture is widespread in the prisons. For example, Nguyen Van Coi, a leader of the Hoa Hao sect, had high-voltage light shined into his eyes, was hung upside down, and had fish sauce poured into his nose. Then he was beaten by his guards into a state of unconsciousness.¹¹³ Similar experiences of torture were reported by certain An Quang Buddhist monks arrested by the communists.¹¹⁴ The demand for a confession of "employment by the CIA"¹¹⁵ is the most common reason for torture in the Vietnamese prisons.

As in the case of the reeducation camps' prisoners, no legal procedure is followed, and virtually none of the hundreds of thousands of people who have been arrested have been charged with anything, let alone put on trial. As Doan Van Toai has put it, "Vietnam today is a country without any law other than the arbitrary directives of those in power."¹¹⁶

*Deportation to the New Economic Zones.*¹¹⁷ A fourth aspect of Hanoi's coercive restructuring of Vietnamese economic and social life is the creation of the so-called New Economic Zones (NEZ). Movement to the NEZs is not to be confused with the program of "return to the villages," whereby more than half a million people, displaced by the war, have moved out of the cities back to the native villages.

The NEZs are previously uninhabited areas of the countryside, usually barren, to which certain categories of the population considered potentially disloyal are sent. These categories include relatives of "reeducation camp" inmates, dispossessed urban capitalists, ethnic Chinese, ex-NCOs from the former army of the Republic of Vietnam, families with a member who served in the army or administration of the French colonialists before 1954, and the unemployed. The program is partly economic, as it utilizes the unemployed and the underemployed. It is partly a means of social transformation, as it destroys the former social order through a process of deurbanization. As the former U.S. State Department's specialist Douglas Pike points out, "Relocation always is by family (or individual) never by extended familial group or clusters of families from the same neighborhood."¹¹⁸ The NEZ program also has a strong penal aspect. Although many people volunteered at first, news of the conditions in the NEZs filtered back to the cities and eventually few people wanted to go. Movement to the NEZs is now usually coerced.

Once a person has been assigned to a NEZ, his residence there is regarded by the regime as permanent. The only way to avoid the rigors of life there is by bribing camp leaders into providing official travel papers or by escaping secretly with the hope of finding a hiding place in Saigon.¹¹⁹

It is not known exactly how many people have been deported to the New Economic Zones. Bribery of government officials has provided an escape for many from the original deportation orders. But the number of people in the social groups targeted for deportation by the current regime runs into several million.

*The Forced Expulsion of Vietnam's Ethnic Chinese.*¹²⁰ The expulsion of those segments of the population it regards as socially undesirable has been the final element in Hanoi's program to transform the country. In the spring of 1978 Vietnam came to regard its 1.5 million ethnic Chinese as a potential fifth column. Increasing conflict with China prompted the government of Vietnam to begin the process of systematically expelling tens of thousands of its citizens. In all cases the refugees were first given the choice of moving to the New Economic Zones. Most chose the latter as the lesser evil. The ethnic Chinese living in the northern half of the country were often expelled by land. But for the nearly 1.2 million ethnic Chinese living in the south the process was different. After the spring of 1978 hundreds of thousands were systematically pressured into leaving, subjected to organized extortion, stripped of all

but a few belongings, and put to sea. It is estimated that up to 50 percent of those setting out from Vietnam did not survive the voyage.

Western supporters of the Hanoi regime have claimed that the government of Vietnam was merely exporting its urban bourgeoisie, who happen to be predominantly Chinese. That claim is disproven by the fact that 230,000 ethnic Chinese citizens of the fully socialist northern half of the country were deported en masse.

CONCLUSIONS

The foregoing case studies of human rights in Vietnam lead me to the following factual conclusions:

1. The government of South Vietnam under Nguyen Van Thieu violated human rights. In particular, it held in prison some people who had committed no crime and who were not actively assisting attempts to overthrow the state by force. The number of such people is not certain, but is only a fraction of the number suggested by Western publicists during the war. Functionaries of the government of South Vietnam also engaged in the torture of prisoners. President Thieu personally manipulated the institutions of power in such a way as to ensure his domination of policy making and his indefinite tenure in office. At the same time substantial political freedoms were preserved. There was a qualified freedom of the press, freedom to demonstrate publicly against the government, and freedom to form political organizations. Furthermore, there was no violation of human rights in the realm of economic and social freedom.

2. The Communist Party-controlled government of North Vietnam, which after 1975 became the government of all of Vietnam, violated human rights on a massive scale. First in the north and later in the south, its acquisition of power meant the suppression of all organizations it did not control and the suppression from public circulation of all information and ideas which conflicted with its officially promulgated, all-embracing "world view." In developing this totalitarian structure of state domination over society, the government engaged in mass executions, which were especially numerous after the seizure of North Vietnam. After its victories in 1954 and again in 1975, the Vietnamese communist government interned hundreds of thousands of people in what are euphemistically referred to as "reeducation camps." In 1975 it began deporting hundreds of thousands, if not more, to remote regions of exile known as New Economic Zones. In 1978 and 1979 the authorities in Hanoi began the systematic expulsion of the ethnic Chinese minority from Vietnam; hundreds of thousands were deported, the majority in unseaworthy boats, before an international outcry brought the process to a halt.

3. The violation of human rights by the Communist Party of Vietnam, in both the north and the south, was incomparably worse than the violation of

human rights by the former Thieu government in South Vietnam. The difference was not one of degree but one of quality.

4. Evidence of the fundamental distinction between the human rights policy of the communists, and that of their rival, was available during the period of American involvement in Vietnam. Thus, the consequences of a North Vietnamese victory over South Vietnam should have come as no surprise to intelligent, informed Americans.

What are the moral and political implications of these factual conclusions for American foreign policy? The answer one gives depends upon what one considers to be the proper relationship between a concern for human rights and the goals of American foreign policy. My own view is that a concern for human rights should be integrated into the overall objectives of American foreign policy. But a concern for human rights cannot be reduced to a simple, mechanical adherence to abstract, moral rules. This is not only because human rights imperatives sometimes clash with national security imperatives but because moral action in any social situation must be concerned with consequences and the judgments which guide it must be made contextually. Context involves moral alternatives and likely moral outcomes in a concrete historical situation. Thus a foreign policy oriented toward the enhancement of human rights must take into account, and seek to avoid, the possible emergence of political regimes more evil than those which already exist in a particular country.

The contextual, consequence-oriented nature of our moral judgments applies not only to our choice of ends but also to our choice of means. Here a concern for human rights operates in a different way. Sometimes a morally preferable regime's immoral acts (i.e., violations of human rights) diminish the likelihood of a morally worse regime coming to power; sometimes such acts enhance the likelihood of a morally worse regime; sometimes such acts are irrelevant to the emergence of a morally worse regime. A foreign policy concerned with human rights ought to give countenance to those immoral acts which diminish the likelihood of a more evil regime coming to power (assuming some rough degree of moral proportionality) while seeking to eradicate those immoral acts which enhance or are irrelevant to the emergence of a more evil regime.

Thus, in the light of these general moral assumptions, and with reference to the previous factual conclusions about human rights violations in Vietnam, the following retrospective moral judgments about an appropriate American foreign policy oriented toward human rights are warranted:

1. Those concerned with the defense of human rights should have attempted to prevent at least those human rights abuses not necessary for the preservation of the government of South Vietnam.
2. Those concerned with the defense of human rights should have consid-

ered the defense of South Vietnam against North Vietnam a vital part of their concern.

Furthermore, this study has broader implications for a future American foreign policy that attempts to take human rights concerns seriously. It suggests:

1. The defense of human rights may require supporting a government that violates human rights.
2. Political choices between greater and lesser evil are not necessarily marginal, difficult choices but may be clear choices resting upon significant, qualitative moral distinctions.

NOTES

1. See the arguments presented in the *New Republic*, 3 May 1975, especially those of Hans Morgenthau ("The Elite Protects Itself," pp. 20-21), Stanley Hoffman ("The Sulking Giant," pp. 15-17), and Harold Isaacs ("Our SOBs," pp. 4-5).
2. Ronald Steel, "Lies and Whimpers," *New Republic*, 3 May 1975, p. 21.
3. A strong strain of this moral absolutism ran through the American antiwar movement; its exponents ranged from genuine pacifists such as Joan Baez to nonpacifists such as Staughton Lynd and Anthony Lewis.
4. Bernard Fall, *The Two Vietnam*, rev. ed. (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 398.
5. The expounders of this distinction include, among others, Mussolini's education minister, Giovanni Gentile, and more recently, Alfred Cobban, Hannah Arendt, and Milovan Djilas. For a summary of the different ways in which totalitarianism has been defined see Benjamin R. Barber, "Conceptual Foundations of Totalitarianism," in Carl J. Friedrich, Michael Curtis, and Benjamin R. Barber, *Totalitarianism in Perspective: Three Views* (New York: Praeger, 1969), pp. 3-52. Unfortunately, Barber's arguments against using the concept are less than lucid.
6. For one example of this line of thinking see Michael Curtis, "Retreat from Totalitarianism," in *Totalitarianism in Perspective*, ed. Friedrich, Curtis, and Barber.
7. See Stephen J. Morris, "The Concept of Totalitarianism: A Reevaluation" (M.A. thesis, University of Sydney, 1978).
8. Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1966), p. 345; also Fall, *Two Vietnams*, p. 443.
9. For example, New York Congresswoman Bella Abzug stated at a U.S. House of Representatives subcommittee hearing, "President Thieu...has suppressed freedom of speech, freedom of elections, and freedom of the press." ("The Treatment of Political Prisoners in South Vietnam by the Government of the Republic of South Vietnam." Hearing before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee of Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-Third Congress, First Session, 13 September 1973, p. 4.)
10. Theresa Tull, "Broadening the Base: South Vietnamese Elections, 1967-71," in *Electoral Politics in South Vietnam*, ed. John C. Donnell and Charles A. Joiner (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1974), p. 35.
11. Charles A. Joiner, "Elections and Building Political Institutions in South Vietnam: An Assessment," in *Electoral Politics*, ed. Donnell and Joiner, pp. 2-4.
12. See Tull, "Broadening the Base," pp. 42-44.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 51.

14. Ta Van Tai and Jerry Mark Silverman, "Elections and Political Party Constraints Following the 1972 Offensive," in *Electoral Politics*, ed. Donnell and Joiner, p. 131.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 125.
16. *Ibid.*, pp. 127-31.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 130-31.
18. *Chinh Luan* (Saigon), 2 February 1975. Quoted in the *Saigon Post*, 4 February 1975, p. 2.
19. Constitution of the Republic of Vietnam, Article 13 (Saigon, 1967).
20. Doan Van Toai, former vice president of the General Association of Saigon Students, April 1981: personal interview, Boston, Mass.
21. *Ibid.*
22. *Ibid.*
23. *Ibid.*
24. Howard R. Penniman, *Elections in South Vietnam* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1972), pp. 156-57.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 157.
26. *Ibid.*
27. *Ibid.*, p. 158.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 159.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 160.
30. *Ibid.*
31. Both editorials are reprinted in the *Saigon Press Review*, translated and published weekly in Saigon during the Vietnam war by the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office, 145 Nguyen Hue, Saigon.
32. The names of the principal figures in this undercover operation are given in Tiziano Terzani, *Giai Phong: The Fall and Liberation of Saigon* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976), pp. 257-58. In this work Chan Tin also gives a brief explanation of his ability to reconcile his Catholic faith with a communist faith. Chan Tin was very effectively used by the American antiwar movement as an "independent source" on the political prisoner issue. See, for example, the testimony of Congresswoman Bella Abzug, note 9.
33. Amnesty International, *Political Prisoners in South Vietnam* (London: 1973).
34. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
35. *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.
36. *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.
37. Abzug, "Treatment of Political Prisoners in South Vietnam" (testimony), p. 4.
38. Amnesty International, *Political Prisoners*, p. 6.
39. Toai, April 1980: personal interview.
40. Amnesty International, *Political Prisoners*, inside front cover.
41. *Ibid.*, pp. 33-36.
42. Nguyen Long's position is now quite clear. He has been appointed a member of the communist National Assembly and periodically participates in officially organized propaganda statements denying the existence of repression in Vietnam. See, for example, the open letter addressed to "western friends," cited by the Vietnam News Agency, 3 July 1979 (*Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, Daily Report Asia and Pacific, 10 July 1979, K8).
43. Amnesty International, *Political Prisoners*, p. 33.

44. Toai, April 1981: personal interview.
45. Mam is now president of the Party-controlled Vietnamese Youth Union and regularly travels abroad to represent "Vietnamese youth." Mam wrote a ludicrous attack on Toai in *Doan Ket* (1 October 1978), a propaganda outlet for the current regime, published by the Union of Vietnamese in France.
46. This belief was expressed to me by several people I met during a visit to Saigon in February 1972. Among them was Nguyen Ngoc Linh, who had been a top aide to Nguyen Cao Ky during his period as premier. At the time of my meeting with Linh, he had retired from politics and had no ties with Thieu, who had maneuvered Ky out of power.
47. Amnesty International, *Political Prisoners*, p. 36.
48. Madame Thanh signed the open letter cited in note 42. *See also* her statement quoted below, note 108.
49. Toai, April 1981: personal interview.
50. Amnesty International, *Political Prisoners*, p. 34.
51. Terzani, *Giai Phong*, p. 164.
52. Amnesty International, *Political Prisoners*, p. 34.
53. Terzani, *Giai Phong*, p. 165.
54. *Ibid.*
55. Amnesty International, *Political Prisoners*, p. 31.
56. I am indebted to Hue-Tam Tai, Assistant Professor of History at Harvard University, for this piece of information.
57. Terzani, *Giai Phong*, pp. 145-46.
58. Quoted in Guenter Lewy, *America in Vietnam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 295.
59. Terzani, *Giai Phong*, p. 97.
60. Lewy, *America in Vietnam*, p. 295; also Hue-Tam Tai (note 56) and Doan Van Toai (note 20).
61. Toai, April 1981: personal interview.
62. Even Amnesty's sources seem credible here. But *see* Lewy, *America in Vietnam*, pp. 287-88. For credible independent evidence of torture in South Vietnamese prisons, *see* "Document. Comment Hanoi nous a trahis. Une interview de Truong Nhu Tang, ancien ministre du G.r.p." *L'Express*, 7 August 1980, p. 162.
63. Toai, April 1980: personal interview.
64. Though in some cases it can be argued that torture may be justified. For example the urban terrorist ring of which Nguyen Huu Thai was a part was broken up as a result of the torture of one of its members (*see* Terzani, *Giai Phong*, p. 165). This is a difficult moral issue, which would require extended discussion beyond the scope of this paper. For an examination of some of the issues involved *see* Marshall Cohen, Thomas Nagel, and Thomas Scanlon, eds., *War and Moral Responsibility* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974), part 1.
65. On the land reform program *see* Roy L. Prosterman, "Land-to-the-Tiller in South Vietnam: The Tables Turn," *Asian Survey* 10, no. 8 (August 1970): 751-64. On the prosperity of the peasantry *see* Sir Robert Thompson, *Peace Is Not At Hand* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1974).
66. Nicholas Philip, "The Mekong: A Resource for South Vietnam," *Asian Survey* 11, no. 4 (April 1971): 373.
67. Stephen Morris, "The Social Basis of Politics in Vietnam: The Government of Nguyen Van Thieu," *Australian Outlook* 27, no. 2 (August 1973): 148.
68. Based upon my personal observations in South Vietnam in 1970 and 1972, and conversa-

tions with various political figures opposed to the Thieu Administration, including An Quang Buddhist senator Tran Quang Thuan, in Saigon, February 1972.

69. Bernard Fall, *Two Vietnams*, p. 315.

70. *Ibid.*, p. 313.

71. Quoted in Michael Charlton and Anthony Moncrieff, *Many Reasons Why: The American Involvement in Vietnam* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1978), p. 1.

72. Truong Chinh, *The Vietnamese August Revolution*, quoted in Nhu Phong, "Intellectuals, Writers and Artists," in *North Vietnam Today: Profile of a Communist Satellite*, ed. P.J. Honey (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 71-72.

73. Fall, *Two Vietnams*, p. 101.

74. See I. Milton Sacks, "Marxism in Vietnam," in *Marxism in Southeast Asia*, ed. Frank N. Trager (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1960).

75. Fall, *Two Vietnams*, p. 130. On the assistance provided by the French see Joseph Buttinger, *Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled* (New York: Praeger, 1967) Vol. I, pp. 402-3.

76. Fall, *Two Vietnams*, p. 131.

77. For a more detailed account of the attacks on the sects and the rural Catholics see Bernard Fall's important *Le Viet-Minh: La Republique Democratique du Vietnam* (Paris: Armand Collin, 1960), especially pp. 164-67.

78. Fall, *Two Vietnams*, p. 101.

79. See Hugh Seton-Watson, *The East European Revolution* (New York: Praeger, 1960), and Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967).

80. See Fall, *Two Vietnams*, p. 101.

81. See Robert Turner, *Vietnamese Communism: Its Origins and Development* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institute Press, 1975), pp. 128-29.

82. *Hanoi Quan Doi Nhan Dan*, 5 March 1972, from *Principal Reports from Communist Radio and Press Sources*, published by the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office, 145 Nguyen Hue, Saigon.

83. The most extensive and reliable account of the "Land Reform" is contained in Hoang Van Chi, *From Colonialism to Communism* (New York: Popular Library, 1964). Useful supporting evidence is provided by Robert Turner, *Vietnamese Communism*, pp. 130-46.

84. Chi, *From Colonialism to Communism*, p. 196.

85. This estimate is a conservative one which combines deaths through execution and through the policy of isolation. See Turner, *Vietnamese Communism*, p. 142, for the best discussion of this matter.

86. See Chi, *From Colonialism to Communism*, chaps. 13-16 passim.

87. The "bloodguilt" explanation has implications beyond the specific context of Vietnam; the actions it helps to explain were copied from the techniques of the Soviets and Chinese. To my knowledge the "bloodguilt" explanation is the original contribution of Hoang Van Chi to our understanding of totalitarianism.

88. Donald Lancaster, *The Emancipation of French Indochina* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 378; Fall, *Two Vietnams*, p. 156.

89. Joseph Stalin, "Dizzy with Success" and "Reply to Collective Farm Comrades," reprinted in J.V. Stalin, *Problems of Leninism* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1950).

90. Turner, *Vietnamese Communism*, p. 189.

91. *Ibid.*, p. 190.

92. Fall, *Two Vietnams*, p. 182.

93. Lancaster, *Emancipation of French Indochina*, p. 364.
94. Fall, *Two Vietnams*, p. 187.
95. Conversation in Saigon, February 1972, with a member of the International Commission of Control and Supervision who had been stationed in Hanoi.
96. Fall, *Two Vietnams*, p. 187.
97. Nhu Phong, "Intellectuals, Writers and Artists," in *North Vietnam Today*, ed. P.J. Honey, pp. 79-82.
98. *Ibid.*, p. 83.
99. *Ibid.*, p. 84.
100. *Ibid.*, pp. 85-87.
101. *Ibid.*, p. 88.
102. *Hanoi Moi*, 2 December 1971, p. 2, from *Principal Reports from Communist Radio and Press Sources*, published by the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office, 145 Nguyen Hue, Saigon.
103. Ellen J. Hammer, *The Struggle for Indochina* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1955), p. 345; Hoang Van Chi, "Why No Peace in Vietnam?" in *Vietnam: Seen From East and West*, ed. Sibnarayan Ray (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 36.
104. Turner, *Vietnamese Communism*, pp. 108-109.
105. For an account of one Western journalist's experience of this ban (even though he had been highly critical of American policy in Vietnam and had been invited to North Vietnam) see Peter Arnett, "Hanoi Has Its Ear to the Teleprinter," *The Age* (Melbourne), 6 October 1972, p. 9.
106. "Statement of Nguyen Cong Hoan, Former Member of the National Assembly, Representing Phu Khanh Province," Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Ninety-Fifth Congress, First Session, 26 July 1977, p. 149; also confirmed by Nguyen Dong Da in *Nguoi Viet Tu Do* 51 (July 1979): 14, 51.
107. For a description of conditions in Maoist camps see Bao Ruo-Wang (Jean Pasqualini) and Rudolph Chelminski, *Prisoner of Mao* (London: New York, 1975).
108. *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, Asia and Pacific, 25 March 1977, K2.
109. Stephen B. Young, "The Legality of Vietnamese Reeducation Camps," *Harvard International Law Journal* 20, no. 3 (Fall 1979).
110. Theodore Jacqueney, "Human Rights in Vietnam," *Free Trade Union News* 32, no. 9 (September 1977): 2.
111. Doan Van Toai, *Le Goulag Vietnamien* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1979), pp. 331-41.
112. Doan Van Toai, *Le Goulag Vietnamien*, p. 187; also "Statement of Nguyen Van Coi, Former Provincial Representative of Quang Due Province, Vietnam," Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, Ninety-Fifth Congress, First Session, 21 June 1977, p. 72.
113. Nguyen Van Coi (note 112), p. 80.
114. See James H. Forest, *The Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam: Fifteen Years for Reconciliation* (Alkmaar, The Netherlands: International Fellowship of Reconciliation, 1978).
115. Nguyen Van Coi (note 112), pp. 74, 80; Forest, *The Unified Buddhist Church*, p. 16; "The Phenomenon of Disappearances in Vietnam," Statement by Nguyen Huu Hieu, Human Rights and the Phenomenon of Disappearances, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee of Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-Sixth Congress, First Session, 20, 25 September, 18 October 1979, Appendix 12, p. 490.
116. Doan Van Toai, "A Lament for Vietnam," *The New York Times Magazine*, 29 March 1981, p. 68.
117. Unless otherwise indicated, the information in the following paragraphs is based on interviews with two former inmates of the New Economic Zones.

118. Douglas Pike, mimeographed (Washington, D.C., 1976).

119. *See* note 117.

120. This section is based on an unpublished report of the United States Department of State, Office of Human Rights (1979), and interviews with six ethnic Chinese Vietnamese refugees (New York, December 1979); also *The Boat People: An "Age" Investigation*, with Bruce Grant (London: Penguin Books, 1979), especially chapter 5; and Barry Wain, *The Refused: The Agony of the Indochinese Refugees* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982).

PART V

Country Summaries

Introduction

The following country descriptions summarize the evidence that lies behind our ratings for each country. They first bring together for each country most of the tabular material of Part I. Then, political rights are considered in terms of the extent to which a country is ruled by a government elected by the majority at the national level, the division of power among levels of government, and the possible denial of self-determination to major subnationalities, if any. While decentralization and the denial of group rights are deemphasized in our rating system, these questions should not be ignored. The summaries also contain consideration of civil liberties, especially as these include freedom of the media and other forms of political expression, freedom from political imprisonment, torture, and other forms of government reprisal, and freedom from interference in nonpublic group or personal life. Equality of access to politically relevant expression is also considered. Economic conditions and organization are also considered in their relation to freedom. In some cases the summaries will touch on the relative degree of freedom from oppression outside of the government arena, for example, through slavery, labor bosses, capitalist exploitation, or private terrorism; this area of analysis is little developed at present.

At the beginning of each summary statement the country is characterized by the forms of its economy and polity. The meanings of the terms used in this classification may be found in Part I, "The Relation of Political-Economic Systems to Freedom," and its accompanying Table 7. The classification is highly simplified, but it serves our concern with the developmental forms and biases that affect political controls. As in Table 7 the terms *inclusive* and *noninclusive* are used to distinguish between societies in which the economic activities of most people are organized in accordance with the dominant system and those dual societies in which they remain largely outside. The system should be assumed to be inclusive unless otherwise indicated.

Each state is categorized according to the political positions of the national or ethnic groups it contains. Since the modern political form is the "nation-state," it is not surprising that many states have a *relatively homogeneous population*. The overwhelming majority in these states belong to roughly the same ethnic group; people from this group naturally form the dominant group in the state. In relatively homogeneous states there is no large subnationality (this is, with more than one million people or twenty percent of the population) residing in a defined territory within the country: Austria, Costa Rica, Somalia, and West Germany are good examples. States in this category may be ethnically diverse (for example, Cuba or Colombia), but there are no sharp ethnic lines between major groups. These states should be distinguished from *ethnically complex states*, such as Guyana or Singapore, that have several ethnic groups, but no major group that has its historic homeland in a particular part of the country. Complex states may have large minorities that have suffered social, political, or economic discrimination in the recent past, but today governments in such states treat all peoples as equals as a matter of policy. In this regard complex states are distinguishable from *ethnic states with major nonterritorial subnationalities*, for the governments of such states have a deliberate policy of giving preference to the dominant ethnic group at the expense of other major groups. Examples are Burundi or China (Taiwan).

Another large category of states is labeled *ethnic states with (a) major territorial subnationalities(y)*. As in the homogeneous states there is a definite ruling people (or *Staatsvolk*) residing on its historic national territory within the state. But the state also incorporates other territories with other historic peoples that are now either without a state, or the state dominated by their people lies beyond the new border. As explained in *Freedom in the World 1978* (pp. 180-218), to be considered a subnationality a territorial minority must have enough cohesion and publicity that their right to nationhood is acknowledged in some quarters. Events have forged a quasi-unity among groups only recently quite distinct—as among the peoples of Southern Sudan. Typical countries in this category are Burma and the USSR. *Ethnic states with major potential territorial subnationalities* fall into a closely related category. In such states—for example, Ecuador or Bolivia—many individuals in the ethnic group have merged, with little overt hostility, with the dominant ethnic strain. The assimilation process has gone on for centuries. Yet in these countries the new consciousness that accompanies the diffusion of nationalistic ideas through education may reverse the process of assimilation in the future, especially where the potential subnationality has preserved a more or less definable territorial base.

