



FREEDOM IN THE WORLD

POLITICAL RIGHTS AND
CIVIL LIBERTIES

1978

Raymond D. Gastil

Executive Director, Amnesty International

Freedom in the World

Political Rights and Civil Liberties
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RAYMOND D. GASTIL

With essays by

Richard W. Cottam

Robert A. Dahl

Herbert J. Ellison

Giovanni Sartori



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Contents

PREFACE	ix
PART I: THE STUDY OF 1977	
The Comparative Survey of Freedom	3
A Working Definition of Political and Civil Freedom	7
The Resources of the Survey	8
The Tabulated Ratings	9
Comparison with Other Surveys	23
Changes in 1977	30
Elections and Referenda	42
The Relation of Political-Economic Systems to Freedom	43
Peoples Without National Rights	51
Conclusion	60
The Year of Human Rights	
Introduction	64
Human Rights East and West, <i>Herbert J. Ellison</i>	71
The Case of Iran, <i>Richard W. Cottam</i>	88
PART II: FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES	
Freedom and Democracy: Definitions and Distinctions	111
Complementary Views of Democracy	
A Realistic Appraisal of What Is Meant by Democratic Rule, <i>Giovanni Sartori</i>	127
Democracy as Polyarchy, <i>Robert A. Dahl</i>	134

The Importance of Ideas: How Democratic Institutions Be- come Established	147
The Relation of Alternative Political-Economic Systems to Freedom	163
Self-Determination, Subnationalities, and Freedom	180
PART III: COUNTRY SUMMARIES	
Introduction	219
Country Summaries	223
INDEX	327

Map and Tables

The Map of Freedom 20-21

Tables

1. Independent Nations: Comparative Measures of Freedom	10
2. Related Territories: Comparative Measures of Freedom	14
3. Ranking of Nations by Political Rights	16
4. Ranking of Nations by Civil Liberties	17
5. Comparison of Surveys	25
6. National Elections or Referenda	36
7. Political-Economic Systems	44
8. Major Peoples Without a Nation-State	48
9. Major Peoples Separated from Existing Nation-States	53
10. Some Requirements for a Democracy Among a Large Number of People	135
11. Conditions Favoring Polyarchy	138

Preface

The urge of men and women to make choices and divest themselves of natural and unnatural restrictions is as old as the human race. No less persistent is the compulsion of some to restrict and repress their fellows.

In most times and places, the oppressors have carried the day. To be sure, religious toleration brought a glimmer of hope to the ancient world. The European Renaissance and Meiji restoration in Japan introduced new possibilities for human relationships. Self-determination of peoples received impetus after World War I, and the Four Freedoms inspired the free and unfree throughout World War II.

Yet on the 24-hour clock by which the entire span of humanity on earth may be shown, individual freedom has been a broadly shared goal for only the past few seconds, and, even then, it has been far more widely recognized in theory than in practice. Table 1 (page 10) suggests that today barely