There are a few truly *multinational states* in which ethnic groups with territorial bases coexist in one state without a clearly definable ruling people or *Staatsvolk*. In such states the several "nations" each have autonomous political rights, although these do not in law generally include the right to secession. India and Nigeria are examples. One *trinational* and a few *bina-*

tional states complete the categories of those states in which several nations coexist.

The distinction between truly multinational states and ethnic states with territorial subnationalities may be made by comparing two major states that lie close to the margin between the categories—the ethnic Russian USSR and multinational India. In the USSR, Russian is in every way the dominant language. By contrast, in India Hindi speakers have not achieved dominance. English remains a unifying lingua franca, the languages of the several states have not been forced to change their script to accord with Hindi forms, and Hindi itself is not the distinctive language of a "ruling people"—it is a nationalized version of the popular language of a portion of the population of northern India. (The pre-British ruling class used a closely related language with Arabic, Persian, and Turkish infusions; it was generally written in Persian-Arabic script.) Unlike Russians in the non-Russian Soviet Republics, Hindi speakers from northern India do not have a special standing in their own eyes or those of other Indians. Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras are non-Hindi speaking cities, and their pride in their identities and cultures is an important aspect of Indian culture. By contrast, many Soviet Republics are dominated by Russian speakers, a situation developing even in Kiev, the largest non-Russian city.

Finally, *transethnic heterogeneous states*, primarily in Africa, are those in which independence found a large number of ethnically distinct peoples grouped more or less artificially within one political framework. The usual solution was for those taking over the reins of government to adopt the colonial approach of formally treating all local peoples as equal, but with the new objective of integrating all equally into a new national framework (and new national identity) as and when this would be possible. Rulers of states such as Senegal or Zaire often come from relatively small tribes, and it is in their interest to deemphasize tribalism. In some cases the tribes are so scattered and localistic that there is no short-term likelihood of secession resulting from tribalism. However, in other cases portions of the country have histories of separate nationhood making the transethnic solution hard to implement. In a few countries recent events have placed certain ethnic groups in opposition to one another or to ruling circles in such a way that the transethnic state remains only the *formal* principle of rule, replaced in practice by an ethnic hierarchy, as in Congo or Sierra Leone.

The descriptive paragraphs for political and civil rights are largely self-explanatory. Subnationalities are generally discussed under a subheading for political rights, although the subject has obvious civil liberties aspects. Discussion of the existence or nonexistence of political parties may be arbitrarily placed in one or the other section. These paragraphs only touch on a few relevant issues, especially in the civil liberties discussion. An issue may be omitted for lack of information, because it does not seem important for the country addressed, or because a particular condition can be inferred from the

general statement of a pattern. It should be noted that we have tried to incorporate the distinction between a broad definition of political prisoners (including those detained for violent political crimes) and a narrow definition that includes those arrested only for nonviolent actions—often labeled "prisoners of conscience." At the end of each country summary we have included an overall comparative statement that places the country's ratings in relation to those of others. Countries chosen for comparison are often neighboring or similar ones, but juxtaposing very different countries is also necessary for tying together the system.

The following summaries take little account of the oppressions that occur within the social units of a society, such as family and religious groups, or that reflect variations in the nonpolitical aspects of culture. In particular, the reader will note few references in the following summaries to the relative freedom of women. This may be a serious gap in the Survey, but with limited resources we felt that it was better to omit this range of issues than to only tangentially include it. We suspect that including the freedom of women would not affect the ratings a great deal. Democracies today have almost universally opened political and civic participation to women on at least a formal basis of equality, while most nondemocratic societies that deny these equal rights to women also deny effective participation to most men. In such societies granting equal rights may have limited meaning. It is little gain for political and most civil rights when women are granted equal participation in a totalitarian society.

A F G H A N I S T A N

Economy: noninclusive socialist **Political Rights:** 7
Polity: communist one-party **Civil Liberties:** 7
Population: 15,100,000* **Status of Freedom:** not free

An ethnic state with major territorial subnationalities

Political Rights. Afghanistan is now ruled by a communist party under the tutelage and direct control of the Soviet Union. The rule of this very small party (10,000 to 20,000) has no electoral or traditional legitimization. Soviet forces control the major cities but their control is contested by a variety of resistance movements throughout the country. *Subnationalities:* The largest minority is the Tajik (thirty percent), the dominant people of the cities and the western part of the country. Essentially lowland Persians, their language remains the lingua franca of the country. The Persian speaking Hazaras constitute five to ten percent of the population. Another ten percent belong to Uzbek and other Turkish groups in the north.

Civil Liberties. The media are primarily government owned and under rigid control. Antigovernment organization or expression is forbidden. Conversation is guarded and travel is restricted. In a condition of civil war and foreign occupation, political imprisonment, torture and execution are common, in addition to war deaths and massacres. Resources have been diverted to the Soviet Union as payment on war debt. The monetary sector is centrally controlled; much of the large agricultural sector has been destroyed. The objectives of the state are totalitarian; their achievement is limited by the continuing struggle for control.

Comparatively: Afghanistan is as free as Mongolia, less free than Iran.

A L B A N I A

Economy: socialist **Political Rights:** 7
Polity: communist one-party **Civil Liberties:** 7
Population: 2,800,000 **Status of Freedom:** not free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Albania has been a communist dictatorship under essentially one-man rule since 1944. While there are a number of elected bodies, including an assembly, the parallel government of the communist party (4.5 percent of the people) is decisive at all levels; elections offer only

*Population estimates for all countries are generally derived from the 1982 World Population Data Sheet of the Population Reference Bureau, Washington, D.C.

one list of candidates. Candidates are officially designated by the Democratic Front, to which all Albanians are supposed to belong. In recent years extensive purges within the party have apparently been designed to maintain the power of the top leaders.

Civil Liberties. Press, radio, and television are completely under government or party control, and communication with the outside world is minimal. Media are characterized by incessant propaganda, and open expression of opinion in private conversation is rare. Political imprisonment is common; torture is frequently reported. All religious institutions were abolished in 1967; religion is outlawed; priests are regularly imprisoned. Apparently there are no private organizations independent of government or party. Economic disparities are comparatively small: all people must work one month of each year in factories or on farms, and there are no private cars. Attempting to leave the state is a major crime. Private economic choice is minimal.

Comparatively: Albania is as free as Cambodia, less free than Yugoslavia.

ALGERIA

Economy: socialist

Polity: socialist one-party

Population: 20,100,000

Political Rights: 6

Civil Liberties: 6

Status of Freedom: not free

An ethnic state with a potential subnationality

Political Rights. Algeria has combined military dictatorship with one-party socialist rule. Elections at both local and national levels are managed by the party; they allow little opposition to the system, although individual representatives and specific policies may be criticized. However, the pragmatic, puritanical, military rulers are probably supported by a fairly broad consensus. *Subnationalities:* About twenty percent of the people are Berbers: recent riots suggest a continual desire for enhanced self-determination.

Civil Liberties. The media are governmental means for active indoctrination; opposition expression is controlled and foreign publications are closely watched. Private conversation appears relatively open. Although not fully independent, the regular judiciary has established a rule of law in some areas. Prisoners of conscience are detained for short periods, but no long-term political prisoners are now held. Appeals from the decisions of special courts for state security and economic crimes are not allowed. Land reform has transformed former French plantations into collectives. Although government goals are clearly socialist, small farms and businesses have been encouraged recently. Travel is generally free. Eighty percent of the people are illiterate; many are still very poor, but extremes of wealth have been reduced. Unions have slight freedom. Islam's continued strength provides a counterweight to governmental absolutism. There is freedom of religious worship.

Comparatively: Algeria is as free as Tanzania, freer than Iraq, less free than Morocco.

ANGOLA

Economy: noninclusive socialist **Political Rights:** 7
Polity: socialist one-party **Civil Liberties:** 7
Population: 6,800,000 **Status of Freedom:** not free

A transethnic heterogeneous state with major subnationalities

Political Rights. Angola is ruled by a very small communist-style socialist party in which military commanders may wield considerable power. The ruling party has relied heavily on Soviet equipment and Cuban troops to dominate the civil war and to stay in power. In 1980 an indirectly elected parliament was established. *Subnationalities:* The party is not tribalist, but is opposed by groups relying on particular tribes or regions—especially in Cabinda, the northeast, and the south-central areas. The UNITA movement among the Ovimbundu people actively controls much of the south and east of the country.

Civil Liberties. The nation remains in a state of war, with power arbitrarily exercised, particularly in the countryside. The media in controlled areas are government owned and do not deviate from its line. Political imprisonment and execution are common; repression of religious activity is reported. Travel is tightly restricted. Private medical care has been abolished, as has much private property—especially in the modern sectors. Strikes are prohibited and unions tightly controlled. Agricultural production is held down by peasant opposition to socialization and lack of markets.

Comparatively: Angola is as free as Ethiopia, less free than Zambia.

ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA

Economy: capitalist **Political Rights:** 2
Polity: centralized multiparty **Civil Liberties:** 2
Population: 75,000 **Status of Freedom:** free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Antigua is a parliamentary democracy with an elected house and appointed senate. The secessionist island of Barbuda has achieved special rights to limited self-government.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers are published by opposing political parties. Radio is government owned. There is freedom of organization. Unions are free and have the right to strike. The rule of law is guaranteed in the British manner.

Comparatively: Antigua and Barbuda is as free as Dominica, freer than Jamaica, less free than Barbados.

ARGENTINA

Economy: capitalist-statist **Political Rights:** 6
Polity: military nonparty **Civil Liberties:** 5
Population: 28,600,000 **Status of Freedom:** not free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Ruled today by a military junta, Argentina has oscillated between democracy and authoritarianism. Presidents are appointed and dismissed by the junta. The provinces are now under central government control.

Civil Liberties. Private newspapers and both private and government broadcasting stations operate; to a limited degree they report unfavorable events and criticism by opponents of the government. The media are commonly used to promote government propaganda. National security laws have made both self-censorship and newspaper closings common. Censorship of media and private expression also occurs informally through the threat of terrorist attacks from radical leftist or rightist groups (with the latter apparently supported by elements of the military and police). Political parties organize dissent. The universities are closely controlled. While courts retain some independence, arbitrary arrest, torture, and execution have affected thousands and are still a threat. The church and trade unions play a strong opposition role, although there is frequent pressure on the unions. Human rights organizations are active. For non-Catholics religious freedom is curtailed.

Comparatively: Argentina is as free as Yugoslavia, freer than Cuba, less free than Chile.

AUSTRALIA

Economy: capitalist **Political Rights:** 1
Polity: decentralized multiparty **Civil Liberties:** 1
Population: 15,000,000 **Status of Freedom:** free

A relatively homogeneous population with small aboriginal groups

Political Rights. Australia is a federal parliamentary democracy with strong powers retained by its component states. With equal representation from each state, the Senate provides a counterbalance to the nationally representative House of Representatives. The British appointed Governor General retains some power in constitutional deadlocks. Trade unions (separately and

through the Labour Party) and foreign investors have great economic weight. The states have separate parliaments and premiers, but appointed governors. There are recurrent attempts to improve the condition and degree of self-determination of the aborigines.

Civil Liberties. All the newspapers and most radio and television stations are privately owned. The Australian Broadcasting Commission operates government radio and television stations on a basis similar to BBC. Although Australia lacks many formal guarantees of civil liberties, the degree of protection of these liberties in the common law is similar to that in Britain and Canada. Freedom of assembly is generally respected, although it varies by region. Freedom of choice in education, travel, occupation, property, and private association are perhaps as complete as anywhere in the world. Relatively low taxes enhance this freedom.

Comparatively: Australia is as free as the United Kingdom, freer than Italy.

AUSTRIA

Economy: mixed capitalist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 7,600,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Austria's parliamentary system has a directly elected lower house and an upper (and less powerful) house elected by the provincial assemblies. The president is directly elected, but the chancellor (representing the majority party in parliament) is the center of political power. The two major parties have alternated control since the 1950s but the government often seeks broad consensus. The referendum is used on rare occasions. Provincial legislatures and governors are elective. *Subnationalities:* Fifty thousand Slovenes in the southern part of the country have rights to their own schools.

Civil Liberties. The press in Austria is free and varied; radio and television are under a state-owned corporation that by law is supposed to be free of political control. Its geographical position and constitutionally defined neutral status places its media and government in a position analogous to Finland, but the Soviets have put less pressure on Austria to conform to Soviet wishes than on Finland. The rule of law is secure, and there are no political prisoners. Banks and heavy industry are largely nationalized.

Comparatively: Austria is as free as Belgium, freer than Greece.

BAHAMAS

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 200,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. The Bahamas have a parliamentary system with a largely ceremonial British Governor General. The house is elective and the senate appointed. The ruling party has a large majority, but there is an opposition in parliament. There has not been a change in government since independence. Most islands are administered by centrally appointed commissioners. There is no army.

Civil Liberties. There are independent newspapers and no censorship. Radio is government owned and is not completely free of government control. Labor and business organization is free; there is a right to strike. A program of Bahamianization is being promoted in several sectors of the economy. Rights of travel, occupation, education, and religion are secure. Corruption is widely alleged.

Comparatively: Bahamas is as free as Venezuela, freer than Malta, less free than Barbados.

BAHRAIN

Economy: capitalist-statist

Political Rights: 5

Polity: traditional nonparty

Civil Liberties: 5

Population: 400,000

Status of Freedom: partly free

The citizenry is relatively homogeneous

Political Rights. Bahrain is a traditional shaikhdom with a modernized administration. Direct access to the ruler is encouraged. At present the legislature is dissolved, but powerful merchant and religious families place a check on royal power. There are local councils. *Subnationalities:* The primary ethnic problem has been the struggle between the Iranians who once ruled and the Arabs who now rule; in part this is reflected in the opposition of the ruling Sunni and majority Shiite Muslim sects.

Civil Liberties. The government and private press seldom criticize government policy. Radio and television are government owned. Although freedom of expression and assembly are cautiously expressed, a climate of fear does not exist. The legal and educational systems are a mixture of traditional Islamic and British. Short-term arrest is used to discourage dissent, and there are long-term political prisoners. In security cases involving violence fair and quick trials are delayed and torture occurs. Rights to travel, property, and religious choice are secured. There is a record of disturbances by workers groups, although union organization is restricted. Many free social services are provided. Citizenship is very hard to obtain; there is antipathy to foreign workers (but unlike neighboring shaikhdoms most people in the country are citizens).

Comparatively: Bahrain is as free as China (Taiwan), freer than Saudi Arabia, less free than India.

BANGLADESH

Economy: noninclusive capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 5
Polity: military nonparty	Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 93,300,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

A relatively homogeneous population with Hindu and Bihari minorities

Political Rights. Bangladesh alternates between military and parliamentary rule. In 1982 a general again intervened. Nevertheless, he has a certain degree of popular support and voices an intention to revive democracy shortly. There is little independent local government. *Subnationalities:* Fighting with minor tribal groups along the border continues; attempts to resettle 500,000 Chittagong tribesmen on new lands are being resisted. The Bihari minority suffers discrimination.

Civil Liberties. The press is private, government, and party. The papers are not censored but there is pervasive self-censorship through both government support and pressure. Radio and television are government controlled, but are not actively used for mobilization. The existence of a broad spectrum of political parties allows for the organization of dissent. In a violent context there have been recurrent executions and imprisonments, and considerable brutality. Political imprisonment continues to occur, but there are few prisoners of conscience. Many trials have been before military courts. The civilian courts can decide against the government. In spite of considerable communal antipathy, religious freedom exists. Travel is generally unrestricted. Although they do not have the right to strike, labor unions are active and strikes occur. Over half of the rural population are laborers or tenant farmers; some illegal land confiscation by local groups has been reported. Corruption remains a major problem.

Comparatively: Bangladesh is as free as Turkey, freer than Pakistan, less free than Malaysia.

BARBADOS

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 300,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Barbados is governed by a parliamentary system, with a ceremonial British Governor General. Elections have been fair and well-administered. Power alternates between the two major parties. Public opinion has a powerful and direct effect on policy. Local governments are also elected.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers are private and free of government control. There are both private and government radio stations, but the government-controlled radio station also controls the only television station on the **BBC** model. There is an independent judiciary, and general freedom from arbitrary government action. Travel, residence, and religion are free. Although both major parties rely on the support of labor, private property is fully accepted.

Comparatively: Barbados is as free as the United Kingdom, freer than Jamaica.

BELGIUM

Economy: capitalist

Political Rights: 1

Polity: decentralized multiparty

Civil Liberties: 1

Population: 9,900,000

Status of Freedom: free

A binational state

Political Rights. Belgium is a constitutional monarchy with a bicameral parliament. Elections lead to coalition governments, generally of the center. Linguistic divisions have produced considerable instability. *Subnationalities:* The rise of nationalism among the two major peoples—Flemish and Walloon—has led to increasing transfer of control over cultural affairs to the communal groups. However, provincial governors are appointed by the national government.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers are free and uncensored. Radio and television are government owned, but the director of each station is solely responsible for programming. The full spectrum of private rights is respected, but voting is compulsory.

Comparatively: Belgium is as free as Switzerland, freer than France.

BELIZE

Economy: capitalist

Political Rights: 1

Polity: centralized multiparty

Civil Liberties: 2

Population: 145,000

Status of Freedom: free

An ethnically complex state

Political Rights. Belize is a parliamentary democracy with an elected house and appointed senate. Elections are competitive and fair.

Civil Liberties. The press is free and varied. Organization and assembly

There are no legal political parties and the Assembly does little more than approve government actions. Villages are traditionally ruled by their own headmen, but districts are directly ruled from the center. The Buddhist hierarchy is still very important in the affairs of the country. In foreign policy Bhutan's dependence upon India has been partially renounced; it is still dependent for defense. *Subnationalities*: The main political party operates outside the country, agitating in favor of the Nepalese minority (about 250,000) and a more open system.

Civil Liberties. The only paper is a government weekly. There is no broadcasting service. Outside media are freely available. There are few if any prisoners of conscience. No organized opposition exists within the country. The legal structure exhibits a mixture of traditional and British forms. There is religious freedom and freedom to travel. Traditional agriculture, crafts, and trade dominate the economy.

Comparatively: Bhutan is as free as Bangladesh, freer than Burma, less free than Nepal.

BOLIVIA

Economy: noninclusive capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 7
Polity: military nonparty	Civil Liberties: 4
Population: 5,600,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

An ethnic state with major potential subnationalities

Political Rights. In 1981-82 Bolivia was a military dictatorship but democratic forms continue to be an imminent alternative. Provincial and local government is controlled from the center. *Subnationalities*: Over sixty percent of the people are Indians speaking Aymara or Quechua; these languages have been given official status alongside Spanish. The Indian peoples remain, however, more potential than active nationalities.

Civil Liberties. The press and most radio and television stations are private, but are under strong government pressure. The military coup in July 1980 resulted in imposition of an "Argentine system," with disappearance, imprisonment, and torture affecting thousands. In mid-1982 all restrictions on political and union activity were officially removed and a complete amnesty announced. Although suffering from government violence the Catholic Church has retained a critical role. The people are overwhelmingly post-land-reform, subsistence agriculturists. The major mines and much of industry are nationalized; the workers have a generous social welfare program, given the country's poverty.

Comparatively: Bolivia in mid-1982 was as free as Chile, freer than Haiti, less free than Paraguay.

BOTSWANA

Economy: noninclusive capitalist **Political Rights:** 2
Polity: decentralized multiparty **Civil Liberties:** 3
Population: 900,000 **Status of Freedom:** free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. The republican system of Botswana combines traditional and modern principles. The assembly is elected for a fixed term and appoints the president who rules. There is also an advisory House of Chiefs. Nine districts, led either by chiefs or elected leaders, have independent power of taxation, as well as traditional power over land and agriculture. Elections continue to be won overwhelmingly by the ruling party as they were even before independence, yet there are opposition members in parliament and local governments. There is economic and political pressure from both black African and white neighbors. *Subnationalities:* The country is divided among several major tribes belonging to the Batswana people, as well as minor peoples on the margins. The latter include a few hundred comparatively wealthy white farmers.

Civil Liberties. The radio and most newspapers are government owned; however, there is no censorship, and opposition party publications and South African media present alternatives. Rights of assembly, religion, and travel are respected; prisoners of conscience are not held. Unions are independent. Judicially, civil liberties appear to be guaranteed, but most people continue to live under traditional rules.

Comparatively: Botswana is as free as Nigeria, freer than Gambia, less free than Barbados.

BRAZIL

Economy: capitalist-statist **Political Rights:** 4
Polity: decentralized multiparty **Civil Liberties:** 3
(military dominated) **Status of Freedom:** partly free
Population: 127,700,000

A complex but relatively homogeneous population with many small, territorial subnationalities

Political Rights. Brazil is currently governed by a president, elected by the military, and a popularly elected but weak assembly. Legislative elections in 1978 gave a majority to the opposition, although the opposition did not gain legislative majorities. Party organization is controlled, but party activity is increasingly competitive; only the communist party remains banned. There are independently organized elected governments at both state

and local levels. A general election scheduled for November, 1982 is expected to bring the country closer to democracy. Governors will be elected for the first time in over 15 years. *Subnationalities*: The many small Indian groups of the interior are under both private and public pressure. Some still fight back in the face of loss of land, lives, and culture.

Civil Liberties. The media are private, except for a few broadcasting stations. The powerful and critical press is now free of overt censorship; however, government control of most industry, and thus advertising, limits freedom to criticize government. Radio and television practice limited self-censorship. In 1982 several movies were banned (even though government financed). There is a general right of assembly and organization, and few if any prisoners of conscience. Political exiles returned in 1979. Private violence against criminals, suspected communists, peasants, and Indians continues outside the law; police brutality remains common. Opposition voices are regularly heard—including parliamentarians, journalists, and officials of the church. Union organization is powerful and strikes are widespread, though sometimes repressed. There is considerable large-scale government industry, but rights to property, religious freedom, travel, and education of one's choice are generally respected.

Comparatively: Brazil is as free as Mexico, freer than Uruguay, less free than Colombia.

BULGARIA

Economy: socialist	Political Rights: 7
Polity: communist one-party	Civil Liberties: 7
Population: 8,900,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Bulgaria is governed by its communist party, although the facade of a parallel government and two-party system is maintained. The same man has essentially ruled over the system since 1954; elections at both national and local levels have little meaning. Both economically and politically the country is subservient to the Soviet Union. *Subnationalities*: Muslim minorities of about one million are persecuted in several ways.

Civil Liberties. All media are under absolute control by the government or its party branches. Citizens have few if any rights against the state. There are hundreds or thousands of prisoners of conscience, many living under severe conditions. Brutality and torture are common. Those accused of opposition to the system may also be banished to villages, denied their occupations, or confined in psychiatric hospitals. Believers are subject to discrimi-

nation. Citizens have no choice of occupation or residence. Political loyalty is required to secure many social benefits. The most common political crimes are illegally trying to leave the country, criticism of the government, and illegal contacts with foreigners.

Comparatively: Bulgaria is as free as Mongolia, less free than Hungary.

BURMA

Economy: noninclusive mixed socialist	Political Rights: 7
Polity: socialist one-party (military dominated)	Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 37,100,000	Status of Freedom: not free

An ethnic state with major territorial subnationalities

Political Rights. Burma is a one-party socialist, military dictatorship. The government's dependence on the army makes its strengths and weaknesses more those of a military dictatorship than those of a communist regime. Elections are held at both national and local levels; the Party chooses the slate of candidates. *Subnationalities:* The government represents essentially the Burmese people that live in the heartland of the country. The Burmese are surrounded by millions of non-Burmese living in continuing disaffection or active revolt. Among the minorities on the periphery are the Karens, Shan, Kachins, Mon, and Chin.

Civil Liberties. All media are government owned, with alternative opinions expressed obliquely if at all; both domestic and foreign publications are censored. The media are expected to actively promote government policy. Organized dissent is forbidden; in part, this policy is explained by the almost continuous warfare the government has had to wage since independence against both rebellious subnationalities and two separate communist armies. Some opposition leaders have recently become reconciled to the regime. Prisoners of conscience have been common and torture reported. However, fewer ethnic Burmans now seem to be detained. The regular court structure has been replaced by "people's courts." Religion is free; union activity is not; both internal and external travel are very difficult. Although the eventual goal of the government is complete socialization, areas of private enterprise remain, but are subject to control by government marketing monopolies.

Comparatively: Burma is as free as Romania, freer than Cambodia, less free than the Philippines.

BURUNDI

Economy: noninclusive mixed capitalist
Political Rights: 7
Civil Liberties: 6
Polity: socialist one-party (military dominated)
Status of Freedom: not free
Population: 4,400,000

An ethnic state with a majority, nonterritorial subnationality

Political Rights. Burundi is ruled by a self-appointed military president with the assistance of the Party Central Committee and Politburo. There is no elected assembly. *Subnationalities:* The rulers continue to be from the Tutsi ethnic group (fifteen percent) that has traditionally ruled; their dominance was reinforced by a massacre of Hutus (eighty-five percent) after an attempted revolt in the early 1970s.

Civil Liberties. The media are all government controlled and closely censored. Lack of freedom of political speech or assembly is accompanied by political imprisonment and reports of brutality. Under current conditions there is little guarantee of individual rights, particularly for the Hutu majority. In recent years exclusion of the Hutu from public services, the party, and so forth, has declined. There are no independent unions, but short wildcat strikes have been reported. Traditional group and individual rights no doubt persist on the village level: Burundi is not a highly structured modern society. Travel is relatively unrestricted. Education is controlled, missionary activity closely regulated. Although officially socialist, private or traditional economic forms predominate.

Comparatively: Burundi is as free as Benin, freer than Somalia, less free than Kenya.

CAMBODIA

Economy: noninclusive socialist
Political Rights: 7
Polity: communist one-party
Civil Liberties: 7
Population: 6,100,000
Status of Freedom: not free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Cambodia is divided between the remnants of the Pol Pot tyranny and the less tyrannical, imposed Vietnamese regime. The people have little part in either regime.

Civil Liberties. The media continue to be completely controlled in both areas; outside publications are rigorously controlled. Political execution has been a common function of government. Reeducation for war captives is again practiced by the new government. There is no rule of law; private

freedoms are not guaranteed. Cambodians continue to be one of the world's most tyrannized peoples. At least temporarily much of economic life has been decollectivized.

Comparatively: Cambodia is as free as Ethiopia, less free than Thailand.

CAMEROON

Economy: noninclusive capitalist **Political Rights:** 6
Polity: nationalist one-party **Civil Liberties:** 6
Population: 8,900,000 **Status of Freedom:** not free

A transethnic heterogeneous state with a major subnationality

Political Rights. Cameroon is a one-party state ruled by the same person since independence in 1960. The government has steadily centralized power. Referendums and other elections have little meaning; voters are given no alternatives and provide ninety-nine percent majorities. Provincial governors are appointed by the central government. An attempt has been made to incorporate all elements in a government of broad consensus. *Subnationalities:* The most significant opposition has come from those opposing centralization, particularly movements supported by the country's largest ethnic group, the Bamileke. Other ethnic groups are quite small.

Civil Liberties. The largely government-owned media are closely controlled; censorship and self-censorship are common; works of critical authors are prohibited. Freedom of speech, assembly, and union organization are limited, while freedom of occupation, education, and property are respected. Prisoners of conscience are detained without trial and may be ill-treated. Allegations have been made of torture and village massacres. Internal travel and religious choice are relatively free; foreign travel may be difficult. Labor and business organizations are closely controlled. Although still relatively short on capital, private enterprise is encouraged wherever possible.

Comparatively: Cameroon is as free as Gabon, freer than Niger, less free than Upper Volta.

CANADA

Economy: capitalist **Political Rights:** 1
Polity: decentralized multiparty **Civil Liberties:** 1
Population: 24,400,000 **Status of Freedom:** free

A binational state

Political Rights. Canada is a parliamentary democracy with alternation of rule between leading parties. The provinces have their own democratic institutions with a higher degree of autonomy than the American states.

Subnationalities: In an attempt to prevent the breakup of Canada, the government had moved toward granting French linguistic equality; French has become the official language in Quebec. In addition, Quebec has been allowed to opt out of some national programs and maintains its own representatives abroad.

Civil Liberties. The media are free, although there is a government-related radio and television network. The full range of civil liberties is generally respected. In Quebec rights to choose English education and language have been infringed. There has been evidence of the invasion of privacy by Canadian security forces in recent years, much as in the United States. Many judicial and legal structures have been borrowed from the United Kingdom or the United States, with consequent advantages and disadvantages. Some provinces limit employment opportunities for nonresidents.

Comparatively: Canada is as free as the United States of America, freer than Italy.

CAPE VERDE ISLANDS

Economy: noninclusive socialist	Political Rights: 6
Polity: socialist one-party	Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 315,000	Status of Freedom: not free

An ethnically complex state

Political Rights. The ruling single party is small and tightly organized. Elections allow no choice, but abstention and negative votes are allowed.

Civil Liberties. The media are government and private; all are closely controlled. Prisoners of conscience are frequently detained for short periods; rights to organize opposition, assembly, or political expression are not respected. The judiciary is weak. For its region Cape Verde's seventy-five percent literacy is very high. The Islands' plantation agriculture has been largely nationalized, but drought and endemic unemployment continue to lead to emigration. Most small enterprise is private. Religion is relatively free, although under political pressure; labor unions are government controlled.

Comparatively: Cape Verde Islands is as free as Tanzania, freer than Ethiopia, less free than Ivory Coast.

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Economy: noninclusive capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 6
Polity: military nonparty	Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 2,400,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. The Central African Republic is currently a military dictatorship without representative institutions. Prefects are appointed by the central government in the French style. Heavily dependent on French economic and military aid; France has influenced or determined recent changes of government, and French forces are still present.

Civil Liberties. All media are government controlled, but there are periods of free expression and assembly. There are few if any long-term prisoners of conscience. Religious freedom is generally respected. Union activity was suspended following the September 1981 coup. Movement is occasionally hampered by highway security checks. Most economic activity is private with limited government involvement.

Comparatively: Central African Republic is as free as Algeria, freer than Togo, less free than Kenya.

CHAD

Economy: noninclusive capitalist	Political Rights: 7
Polity: military decentralized	Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 4,600,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A collection of semi-autonomous ethnic groups

Political Rights. Central government has largely disappeared; undefined regions are ruled by military or tribal leaders. Chad has been repeatedly torn apart by competing factional or ethnic group armies. *Subnationalities:* Ethnic struggle pits the southern negroes (principally the Christian and animist Sara tribe) against a variety of northern Muslim groups (principally nomadic Arabs).

Civil Liberties. The very limited media are controlled by the armed forces of the areas they operate in. In conditions of mixed anarchy and varying degrees of local and national control, rights have little meaning. Many have been killed or imprisoned without due process. Anarchy gives certain freedoms to local groups. Not an ideological area, traditional law is still influential. The economy is predominantly subsistence agriculture with little protection of property rights.

Comparatively: Chad is apparently as free as Malawi, freer than Guinea, less free than Tanzania.

CHILE

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 6
Polity: military nonparty	Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 11,500,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Chile is a military dictatorship. A 1980 plebiscite confirming government policy allowed an opposition vote of thirty percent. All power is concentrated at the center; there are no elective positions. An appointive Council of State is supposed to represent most sectors of society.

Civil Liberties. All media have both public and private outlets; newspapers are primarily private. The media, although censored and often threatened with closure, express a considerable range of opinion, occasionally including direct criticism of government policy. Limited party activity is tacitly allowed, and human rights organizations operate under pressure. Students, church leaders, and former political leaders regularly express dissent. While one can win against the government, the courts are under government pressure. After years of terror, disappearances and other extralegal repressions are now less common. Prisoners of conscience are still commonly taken for short periods, and torture occurs; political expulsions and internal exile continue. The right to travel is generally respected. Unions are restricted but have some rights, including a limited right to strike and organize at plant levels. Many nationalized enterprises have been resold to private investors, with government intervention in the economy now being limited to copper and petroleum.

Comparatively: Chile is as free as Nicaragua, freer than Czechoslovakia, less free than Peru.

CHINA (Mainland)

Economy: socialist	Political Rights: 6
Polity: communist one-party	Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 1,000,000,000	Status of Freedom: not free

An ethnic state with peripheral subnationalities

Political Rights. China is a one-party communist state under the collective leadership of the Politburo. A National Peoples Congress is indirectly elected within party guidelines, but does not function as a competitive parliament. National policy struggles are obscured by secrecy; choices are sharply limited. Recently there have been some more open local elections. Minor political parties have been revived, but it is not yet clear whether they will be allowed to function as a critical force. *Subnationalities:* There are several subordinated peripheral peoples such as the Tibetans, Uighurs, and Mongols. These are granted a very limited degree of separate cultural life. Amounting to not more than five percent of the population, non-Chinese ethnic groups have tended to be diluted and obscured by Chinese settlement or sinification.

Civil Liberties. The mass media remain closely controlled tools for mobilizing the population. While the limited underground and wall poster literature of 1978-79 was suppressed, there are reports of a continuing and extensive underground literature. There is limited non-political cultural freedom. Al-

though there is movement toward "socialist legality" on the Soviet model, court cases often appear to be decided in political terms. There are unknown thousands of political prisoners, including those in labor-reform camps; the government has forced millions to live indefinitely in undesirable areas. Political executions are still reported. Millions of Chinese have been systematically discriminated against because of "bad class background," but such discrimination has recently been curtailed. Political-social controls at work are pervasive.

Compared to other communist states popular opinions and pressures play a considerable role. Recurrent poster campaigns, demonstrations, and evidence of private conversation show that pervasive factionalism has allowed elements of freedom and consensus into the system; recurrent repression, including imprisonment, equally shows the government's determination to keep such campaigning from becoming a threat to the system or its current leaders. Rights to travel and emigration are limited, as are religious freedoms. Rights to marry and have children are perhaps more limited than in any other country in the world. Economic pressures have forced some, not wholly successful, rationalization of economic policy, including renunciation of guaranteed employment for youth. Introduction of private sector incentives has most affected farms and small enterprises. Small local strikes and slowdowns have been reported concerning wage increases and worker demands for greater control over choice of employment. Inequality derives from differences in political position rather than direct income.

Comparatively: China (Mainland) is as free as Algeria, freer than Mongolia, and less free than China (Taiwan).

CHINA (Taiwan)

Economy: capitalist-statist

Political Rights: 5

Polity: centralized dominant-party

Civil Liberties: 5

Population: 18,500,000

Status of Freedom: partly free

A quasi-ethnic state with a majority nonterritorial subnationality

Political Rights. Taiwan is ruled by a single party organized according to a communist model (although anticommunist ideologically). There is a parliament to which representatives from Taiwan are elected in fairly free elections; a few members oppose the regime but no effective opposition party is tolerated. Most parliamentarians are still persons elected in 1947 as representatives of districts in China where elections could not be held subsequently. Late 1980 elections allowed some opposition success. The indirect presidential election is pro forma, but the election of a Taiwanese as vice president in 1978 was significant. Important local and regional positions are elective, including those in the provincial assembly which are held by Taiwanese.

Subnationalities: The people are eighty-six percent native Taiwanese (speaking two Chinese dialects), and an opposition movement to transfer control from the mainland immigrants to the Taiwanese has been repressed.

Civil Liberties. The media include government or party organs, but are mostly in private hands. Newspapers and magazines are subject to censorship or suspension, and practice self-censorship. In late 1979 a major confrontation led to the closing of publications and the imprisonment of major leaders of the opposition. Television is one-sided. Rights to assembly are limited, but were improved at least for the elections in 1980. There are several hundred political prisoners, but there have been very few recent political executions. Union activity is restricted; strikes are forbidden. Other apolitical groups are free to organize. Private rights to property, education, and religion are generally respected; there is no right to travel to the mainland.

Comparatively: China (Taiwan) is as free as South Korea, freer than Burma, less free than Malaysia.

COLOMBIA

Economy: capitalist

Political Rights: 2

Polity: centralized multiparty

Civil Liberties: 3

Population: 25,600,000

Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population with scattered minorities

Political Rights. Colombia is a constitutional democracy. The president is directly elected, as are both houses of the legislature. The opposition won the 1982 presidential election in which participation rose to over fifty percent. Members of the two principal parties are included in the government and the list of departmental governors. Both of the leading parties have well-defined factions; among the minor parties several are involved in revolutionary activity. The provinces are directly administered by the national government. The military is alleged to be only partly under government control.

Civil Liberties. The press is private, with some papers under party control, and quite free. Radio and television include both government and private stations. All media have been limited in their freedom to report subversive activity. Personal rights are generally respected; courts are relatively strong and independent. Riots and guerrilla activity have led to periodic states of siege in which these rights are limited. Assemblies are often banned for fear of riots. In these conditions the security forces have infringed personal rights violently, especially those of leftist unions, peasants, and Amerindians in rural areas. Many persons are rounded up in antiguerrilla or antiterrorist campaigns, and may be tortured or killed. Opponents are not given prison sentences simply for their nonviolent expression of political opinion, and the government and courts have made some attempts to control abuses. Human rights

organizations are active. The government encourages private enterprise where possible; union activity and strikes for economic goals are legal.

Comparatively: Colombia is as free as India, freer than Brazil, less free than Venezuela.

COMORO ISLANDS

Economy: noninclusive capitalist **Political Rights:** 4
Polity: decentralized nonparty **Civil Liberties:** 5
Population: 310,000 **Status of Freedom:** partly free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. The Comoran government came to power by armed attack in 1978. Subsequently, the voters approved a new constitution and president. The majority probably support the new system—the previous ruler had become very oppressive and the new president had been prime minister in the recent past. There are contested parliamentary elections but candidates do not represent parties. Each island has an elected governor and council. (The island of Mayotte is formally a part of the Comoros, but it has chosen to be a French dependency.)

Civil Liberties. Radio is government owned; there is no press. Some outside publications and meetings have been banned. There are prisoners of conscience, and many have been mistreated; pressure is reported against opposition groups. There is a new emphasis on Islamic customs. The largely plantation economy has led to severe landlessness and concentrated wealth; emigration to the mainland for employment is extremely high. There are no labor unions.

Comparatively: Comoro Islands appears to be as free as Singapore, freer than Kenya, less free than Mauritius.

CONGO

Economy: noninclusive mixed **Political Rights:** 7
 socialist **Civil Liberties:** 6
Polity: socialist one-party (military **Status of Freedom:** not free
 dominated)
Population: 1,600,000

A formally transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Congo is a military dictatorship with lethal factional infighting. One-party elections allow no opposition, but parliament can be critical. *Subnationalities:* Historically the country was established out of a

maze of ethnic groups, without the domination of some by others. However, the army that now rules is said to come from tribes with not more than fifteen percent of the population.

Civil Liberties. The press is private but heavily censored. Radio is government owned. Criticism may lead to imprisonment, yet there is some private discussion and limited dissent. Executions and imprisonment of political opponents have occurred, but conditions have improved. The only union is state sponsored; it is not allowed to strike. Religious groups are limited but generally free. At the local and small entrepreneur level private property is generally respected, although most large-scale commerce and industry are either nationalized or controlled by expatriates. Literacy is remarkably high.

Comparatively: Congo is as free as Iraq, freer than Mozambique, less free than Cameroon.

COSTA RICA

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 2,300,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. A parliamentary democracy, Costa Rica has a directly elected president and several important parties. No parties are prohibited. This structure is supplemented by an independent tribunal for the overseeing of elections. Elections are fair; rule alternates between parties. Provinces are under the direction of the central government.

Civil Liberties. The media are notably free, private, and varied; they serve a society ninety percent literate. The courts are fair, and private rights, such as those to movement, occupation, education, religion, and union organization, are respected.

Comparatively: Costa Rica is as free as Ireland, freer than Colombia.

CUBA

Economy: socialist	Political Rights: 6
Polity: communist one-party	Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 9,800,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A complex but relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Cuba is a one-party communist state on the Soviet model. Real power lies, however, more in the person of Fidel Castro and in the Russian leaders upon whom he depends than is the case in other noncontiguous states adopting this model. Popular election at the municipal level has

recently been introduced. Provincial and national assemblies are elected by municipalities but can be recalled by popular vote. The whole system is largely a show: Political opponents are excluded from nomination by law, many others are simply disqualified by party fiat; no debate is allowed on major issues; once elected the assemblies do not oppose party decisions.

Civil Liberties. The media are state controlled and publish only as the state directs. Thousands of political prisoners have been released recently, mostly into exile. Torture has been reported only in the past, but hundreds who have refused to recant continue to be held in difficult conditions, and new arrests are frequent. There are hundreds of thousands of others who are formally discriminated against as opponents of the system. There is freedom to criticize policy administration through the press and the institutions of "popular democracy," but writing or speaking against the system, even in private, is severely repressed. There are reports of psychiatric institutions also being used to incarcerate. Freedom to choose work, education, or residence is greatly restricted; new laws force people to work harder. It is generally illegal to leave Cuba, but some have been forced to leave. The practice of religion is discouraged by the government.

Comparatively: Cuba is as free as Guatemala, freer than Czechoslovakia, less free than Mexico.

CYPRUS

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: (G) 1
Polity: decentralized multiparty	(T) 4
Population: 650,000	Civil Liberties: (G) 2
	(T) 3
	Status of Freedom: (G) free
	(T) partly free

A binational state (no central government)

Political Rights. At present Cyprus is one state only in theory. Both the Greek and the Turkish sectors are parliamentary democracies, although the Turkish sector is in effect a protectorate of Turkey. Elections have seemed reasonably fair in both sectors, but in the violent atmosphere pressure has been applied to all nonconforming groups or individuals. Greek Cypriots in the North are denied voting rights. *Nationalities:* Greeks and Turks now live almost exclusively in their own sectors. Eighty percent of the population is Greek, sixty percent of the land is in the Greek sector.

Civil Liberties. The newspapers are free and varied in both sectors, with the constraints mentioned above. Radio and television are under the respective governments or semigovernmental bodies. The usual rights of free peoples are respected in each sector, including occupation, labor organization, and religion, although somewhat more circumscribed in the Turkish sector.

Because of communal strife and invasion, property has often been taken from members of one group by force (or abandoned from fear of force) and given to the other. Under these conditions rights to choose one's sector of residence or to travel between sectors are greatly restricted.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Economy: socialist	Political Rights: 7
Polity: communist one-party	Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 15,400,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A binational state

Political Rights. Czechoslovakia is a Soviet-style, one-party communist state, reinforced by the presence of Soviet troops. Elections are noncompetitive and there is essentially no legislative debate. *Subnationalities:* The division of the state into separate Czech and Slovak socialist republics has only slight meaning since the Czechoslovak Communist Party continues to run the country (under the guidance of the Soviet Communist Party). Although less numerous and poorer than the Czech people, the Slovaks are probably granted their rightful share of power within this framework.

Civil Liberties. Media are government or party owned and rigidly censored. However, some private and literary expression occurs that is relatively free. Freedoms of assembly, organization, and even association are denied. Rights to travel, occupation, and private property are restricted. Heavy pressures are placed on religious activities, especially through holding ministerial incomes at a very low level and curtailing religious education. There are a number of prisoners of conscience; exclusion of individuals from their chosen occupation and short detentions are more common sanctions. The beating of political suspects is common, and psychiatric detention is employed. Successful defense in political cases is possible, but lawyers may be arrested for overzealous defense. Travel to the West and emigration are restricted. Independent trade unions and strikes are forbidden. Human rights groups are persecuted.

Comparatively: Czechoslovakia is as free as Romania, freer than Bulgaria, less free than Poland.

DENMARK

Economy: mixed capitalist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 5,100,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Denmark is a constitutional monarchy with a unicameral parliament. Elections are fair. Since a wide variety of parties achieve success, resulting governments are based on coalitions. Districts have governors appointed from the center and elected councils; local officials are under local control.

Civil Liberties. The press is free (and more conservative politically than the electorate). Radio and television are government owned but relatively free. All other rights are guaranteed, although the very high tax level constitutes more than usual constraint on private property in a capitalist state. Religion is free but state supported.

Comparatively: Denmark is as free as Norway, freer than Finland.

DJIBOUTI

Economy: noninclusive capitalist

Political Rights: 5

Polity: nationalist one-party

Civil Liberties: 6

Population: 300,000*

Status of Freedom: not free

A binational state with subordination

Political Rights. Djibouti is formally a parliamentary democracy under French protection. In recent elections there has been little if any choice. Although all ethnic groups are included in single party lists, one group is clearly dominant. A large French garrison continues to play a role.

Civil Liberties. The media are government owned and controlled. There are prisoners of conscience and torture. Unions are under a degree of government control but there is a right to strike. The market economy is still dominated by French interests.

Comparatively: Djibouti appears to be as free as North Yemen, freer than Somalia, less free than Israel.

DOMINICA

Economy: capitalist

Political Rights: 2

Polity: centralized multiparty

Civil Liberties: 2

Population: 100,000

Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population with a minority enclave

Political Rights. Dominica is a parliamentary democracy with competing political parties. An opposition party came to power in highly competitive

*Population estimates vary widely.

1980 elections. There have been several violent attempts against the government. The military is disbanded. The rights of the native Caribs are said not to be fully respected.

Civil Liberties. Press is private and the radio public. The press is generally free and critical, and radio presents alternative views. Rights of assembly and organization are guaranteed. There is a rule of law with no prisoners of conscience. States of emergency have recurrently limited rights to a small extent. Personal freedoms of travel, residence, union rights of workers, and property rights are secured.

Comparatively: Dominica is as free as Nauru, freer than Guyana, less free than Barbados.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Economy: capitalist

Political Rights: 1

Polity: centralized multiparty

Civil Liberties: 2

Population: 5,700,000

Status of Freedom: free

A complex but relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. The Dominican Republic is a presidential democracy on the American model. Elections are free and competitive. Military influence is greatly reduced. Provinces are under national control, municipalities under local.

Civil Liberties. The media are generally privately owned, free, and diverse. Communist materials are restricted. Broadcasting is highly varied but subject to government review. Public expression is generally free; the spokesmen of a wide range of parties openly express their opinions. There are no prisoners of conscience. The courts appear relatively independent and human rights groups are active. Labor unions operate under moderate constraints. Travel overseas is sometimes restricted. State-owned lands are slowly being redistributed.

Comparatively: Dominican Republic is as free as Trinidad and Tobago, freer than Colombia, less free than Barbados.

ECUADOR

Economy: noninclusive capitalist

Political Rights: 2

Polity: centralized multiparty

Civil Liberties: 2

Population: 8,500,000

Status of Freedom: free

An ethnic state with a potential subnationality

Political Rights. Ecuador is governed by an elected president and parliament. There have been minor restrictions on party activity and nomina-

tions. Provinces and municipalities are administered from the center, but there are elected local and provincial councils. *Subnationalities*: Perhaps forty percent of the population is Indian and many of these speak Quechua. This population at present does not form a conscious subnationality in a distinctive homeland.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers are under private or party control and quite outspoken; there is no censorship. Radio and television are mostly under private control. There are no long-term prisoners of conscience, but persons are detained for criticizing government officials. Human rights organizations are active. The court system is not strongly independent, and imprisonment for belief may occur. Unions are independent and influential in the political process, but government intervention in strikes and negotiations may occur. Personal freedoms to travel, residence, education, and religion are secured. Land reform has been hampered by resistance from landed elites. Although there are state firms, particularly in major industries, Ecuador is essentially a capitalist and traditional state.

Comparatively: Ecuador is as free as Portugal, freer than Colombia, less free than Venezuela.

EGYPT

Economy: mixed socialist	Political Rights: 5
Polity: centralized dominant-party	Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 44,800,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

A relatively homogeneous population with a communal religious minority

Political Rights. Egypt is a controlled democracy. Within limits political parties may organize: communist and religious extremist parties are forbidden. Referendums receive unlikely ninety-eight and ninety-nine percent approvals. The ruling party won ninety percent of parliamentary seats in the 1979 election, but other parties achieved representation. *Subnationalities*: Several million Coptic Christians live a distinct communal life.

Civil Liberties. The Egyptian press is mostly government owned. Radio and television are under governmental control. All media are governmental means for active indoctrination, but opposition journals are allowed to appear sporadically; a fairly broad range of literary publications has recently developed. There is limited freedom of assembly. Severe riot laws and a variety of laws restricting dissent have led to large-scale imprisonment or banning from political or other organizational activity. Many prisoners of conscience have been held in the last few years, but very seldom for long periods. Women's rights have improved. In both agriculture and industry considerable diversity and choice exists within a mixed socialist framework. Unions have developed some independence from the government, but there is no right to strike. The

predominance of state corporations contributes to the acquiescence of unions in official policy. Travel and other private rights are generally free.

Comparatively: Egypt is as free as Kenya, freer than Algeria, less free than Nigeria.

EL SALVADOR

Economy: capitalist
Polity: Centralized multiparty
 (military dominated)
Population: 5,000,000*

Political Rights: 4
Civil Liberties: 5
Status of Freedom: partly free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. El Salvador is ruled by an elected parliament and interim president (chosen in effect by parliament, the army, and foreign supporters). The 1982 election was reasonably fair but some groups did not participate. In the countryside a bloody struggle between guerrilla and government forces continues.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers and radio are largely in private hands. The media are under strong pressures from all sides and are generally self-censored. Legal and illegal opposition papers and broadcasts appear. The rule of law is weak; assassination common. Atrocities have been committed by both sides in the conflict, probably frequently without the authorization of leaders. The judiciary is ineffective in political cases. Human rights organizations have been active. The Catholic church remains a force. Although still a heavily agricultural country, rural people are to a large extent involved in the wage and market economy. Banking and the foreign trade of export crops have been nationalized; land reform has had limited success.

Comparatively: El Salvador is as free as Guyana, freer than Guatemala, less free than Mexico.

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

Economy: noninclusive capitalist-
 statist
Polity: military nonparty
Population: 340,000

Political Rights: 7
Civil Liberties: 6
Status of Freedom: not free

An ethnic state with a territorial minority.

*Estimates vary widely.

Political Rights. Equatorial Guinea is a military dictatorship. The coup that replaced the former dictator was popular, but the population as a whole played and plays little part.

Civil Liberties. The media are very limited, largely government owned, and do not report opposition viewpoints. The rule of law is tenuous; there are political prisoners, but perhaps none of conscience. Opposition parties are not tolerated. Religious freedom was reestablished in 1979 and private property is recognized. Plantation and subsistence farming is still recovering from near destruction under the previous government.

Comparatively: Equatorial Guinea appears to be as free as Congo, freer than Somalia, less free than Tanzania.

ETHIOPIA

Economy: noninclusive socialist

Political Rights: 7

Polity: military nonparty

Civil Liberties: 7

Population: 30,500,000

Status of Freedom: not free

An ethnic state with major territorial subnationalities

Political Rights. Ethiopia is ruled by a military committee that has successively slaughtered the leaders of the *ancien regime* and many of its own leaders. A spectrum of mass organizations has been established on the model of a one-party socialist state. Locally elected village councils are the primary effort to mobilize the people. *Subnationalities:* The heartland of Ethiopia is occupied by the traditionally dominant Amhara and acculturated portions of the diffuse Galla people. In the late nineteenth century Ethiopian rulers united what had been warring fragments of a former empire in this heartland, and proceeded to incorporate some entirely new areas. At this time the Somali of the south came under Ethiopian rule; Eritrea was incorporated as the result of a UN decision in 1952. Today Ethiopia is crosscut by linguistic and religious conflicts: most important is separatism due to historic allegiances to ancient provinces (especially Tigre), to different experiences (Eritrea), and to the population of a foreign nation (Somalia).

Civil Liberties. The media are controlled, serving the mobilization needs of the government. Individual rights as we know them are unprotected under conditions of despotism and anarchy. Political imprisonment, forced confession, execution, disappearance, and torture are common. There are no rights to assembly. Many thousands have been killed aside from those dying in civil war. Education is totally controlled. What independence there was under the Ethiopian monarchy has been largely lost, but the land reform benefited many. Choice of residence and workplace is often made by the government; there have been reports of forced transport to state farms. Religious groups have been persecuted, and there is limited religious freedom. Peasant and

worker organizations are closely controlled. Travel outside the country is strictly controlled; hostages or guarantors are often required before exit. The words and actions of the regime indicate little respect for private rights in property. The economy is under increasing government control through nationalizations, state-sponsored peasant cooperatives, and the regulation of business licenses.

Comparatively: Ethiopia is as free as Cambodia, less free than Sudan.

FIJI

Economy: noninclusive capitalist **Political Rights: 2**
Polity: centralized multiparty **Civil Liberties: 2**
Population: 650,000 **Status of Freedom:** free

A binational state

Political Rights. Fiji has a complex political structure designed to protect the interests of both the original Fiji people and the Indian people, who now form a slight majority. The Lower House is directly elected on the basis of both communal and national rolls. The Upper House is indirectly elected by a variety of electors (including the council of chiefs, the prime minister, and the opposition leader). Local government is organized both by the central government and by a Fijian administration headed by the council of chiefs. Although the opposition has ruled only briefly since independence, the 1982 general election again illustrated the vitality of the election process.

Civil Liberties. The press is free and private (but government positions must sometimes be published); government radio is under a separate and independent commission. There are slight limits on freedom to assemble. The full protection of the rule of law is supplemented by an ombudsman to investigate complaints against the government. Right to property is limited by special rights of inalienability that are granted to the Fijians and cover most of the country. Strong unions have full rights. Religion, travel, and other personal rights are secured. The nation may be about evenly divided between a subsistence economy, based on agriculture and fishing, and a modern market economy.

Comparatively: Fiji is as free as Papua New Guinea, freer than Tonga, less free than New Zealand.

FINLAND

Economy: mixed capitalist **Political Rights: 2**
Polity: centralized multiparty **Civil Liberties: 2**
Population: 4,800,000 **Status of Freedom:** free

An ethnic state with a small territorial subnationality

Political Rights. Finland has a parliamentary system with a strong, directly elected president. Since there are a large number of relatively strong parties, government is almost always by coalition. Elections have resulted in shifts in coalition membership. By treaty foreign policy cannot be anti-Soviet, but the 1982 presidential election indicated a weakening of a more general Soviet veto on the political process. The provinces have centrally appointed governors. *Subnationalities:* The rural Swedish minority (seven percent) has its own political party and strong cultural ties to Sweden. The Swedish-speaking Aland Islands have local autonomy and other special rights.

Civil Liberties. The press is private, diverse, and uncensored. Most of the radio service is government controlled, but there is an important commercial television station. The government network has been manipulated at times. Discussion in the media is controlled by a political consensus that criticism of the Soviet Union should be circumspect. There is a complete rule of law, and private rights are secured.

Comparatively: Finland is as free as Portugal, freer than Spain, less free than Sweden.

FRANCE

Economy: capitalist-statist

Polity: centralized multiparty

Population: 54,200,000

Political Rights: 1

Civil Liberties: 2

Status of Freedom: free

An ethnic state with major territorial subnationalities

Political Rights. France is a parliamentary democracy. However, the directly elected president is more powerful than the premier and assembly. There is also a constitutional council that oversees elections and passes on the constitutionality of assembly or executive actions on the model of the United States Supreme Court. The multiparty system ensures that governments are generally coalitions. *Subnationalities:* Territorial subnationalities continue to have few rights as ethnic units and have little power under a rigidly centralized provincial administration. At present the Alsatian minority seems well satisfied, but there is a demand for greater autonomy among many Bretons, Corsicans, and Basques. Movement toward decentralization may help.

Civil Liberties. The French press is free, although there is government involvement in financing and the registration of journalists. Press laws restrict freedom more than in other Western states. Criticism of the president and top officials may be muted by government threats and court actions. The news agency is private; radio and television are divided among a variety of theoretically independent companies under indirect government control. In spite of recent changes there is still an authoritarian attitude in government-citizen relations, publications may be banned at the behest of foreign governments, and arrest without explanation still occurs, particularly of members of

subnationalities. Police brutality is commonly alleged. Information and organization in regard to conscientious objection is restricted. France is, of course, under the rule of law, and rights to occupation, residence, religion, and property are secured. Both through extensive social programs and the creation of state enterprises France is quite far from a pure capitalist form.

Comparatively: France is as free as West Germany, freer than Spain, less free than the United Kingdom.

GABON

Economy: noninclusive capitalist **Political Rights:** 6
Polity: nationalist one-party **Civil Liberties:** 6
Population: 700,000 **Status of Freedom:** not free

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Gabon is a moderate dictatorship operating in the guise of a one-party state, with noncompetitive elections characteristic of this form. Candidates must be party approved. Major cities have elected local governments; provinces are administered from the center.

Civil Liberties. All media are government controlled, and few legitimate opposition voices are raised. Some critical items appear in local or available foreign media. There are prisoners of conscience and mistreatment; several leading journalists were arrested in 1982. There is no right of political assembly; only one labor union is sanctioned. The authoritarian government generally does not care to interfere in private lives, and respects religious freedom, private property, and the right to travel. The government is taking a more active role in the economy and is gradually replacing foreign managers with Gabonese.

Comparatively: Gabon is as free as Jordan, freer than Angola, less free than Ghana.

GAMBIA

Economy: noninclusive capitalist **Political Rights:** 3
Polity: centralized multiparty **Civil Liberties:** 4
Population: 600,000 **Status of Freedom:** partly free

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. This is a parliamentary democracy in which the same party and leader have been in power since independence in 1965, with substantial electoral margins. In the last election the opposition candidate campaigned from prison. There is local, mostly traditional, autonomy, but not

regional self-rule. The state is now in confederation with Senegal, and the system is protected by Senegalese troops.

Civil Liberties. The private and public newspapers and radio stations are now subject to self-censorship. The opposition is cowed following a failed rebellion and Senegalese occupation. Opposition leaders have been jailed. An independent judiciary maintains the rule of law. Labor unions operate, but within limits. The agricultural economy remains traditionally organized and is largely dependent on peanuts, the export of which is a state monopoly. Internal travel is somewhat limited by document checkpoints.

Comparatively: Gambia is as free as Malaysia, freer than Senegal, less free than Botswana.

GERMANY, EAST

Economy: socialist

Polity: communist one-party

Population: 16,700,000

Political Rights: 7

Civil Liberties: 7

Status of Freedom: not free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. East Germany is in practice a one-party communist dictatorship. No electoral competition is allowed that involves policy questions; all citizens are compelled to vote for a government-selected list of candidates. In addition, the presence of Soviet troops and direction from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union significantly reduces the sovereignty (or group freedom) of the East Germans.

Civil Liberties. Media are government-owned means of indoctrination. Dissidents are repressed by imprisonment and exclusion; the publication or importation of materials with opposing views is forbidden. One may be arrested for private conversation, but complaints about policy implementation occur in all media. Among the thousands of prisoners of conscience, the most common offense is trying to leave the country illegally (or in some cases even seeking permission to leave), or propaganda against the state. Prisoners of conscience may be severely beaten or otherwise harmed. Political reeducation may be a condition of release. The average person is not allowed freedom of occupation or residence. Once defined as an enemy of the state, a person may be barred from his occupation and his children denied higher education. Particularly revealing has been the use of the "buying out scheme" by which West Germany has been able intermittently to obtain the release of prisoners in the East through cash payments and delivering goods such as bananas and coffee. There is considerable religious freedom, with the Catholic and Protestant hierarchies possessing some independence. Freedom exists within the family, although there is no right to privacy or the inviolability of the home, mail, or telephone. Agriculture is highly collectivized and virtually all indus-

try is state controlled. Membership in unions, production cooperatives, and other associations is compulsory.

Comparatively: East Germany is as free as Bulgaria, less free than Poland.

GERMANY, WEST

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: decentralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 61,700,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. West Germany is a parliamentary democracy with an indirectly elected and largely ceremonial president. Both major parties have ruled since the war. The weak Senate is elected by the assemblies of the constituent states and loyally defends states' rights. Successive national governments have been based on changing party balances in the powerful lower house. The states have their own elected assemblies; they control education, internal security, and culture.

Civil Liberties. The papers are independent and free, with little governmental interference. Radio and television are organized in public corporations under the usually neutral direction of the state governments. Generally the rule of law has been carefully observed, and the full spectrum of private freedoms is available. In recent years jobs have been denied to some individuals with radical leftist connections; terrorist activities have led to tighter security regulations, invasions of privacy, and less acceptance of nonconformity. Arrests have been made for handling or producing inflammatory literature, for neo-Nazi propaganda or organization, or for calling in question the courts or electoral system. Government participation in the economy is largely regulatory; in addition, complex social programs and worker participation in management have limited certain private freedoms while possibly expanding others.

Comparatively: West Germany is as free as France, freer than Spain, less free than the United States of America.

GHANA

Economy: capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 6
Polity: military nonparty	Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 12,400,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A transethnic heterogeneous state with subnationalities

Political Rights. As the result of a coup the country is currently under the rule of a military faction, with the support of some radical parties. On the local level traditional sources of power are still significant. There have been elected district and local councils. *Subnationalities:* The country is composed of a variety of peoples, with those in the south most self-conscious. The latter are the descendants of a number of traditional kingdoms, of which the Ashanti was the most important. A north-south, Muslim-Christian opposition exists but is weakly developed, because of the economic and numerical weakness and the incomplete hold of Islam in the north. In the south and center of the country a sense of Akan identity is developing among the Ashanti, Fanti, and others; since they include forty-five percent of the people, this amounts to strengthening the ethnic core of the nation. The leaders of the one million Ewe in the southeast (a people divided between Ghana and Togo) have on occasion asked for separation or enhanced self-determination.

Civil Liberties. The press is government and private; radio and television are government owned. Both are under close government scrutiny. Private opinion is expressed on most matters. There were some political detentions and police brutality before the 1981 military coup; such denials of rights have subsequently increased. There has been a great deal of government control in some areas of the economy—especially in cocoa production, on which the economy depends, and in modern capital-intensive industry. The assets of many businesses have been frozen. Some groups, including the strong women's marketing associations, have resisted government attempts to impose price ceilings on all goods. Like Senegal, Ghana has a relatively highly developed industry and its agriculture is dependent on world markets. Religion and travel are generally free.

Comparatively: Ghana is as free as North Yemen, freer than Liberia, less free than Ivory Coast.

GREECE

Economy: capitalist-statist

Polity: centralized multiparty

Population: 9,800,000

Political Rights: 1

Civil Liberties: 2

Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous state

Political Rights. Greece is a parliamentary democracy with a theoretically strong, but indirectly elected, president. The stabilization of free institutions is proceeding rapidly: recent elections have been competitive and open to the full spectrum of parties. Provincial administration is centrally controlled; there is local self-government.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers are private and the judiciary is independent. Broadcast media are government owned and controlled. There are no known prisoners of conscience. Because of the recent revolutionary situation all views are not freely expressed (a situation similar to that in post-fascist Portugal). One can be imprisoned for insulting the authorities or religion. The service sector is dominated by family-run businesses, but state intervention and patronage are significant. Private rights are respected. Union activity is free.

Comparatively: Greece is as free as France, freer than Finland, less free than Netherlands.

GRENADA

Economy: mixed socialist

Political Rights: 6

Polity: centralized dominant-party

Civil Liberties: 5

Population: 100,000

Status of Freedom: not free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. In 1979 a major opposition party came to power by force. The change was initially popular, but the new leaders have increasingly monopolized power and have now postponed elections indefinitely. Opposition parties are no longer active. There is no local government.

Civil Liberties. The news media are government controlled. All opposition or nongovernment media have been eliminated; arbitrary arrests of journalists have been legalized. Opposition assemblies have regularly been broken up. Many opposition political leaders have been detained indefinitely on vague charges. Unions are under government pressure. Some property has been confiscated; the processing and marketing of spices, the major export, have been nationalized. State-sponsored cooperatives are being formed, though small private farms remain more common.

Comparatively: Grenada is as free as Argentina, freer than Haiti, less free than Panama.

GUATEMALA

Economy: noninclusive capitalist

Political Rights: 6

Polity: military nonparty

Civil Liberties: 6

Population: 7,700,000

Status of Freedom: not free

An ethnic state with a major potential territorial subnationality

Political Rights. Until a 1982 coup Guatemala was formally a constitutional democracy on the American model. Election results were often altered

in favor of a preselected candidate. The 1982 military coup was in part a response to such irregularities. The provinces are centrally administered. Military and other security forces maintain decisive extra-constitutional power at all levels. *Subnationalities*: Various groups of Mayan and other Indians make up half the population; they do not yet have a subnationalist sense of unity, but are very involved in guerrilla activity.

Civil Liberties. The press and a large portion of radio and television are privately controlled. The press is generally free, but self-censorship has been common, because of the threat of torture and murder by political opponents. Following the 1982 coup a state of siege led to direct control of the press and suspension of unions. The struggle against rural guerrillas has led to frequent attacks on recalcitrant peasants or Indians by security forces. The judiciary is under both leftist and governmental pressure in political or subversive cases and has become relatively ineffective in these areas. Unions have been intimidated, and property rights have not been secure. A land resettlement program for peasants continues in spite of strong, often violent, resistance from agribusinesses. Fear of attack inhibits domestic travel, but other private rights seem fairly well respected.

Comparatively: Guatemala is as free as Cuba, freer than Haiti, less free than Nicaragua.

GUINEA

Economy: noninclusive socialist

Political Rights: 7

Polity: socialist one-party

Civil Liberties: 7

Population: 5,300,000

Status of Freedom: not free

A formally transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Guinea is a one-party socialist dictatorship. Elections for president and parliament are uncontested. The party controls all levels of government. Power is concentrated in one tribal group.

Civil Liberties. All media are government or party owned and censorship is rigid. Ideological purity is demanded in all areas except religion. There are prisoners of conscience; torture has been common and execution frequent. Hundreds or thousands may have died in detention. Everyone must participate in guided political activity. Few private rights, such as those to organize unions, develop property, or choose one's education are recognized. Private lawyers are not permitted. Industry is heavily nationalized and private farmers, who provide most produce, are denied credit. A pervasive black market circumvents the state distribution system. Seasonal migration within the country and across the border is unrestricted. There is no legal sanctity of the home.

Comparatively: Guinea is as free as Ethiopia, less free than Zambia.

GUINEA-BISSAU

Economy: noninclusive socialist **Political Rights:** 6
Polity: socialist one-party (military **Civil Liberties:** 6
dominated) **Status of Freedom:** not free
Population: 800,000

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Guinea-Bissau is administered by one party; all other parties are illegal. A 1980 coup dissolved the previous formally representative institutions. Local economic control under party guidance is emphasized.

Civil Liberties. The media are government controlled; criticism of the system is forbidden. There are prisoners of conscience. Political executions are alleged to have been common and opponents are readily imprisoned. Union activity is government directed. Land ownership is public or communal. The small industrial sector remains mixed, but the continuing economic crisis has virtually halted all private sector activity. Travel and religion are relatively free.

Comparatively: Guinea-Bissau is as free as Tanzania, freer than Guinea, less free than Senegal.

GUYANA

Economy: mixed socialist **Political Rights:** 5
Polity: centralized multiparty **Civil Liberties:** 4
Population: 900,000 **Status of Freedom:** partly free

An ethnically complex state

Political Rights. Guyana is a parliamentary democracy. However, in recent elections the government has been responsibly charged with irregularities that resulted in its victory. The 1980 parliamentary elections were criticized by both foreign and local observers for lack of adequate controls. Opposition parties are denied equal access to the media, and their supporters are discriminated against in employment. Administration is generally centralized but there are some elected local officials.

Civil Liberties. Radio is now government owned. Several opposition newspapers have been nationalized; the opposition papers have been forced to small, restricted editions. However, a variety of foreign news media are still available. There is a right of assembly, but harassment occurs. There is an operating human rights organization. All private schools have been nationalized recently, and the government has interfered with university appointments. It is possible to win against the government in court; there are no prisoners of conscience. Art and music are under considerable government control. Unions

are free but under increasing pressure. The private sector is stagnating under official intimidation, although a black market thrives. Social benefits are available only to the politically favored. Internal exile has been used against political opponents.

Comparatively: Guyana is as free as El Salvador, freer than Nicaragua, less free than Colombia.

HAITI

Economy: noninclusive capitalist **Political Rights:** 7
Polity: dominant party **Civil Liberties:** 6
Population: 6,100,000 **Status of Freedom:** not free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Haiti is a dictatorship with an ephemeral ruling party. Elections allow little if any opposition. Small parties have been organized, but effectively neutralized. There are elected mayors.

Civil Liberties. The media are both private and public. Censorship is legal for all media, including films and theatre; attempts at independence in journalism were severely repressed in 1980. Rights of assembly and organization are restricted. A government-sponsored militia has suppressed opposition; political murders, imprisonment without trial, exile, and torture have characterized the system intermittently. An acceptable rule of law has been in abeyance during a prolonged "state of siege"; property has been seized indiscriminately by security forces. Many people attempt to flee the country illegally every year; several dozen opponents have been forcibly expelled. Union activity is restricted. Corruption seriously infringes rights to political equality.

Comparatively: Haiti is as free as Benin, freer than Guinea, less free than Panama.

HONDURAS

Economy: noninclusive capitalist **Political Rights:** 2
Polity: centralized multiparty **Civil Liberties:** 3
Population: 4,000,000 **Status of Freedom:** free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. The government is now a parliamentary democracy with an elected president. Because of recent history the military remains politically influential. Provincial government is centrally administered; local government is elected.

Civil Liberties. The media are largely private and free of prior censorship. Militant peasant organizations and political parties continue to function outside government control. The struggle of peasants for land often leads to violence, but the government actively seeks peaceful resolutions. Guerrilla war in neighboring countries has led to violent suppression of refugees and others. Most private rights are respected—insofar as government power reaches. Labor unions have suffered oppression, but are relatively strong, especially in plantation areas. There is freedom of religion and movement.

Comparatively: Honduras is as free as Peru, freer than Panama, less free than Venezuela.

HUNGARY

Economy: socialist

Polity: communist one-party

Population: 10,700,000

Political Rights: 6

Civil Liberties: 5

Status of Freedom: not free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Hungary is ruled as a one-party communist dictatorship. Although there is an elective national assembly as well as local assemblies, all candidates must be approved by the party, and the decisions of the politburo are decisive. Within this framework recent elections have allowed little or no choice among candidates. The group rights of the Hungarian people are diminished by the government's official acceptance of the right of the Soviet government to interfere in the domestic affairs of Hungary by force.

Civil Liberties. Media are under government or party control. Basic criticism of top leaders, communism, human rights performance, or the Soviet presence is inadmissible, but some criticism is allowed, especially through papers, plays, books, and the importation of foreign publications or listening to foreign broadcasts. Prisoners of conscience are detained regularly, though usually for short periods. Control over religious affairs is more relaxed than in most communist states. Although private rights are not guaranteed, in practice there is considerable private property, and permission to travel into and out of the country is easier to obtain than in most of Eastern Europe. The border with Austria is essentially open. Unions are party directed and have no right to strike, although workers have gained some influence over enterprise management and operations.

Comparatively: Hungary is as free as Yugoslavia, freer than Czechoslovakia, less free than Egypt.

ICELAND

Economy: capitalist
Polity: centralized multiparty
Population: 228,000

Political Rights: 1
Civil Liberties: 1
Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Iceland is governed by a parliamentary democracy. Recent years have seen important shifts in voter sentiment, resulting successively in right- and left-wing coalitions. Although a small country Iceland has pursued a highly independent foreign policy. Provinces are ruled by central government appointees.

Civil Liberties. The press is private or party and free of censorship. Radio and television are state owned, but supervised by a public board representing major parties and interests. There are no political prisoners and the judiciary is independent. Private rights are respected; few are poor or illiterate.

Comparatively: Iceland is as free as Norway, freer than Portugal.

INDIA

Economy: noninclusive capitalist-statist
Polity: decentralized multiparty
Population: 713,800,000

Political Rights: 2
Civil Liberties: 3
Status of Freedom: free

A multinational and complex state

Political Rights. India is a parliamentary democracy in which the opposition has had an opportunity to rule. The strong powers retained by its component states have been compromised in recent years by the central government's frequent imposition of direct rule. Calling immediate state elections where the opposition continues to rule after a national change of government is a recent practice compromising the federal system.

Subnationalities. India contains a diverse collection of mostly territorially distinct peoples united by historical experience and the predominance of Hinduism. India's dominant peoples are those of the north central area who speak as a first language either the official language, Hindi (Hindustani), or a very closely related dialect of Sanskrit origin. The other major subnational peoples of India may be divided into several groups: (1) peoples with separate states that are linguistically and historically only marginally distinct from the dominant Hindi speakers (for example, the Marathi, Gujerati, or Oriya); (2) peoples with separate states that are of Sanskrit background linguistically, but have a relatively strong sense of separate identity (for example, Bengalis or Kashmiris); (3) peoples with separate states that are linguistically and to some extent racially quite distinct (for example, Telegu or Malayalam); and (4)

peoples that do not have states of their own and are often survivors of India's pre-Aryan peoples (for example, Santali, Bhuti-Lepcha, or Mizo). With the exception of the last group, the Indian federal system accords a fair amount of democratic rights to all peoples. Several peoples from groups (2), (3), and (4) have shown through legal (especially votes) and illegal means a strong desire by a significant part of the population for independence or greater autonomy (notably Kashmiris, Nagas, and Mizos). This accounting leaves out many *nonterritorial* religious and caste minorities, although, here again, the system has granted relatively broad rights to such groups to reasonable self-determination.

Civil Liberties. The Indian press is strong and independent. Radio and television are government controlled in this largely illiterate country and serve government interests. There have been illegal arrests, questionable killings, and reports of torture by the police which have often been out of control. The judiciary is generally responsive, fair, and independent. The problem of extreme trial delay has recently been addressed. The frequent near anarchy offers many examples both of freedom and repression. There are few, if any, prisoners of conscience, but there are hundreds imprisoned for real or "proposed" political violence, and demonstrations may lead to fatalities and large-scale jailings. Due to the decentralized political structure there is a great deal of regional variation in the operation of security laws. Kashmir has especially repressive security policies in relation to the press and political detention; Sikkim is treated as an Indian colony, and the same might be said for other border areas. Indians enjoy freedom to travel, to worship as they please, and to organize for mutual benefit, especially in unions. Lack of education, extreme poverty, and surviving traditional controls certainly reduce the meaning of such liberties for large numbers of Indians.

Comparatively: India is as free as Spain, freer than Malaysia, less free than Japan.

INDONESIA

Economy: noninclusive capitalist-statist

Polity: centralized dominant-party (military dominated)

Population: 151,300,000

Political Rights: 5

Civil Liberties: 5

Status of Freedom: partly free

A transethnic heterogeneous state with active and potential subnationalities

Political Rights. Indonesia is a controlled parliamentary democracy under military direction. Recent parliamentary elections allowed some competition but severely restricted opposition campaigning and organization. The number and character of opposition parties are carefully controlled, parties must refrain from criticizing one another, candidates of both government and opposition require government approval, and the opposition is not allowed to organize in rural areas. In any event parliament does not have a great deal of

power. Regional and local government is under central control. Local assemblies are elected. *Subnationalities*: Indonesia includes a variety of ethnic groups and is divided by crosscutting island identities. Although the island of Java is numerically dominant, the national language is not Javanese, and most groups or islands do not appear to have strong subnational identifications. Both civilian and military elites generally attempt to maintain religious, ethnic, and regional balance. Groups demanding independence exist in Sulawesi, the Moluccas, Timor, West Irian, and northern Sumatra, and continue to mount revolts against the government.

Civil Liberties. Most newspapers are private. All are subject to fairly close government supervision; criticism of the system is muted by periodic suppressions. Radio and television are government controlled. Freedom of assembly is restricted, but citizens are not compelled to attend meetings. There continue to be prisoners of conscience, but most are now detained only for short periods. Thousands of released prisoners remain in a second-class status, especially in regard to residence and employment. In this area the army rather than the civilian judiciary is dominant. Torture has been infrequent recently; the army has been responsible for many thousands of unnecessary deaths in its suppression of revolt in, or conquest of, East Timor. Union activity is closely regulated, but labor organization is widespread and strikes occur. Movement, especially to the cities, is restricted; other private rights are generally respected. The Indonesian bureaucracy has an unenviable reputation for arbitrariness and corruption, practices that reduce the effective expression of human rights. There are many active human rights organizations. Much of industry and commercial agriculture is government owned; sharecropping and tenant farming are relatively common, particularly on Java.

Comparatively: Indonesia is as free as China (Taiwan), freer than Burma, less free than Singapore.

IRAN

Economy: noninclusive capitalist-statist

Polity: quasi-dominant party

Population: 41,200,000

Political Rights: 6

Civil Liberties: 6

Status of Freedom: not free

An ethnic state with major territorial subnationalities

Political Rights. Iran is a competitive democracy, though the direction of the nonelective theocratic leadership greatly limits the alternatives. Recent elections have allowed some choice but opposition figures have been all but eliminated from the system. *Subnationalities*: Among the most important non-Persian peoples are the Kurds, the Azerbaijani Turks, the Baluch, and a variety of other (primarily Turkish) tribes. Many of these have striven for

independence in the recent past when the opportunity arose. The Kurds are in active revolt.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers are private or party, but have been repeatedly suppressed or otherwise controlled during the year. Other media are largely government owned and are propaganda organs. The right of assembly has been denied to those who do not approve of the new system. There are many prisoners of conscience and executions for political offenses, often nonviolent, have been frequent. Unions have been suppressed. Anarchy has led to vigilante groups competing with the official security system; many private rights have become highly insecure. This is especially so for Bahais and other religious minorities. Legal emigration is quite difficult. Education is subject to religious restrictions; the freedom and equality of women have been radically curtailed.

Comparatively: Iran is as free as Jordan, freer than Iraq, less free than Bangladesh.

IRAQ

Economy: noninclusive socialist	Political Rights: 6
Polity: socialist one-party (military dominated)	Civil Liberties: 7
Population: 14,000,000	Status of Freedom: not free

An ethnic state with a major territorial subnationality

Political Rights. Iraq is essentially a one-party state under military leadership. A 1980 parliamentary election allowed some choice of individuals, but all candidates were carefully selected and no policy choices were allowed. Parliament appears to have little, if any, power. Provinces are governed from the center. *Subnationalities:* The Kurds have been repeatedly denied self-determination, most recently through reoccupation of their lands and an attempt to disperse them about the country.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers are public or party and are closely controlled by the government; both foreign and domestic books and movies are censored. Radio and television are government monopolies. The strident media are emphasized as governmental means for active indoctrination. Political imprisonment, brutality, and torture are common, and execution frequent. Poisoning upon release from prison appears to be a recent innovation. The families of suspects are often imprisoned. Rights are largely de facto or those deriving from traditional religious law. Religious freedom and freedom to organize for any purpose is very limited. Education is intended to serve the party's purposes. Iraq has a dual economy, with a large traditional sector. The government has taken over much of the modern petroleum-based economy and, through land reform leading to collectives and state farms, has limited private economic choice.

Comparatively: Iraq is as free as Libya, freer than Somalia, less free than Iran.

IRELAND

Economy: capitalist
Polity: centralized multiparty
Population: 3,500,000

Political Rights: 1
Civil Liberties: 1
Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Ireland is a parliamentary democracy which successfully shifts national power among parties. The bicameral legislature has an appointive upper house with powers only of delay. Local government is not powerful, but is elective rather than appointive. The referendum is also used for national decisions.

Civil Liberties. The press is free and private, and radio and television are under an autonomous corporation. Strong censorship has always been exercised over both publishers and the press, but since this is of social rather than political content, it lies within that sphere of control permitted a majority in a free democracy. The rule of law is firmly established and private rights are guaranteed.

Comparatively: Ireland is as free as Canada, freer than France.

ISRAEL

Economy: mixed capitalist
Polity: centralized multiparty
Population: 4,100,000

Political Rights: 2
Civil Liberties: 2
Status of Freedom: free

An ethnic state with microterritorial subnationalities

Political Rights. Israel is governed under a parliamentary system. Recent elections have resulted in shifts of power among the many political parties. Provinces are ruled from the center, although there are important local elective offices in the cities. *Subnationalities:* National elections do not involve the Arabs in the occupied territories; Arabs in Israel proper participate in Israeli elections as a minority. Arabs both in Israel and the occupied territories must live in their homeland under the cultural and political domination of twentieth-century immigrants.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers are private or party, and free of censorship except for restrictions relating to the always precarious national security. Radio and television are government owned. In general the rule of law is observed, although Arabs in Israel are not accorded the full rights of citizens,

and the Orthodox Jewish faith holds a special position in the country's religious, customary, and legal life. Detentions, house arrest, and brutality have been reported against Arabs opposing Israel's Palestine policy. Because of the war, the socialist-cooperative ideology of its founders, and dependence on outside support, the role of private enterprise in the economy has been less than in most of Euro-America. Arabs are, in effect, not allowed to buy land from Jews, and Arab land has been expropriated for Jewish settlement. Unions are economically and politically powerful and control twenty-five percent of industry. Freedom House's rating of Israel is based on its judgment of the situation in Israel proper and not that in the occupied territories.

Comparatively: Israel is as free as Portugal, freer than Spain, less free than France.

ITALY

Economy: capitalist-statist

Polity: centralized multiparty

Population: 57,400,000

Political Rights: 1

Civil Liberties: 2

Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population with small territorial subnationalities

Political Rights. Italy is a bicameral parliamentary democracy. Elections are generally free. Since the 1940s governments have been dominated by the Christian Democrats, with coalitions shifting between dependence on minor parties of the left or right. The fascist party is banned. Referendums are used to supplement parliamentary rule. Opposition parties gain local political power, but regional and local power are generally quite limited. Regional institutions are developing.

Civil Liberties. Italian newspapers are free and cover a broad spectrum. Radio and television are both public and private and provide unusually diverse programming. Laws against defamation of the government and foreign and ecclesiastical officials exert a slight limiting effect on the media. Freedom of speech is inhibited in some areas and for many individuals by the violence of extremist groups or criminal organizations. Since the bureaucracy does not promptly respond to citizen desires, it represents, as in many countries, an additional impediment to the full expression of the rule of law. Detention may last for years without trial. Unions are strong and independent. Major industries are managed by the government, and the government has undertaken extensive reallocations of land.

Comparatively: Italy is as free as Greece, freer than Morocco, less free than the Netherlands.

IVORY COAST

Economy: noninclusive capitalist **Political Rights:** 5
Polity: nationalist one-party **Civil Liberties:** 5
Population: 8,800,000 **Status of Freedom:** partly free

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Ivory Coast is ruled by a one-party, capitalist dictatorship into which a variety of political elements have been integrated. Assembly elections have recently allowed choice of individuals, including nonparty, but not policies. Organized in the 1940s, the ruling party incorporates a variety of interests and forces. Provinces are ruled directly from the center. Contested mayoralty elections occur.

Civil Liberties. Although the legal press is mostly party or government controlled, it presents a limited spectrum of opinion. Foreign publications are widely available. While opposition is discouraged, there is no ideological conformity. Radio and television are government controlled. Short-term imprisonment and conscription are used to control opposition. Travel and religion are generally free. There is a limited right to strike and organize unions. Economically the country depends on small private or traditional farms; in the modern sector private enterprise is encouraged.

Comparatively: Ivory Coast is as free as Sierra Leone, freer than Guinea, less free than Senegal.

JAMAICA

Economy: capitalist-statist **Political Rights:** 2
Polity: centralized multiparty **Civil Liberties:** 3
Population: 2,200,000 **Status of Freedom:** free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Jamaica is a parliamentary democracy in which power changes from one party to another. However, political life is violent; the last election was accompanied by 700 deaths in the pre-election period. The general neutrality of the civil service, police and army preserves the system. Regional or local administrations have little independent power, although there are elected parish councils.

Civil Liberties. In spite of nationalization of several of the news media, critical media are widely available to the public. Freedom of assembly and organization are generally respected. The judiciary and much of the bureaucracy retain independence. Although some foreign companies have been nationalized, the economy remains largely in private hands. Labor is both politically and economically powerful.

Comparatively: Jamaica is as free as Colombia, freer than Panama, less free than Dominica.

JAPAN

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 118,600,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Japan is a bicameral, constitutional monarchy with a relatively weak upper house. The conservative-to-centrist Liberal Democratic Party ruled with solid majorities from independence in the early 1950s until the mid-1970s. Although the Liberal Democrats have lost considerable support in recent elections, through coalitions with independents they have maintained control at the national level and have recently showed increased strength at the local level. Concentrated business interests have played a strong role in maintaining Liberal Party hegemony through the use of their money, influence, and prestige. In addition, a weighting of representation in favor of rural areas tends to maintain the Liberal Party position. Opposition parties are fragmented. They have local control in some areas, but the power of local and regional assemblies and officials is limited. Since electoral and parliamentary procedures are democratic, we assume that Japan's system would freely allow a transfer of national power to an opposition group should the majority desire it. Democracy within the Liberal Party is increasing.

Civil Liberties. News media are generally private and free, although many radio and television stations are served by a public broadcasting corporation. Television is excellent and quite free. Courts of law are not as important in Japanese society as in Europe and America; both the courts and police appear to be relatively fair. Travel and change of residence are unrestricted. The public expressions and actions of many people are more restricted than in most modern democracies by traditional controls. Japanese style collectivism leads to strong social pressures, especially psychological pressures, in many spheres (unions, corporations, or religious-political groups, such as Soka Gakkai). Human rights organizations are very active.

Comparatively: Japan is as free as Australia, freer than France.

JORDAN

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 6
Polity: traditional nonparty	Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 3,500,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Jordan is an absolute monarchy. There are no parties; parliament is dissolved. In 1978 an appointive National Consultative Council was established, but it has little power. Provinces are ruled from the center; elected local governments have limited autonomy. The king and his ministers are regularly petitioned by citizens.

Civil Liberties. Papers are mostly private but self-censored and occasionally suspended. Television and radio are government controlled. Free private conversation and mild public criticism are allowed. Under continuing emergency laws normal legal guarantees for political suspects are suspended, and organized opposition is not permitted. There are prisoners of conscience and instances of torture. Labor has a limited right to organize and strike. Private rights such as those to property, travel, or religion appear to be respected. The government has partial control over many large corporations.

Comparatively: Jordan is as free as Saudi Arabia, freer than South Yemen, less free than Egypt.

KENYA

Economy: noninclusive capitalist

Political Rights: 5

Polity: nationalist one-party

Civil Liberties: 5

Population: 17,900,000

Status of Freedom: partly free

A formally transethnic heterogeneous state with active and potential subnationalities

Political Rights. Kenya is a one-party nationalist state in which the largest tribal group has a preponderance of political power. Election results often express popular dissatisfaction, but candidates avoid discussion of basic policy or the president. Selection of top party and national leaders is by consensus or acclamation. The administration is centralized, but elements of tribal and communal government continue at the periphery. *Subnationalities:* Comprising twenty percent of the population, the Kikuyu are the largest tribal group. In a very heterogeneous society, the Luo are the second most important subnationality.

Civil Liberties. The press is private, but essentially no criticism of major policies is allowed. Radio and television are under government control. Rights of assembly, organization, and demonstration are limited. The courts have considerable independence. Prisoners of conscience detained intermittently include university lecturers and writers. Defending them in court has now become itself dangerous. Unions are active but strikes are de facto illegal. Private rights are generally respected. Land is gradually coming under private rather than tribal control.

Comparatively: Kenya is as free as Ivory Coast, freer than Djibouti, less free than Gambia.

KIRIBATI

Economy: noninclusive capitalist-statist **Political Rights:** 2
Polity: decentralized nonparty **Civil Liberties:** 2
Population: 57,000 **Status of Freedom:** free

A relatively homogeneous population with a territorial subnationality

Political Rights. Both the legislature and chief minister are elected in a fully competitive system. Local government is significant.

Civil Liberties. The press is private; radio government owned. Public expression appears to be free and the rule of law guaranteed. The modern economy is dominated by investments from the now virtually depleted government-run phosphate industry. A free union operates, and most agriculture is small private subsistence.

Comparatively: Kiribati is as free as Fiji, freer than Western Samoa, less free than Australia.

KOREA, NORTH

Economy: socialist **Political Rights:** 7
Polity: communist one-party **Civil Liberties:** 7
Population: 18,700,000 **Status of Freedom:** not free

A relatively homogeneous state

Political Rights. North Korea is a hard-line communist dictatorship in which the organs and assemblies of government are merely a facade for party or individual rule. National elections allow no choice. The politburo is under one-man rule; the dictator's son is the dictator's officially anointed successor. Military officers are very strong in top positions.

Civil Liberties. The media are all government controlled, with glorification of the leader a major responsibility. External publications are rigidly excluded and those who listen to foreign broadcasts severely punished. No individual thoughts are advanced publicly or privately. Individual rights are minimal. Everyone is given a security rating that determines future success. Opponents are even kidnapped overseas. Rights to travel internally and externally are perhaps the most restricted in the world: tourism is unknown—even to communist countries. Social classes are politically defined in a rigidly controlled society. There are thousands of long-term prisoners of conscience; torture is reportedly common. There are also reeducation centers and internal exile. There is no private business or agriculture.

Comparatively: North Korea is as free as Albania, less free than South Korea.

KOREA, SOUTH

Economy: capitalist
Polity: centralized multiparty
Population: 41,100,000
Political Rights: 5
Civil Liberties: 5
Status of Freedom: partly free

A relatively homogeneous state

Political Rights. South Korea is under a military regime with the support of a partly free legislature. Recent elections of both president and assembly have given opposition leaders a restricted right to compete. There is no independent local government.

Civil Liberties. Although most newspapers are private, as well as many radio stations and one television station, they have been reorganized by government fiat. Freedom to express differing opinion has been repeatedly restricted but it also reemerges, and the mobilization of public opinion by the opposition directly affects government policy. Because of government pressure, self-censorship is the rule. Special laws against criticizing the constitution, the government, or its policies have resulted in many prisoners of conscience and the use of torture. The courts have not been able to effectively protect the rights of political suspects or prisoners. Many political opponents have been denied travel permits. Human rights organizations are active, but have been under heavy pressure. Outside this arena private rights have been generally respected. Rapid, capitalistic economic growth has been combined with a relatively egalitarian income distribution. Government controls most heavy industry; other sectors are private. Union activity remains severely curtailed under the 1980 labor law.

Comparatively: South Korea is as free as Turkey, freer than China (Mainland), less free than Thailand.

KUWAIT

Economy: mixed capitalist-statist
Polity: traditional nonparty
Population: 1,300,000
Political Rights: 4
Civil Liberties: 4
Status of Freedom: partly free

The citizenry is relatively homogeneous

Political Rights. Kuwait is a constitutional and parliamentary monarchy with a limited franchise and concentration of power in the monarch. Citizens have access to the monarch. More than half the population are immigrants; their political, economic, and social rights are inferior to those of natives.

Civil Liberties. Although the private press presents diverse opinions and ideological viewpoints, papers are subject to suspension for "spreading dis-

sension." Radio and television are government controlled. Freedom of assembly is curtailed. Public critics may be detained, expelled, or have their passports confiscated. Formal political parties are not allowed. Private discussion is open, and few, if any, political prisoners are held. Private freedoms are respected, and independent unions operate. There is a wide variety of enabling government activity in fields such as education, housing, and medicine that is not based on reducing choice through taxation.

Comparatively: Kuwait is as free as Zimbabwe, freer than Saudi Arabia, less free than Nepal.

LAOS

Economy: noninclusive socialist **Political Rights: 7**
Polity: communist one-party **Civil Liberties: 7**
Population: 3,700,000 **Status of Freedom:** not free

An ethnic state with active or potential subnationalities

Political Rights. Laos has established a traditional communist party dictatorship in which the party is superior to the external government at all levels. The government is subservient to the desires of the Vietnamese communist party, upon which the present leaders must depend. There is continued resistance in rural areas, where many groups have been violently suppressed. *Subnationalities:* Pressure on the Hmong (Meo) hill people has caused the majority of them to flee the country.

Civil Liberties. The media are all government controlled. There are many political prisoners; large numbers remain in reeducation camps. There are few accepted private rights, but there has been some relaxation of opposition to traditional ways recently. Collectivization has been halted since 1979 because of peasant resistance; most farmers continue to be small, individual owners. Strict controls have been imposed on urban entrepreneurs. Travel within and exit from the country is highly restricted.

Comparatively: Laos is as free as Mongolia, less free than China (Mainland).

LEBANON

Economy: capitalist **Political Rights: 5**
Polity: decentralized multiparty **Civil Liberties: 4**
Population: 2,700,000 **Status of Freedom:** partly free

A complex, multinational, microterritorial state

Political Rights. In theory Lebanon is a parliamentary democracy with a strong but indirectly elected president. In spite of the calamities of the last

few years the constitutional system still functions to varying degrees in much of the country. The parliament is elected, although the last general election was in 1972. Palestinians, local militias, Syrian, and Israeli forces have all but erased sovereignty in much of the country. *Subnationalities*: Leading administrative and parliamentary officials are allocated among the several religious or communal groups by complicated formulas. These groups have for years pursued semi-autonomous lives within the state, although their territories are often intermixed.

Civil Liberties. Renowned for its independence, the press still offers a highly diverse selection to an attentive audience. Most censorship is now self-imposed, reflecting the views of locally dominant military forces. Radio is government and party; television is part government and now officially uncensored. Widespread killing in recent years has inhibited the nationwide expression of most freedoms and tightened communal controls on individuals. In many areas the courts cannot function effectively, but within its power the government secures most private rights. Few if any prisoners of conscience are detained by the government. Unions are government-supervised and subsidized and generally avoid political activity. There is little government intervention in the predominantly service-oriented economy. There is an active human rights organization.

Comparatively: Lebanon is as free as Morocco, freer than Syria, less free than Cyprus.

L E S O T H O

Economy: noninclusive capitalist

Political Rights: 5

Polity: partially centralized
dominant party

Civil Liberties: 5

Status of Freedom: partly free

Population: 1,400,000

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Lesotho is a constitutional monarchy essentially under the one-man rule of the leader of the ruling political party who suspended the constitution to avoid being defeated in 1970. Opposition parties as well as the king have been repressed. Guerrilla activity remains. Major elements of the traditional system (chiefs) remain, and members of other parties have been introduced into the government. There is some local government. Although there are frequent expressions of national independence, Lesotho remains under considerable South African economic and political pressure. Lesotho is populated almost exclusively by Basotho people, and the land has never been alienated. A large percentage of the male citizenry works in South Africa.

Civil Liberties. The media are government and church; criticism is muted. Opposition political activity or assembly is repressed, but not eliminated.

interests and are relatively fair. Whatever the form, no opposition is allowed on the larger questions of society. Institutional self-management has been widely introduced in schools, hospitals, and factories. Sometimes the system works well enough to provide a meaningful degree of decentralized self-determination.

Civil Liberties. The media are government-controlled means for active indoctrination. Political discussion at the local level is relatively open. There are many political prisoners; the use of military and people's courts for political cases suggests little respect for the rule of law, yet acquittals in political cases occur. All lawyers must work for the state. Torture and mistreatment are frequent; executions for crimes of conscience occur—even in foreign countries. Although ideologically socialist, even some of the press remains in private hands. Oil and oil-related industry are the major government enterprises. Socialization tends to be announced at the top and imposed rather anarchically and sporadically at the bottom. Most private associations and trade are being integrated into or replaced by state organizations. Employment is increasingly dependent on political loyalty. Respect for Islam provides some check on arbitrary government.

Comparatively: Libya is as free as Algeria, freer than Afghanistan, less free than Tunisia.

LUXEMBOURG

Economy: capitalist

Polity: centralized multiparty

Population: 368,000

Political Rights: 1

Civil Liberties: 1

Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous state

Political Rights. Luxembourg is a constitutional monarchy on the Belgian model, in which the monarchy is somewhat more powerful than in the United Kingdom or Scandinavia. The legislature is bicameral with the appointive upper house having only a delaying function. Recent votes have resulted in important shifts in the nature of the dominant coalition.

Civil Liberties. The media are private and free. The rule of law is thoroughly accepted in both public and private realms. Rights of assembly, organization, travel, and property are protected.

Comparatively: Luxembourg is as free as Iceland, freer than France.

MADAGASCAR

Economy: noninclusive mixed
socialist

Polity: nationalist one-party
(military dominated)

Population: 9,200,000

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights: 6

Civil Liberties: 6

Status of Freedom: not free

Political Rights. Madagascar is a military dictatorship with a very weak legislature. Elections are restricted to candidates selected by the former political parties grouped in a "national front," a government sponsored coalition; parliament appears to play a very small part in government. Anarchical conditions call into question the extent to which the people are willing to grant the regime legitimacy. Emphasis has been put on developing the autonomy of local Malagasy governmental institutions, but the restriction of local elections to approved front candidates belies this emphasis. Although tribal rivalries are politically important, all groups speak the same language.

Civil Liberties. There is a private press, but papers are carefully censored and may be suspended. Broadcasting is government controlled. Movie theatres have been nationalized. The government replaced the national news agency with one which will "disregard information likely to be harmful to the government's socialist development policies." There is no right of assembly; one must be careful of public speech. There are few long-term prisoners of conscience; short-term political detentions are common, often combined with ill-treatment. The rule of law is weak. Labor unions are not strong and most are party-affiliated. Religion is free and most private rights respected. Public security is very weak. Overseas travel is restricted. While still encouraging private investment, most businesses and large farms are nationalized. Corruption is widespread.

Comparatively: Madagascar is as free as Tanzania, freer than Mozambique, less free than Egypt.

MALAWI

Economy: noninclusive capitalist	Political Rights: 6
Polity: nationalist one-party	Civil Liberties: 7
Population: 6,600,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Malawi is a one-man dictatorship with party and parliamentary forms. A 1978 election allowed some choice among individuals for the first time. Administration is centralized, but there are both traditional and modern local government.

Civil Liberties. The press is private or religious but under strict government control, as is the government-owned radio service. Even private criticism of the administration remains dangerous. Foreign publications are carefully screened. The country has been notable for the persecution of political opponents. In recent years there have been fewer prisoners of conscience, but even slight criticism still leads to severe penalties. Asians suffer discrimination. Corruption and economic inequality are characteristic. The comparatively limited interests of the government offer considerable scope for individual

assume control of strategic sectors of the economy, economic activity is generally free, except for government favoritism to the Malays.

Comparatively: Malaysia is as free as Mexico, freer than Indonesia, less free than Sri Lanka.

MALDIVES

Economy: noninclusive capitalist	Political Rights:	5
Polity: traditional nonparty	Civil Liberties:	5
Population: 160,000	Status of Freedom:	partly free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. The Maldives have a parliamentary government in which a president (elected by parliament and confirmed by the people) is predominant. The elected parliament has gained some freedom of discussion. Regional leaders are presidentially appointed, but there are elected councils. Both economic and political power are concentrated in the hands of a very small, wealthy elite. Islam places a check on absolutism.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers present some diversity of views but are under pressure to conform; the radio station is owned by the government. Foreign publications are received; political discussion is limited. Several persons have been arrested for their political associations since a coup attempt. Law is traditional Islamic law. No unions have been formed. Most of the people rely on a subsistence economy; the small elite has developed commercial fishing and tourism.

Comparatively: Maldives is as free as Qatar, freer than Seychelles, less free than Mauritius.

MALI

Economy: noninclusive mixed socialist	Political Rights:	7
Polity: nationalist one-party (military dominated)	Civil Liberties:	6
Population: 7,100,000	Status of Freedom:	not free

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Mali is a military dictatorship with a recently constructed political party to lend support. The regime appears to function without broad popular consensus. National elections allow no choice, though there is some at the local level. *Subnationalities:* Although the government is ostensibly above ethnic rivalries, repression of the northern peoples has been reported.

Civil Liberties. The media are all government owned and controlled. Antigovernment demonstrations are forbidden. Private conversation is relatively free. Political imprisonment and torture are frequent. Reeducation centers are brutal. Student protests are controlled by conscription and detention. Religion is free; unions are controlled; travelers must submit to frequent police checks. There have been reports of slavery and forced labor. Private economic rights in the modern sector are minimal, but collectivization has recently been deemphasized for subsistence agriculturists, the majority of the people. Corruption, particularly in the state enterprises, is widespread and costly.

Comparatively: Mali is as free as Benin, freer than Somalia, less free than Liberia.

MALTA

Economy: mixed capitalist-statist **Political Rights:** 2
Polity: centralized multiparty **Civil Liberties:** 3
Population: 400,000 **Status of Freedom:** free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights: Malta is a parliamentary democracy in which the governing party appears increasingly antidemocratic. The most recent election resulted in a government victory in spite of the opposition majority in the popular vote.

Civil Liberties: The press is free, but foreign and domestic journalists are under government pressure. Broadcasting is under a licensed body, but is accused of following a government line. Italian media are also available. Although the rule of law is generally accepted, the government is suspected of fomenting gang violence against its opponents. The government has concentrated a great deal of the economy in its hands, and social equalization programs have been emphasized. The governing party and major union have been amalgamated; one confederation remains independent, but subdued.

Comparatively: Malta is as free as Sri Lanka, freer than Turkey, less free than the United Kingdom.

MAURITANIA

Economy: noninclusive capitalist-
statist **Political Rights:** 7
Polity: military nonparty **Civil Liberties:** 6
Population: 1,700,000 **Status of Freedom:** not free

An ethnic state with a major territorial subnationality

Political Rights. Mauritania has been ruled by a succession of military leaders without formal popular or traditional legitimation. *Subnationalities:* There is a subnational movement, concerned particularly with linguistic questions in the non-Arab, southern part of the country.

Civil Liberties. The media are government owned and censored, but foreign publications and broadcasts are freely available. There are few if any long-term prisoners of conscience. Conversation is free; no ideology is imposed, but assembly is restricted and demonstrations repressed. Travel may be restricted for political reasons. Internal exile has been imposed on some former officials. Union activity is government controlled. There is religious freedom. The government controls much of industry and mining, as well as wholesale trade, but there have been recent moves to reduce government involvement. The large rural sector remains under tribal or family control. Only in 1980 did the government move to abolish slavery.

Comparatively: Mauritania is as free as Romania, freer than Guinea, less free than Morocco.

MAURITIUS

Economy: capitalist

Political Rights: 2

Polity: centralized multiparty

Civil Liberties: 3

Population: 1,000,000

Status of Freedom: free

An ethnically complex state

Political Rights. Mauritius is a parliamentary democracy. The radical opposition won 1982 elections overwhelmingly. A variety of different racial and religious communities are active in politics, although they are not territorially based. There are a number of semi-autonomous local governing bodies.

Civil Liberties. The press is private or party and without censorship. There is no national news agency. Broadcasting is government controlled. Opposition parties campaign freely. The labor union movement is quite strong, as are a variety of communal organizations. Strikes are common. There is religious and economic freedom; social services are financed through relatively high taxes.

Comparatively: Mauritius is as free as Botswana, freer than Bangladesh, less free than Fiji.

MEXICO

Economy: capitalist-statist

Political Rights: 3

Polity: decentralized dominant party

Civil Liberties: 4

Population: 71,300,000

Status of Freedom: partly free

An ethnic state with potential subnationalities

Political Rights. Mexico is ruled by a governmental system formally modeled on that of the United States; in practice the president is much stronger and the legislative and judicial branches much weaker. The states have independent governors and legislatures. The ruling party has had a near monopoly of power on all levels since the 1920s. Political competition has been largely confined to factional struggles within the ruling party. However, in 1979 new parties participated, and the new election law gave twenty-five percent of the seats to minor parties by proportional representation; the resulting congress showed unusual independence. Further progress in opening the system to other parties was reflected in the presidential election of mid-1982. Voting and campaign irregularities have been common, particularly on the local level. The clergy are not allowed to participate in the political process. *Subnationalities:* There is a large Mayan area in Yucatan that has formerly been restive; there are also other smaller Indian areas.

Civil Liberties. The media are mostly private. Although they have operated under a variety of direct and indirect government controls (including take-overs), they are generally free of overt censorship but operate under government "guidance." Literature and the arts are free. The judicial system is not strong. However, decisions can go against the government; it is possible to win a judicial decision that a law is unconstitutional in a particular application. Religion is free. Widespread bribery and lack of control over the behavior of security forces greatly limits operative freedom, especially in rural areas. Disappearances occur, detention is prolonged, torture and brutality have been common. Private economic rights are respected; government ownership predominates in major industries. Access to land continues to be a problem despite reform efforts. Nearly all labor unions are associated with the ruling party. There is a right to strike. Some union and student activity has been repressed. Critical human rights organizations exist.

Comparatively: Mexico is as free as Malaysia, freer than Nicaragua, less free than Colombia.

MONGOLIA

Economy: socialist

Polity: communist one-party

Population: 1,800,000

Political Rights: 7

Civil Liberties: 7

Status of Freedom: not free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. A one-party communist dictatorship, for many years Mongolia has been firmly under the control of one man. Power is organized at all levels through the party apparatus. Those who oppose the government cannot run for office. Parliamentary elections offer no choice and result in

99.9% victories. Mongolia has a subordinate relationship to the Soviet Union, which it depends on for defense against Chinese claims. It must use the USSR as an outlet for nearly all of its trade, and its finances are under close Soviet supervision.

Civil Liberties. All media are government controlled, and apparently quite effectively. Religion is greatly restricted, Lamaism having been nearly wiped out. Freedom of travel, residence, and other civil liberties are denied. Employment is assigned; workers committees are extensions of the party.

Comparatively: Mongolia is as free as Bulgaria, less free than the USSR.

MOROCCO

Economy: noninclusive capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 4
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 22,300,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

An ethnic state with active and potential subnationalities

Political Rights. Morocco is a constitutional monarchy in which the king has retained major executive powers. Recent elections at both local and national levels were fair and well contested in most localities. Most parties participated (including the communist); independents (largely supporters of the king) were the major winners. Opposition leaders were included in the subsequent government. The results of 1980 referendums were more questionable. The autonomy of local and regional elected governments is limited. *Subnationalities:* Although people in the newly acquired land of the Western Sahara participate in the electoral process, it has an important resistance movement. In the rest of the country the large Berber minority is a potential subnationality.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers are private or party, and quite diverse. Recently there has been no formal censorship; there are other pressures, including the confiscation of particular issues. Monarchical power must not be criticized. Both public and private broadcasting stations are under government control. In the past the use of torture has been quite common and may continue; the rule of law has also been weakened by the frequent use of prolonged detention without trial. There are many political prisoners; some are prisoners of conscience. Private organizational activity is vigorous and includes student, party, business, farmer, and human rights groups. There are strong independent labor unions in all sectors; religious and other private rights are respected. State intervention in the economy is increasing, particularly in agriculture and foreign trade.

Comparatively: Morocco is as free as Guyana, freer than Algeria, less free than Spain.

MOZAMBIQUE

Economy: noninclusive socialist **Political Rights: 7**
Polity: socialist one-party **Civil Liberties: 7**
Population: 12,700,000 **Status of Freedom: not free**

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Mozambique is a one-party communist dictatorship in which all power resides in the "vanguard party." All candidates are selected by the party at all levels, but there is some popular control of selection at local levels. Regional administration is controlled from the center. Southerners and non-Africans dominate the government.

Civil Liberties. All media are rigidly controlled; no public criticism is allowed. Rights of assembly and foreign travel do not exist. There are no private lawyers. Secret police are powerful; thousands are in reeducation camps, and executions occur. Police brutality is common. Unions are prohibited. Heavy pressure has been put on all religions, especially Jehovah's Witnesses. Villagers are being forced into communes, leading to revolts in some areas. However, the socialization of private entrepreneurs has been partially reversed. The emigration of citizens is restricted, although seasonal movement of workers across borders is unrecorded.

Comparatively: Mozambique is as free as Angola, less free than Tanzania.

NAURU

Economy: mixed capitalist-
statist **Political Rights: 2**
Polity: traditional nonparty **Civil Liberties: 2**
Population: 9,100 **Status of Freedom: free**

An ethnically complex state

Political Rights. Nauru is a parliamentary democracy in which governments change by elective and parliamentary means. Realignments have led to occasional political instability. The country is under Australian influence.

Civil Liberties. The media are free of censorship but little developed. The island's major industry is controlled by the government under a complex system of royalties and profit-sharing. No taxes are levied; phosphate revenues finance a wide range of social services. The major cooperative and union are independent.

Comparatively: Nauru is as free as Fiji, freer than Maldives, less free than New Zealand.

NEPAL

Economy: noninclusive capitalist **Political Rights:** 3
Polity: traditional nonparty **Civil Liberties:** 4
Population: 14,500,000 **Status of Freedom:** partly free

An ethnic state with active and potential subnationalities

Political Rights. Nepal is a constitutional monarchy in which the king is dominant. A relatively free referendum held in 1980 rejected a move toward party government. The new constitution has opened the system to direct parliamentary elections. However, there remain many appointed members, candidates must belong to certain "class" organizations, and the king's power to intervene is essentially unchecked. *Subnationalities:* There are a variety of different peoples, with only fifty percent of the people speaking Nepali as their first language. Hinduism is a unifying force for the vast majority. The historically powerful ruling castes continue to dominate.

Civil Liberties. Principal newspapers are public; private journals carry criticism of the government but not the king. Some offending publications have been suspended in the recent past. Radio is government owned. Private contacts are relatively open. Political detention is common, sometimes probably for little more than expression of opinion. Political campaigning for a variety of different alternatives has recently been relatively open. Parties are banned as the result of a referendum, but human rights organizations function. Unions exist only informally, but activity has been increasing. The judiciary is independent. Religious proselytizing and conversion is prohibited, and the emigration of those with valuable skills or education is restricted. The population is nearly all engaged in traditional occupations; sharecropping and tenant farming is common. Illiteracy levels are very high.

Comparatively: Nepal is as free as Thailand, freer than Bhutan, less free than Mauritius.

NETHERLANDS

Economy: mixed capitalist **Political Rights:** 1
Polity: centralized multiparty **Civil Liberties:** 1
Population: 14,300,000 **Status of Freedom:** free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Netherlands is a constitutional monarchy in which nearly all the power is vested in a directly elected legislature. The results of elections have periodically transferred power to coalitions of the left and right. There is some diffusion of political power below this level, but not a great deal. The monarch retains more power than in the United Kingdom both

through the activity of appointing governments in frequently stalemated situations, and through the advisory Council of State.

Civil Liberties. The press is free and private. Radio and television are provided by private associations under state regulation. The courts are independent, and the full spectrum of private rights guaranteed. The burden of exceptionally heavy taxes limits economic choice.

Comparatively: The Netherlands is as free as Belgium, freer than Portugal.

NEW ZEALAND

Economy: capitalist

Political Rights: 1

Polity: centralized multiparty

Civil Liberties: 1

Population: 3,100,000

Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous state with a native subnationality

Political Rights. New Zealand is a parliamentary democracy in which power alternates between the two major parties. There is elected local government, but it is not independently powerful. *Subnationalities*-. About eight percent of the population are Maori, the original inhabitants.

Civil Liberties. The press is private and free. Television and most radio stations are owned by the government. The rule of law and private rights are thoroughly respected. Since taxes (a direct restriction on choice) are not exceptionally high, and industry is not government owned, we label New Zealand capitalist. Others, emphasizing the government's highly developed social programs and penchant for controlling prices, wages, and credit, might place New Zealand further toward the socialist end of the economic spectrum.

Comparatively: New Zealand is as free as the United States, freer than France.

NICARAGUA

Economy: mixed capitalist

Political Rights: 6

Polity: quasi-nonparty

Civil Liberties: 5

Population: 2,600,000

Status of Freedom: partly free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Government is in the hands of the Sandinista political-military movement and a governing junta installed by them. Although not elected, the new government initially had widespread popular backing. In late 1980 the remaining non-Sandinistas left the Council of State; popular backing can no longer be assumed. *Subnationalities*: several thousand Miskito Indians have been forcibly resettled from the Atlantic Coast to the interior.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers and radio stations are private and diverse; private television is not allowed. There is pressure on dissident or radical journalists. A radio station and a paper have been closed. However, papers and private persons still vocally oppose the new system. No organizations representing previous Somoza movements are allowed to exist. Political activity by parties outside the Sandinista movement is closely restricted. There are thousands of political prisoners: most are former national guardsmen; a few more recent detainees are clearly prisoners of conscience. Neighborhood watch committees have been established. Killing and intimidation occur, especially in rural areas. Disappearances are commonly recorded. The independence of the judiciary is not well developed, but the government does not always win in the courts. Passports were suspended in late 1981. Unions are under pressure to join a new government-sponsored federation; strikes have been banned. A private human rights organization is active, but it has been intermittently harassed and oppressed. Some enterprises and land have been nationalized; sixty percent of the economy remains private, though subject to occasional harassment.

Comparatively: Nicaragua is as free as Chile, freer than Cuba, less free than El Salvador.

NIGER

Economy: noninclusive capitalist	Political Rights: 7
Polity: military nonparty	Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 5,800,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Niger is a military dictatorship with no elected assembly or legal parties. All districts are administered from the center.

Civil Liberties. Niger's very limited media are government owned and operated. Dissent is seldom tolerated, although ideological conformity is not demanded. Foreign publications are not censored. A military court has taken the place of a suspended Supreme Court; a few political prisoners are held under severe conditions. Unions and religious organizations are relatively independent but nonpolitical. Foreign travel is relatively open; outside of politics the government does not regulate individual behavior. The economy is largely subsistence farming based on communal tenure; direct taxes on the poor have been abolished.

Comparatively: Niger is as free as Mali, freer than North Korea, less free than Liberia.

NIGERIA

Economy: noninclusive capitalist-statist

Political Rights: 2

Civil Liberties: 3

Polity: decentralized multiparty

Status of Freedom: free

Population: 82,300,000

A multinational state

Political Rights. A multiparty democracy with an elected president and elected provincial governments was reestablished in 1979. The many political parties include the full spectrum of known leaders. *Subnationalities:* Nigeria is made up of a number of powerful subnational groupings. Speaking mainly Hausa, the people of the north are Muslim. The highly urbanized southwest is dominated by the Yoruba; and the east by the Ibo. Within each of these areas and along their borders there are other peoples, some of which are conscious of their identity and number more than one million persons. Strong loyalties to traditional political units—lineages or kingdoms—throughout the country further complicate the regional picture. With nineteen states (and more proposed), and independent institutions below this level, the present rulers seem dedicated to taking into account the demands of this complexity in the new federal structure.

Civil Liberties. Traditionally, Nigeria's media have been some of the freest in Africa. Television and radio are now wholly federal or state owned, as are all but two of the major papers, in part as the result of a Nigerianization program. However, in spite of occasional suppressions, the media have considerable editorial independence. Political organization, assembly, and publication are now freely permitted. The universities, secondary schools, and the trade unions have been brought under close government control or reorganization in the last few years. Apparently the judiciary remains strong and independent, including, in Muslim areas, *sharia* courts. No prisoners of conscience are held; citizens can win in court against the government. However, police are often brutal, and military riot control has led to many deaths. There is freedom of religion and travel, but rights of married women are quite restricted. The country is in the process of moving from a subsistence to industrial economy—largely on the basis of government-controlled oil and oil-related industry. Government intervention elsewhere in agriculture (cooperatives and plantations) and industry has been considerable. Since private business and industry are also encouraged, this is still far from a program of massive redistribution. General corruption in political and economic life has frequently diminished the rule of law. Freedom is respected in most other areas of life.

Comparatively: Nigeria is as free as India, freer than Kenya, less free than Portugal.

property is respected. The population is nomadic or involved in subsistence agriculture.

Comparatively: Oman is as free as Saudi Arabia, freer than South Yemen, less free than the United Arab Emirates.

PAKISTAN

Economy: noninclusive capitalist-statist

Polity: military nonparty

Population: 93,000,000

Political Rights: 7

Civil Liberties: 5

Status of Freedom: not free

A multinational state

Political Rights. Pakistan is under centralized military dictatorship. The political parties, religious leaders, provincial leaders, and judiciary (and bar association) continue to be factors in the situation but consensus has progressively withered. The former prime minister was executed following a political trial. Political parties have been officially disbanded and promised elections put off indefinitely; local elections of limited significance have been held. *Subnationalities:* Millions of Pathans, Baluch, and Sindis have been represented since the origin of Pakistan as desiring greater regional autonomy or independence. Provincial organization has sporadically offered a measure of self-determination.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers are censored; the frequent detention of journalists and closing of papers lead to strict self-censorship. Radio and television are government controlled. For crime punishments are often severe; torture is alleged, and executions have been common. Thousands of members of the opposition have been imprisoned or flogged in the violent political climate. The officially dissolved parties retain considerable de facto organization. There is a human rights society. Rights of assembly are limited, as are those of travel for some political persons. Courts preserve some independence. Union activity is banned; violent strikes and demonstrations occur. Emphasis on Islamic conservatism curtails private rights, especially freedom of religion: religious minorities suffer discrimination. Private property is respected, although some basic industries have been nationalized. Over half the large rural population are sharecroppers and tenant farmers.

Comparatively: Pakistan is as free as Algeria, freer than the USSR, less free than Bangladesh.

ment is meant to contain strong secessionist movements in Bougainville, Papua, and elsewhere.

Civil Liberties. The press is not highly developed but apparently free. Radio is government controlled but presents critical views; Australian stations are also received. There are no political prisoners. Rights to travel, organize, demonstrate, and practice religion are legally secured. The legal system adapted from Australia is operational, but a large proportion of the population lives in a preindustrial world with traditional controls, including violence, that limit freedom of speech, travel, occupation, and other private rights.

Comparatively: Papua New Guinea is as free as Portugal, freer than Malaysia, less free than Australia.

PARAGUAY

Economy: noninclusive capitalist-statist

Polity: centralized dominant-party (military dominated)

Population: 3,300,000

Political Rights: 5

Civil Liberties: 5

Status of Freedom: partly free

A relatively homogeneous state with small Indian groups

Political Rights. Paraguay has been ruled as a modified dictatorship since 1954. In addition to an elected president there is a parliament that includes members of opposition parties. Elections are regularly held, but they have limited meaning: the ruling party receives eighty to ninety percent of the vote, a result guaranteed by direct and indirect pressures on the media, massive government pressure on voters, especially in the countryside, and interference with opposition party organization. The most important regional and local officials are appointed by the president. *Subnationalities:* The population represents a mixture of Indian (Guarani) and Spanish peoples; ninety percent continue to speak Guarani as well as Spanish. Several small tribes of primitive forest peoples are under heavy pressure from both the government and the public.

Civil Liberties. There is a private press, and a combination of private, government, and church radio and television. In spite of censorship and periodic suppression of publications, dissenting opinion is expressed, especially by the church hierarchy and opposition newspapers. Opposition political organization continues, as do human rights organizations, but there is open discrimination in favor of members of the ruling party in education, government, business, and other areas. Torture, imprisonment, and execution of political opponents, particularly peasants, have been and to a limited extent still are an important part of a sociopolitical situation that includes general corruption and anarchy. There are now few if any long-term prisoners of

conscience, but the rule of law is very weak. Most unions are party dominated. Political opponents may be refused passports. Beyond the subsistence sector, private economic rights are restricted by government intervention and control. A large proportion of peasants work their own land, partly as a result of government policy.

Comparatively: Paraguay is as free as Uruguay, freer than Cuba, less free than Brazil.

PERU

Economy: noninclusive capitalist-statist **Political Rights:** 2
Civil Liberties: 3
Polity: centralized multiparty **Status of Freedom:** free
Population: 18,600,000

An ethnic state with a major potential territorial subnationality

Political Rights. Peru is ruled by an elected multiparty system. Provincial administration is not independent, but local elections are now significant. *Subnationalities:* Several million people speak Quechua in the highlands, and it has become an official language. There are other important Indian groups.

Civil Liberties. The media are largely private. Censorship has been abolished. Essentially all positions are freely expressed, but there is still the shadow of the military and the recent past. There is no flagrant imprisonment for conscience, but many prisoners are taken in antiguerrilla and antiterrorist campaigns, and torture occurs. Travel is not restrained. Rights to religion and occupation are generally respected. Labor is independent and politically active; strikes are common. The public sector remains dominant, but private property has regained governmental acceptance.

Comparatively: Peru is as free as Honduras, freer than Brazil, less free than Costa Rica.

PHILIPPINES

Economy: noninclusive capitalist-statist **Political Rights:** 5
Civil Liberties: 4
Polity: dominant party **Status of Freedom:** partly free
Population: 51,600,000

A transethnic heterogeneous state with active and potential subnationalities

Political Rights. The Philippines is ruled as a plebiscitary family dictatorship with the aid of a docile assembly. The present ruler was elected in a fair election, but more recent referendums and elections affirming his rule and

his constitutional changes have not been conducted with open competition, free discussion, or acceptable voting procedures. Previously legitimate political parties exist, but they have no part to play in current political life. Assembly elections in 1978 were held with severely restricted opposition activity and were boycotted by the major parties. The results were subject to questionable tabulations. 1981 elections provided only token opposition. There is some decentralization of power to local assemblies. Many provincial and local officials are centrally appointed. *Subnationalities*: The Philippines includes a variety of different peoples of which the Tagalog speaking are the most important (although a minority). A portion of the Muslim (Moro) subnationality is in active revolt along the front of Christian-Muslim opposition. There are several major potential subnationalities that may request autonomy in the near future on the basis of both territorial and linguistic identity.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers and broadcasting are largely private but under indirect government control. Only minor opposition papers exist; diverse foreign publications are widely available. Access to radio and television for the opposition is restricted. Rights of assembly are restricted, but there is considerable opposition political organization, and opposition leaders regularly hold public meetings. The courts have retained some independence although it has been much reduced. Hundreds of prisoners of conscience have been held; torture is used but is sporadically condemned by the top levels of government—torturers have been punished. Unions have only limited independence; strike activity increased dramatically in 1981. Military actions against insurgents have led to many unnecessary arrests, killings, and destruction. Disappearances occur, as do private, progovernment killings. The Catholic Church still maintains its independence. The private economy is marginally capitalist, but rapid growth in government intervention, favoritism, and direct ownership of industries by government and private sympathizers brings the economy closer to capitalist-statist.

Comparatively: The Philippines is as free as Singapore, freer than Burma, less free than Malaysia.

POLAND

Economy: mixed socialist
Polity: communist one-party
 (military dominated)
Population: 36,300,000

Political Rights: 7
Civil Liberties: 5
Status of Freedom: not free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Poland is a one-party communist and military dictatorship, with noncompetitive, one-list elections. However, in recent years a few nonparty persons gained election to the assembly and some sessions have evidenced more than pro forma debate. There are elected councils at provin-

rial levels. Although party and military hierarchies operating from the top down are the loci of power, the Catholic Church, academics, peasants, and workers must be considered by any government. The Soviet Union's right of interference and continual pressure diminishes Poland's independence.

Civil Liberties. The Polish newspapers are both private and government; broadcasting is government owned. Censorship is pervasive; there have been sporadic anti-Marxist publications with limited circulations. There are prisoners of conscience, no formal right of assembly, nor concept of an independent judiciary. Short imprisonment, beating, and harassment have been the most common means of restricting opposition. Under the "state of war" declared by the government in December 1981 thousands have been imprisoned. Illegal attempts to leave Poland have frequently led to arrest. The recent independent union movement has been suppressed, though illegal organization and strike activity continue. Most agriculture and considerable commerce remain in private hands; industry is fully nationalized.

Comparatively: Poland is as free as Cuba, freer than Czechoslovakia, less free than Mexico.

PORTUGAL

Economy: mixed capitalist
Polity: centralized multiparty
Population: 9,900,000

Political Rights: 2
Civil Liberties: 2
Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. At present Portugal is a parliamentary democracy with the military command playing a relatively strong role through the presidency. There is vigorous party competition over most of the spectrum (except the far right), and fair elections. Elections are competitive and power is shared by several groups. Provincial government is centrally directed.

Civil Liberties. The most important papers and journals are private or party owned, and are now quite free. Radio and television are government owned except for one Catholic station. The government has restored the rule of law. There are few prisoners of conscience, yet one can be imprisoned for insult to the government or military. Long periods of detention without trial occur in isolated instances. Imprisonment for "fascist" organization or discussion was promulgated in 1978. The Catholic Church, unions, peasant organizations, and military services remain alternative institutions of power. Although there is a large nationalized sector, capitalism is the accepted form for much of the economy.

Comparatively: Portugal is as free as Finland, freer than Jamaica, less free than France.

QATAR

Economy: mixed capitalist-statist **Political Rights: 5**
Polity: traditional nonparty **Civil Liberties: 5**
Population: 300,000 **Status of Freedom: partly free**

A relatively homogeneous citizenry

Political Rights. Qatar is a traditional monarchy. The majority of the residents are recently arrived foreigners; of the native population perhaps one-fourth are members of the ruling family. There is an appointed advisory council. Consensus plays an important role in the system.

Civil Liberties. The media are public and private, and passively loyalist. Discussion is fairly open; foreign publications are controlled. Political parties are forbidden. This is a traditional state still responsive to Islamic and tribal laws that moderate the absolutism of government. The family government controls the nation's wealth through control over oil, but there are also independently powerful merchant and religious classes. There are no income taxes and many public services are free. There are no organized unions or strikes. The rights of women and religious minorities are quite limited.

Comparatively: Qatar is as free as the United Arab Emirates, freer than Saudi Arabia, less free than Lebanon.

ROMANIA

Economy: socialist **Political Rights: 7**
Polity: communist one-party **Civil Liberties: 6**
Population: 22,600,000 **Status of Freedom: not free**

An ethnic state with territorial subnationalities

Political Rights. Romania is a now-traditional communist state. Assemblies at national and regional levels are subservient to the party hierarchy. Although the party is very large, all decisions are made by a small elite and especially the dictator. Elections involve only candidates chosen by the party; for some assembly positions the party may propose several candidates. Soviet influence is relatively slight. *Subnationalities:* The Magyar and German minorities are territorially based. If offered self-determination one Magyar area would surely opt for rejoining neighboring Hungary; many of the Germans evidently wish to migrate to Germany, and this movement has been developing. In Romania the cultural rights of both groups are narrowly limited.

Civil Liberties. The media include only government or party organs; self-censorship committees replace centralized censorship. Private discussion may be relatively candid. Dissenters are frequently imprisoned. Forced confessions, false charges, and psychiatric incarceration are characteristic. Treat-

ment may be brutal; physical threats are common. Many arrests have been made for attempting to leave the country or importing foreign literature (especially Bibles and material in minority languages). Contacts with foreigners must be reported if not given prior approval. Religious and other personal freedoms are quite restricted. Outside travel and emigration are not considered rights; potential emigrants may suffer economic discrimination. Private museums have been closed. Independent labor and management rights are essentially nonexistent. Attempts to form a trade union in 1979 were crushed, although a major coal strike was reported in late 1981. Central planning is pervasive throughout the highly nationalized economy.

Comparatively: Romania is as free as the USSR, freer than Bulgaria, less free than Hungary.

RWANDA

Economy: noninclusive mixed
socialist

Political Rights: 6

Civil Liberties: 6

Polity: nationalist one-party
(military dominated)

Status of Freedom: not free

Population: 5,400,000

An ethnic state with a minority nonterritorial subnationality

Political Rights. Rwanda is a military dictatorship with an auxiliary party organization. Elections are not free and candidates are pre-selected. A legislature was elected on single-party principles in 1981. Districts are administered by the central government. However, everyone belongs to the party and party elections and deliberations have some competitive and critical aspects. There are elected local councils and officials. *Subnationalities:* The former ruling people, the Tutsi, have been persecuted and heavily discriminated against, but the situation has improved.

Civil Liberties. The weak press is religious or governmental; radio is government owned. Only the mildest criticism is voiced. Political prisoners are held, and beating of prisoners and suspects may be common. The courts have some independence. Considerable religious freedom exists. Travel is restricted both within the country and across its borders. Labor unions are very weak. There are no great extremes of wealth. The government is socialist in intent, but missionary cooperatives dominate trade, and private business is active in the small nonsubsistence sector. Traditional ways of life rather than government orders regulate the lives of most.

Comparatively: Rwanda is as free as Gabon, freer than Burundi, less free than Zambia.

ST. LUCIA

Economy: capitalist
Polity: centralized multiparty
Population: 115,000
Political Rights: 2
Civil Liberties: 2
Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous state

Political Rights. This is a functioning parliamentary democracy in which power alternates between parties, most recently in 1982. The government has in the recent past been paralyzed by factional struggles and instability. There is elected local government.

Civil Liberties. The media are largely private and uncensored. Organization and assembly are free, but harassment and violence accompany their expression. There are strong business, labor, and religious organizations. Massive strikes in part forced the resignation of the prime minister in early 1982. Personal rights are secured.

Comparatively: St. Lucia is as free as Portugal, freer than Jamaica, less free than Barbados.

ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES

Economy: capitalist
Polity: centralized multiparty
Population: 123,000
Political Rights: 2
Civil Liberties: 2
Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous state

Political Rights. St. Vincent is an operating multiparty state. In a 1979 election the ruling party was returned to office, winning 11 of 13 seats with fifty-three percent of the vote.

Civil Liberties. Weekly papers present a wide variety of uncensored opinion. Radio is government owned and has been accused of bias. Foreign media are readily available. There is a full right to assembly and organization; effective opposition to government policies is easily organized and often successful. There is a rule of law. Much of economic activity remains oriented toward agriculture.

Comparatively: St. Vincent is as free as Antigua and Barbuda, freer than Colombia, less free than Dominican Republic.

SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE

Economy: socialist
Polity: socialist one-party
Population: 85,000
Political Rights: 6
Civil Liberties: 6
Status of Freedom: not free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Sao Tome and Principe are governed under strongman leadership by the revolutionary party that led the country to independence. There is an indirectly elected assembly. Popular dissatisfaction and factional struggles appear serious. There are local elections. Angolan troops have been used to maintain the regime.

Civil Liberties. The media are government controlled; opposition voices are not heard; there is no effective right of political assembly. Labor unions are not independent. The rule of law does not extend to political questions, but there are few known political prisoners. There is little evidence of brutality or torture. The largely plantation agriculture has been socialized, as has most of the economy.

Comparatively: Sao Tome and Principe appear to be as free as Guinea-Bissau, freer than Equatorial Guinea, less free than Comoros.

SAUDI ARABIA

Economy: capitalist-statist

Polity: traditional nonparty

Population: 11,100,000

Political Rights: 6

Civil Liberties: 6

Status of Freedom: not free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Saudi Arabia is a traditional family monarchy ruling without representative assemblies. Political parties are prohibited. The right of petition is guaranteed, and religious leaders provide a check on arbitrary government. Regional government is by appointive officers; there are some local elective assemblies.

Civil Liberties. The press is both private and governmental; strict self-censorship is expected. Radio and television are mostly government owned, although ARAMCO also has stations. Private conversation is relatively free; there is no right of political assembly or political organization. Islamic law limits arbitrary government, but the rule of law is not fully institutionalized. There are political prisoners and torture is reported; there may be prisoners of conscience. Citizens have no freedom of religion—all must be Muslims. Strikes and unions are forbidden. Private rights in areas such as occupation or residence are generally respected, but marriage to a non-Muslim or non-Saudi is closely controlled. Women may not marry non-Muslims, and suffer other special disabilities, particularly in the right to travel. The economy is overwhelmingly dominated by petroleum or petroleum-related industry that is directly or indirectly under government control. The commercial and agriculture sectors are private.

Comparatively: Saudi Arabia is as free as Algeria, freer than Iraq, less free than Bahrain.

SENEGAL

Economy: mixed capitalist **Political Rights: 4**
Polity: centralized dominant-party **Civil Liberties: 4**
Population: 5,900,000 **Status of Freedom: partly free**

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. After several years under a relatively benevolent one-party system, the constitutional limit on party activity has been lifted; over ten parties have been organized. In parliamentary elections eighteen of one hundred seats were obtained by an opposition party. Decentralization is restricted to the local level where contested elections occur. *Subnationalities:* Ethnically eighty percent are Muslims; the Wolof people represent thirty-six percent of the population, including most of the elite, the urban population, and the more prosperous farmers. However, regional loyalties, both within and outside of this linguistic grouping, seem to be at least as important as communal groupings in defining potential subnationalities. In addition, rapid assimilation of rural migrants in the cities to Wolof culture has reduced the tendency toward ethnic cleavage.

Civil Liberties. The press is predominantly public, and government regulations restrict the independence of private publications. Opposition papers and journals appear. Both papers and parties are brought before the courts for going too far in their opposition, yet the government sometimes loses in the courts. Radio and television are under an autonomous government body. Unions have gained increasing independence. Religion, travel, occupation, and other private rights are respected. Although much of the land remains tribally owned, government-organized cooperatives, a strong internal private market, and dependence on external markets have transformed the preindustrial society. Many inefficient and corrupt state and quasi-public enterprises are now being dismantled.

Comparatively: Senegal is as free as Kuwait, freer than Ivory Coast, less free than Gambia.

SEYCHELLES

Economy: mixed capitalist **Political Rights: 6**
Polity: socialist one-party **Civil Liberties: 6**
Population: 65,000 **Status of Freedom: not free**

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Seychelles is a one-party state allowing personal competition for parliament but not president. The former ruling party is said to

have "simply disappeared." Tanzanian troops continue to help maintain the government in power. There is no local government.

Civil Liberties. There is no independent opinion press, radio is government and church owned. No opposition in publication or even conversation is legal. Individuals have little judicial protection. There is no right of political assembly and the security services have broad powers of arrest. Opposition party activities are banned; people have frequently been arrested on political charges. Labor and government are interconnected. Private rights, including private property, are generally respected. Quasi-government enterprises are being established; state monopolies control the marketing of all export crops. Government services in this largely impoverished country are extensive.

Comparatively: Seychelles is as free as Tanzania, freer than Somalia, less free than Maldives.

SIERRA LEONE

Political Rights: 5

Economy: noninclusive capitalist

Polity: socialist one-party

Population: 3,700,000

A formally transethnic heterogeneous state

Civil Liberties: 5

Status of Freedom: partly free

Political Rights. After progressively excluding opposition candidates from power by violence, arrest, parliamentary exclusion, or electoral malpractice, in 1978 Sierra Leone's ethnically based ruling party used a possibly fraudulent referendum to establish a one-party state. Although previous opposition leaders have been co-opted, the 1982 competitive one-party election was again marked by widespread violence. There is some elected and traditional local government.

Civil Liberties. The press is private and governmental. Radio is government controlled. Both are now closely controlled, but there is considerable freedom of private speech. The courts do not appear to be very powerful or independent. Special emergency powers have given the government untrammelled powers of detention, censorship, restriction of assembly, and search for the last few years. There may now be no prisoners of conscience. Identity cards have recently been required of all citizens. Labor unions are relatively independent and travel is freely permitted. The largely subsistence economy has an essentially capitalist modern sector. Corruption is pervasive and costly.

Comparatively: Sierra Leone is as free as Sudan, freer than Gabon, less free than Zimbabwe.

SINGAPORE

Economy: mixed capitalist

Polity: centralized dominant-party

Population: 2,500,000

An ethnically complex state

Political Rights: 4

Civil Liberties: 5

Status of Freedom: partly free

Political Rights. Singapore is a parliamentary democracy in which the ruling party traditionally won all legislative seats. Economic and other pressures against all opposition groups (exerted in part through control of the media) make elections very unfair. Opposition leaders have been sentenced for such crimes as defaming the prime minister during the campaign. The opposition still obtains thirty percent of the vote. In 1981 an opponent's victory in a by-election was regarded with great alarm, and court cases were soon launched against him. There is no local government.

Civil Liberties. The press is nominally free, but owners of shares with policy-making power must be officially approved—in some cases the government owns the shares. Broadcasting is largely a government monopoly. By closing papers and imprisoning editors and reporters, the press is kept under close control. University faculties are also under considerable pressure to conform. Most opposition is treated as a communist threat and, therefore, treasonable. Prisoners of conscience are held; in internal security cases the protection of the law is weak—the prosecution's main task appears to be obtaining forced confessions of communist activity. Torture is alleged. Trade union freedom is inhibited by the close association of government and union. Private rights of religion, occupation, or property are generally observed, although a large and increasing percentage of manufacturing and service companies are government owned. Many youths have reportedly been forcibly drafted into construction brigades.

Comparatively: Singapore is as free as El Salvador, freer than Indonesia, less free than Malaysia.

SOLOMON ISLANDS

Economy: noninclusive capitalist

Political Rights: 2

Polity: decentralized multiparty

Civil Liberties: 2

Population: 200,000

Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous state with subnational strains

Political Rights. The Solomon Islands are a parliamentary democracy under the British monarch. Elections are intensely contested; party discipline is weak. There is some decentralization of power at the local level; further decentralization to the provincial level is planned.

Civil Liberties. Radio is government controlled; the very limited press is both government and private. There is no censorship. The rule of law is maintained in the British manner alongside traditional ideas of justice. Published incitement to inter-island conflict has led to banishment for several persons. Union activity is free. The government is involved in major businesses. Most land is held communally, but farmed individually.

Comparatively: The Solomon Islands are as free as Tuvalu, freer than Mauritius, less free than New Zealand.

SOMALIA

Economy: noninclusive mixed socialist
Political Rights: 7
Civil Liberties: 7
Polity: socialist one-party (military dominated)
Status of Freedom: not free
Population: 4,600,000

A relatively homogeneous state

Political Rights. The Somali Republic is under one-man military rule combining glorification of the ruler with one-party socialist legitimization. 1979 elections with 99 percent approval allowed no choice. Even an assembly elected on this basis was suspended in 1980. Ethnically the state is homogeneous, although until the military coup in 1969 the six main clan groupings and their subdivisions were the major means of organizing loyalty and power. While politics is still understood in lineage terms, in its centralizing drive the government has tried to eliminate both tribal and religious power.

Civil Liberties. The media are under strict government control, private conversation is controlled, and those who do not follow the government are considered to be against it. There are many political prisoners, including prisoners of conscience. There have been jailings for strikes and executions of rebels. Travel is restricted. Some state farms and industries have been established, beyond the dominant subsistence economy. A large black market circumvents official distribution channels; corruption is widespread in government and business.

Comparatively: Somalia is as free as Ethiopia, less free than Kenya.

SOUTH AFRICA

Economy: capitalist-statist
Political Rights: 5
Polity: centralized multiparty
Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 27,600,000*
Status of Freedom: not free

An ethnic state with major territorial and nonterritorial subnationalities

Political Rights. South Africa is a parliamentary democracy in which over eighty percent of the people are excluded from participation in the national political process because of race. For the white population elections appear fair and open. There is, in addition, a limited scope for the nonwhites to influence affairs within their own communities. *Subnationalities:* In the several Bantustans that have not yet separated from the country, black leaders have some power and support from their people. Most black political parties are banned, but operating political parties among Indians and people of mixed blood work for the interests of their respective peoples. Regionally, govern-

*Excludes Transkei; includes nominally independent republics.

ment within the white community includes both central government officials and elected councils.

Civil Liberties. The white South African press is private and quite outspoken, although pressures have been increasing, especially on reporters. Freedom for the nonwhite press is restricted. Broadcasting is under government control. The courts are independent, but do not effectively control security forces. There are political prisoners and torture—especially for black activists, who live in an atmosphere of terror. Private rights are generally respected for whites. Rights to labor organization have improved for blacks recently. Legal separation of the races remains, but has relaxed in some respects. Rights to choice of residence and occupation are legally circumscribed for nonwhites. Hundreds of thousands are arrested or forcibly moved every year as a result of discriminatory laws. This includes large-scale deportations from one rural area to another. Human rights organizations are quite active in both white and black communities.

Comparatively: South Africa is as free as Argentina, freer than Tanzania, less free than Morocco.

SPAIN

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 2
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 3
Population: 37,900,000	Status of Freedom: free

An ethnic state with major subnationalities

Political Rights. Spain has recently established a constitutional monarchy in the European manner. So far it is struggling successfully to overcome the traditional military veto on policy. The current parliament has been fairly elected from a wide range of parties. Municipalities are often controlled by the opposition. Regional and local government is changing the previous centralized character of the state. *Subnationalities:* The Basque and Catalan territorial subnationalities have had their rights greatly expanded in the last few years. The process is now extended to Galicia and Andalusia. Regional power is being extended to other parts of the country.

Civil Liberties. The press is private and is now largely free. The television network and some radio stations are government owned. Radio is no longer a state monopoly and television is controlled by an all-party committee. There are few prisoners of conscience; imprisonment still threatens those who insult the security services, the courts, or the state. Short detention periods are often used with little legal redress. Police brutality and torture still occur. However, criticism of the government and suspected human rights violations are quite freely expressed publicly and privately. Private freedoms

are respected. Continued terrorism and reaction to terrorism affect some areas. Union organization is quite free and independent.

Comparatively: Spain is as free as Colombia, freer than Egypt, less free than France.

SRI LANKA

Economy: mixed capitalist-statist **Political Rights:** 2
Polity: centralized multiparty **Civil Liberties:** 3
Population: 15,200,000 **Status of Freedom:** free

An ethnic state with a major subnationality

Political Rights. Sri Lanka is a parliamentary democracy in which power has alternated between the major parties. The constitution was changed in 1977-78 to a presidential system along French lines. Regional government is centrally controlled, but local government is by elected councils. A number of individuals have been barred from government for breach of trust, but a major terrorist party has now been legalized. *Subnationalities:* Receiving a large vote in the most recent election, the Tamil minority constitutes an important secessionist tendency. Repression or private violence against the Tamils occurs; the present government is inclined to meet Tamil demands up to but not including that for independence or equal linguistic standing.

Civil Liberties. The press has been strong, both private and governmental. However, even the private papers feel under government pressure. Broadcasting is under government control and presents a relatively narrow range of views. Limited censorship has been applied to prevent violence at particular places and times. The rule of law has been threatened by communal violence. Courts remain independent of the government; an important human rights movement supports their independence. A few prisoners of conscience have been arrested, at least for advocating Tamil independence; and torture or brutality is alleged. There is freedom of assembly but not demonstration. Private rights to movement, residence, religion, and occupation are respected. Strikes in public services are restricted, but unions are well developed and politically influential. There has been extensive land reform; the State has nationalized a number of enterprises in this largely plantation economy. The system has done an excellent job in providing for basic nutrition, health, and educational standards within a democratic framework.

Comparatively: Sri Lanka is as free as India, freer than Malaysia, less free than the United Kingdom.

SUDAN

Economy: noninclusive mixed socialist
Political Rights: 5
Civil Liberties: 5
Polity: nationalist one-party (military dominated)
Status of Freedom: partly free
Population: 19,900,000

An ethnic state with a major but highly diverse subnationality

Political Rights. Sudan is a military dictatorship with a supportive single party and legislature. There has been a general reconciliation of the government and its noncommunist opposition. Legislative elections allow the participation and frequent victory of individuals from de facto opposition groups. Several cabinet and party central committee members are also from these groups. There is considerable power "in the streets" and there has been a continuing devolution of power to the regions. *Subnationalities:* The Southern (Negro) region has been given a separate assembly; its former guerrillas form a part of the Southern army. The national government remains overwhelmingly northern, and southern politicians can be quickly jailed for verbal opposition.

Civil Liberties. The press is weak and nationalized. Radio and television are government controlled. The media have been used for active indoctrination, but criticism is common in parliament and the press, and especially in private. The university campus maintains a tradition of independence, but the courts are not strong. There are many prisoners of conscience, reports of torture, and detention without trial. Religion is relatively free. Unions are government organized but nevertheless lead illegal strikes. Some force has been used to reduce urban migration. Sudan is socialist theoretically, but in business and agriculture the private sector has recently been supported by denationalizations. Bureaucratic corruption is costly.

Comparatively: Sudan is as free as Egypt, freer than Ethiopia, less free than Senegal.

SURINAME

Economy: capitalist
Political Rights: 7
Polity: military nonparty
Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 450,000
Status of Freedom: not free

An ethnically complex state

Political Rights. Suriname is ruled by a military council without legitimization by elections or other means. Power shifts among factions of non-commissioned officers. There have been some elections at local levels.

Civil Liberties. The press is under strong pressure. Political organization or assembly is forbidden. Prisoners of conscience have been detained and may be treated brutally. Courts and unions retain some independence. Houses are searched at will. The state is increasing its control over industry, but business groups continue to publicly express opposition to economic policy.

Comparatively: Suriname is as free as Liberia, freer than Haiti, less free than El Salvador.

SWAZILAND

Economy: noninclusive capitalist	Political Rights: 5
Polity: traditional nonparty	Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 600,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Swaziland is ruled directly by the king with the aid of his royal advisors. The majority of the people probably support the king who is both a religious and political figure and has been king since 1900. Indirect elections for the advisory legislature are held. Local councils invite popular participation. South African political and economic influence is extensive.

Civil Liberties. Private media exist alongside governmental; little criticism is allowed; South African and other foreign media present available alternatives. Opposition leaders have been repeatedly detained, and partisan activity is forbidden. Parliamentary and council criticism occurs, but public assemblies are restricted, unions limited, emigration difficult. Religious, economic, and other private rights are maintained. The traditional way of life is continued, especially on the local level. Several thousand whites in the country and in neighboring Transvaal own the most productive land and business.

Comparatively: Swaziland is as free as Lesotho, freer than South Africa, less free than Botswana.

SWEDEN

Economy: mixed capitalist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 8,300,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Sweden is a parliamentary democracy in which no party monopolizes power. Referendums are held. Although there are some representative institutions at regional and local levels, the system is relatively centralized. The tendency of modern bureaucracies to regard issues as

technical rather than political has progressed further in Sweden than elsewhere.

Civil Liberties. The press is private or party; broadcasting is by state-licensed monopolies. Although free of censorship, the media are accused of presenting a rather narrow range of views. There is the rule of law. The defense of those accused by the government may not be as spirited as elsewhere, but, on the other hand, the ombudsman office gives special means of redress against administrative arbitrariness. Most private rights are respected; but state interference in family life is unusually strong. The national church has a special position. In many areas, such as housing, individual choice is restricted more than in other capitalist states—as it is of course by the very high tax load. Unions are a powerful part of the system. The state intervenes in the economy mainly through extensive business regulation rather than direct ownership.

Comparatively: Sweden is as free as Denmark, freer than West Germany.

SWITZERLAND

Economy: capitalist

Political Rights: 1

Polity: decentralized multiparty

Civil Liberties: 1

Population: 6,300,000

Status of Freedom: free

A trinationa! state

Political Rights. Switzerland is a parliamentary democracy in which all major parties are given a role in government determined by the size of the vote for each party. Parties that increase their vote above a certain level are invited to join the government, although such changes in party strength rarely occur. The lack of a decisive shift in power from one party to another in the last fifty years is the major limitation on the democratic effectiveness of the Swiss system. However, its dependence on the grand coalition style of government is a partial substitute, and the Swiss grant political rights in other ways that compensate for the lack of a transfer of power. Many issues are decided by the citizenry through national referendums or popular initiatives. After referendums in keeping with the Swiss attitude, even the losing side is given part of what it wants if its vote is sufficiently large. *Subnationalities:* The three major linguistic groups have separate areas under their partial control. Their regional and local elected governments have autonomous rights and determine directly much of the country's business. National governments try to balance the representatives of the primary linguistic and religious groups; this is accomplished in another way by the upper house that directly represents the cantons (regions) on an equal basis.

Civil Liberties. The high quality press is private and independent. Broadcasting is government operated, although with the considerable independence

of comparable West European systems. The rule of law is strongly upheld; as in Germany it is against the law to question the intentions of judges. Private rights are thoroughly respected.

Comparatively: Switzerland is as free as the United States, freer than Italy.

SYRIA

Economy: mixed socialist	Political Rights: 5
Polity: centralized dominant-party (military dominated)	Civil Liberties: 7
Population: 9,700,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Syria is a military dictatorship assisted by an elected parliament. The election of the military president is largely pro forma, but in recent assembly elections a variety of parties have competed within the National Front, organized under the leadership of the governing party. The ruling Front includes several ideologically distinct parties, and cabinets have included representatives of a variety of such parties. Some authenticity to the election procedure is suggested by the fact that due to apathy and a boycott by dissident party factions in 1977 elections, the government had such great difficulty achieving the constitutionally required voter participation that it was forced to extend the voting period. Because of its position in the army the Alawite minority (ten percent) has a very unequal share of national power. Provinces have little separate power, but local elections are contested.

Civil Liberties. The media are in the hands of government or party. Broadcasting services are government owned. Although the media are used as governmental means for active indoctrination, a limited number of legalized political parties have articulated a narrow range of viewpoints. Nongovernmental political, employee, religious, and professional organizations continue to exist, although under great pressure. Thousands have been arrested and many executed. The courts are neither strongly independent nor effective in political cases where long-term detention with trial occurs. Political prisoners are often arrested following violence, but there are prisoners of conscience. Political opponents may even be killed overseas. Torture has frequently been employed in interrogation. Private rights, such as those of religion, occupation, or residence are generally respected; foreign travel and emigration are closely controlled for certain groups. Much of industry has been nationalized; the commercial sector remains private. Land reform has successfully expanded private ownership. There is no independent labor movement.

Comparatively: Syria is as free as Algeria, freer than South Yemen, less free than Kuwait.

Political Rights. Under the controlled parliamentary system the prime minister was successfully replaced by constitutional means in 1980. Both parties and parliament seem to be becoming more significant, but the record of repeated military interventions in recent years limits the freedom of civilian politicians. Provincial government is under national control; there are elected and traditional institutions at the local level. *Subnationalities:* There is a Muslim Malay community in the far south, and small ethnic enclaves in the north.

Civil Liberties. The press is private, but periodic suppressions and warnings lead to self-censorship. Most broadcasting is government or military controlled. Some books are banned as subversive. There are few long-term prisoners of conscience, but many are periodically detained for communist activity. In rural areas arrest may be on vague charges and treatment brutal. Human rights organizations are active. Labor activity is relatively free; a ban on strikes was lifted in early 1981. Private rights to property, choice of religion, or residence are secure; foreign travel or emigration is not restricted. However, corruption limits the expression of all rights. Government enterprise is quite important in the basically capitalist modern economy.

Comparatively: Thailand is as free as Malaysia, freer than the Philippines, less free than Sri Lanka.

TONGA

Economy: noninclusive
capitalist

Polity: traditional nonparty

Population: 94,000

Political Rights: 5

Civil Liberties: 3

Status of Freedom: partly free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Tonga is a constitutional monarchy in which the king and nobles retain power. Only a minority of the members of the legislative assembly are elected directly by the people; but the veto power of the assembly can be effectively expressed. Regional administration is centralized; there are some elected local officials.

Civil Liberties. The main paper is a government weekly; radio is under government control. Other foreign and local media are available. There is a rule of law, but the king's decision is still a very important part of the system. Private rights within the traditional Tonga context seem guaranteed.

Comparatively: Tonga is as free as Kuwait, freer than Seychelles, less free than Western Samoa.

TOGO

Economy: noninclusive mixed
socialist

Polity: nationalist one-party
(military dominated)

Population: 2,800,000

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights: 7

Civil Liberties: 6

Status of Freedom: not free

Political Rights. Togo is a military dictatorship ruled in the name of a one-party state. In this spirit there is a deliberate denial of the rights of separate branches of government, including a separate judiciary, or even of private groups. National elections allow little or no choice. Below the national level only the cities have a semblance of self-government. *Subnationalities:* The southern Ewe are culturally dominant and the largest group (twenty percent), but militant northerners now rule.

Civil Liberties. No criticism of the government is allowed in the government or church media, and foreign publications may be confiscated. There is little guarantee of a rule of law; people have been imprisoned and beaten for offenses such as the distribution of leaflets or failure to wear a party badge. There are long-term prisoners of conscience. Religious freedom is limited. There is occasional restriction of foreign travel. Union organization is closely regulated. In this largely subsistence economy the government is heavily involved in trade, production, and the provision of services. All wage earners must contribute to the ruling party.

Comparatively: Togo is as free as Haiti, freer than Ethiopia, less free than Cameroon.

TRANSKEI

Economy: noninclusive capitalist

Polity: centralized dominant-party

Population: 2,400,000

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights: 5

Civil Liberties: 6

Status of Freedom: partly free

Political Rights. In form Transkei is a multiparty parliamentary democracy; in fact it is under the strong-man rule of a paramount chief supported by his party's majority. The meaning of recent elections has been largely nullified by governmental interference, including the jailing of opposition leaders. Chiefs and the balancing of tribal interests remain very important in the system, but beyond that there is little decentralization of power. South Africa has a great deal of de facto power over the state, particularly because of the

large number of nationals that work in South Africa. However, Transkei is more independent than the Soviet satellites; it has had continuing disputes with South Africa.

Civil Liberties. The press is private, but under strong government pressure. Broadcasting is government controlled. Many members of the opposition have been imprisoned; new retroactive laws render it illegal to criticize Transkei or its rulers. Freedom of organization is very limited, although an opposition party still exists. Private rights are respected within the limits of South African and Transkei custom. Capitalist and traditional economic rights are diminished by the necessity of a large portion of the labor force to work in South Africa.

Comparatively: Transkei is as free as Zambia, freer than Mozambique, less free than Swaziland.

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Economy: capitalist-statist

Political Rights: 1

Polity: decentralized multiparty

Civil Liberties: 2

Population: 1,100,000

Status of Freedom: free

An ethnically complex state

Political Rights. Trinidad and Tobago is a parliamentary democracy in which one party has managed to retain power since 1956. However, there has been a decentralization of power and elections have been vigorously contested by a variety of parties. There is elected local government. Tobago has an elected regional government.

Civil Liberties. The private or party press is generally free of restriction; broadcasting is under both government and private control. Opposition is regularly voiced. There is the full spectrum of private rights, although violence and communal feeling reduce the effectiveness of such rights for many. Major sections of the economy are government owned. Human rights organizations are active. Labor is powerful and strikes frequent.

Comparatively: Trinidad and Tobago is as free as Bahamas, freer than Guyana, less free than Barbados.

TUNISIA

Economy: mixed capitalist

Political Rights: 5

Polity: dominant party

Civil Liberties: 5

Population: 6,700,000

Status of Freedom: partly free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Tunisia is now a dominant party system under essentially one-man rule. Elections to the assembly are contested primarily within the one-party framework, but opposition parties played a minor role in 1981 elections. Regional government is centrally directed, but there is elected local government.

Civil Liberties. The private, party, and government press is under government pressure. Although frequently banned or fined, opposition papers have been published since 1978. Broadcasting is government controlled. Private conversation is relatively free, but there is no right of assembly. Organizational activity is generally free, including that of the Tunisian Human Rights League. The courts demonstrate only a limited independence, but it is possible to win against the government. Unions have been relatively independent despite periods of repression. There are few if any prisoners of conscience. The unemployed young are drafted for government work. Overseas travel is occasionally blocked. Most private rights seem to be respected, including economic freedoms since doctrinaire socialism was abandoned and much of agriculture returned to private hands.

Comparatively: Tunisia is as free as Egypt, freer than Algeria, less free than Senegal.

TURKEY

Economy: capitalist-statist

Polity: military nonparty

Population: 47,700,000

Political Rights: 5

Civil Liberties: 5

Status of Freedom: partly free

An ethnic state with a major territorial subnationality

Political Rights. In 1980 Turkey came under at least temporary military rule. The change was widely welcomed because of the severe internal security and financial situations and political crisis. An early return to civilian democracy is anticipated. *Subnationalities:* Several million Kurds are denied self-determination; it is even illegal to teach or publish in Kurdish.

Civil Liberties. The press is private; the government controls the broadcasting system directly or indirectly. Suspensions and arrests by the new government have produced general self-censorship. There are now many prisoners of conscience under martial law. Torture has been common, but the military government has made arrests of some accused torturers. Private rights are generally respected in other areas such as religion. Independent union activity has been curtailed; strikes are prohibited. Nearly fifty percent of the people are subsistence agriculturists. State enterprises make up more than half of Turkey's industry.

Comparatively: Turkey is as free as Indonesia, freer than Yugoslavia, less free than Spain.

suffered severe dislocation: property is not secure, corruption is pervasive and costly, a black market flourishes.

Comparatively: Uganda is as free as Kenya, freer than Tanzania, less free than Zimbabwe.

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Economy: socialist	Political Rights: 6
Polity: communist one-party	Civil Liberties: 7
Population: 270,000,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A complex ethnic state with major territorial subnationalities

Political Rights. The Soviet Union is ruled by parallel party and governmental systems: the party system is dominant. Elections are held for both systems, but in neither is it possible for the rank and file to determine policy. Candidacy and voting are closely controlled and the resulting assemblies do not seriously question the policies developed by party leaders (varying by time or issue from one individual to twenty-five). The Soviet Union is in theory elaborately divided into subnational units, but in fact the all-embracing party structure renders local power minimal.

Subnationalities: Russians account for half the Soviet population. The rest belong to a variety of subnational groupings ranging down in size from the forty million Ukrainians. Most groups are territorial, with a developed sense of subnational identity. The political rights of all of these to self-determination, either within the USSR or through secession, is effectively denied. In many cases Russians or other non-native peoples have been settled in a subnational territory in such numbers as to make the native people a minority in their own land (for example, Kazakhstan). Expression of opinion in favor of increased self-determination is repressed at least as much as anticommunist opinion. Most of these peoples have had independence movements or movements for enhanced self-determination in the years since the founding of the USSR. Several movements have been quite strong since World War II (for example, in the Ukraine or Lithuania); the blockage of communication by the Soviet government makes it very difficult to estimate either the overt or latent support such movements might have. In 1978 popular movements in Georgia and Armenia led to the retention of the official status of local languages in the Republics of the Caucasus.

Civil Liberties. The media are totally owned by the government or party and are, in addition, regularly censored. Elite publications occasionally present variations from the official line, but significant deviations are found only in underground publications. Recent cases of arrests and exile have forced

nearly all criticism underground. Crimes against the state, including insanity (demonstrated by perverse willingness to oppose the state), are broadly defined; as a result political prisoners are present in large numbers both in jails and insane asylums. Nearly all imprisonment and mistreatment of prisoners in the Soviet Union are now carried out in accordance with Soviet security laws—even though these laws conflict with other Soviet laws written to accord with international standards. Since the Bolshevik Revolution there has never been an acquittal in a political trial. Insofar as private rights, such as those to religion, education, or choice of occupation, exist, they are de facto rights that may be denied at any time. Travel within and outside of the USSR is highly controlled; many areas of the country are still off-limits to foreigners—especially those used as areal prisons for dissidents. Nearly all private entrepreneurial activity is outside the law; there are rights to nonproductive personal property. Other rights such as those to organize an independent labor union are strictly denied. Literacy is high, few starve, and private oppression is no more.

Comparatively: The USSR is as free as Malawi, freer than East Germany, less free than Hungary.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Economy: capitalist-statist
Polity: decentralized nonparty
Population: 1,200,000

Political Rights: 5
Civil Liberties: 5
Status of Freedom: partly free

A relatively homogeneous citizenry

Political Rights. The UAE is a confederation of seven shaikhdoms in which the larger are given the greater power both in the appointed assembly and the administrative hierarchy. There is a great deal of consultation in the traditional pattern. Below the confederation level there are no electoral procedures or parties. Each shaikhdom is relatively autonomous in its internal affairs. The majority of the people are recent immigrants and noncitizens.

Civil Liberties. The press is private or governmental. There is self-censorship, but some opposition is expressed. Broadcasting is under UAE control. There are no political assemblies, but there are also few, if any, prisoners of conscience. The courts dispense a combination of British, tribal, and Islamic law. Labor unions are prohibited, but illegal strikes have occurred. Private rights are generally respected; there is freedom of travel and some religious freedom. Many persons may still accept the feudal privileges and restraints of their tribal position. The rights of the alien majority are less secure: "troublemakers" are deported. Private economic activity exists alongside the dominance of government petroleum and petroleum-related activities.

Comparatively: United Arab Emirates are as free as Bahrain, freer than North Yemen, less free than Kuwait.

UNITED KINGDOM

Economy: mixed capitalist **Political Rights:** 1
Polity: centralized multiparty **Civil Liberties:** 1
Population: 56,100,000 **Status of Freedom:** free

An ethnic state with major subnationalities

Political Rights. The United Kingdom is a parliamentary democracy with a symbolic monarch. Fair elections are open to all parties, including those advocating secession. There are elected local and regional governments, but to date these are primarily concerned with administering national laws. The devolution of more substantial powers is currently under discussion and development. *Subnationalities:* Scots, Welsh, Ulster Scots, and Ulster Irish are significant and highly self-conscious territorial minorities. In 1978 parliament approved home rule for Scotland and Wales, but the Welsh and (more ambiguously) the Scots voters rejected this opportunity in 1979. Northern Ireland's home rule is in abeyance because of an ethnic impasse. Ulster Scots and Irish live in intermixed territories in Northern Ireland. Both want more self-determination—the majority Ulster Scots as an autonomous part of the United Kingdom, the minority Ulster Irish as an area within Ireland.

Civil Liberties. The press is private and powerful; broadcasting has statutory independence although it is indirectly under government control. British media are comparatively restrained because of strict libel and national security laws, and a tradition of accepting government suggestions for the handling of sensitive news. In Northern Ireland a severe security situation has led to the curtailment of private rights, to imprisonment, and on occasion to torture and brutality. However, these conditions have been relatively limited, have been thoroughly investigated by the government, and improved as a result. Elsewhere the rule of law is entrenched, and private rights generally respected. Unions are independent and powerful. In certain areas, such as medicine, housing, inheritance, and general disposability of income, socialist government policies have limited choice for some while expanding the access of others.

Comparatively: The United Kingdom is as free as the United States, freer than West Germany.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Economy: capitalist **Political Rights:** 1
Polity: decentralized multiparty **Civil Liberties:** 1
Population: 232,000,000 **Status of Freedom:** free

An ethnically complex state with minor territorial subnationalities

Political Rights. The United States is a constitutional democracy with three strong but separate centers of power: president, congress, and judiciary. Elections are fair and competitive. Parties are remarkably weak: in some areas they are little more than temporary means of organizing primary elections. States, and to a lesser extent cities, have powers in their own rights; they often successfully oppose the desires of national administrations. Each state has equal representation in the upper house, which in the USA is the more powerful half of parliament.

Subnationalities. There are many significant ethnic groups, but the only clearly territorial subnationalities are the native peoples. The largest Indian tribes, the Navaho and Sioux, number 100,000 or more each. About 150,000 Hawaiians still reside on their native islands, intermingled with a much larger white and oriental population. Spanish-speaking Americans number in the millions; except for a few thousand residing in an area of northern New Mexico, they are mostly twentieth-century immigrants living among English-speaking Americans, particularly in the large cities. Black Americans make up over one-tenth of the U.S. population; residing primarily in large cities, they have no major territorial base. Black and Spanish-speaking Americans are of special concern because of their relative poverty; their ethnic status is quite comparable to that of many other groups in America, including Chinese, Japanese, Filipinos, Italians, or Jews.

Civil Liberties. The press is private and free; both private and public radio and television are government regulated. There are virtually no government controls on the content of the printed media (except in nonpolitical areas such as pornography) and few on broadcasting. There are no prisoners of conscience or sanctioned uses of torture; some regional miscarriages of justice and police brutality have political and social overtones. Widespread use of surveillance techniques and clandestine interference with radical groups or groups thought to be radical have occurred; as a reduction of liberties the threat has remained largely potential; in recent years these security excesses have been greatly attenuated if not eliminated. Wherever and whenever publicity penetrates, the rule of law is generally secure, even against the most powerful. The government often loses in the courts. Private rights in most spheres are respected. Unions are independent and politically influential. Although a relatively capitalistic country, the combination of tax loads and with the decisive government role in agriculture, energy, defense, and other industries restricts individual choice as it increases majority power.

Comparatively: The United States is as free as Australia, freer than Italy.

UPPER VOLTA

Economy: noninclusive capitalist

Polity: military nonparty

Population: 6,700,000

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights: 6

Civil Liberties: 5

Status of Freedom: partly free

Political Rights. Upper Volta is under command of a military committee as the result of a coup in late 1980.

Civil Liberties. Media are both government and private; self-censorship is the rule. Private criticism is common. As a result of the coup there are a number of prisoners of conscience, and freedom of assembly or of political organization is denied. The rule of law seems fairly well established; within traditional limits private rights are respected. Trade unions are active but under government pressure; they have a limited right to strike. External travel is restricted; internal movement is free. The economy remains dependent on subsistence agriculture, with the government playing the role of regulator and promoter of development.

Comparatively: Upper Volta is as free as Zambia, freer than Liberia, less free than Sierra Leone.

URUGUAY

Economy: mixed capitalist

Political Rights: 5

Polity: military nonparty

Civil Liberties: 5

Population: 3,000,000

Status of Freedom: partly free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Uruguay is a military dictatorship supplemented by an appointed civilian head of state and appointed advisory council. The leading parties are inactive but still exist legally. The state is highly centralized. In 1980 the constitution submitted to the people was rejected—apparently a reasonably fair vote.

Civil Liberties. The press is private, and broadcasting private and public. Both are under censorship and threats of confiscation or closure, as are book and journal outlets. No criticism of the military is permitted, but some criticism appears in the media; foreign media are also generally available. The right of assembly is very restricted. The independence of the judiciary and the civil service has been drastically curtailed. Nearly 1,000 prisoners of conscience are still held. Torture has been routinely used in the past, and may continue in some instances; convictions generally have been based on written confessions. Many parties have been banned, but there is still considerable room for political discussion of alternatives beyond the limits of the present system. All organizations, including unions, are under close government supervision. There is no inviolability of the home. Private rights are generally respected. The tax load of an overbuilt bureaucracy and emphasis on private and government monopolies in major sectors have also restricted choice in this now impoverished welfare state.

Comparatively: Uruguay is as free as Indonesia, freer than Argentina, less free than Brazil.

VANUATU

Economy: noninclusive capitalist-statist
Political Rights: 2
Civil Liberties: 2
Polity: decentralized multiparty
Status of Freedom: free
Population: 100,000

A relatively homogeneous society with geographical subnationalities

Political Rights. Vanuatu has a parliamentary system with an indirectly elected president. Elections have been freely contested by multiple parties. Opposition exists between islands and between the French and English educated. Local government is elected; a decentralized federal system of regional government is being developed.

Civil Liberties. News media are limited and largely government owned but generally free. The full spectrum of civil freedoms is observed, but in the aftermath of the suppression of a secessionist (largely French supported) movement at independence, many political arrests and trials occurred; mistreatment was reported. The judiciary is independent. Rights to political, economic, and union organization are observed. There is a general right to travel.

Comparatively: Vanuatu is as free as Fiji, freer than Maldives, less free than Belize.

VENEZUELA

Economy: capitalist-statist
Political Rights: 1
Civil Liberties: 2
Polity: centralized multiparty
Status of Freedom: free
Population: 18,400,000

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Venezuela is a parliamentary democracy in which power has alternated between major parties in recent years. Campaigns and voting appear fair. The opposition presidential victory in 1978 provided a good example of the power of the average voter. Regional and local assemblies are relatively powerful, but governors are centrally appointed. Each state had equal representation in the upper house.

Civil Liberties. The press is private and free; most broadcasting is also in private hands. Censorship occurs only in emergencies, but television scripts on certain subjects must be approved in advance, and there are recurrent attempts at government control. The rule of law is generally secured, but in the face of guerrilla actions the security services have on occasion arbitrarily imprisoned persons, used torture, and threatened to prosecute for antimilitary statements. A paper may be confiscated for slandering the president. Many

persons have been detained, sometimes for long periods. On rare occasions members of parliament have been arrested. However, there is little evidence that those detained have been prisoners of conscience, and the government has taken steps to prevent torture. The court can rule against the government and charges are brought against the security forces. Most private rights are respected; government involvement in the petroleum industry has given it a predominant economic role. Human rights organizations are very active. Unions are well organized and powerful.

Comparatively: Venezuela is as free as France, freer than Ecuador, less free than Costa Rica.

VIETNAM

Economy: socialist

Political Rights: 7

Polity: communist one-party

Civil Liberties: 6

Population: 56,600,000

Status of Freedom: not free

An ethnic state with subnationalities

Political Rights. Vietnam is a traditional communist dictatorship with the forms of parliamentary democracy. Actual power is in the hands of the communist party; this is in turn dominated by a small group at the top. Officially there is a ruling national front as in several other communist states, but the noncommunist parties are essentially meaningless. Administration is highly centralized, with provincial boundaries arbitrarily determined by the central government. The flow of refugees and other evidence suggest that the present regime is very unpopular, especially in the South which is treated as an occupied country. *Subnationalities:* Continued fighting has been reported in the Montagnard areas in the South. Combined with new resettlement schemes non-Vietnamese peoples are under pressure in both North and South Vietnam. Many Chinese have been driven out of the country.

Civil Liberties. The media are under direct government, party, or army control; only the approved line is presented. While the people have essentially no rights against the interests of the state, there continues to be some public criticism and passive resistance, especially in the South. Arbitrary arrest is frequent. Severe repression of the Buddhist opposition has led to many immolations—pressure on the Hoa Hao and Catholics is comparable. In spite of superficial appearances religious freedom is generally denied. Perhaps one-half million persons have been put through reeducation camps, hundreds of thousands have been forced to move into new areas, or to change occupations; hundreds of thousands remain political prisoners or in internal exile. Former anticommunist and other groups are regularly discriminated against in employment, health care, and travel. There are no independent labor union rights, rights to travel, choice of education; many have been forced into collectives.

Comparatively: Vietnam is as free as Burma, freer than Cambodia, less free than China (Mainland).

WESTERN SAMOA

Economy: noninclusive capitalist **Political Rights:** 4
Polity: traditional nonparty **Civil Liberties:** 3
Population: 160,000 **Status of Freedom:** partly free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Western Samoa is a constitutional monarchy in which the assembly is elected by 9,500 "family heads." There have been important shifts of power within the assembly as the result of elections, although there are no political parties. Village government has preserved traditional forms and considerable autonomy; it is also based on rule by "family heads."

Civil Liberties. The press is private and government; radio is government owned; television is received only from outside. Government media have limited independence. There is general freedom of expression, organization, and assembly. The rule of law and private rights are respected within the limits set by the traditional system. Most arable land is held in customary tenure.

Comparatively: Western Samoa is as free as Bangladesh, freer than Indonesia, less free than Nauru.

YEMEN, NORTH

Economy: noninclusive capitalist **Political Rights:** 6
Polity: military nonparty **Civil Liberties:** 5
Population: 5,500,000 **Status of Freedom:** not free

A complex but relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. North Yemen is under collective military dictatorship supplemented by an appointive People's Assembly. Leaders are frequently assassinated. The tribal and religious structures still retain considerable authority, and the government must rely on a wide variety of different groups in an essentially nonideological consensual regime. Some local elective institutions have recently been developed. Political parties are forbidden. The country is divided between city and country, a variety of tribes, and two major religious groupings.

Civil Liberties. The weak media are largely government owned; the papers have occasional criticisms—the broadcast media have none. Foreign publications are routinely censored. Yet proponents of both royalist and far

left persuasions are openly accepted in a society with few known prisoners of conscience. There is no right of assembly. Politically active opponents may be encouraged to go into exile. The traditional Islamic courts give some protection; many private rights are respected. There is no right to strike or to engage in religious proselytizing. Unions and professional associations are government sponsored. Economically the government has concentrated on improving the infrastructure of Yemen's still overwhelmingly traditional economy. Most farmers are tenants; half the labor force is employed abroad.

Comparatively: North Yemen is as free as Argentina, freer than South Yemen, less free than Egypt.

YEMEN, SOUTH

Economy: noninclusive socialist	Political Rights: 6
Polity: socialist one-party	Civil Liberties: 7
Population: 2,000,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. South Yemen considers itself a communist country governed according to the communist one-party model. It is doubtful that the party retains the tight party discipline of its exemplars; it is government by coup and violence. Parliamentary elections in 1978 followed the one-party model; they allowed some choice among individuals. Soviet influence in internal and external affairs is powerful.

Civil Liberties. The media are government owned or controlled, and employed actively as means of indoctrination. Even conversation with foreigners is highly restricted. In the political and security areas the rule of law hardly applies. Thousands of political prisoners, torture, and hundreds of "disappearances" have instilled a pervasive fear in those who would speak up. Death sentences against protesting farmers have been handed down by people's courts. Independent private rights are few, although some traditional law and institutions remain. Unions are under government control. Industry and commerce have been nationalized, some of the land collectivized.

Comparatively: South Yemen is as free as Malawi, freer than Somalia, less free than Oman.

YUGOSLAVIA

Economy: mixed socialist	Political Rights: 6
Polity: communist one-party	Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 22,600,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A multinational state

Political Rights. Yugoslavia is governed on the model of the USSR, but with the addition of unique elements. These include: the greater role given the governments of the constituent republics; and the greater power given the assemblies of the self-managed communities and industrial enterprises. The Federal Assembly is elected indirectly by those successful in lower level elections. In any event, the country is directed by a small elite of the communist party; evidence suggests that in spite of some earlier liberalizing tendencies to allow the more democratic formal structure to work, Yugoslavia is now no more democratic than Hungary. No opposition member is elected to state or national position, nor is there public opposition in the assemblies to government policy on the national or regional level.

Subnationalities. The several peoples of Yugoslavia live largely in their historical homelands. The population consists of forty percent Serbs, twenty-two percent Croats, eight percent Slovenes, eight percent Bosnian Muslims, six percent Macedonians, six percent Albanians, two percent Montenegrins, and many others. The Croats have an especially active independence movement; Albanians have agitated for more self-determination.

Civil Liberties. The media in Yugoslavia are controlled directly or indirectly by the government, although there is ostensible worker control. There is no right of assembly. Hundreds have been imprisoned for ideas expressed verbally or in print that deviated from the official line (primarily through subnationalist enthusiasm, anticommunism, or communist deviationism). Dissidents are even pursued overseas. Torture and brutality occur; psychiatric hospitals are also used to confine prisoners of conscience. As long as the issue is not political, however, the courts have some independence; there is a realm of de facto individual freedom that includes the right to seek employment outside the country. Travel outside Yugoslavia is often denied to dissidents, and religious proselytizing is forbidden. Labor is not independent, but has rights through the working of the "self-management" system; local strikes are common. Although the economy is socialist or communalist in most respects, agriculture in this most agricultural of European countries remains overwhelmingly private.

Comparatively: Yugoslavia is as free as Hungary, freer than Romania, less free than Morocco.

Z A I R E

Economy: noninclusive capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 6
Polity: nationalist one-party (military dominated)	Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 30,300,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A transethnic heterogeneous state with subnationalities

Political Rights. Zaire is under one-man military rule, with the ruling party essentially an extension of the ruler's personality. Elections in 1977 at both local and parliamentary levels were restricted to one party, but allowed for extensive choice among individuals. The majority of the party's ruling council was also elected in this manner. A subsequent presidential election offered no choice. Regions are deliberately organized to avoid ethnic identity: regional officers all are appointed from the center, generally from outside of the area, as are officers of the ruling party.

Subnationalities. There are such a variety of tribes or linguistic groups in Zaire that no one group has as much as twenty percent of the population. The fact that French remains the dominant language reflects the degree of this dispersion. Until recently most of the Zaire people have seen themselves only in local terms without broader ethnic identification. The revolts and wars of the early 1960s saw continually shifting patterns of affiliation, with the European provincial but not ethnic realities of Katanga and South Kasai being most important. The most self-conscious ethnic groups are the Kongo people living in the west (and Congo and Angola) and the Luba in the center of the country. In both cases ethnicity goes back to important ancient kingdoms. There is continuing disaffection among the Lunda and other ethnic groups.

Civil Liberties. Private newspaper ownership remains. There is some freedom to criticize, but censorship is pervasive. There is no right of assembly, and union organization is controlled. Government has been arbitrary and capricious. The judiciary is not independent; prisoners of conscience are numerous, and execution and torture occurs. All ethnic organizations are forbidden. Arrested conspirators have been forbidden their own lawyers. Major churches retain some autonomy, but independent churches have been proscribed. Through the misuse of government power, the extravagance and business dealings of those in high places reduces economic freedom. Nationalization of land has often been a prelude to private development by powerful bureaucrats. Pervasive corruption and anarchy reduce human rights. There is also considerable government enterprise.

Comparatively: Zaire is as free as Gabon, freer than Benin, less free than Zambia.

ZAMBIA

Economy: noninclusive mixed
socialist

Polity: socialist one-party

Population: 6,000,000

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights: 5

Civil Liberties: 6

Status of Freedom: partly free

Political Rights. Zambia is ruled as a one-party dictatorship, although there have been elements of freedom within that party. Party organs are constitutionally more important than governmental. Although elections have had some competitive meaning within this framework, recently the government has repressed opposition movements within the party. Expression of dissent is possible through abstention. A 1978 presidential election allowed no choice and little opposition campaigning; it allowed negative votes. There are some town councils with elected members.

Civil Liberties. All media are government controlled. A considerable variety of opinion is expressed, but it is a crime to criticize the president, the parliament, or the ideology. Foreign publications are censored. There is a rule of law and the courts have some independence; cases have been won against the government. Political opponents are often detained, and occasionally tortured, yet most people talk without fear. Traditional life continues. The government does not fully accept private or traditional rights in property or religion; important parts of the economy, especially copper mining, have been nationalized. Both union and business organization are under government pressure.

Comparatively: Zambia is as free as Chile, freer than Angola, less free than Morocco.

ZIMBABWE

Economy: noninclusive capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 3
Polity: centralized dominant party	Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 8,000,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

An ethnically complex state with a territorial subnationality

Political Rights. Zimbabwe is a parliamentary democracy. The ruling party came to power in 1980 through elections marked by considerable coercion of the electorate. The whites retain special political rights. All military forces are still not controlled. Pressure to form a one-party state is growing.

Subnationalities. The formerly dominant white, Indian, and colored populations (five percent altogether) are largely urban. The emerging dominant people are the majority Shona-speaking groups (seventy-four percent). The Ndebele (eighteen percent) are territorially distinct and politically self-conscious.

Civil Liberties. The press is private. It is under pressure to conform; it now offers a narrow spectrum of opinion. The broadcast media are more active organs of government propaganda. The rule of law is increasingly

threatened; opposition politicians have been imprisoned or forced into exile. Racial discrimination is officially outlawed, especially in residence, occupation, and conscription. Much of the country may live in apprehension of the ruling parties and their former guerrilla forces. Unions and private associations are independent. The economy is mixed capitalist, socialist, and statist. The white population still wields disproportionate economic power.

Comparatively: Zimbabwe is as free as Senegal, freer than South Africa, less free than Botswana.

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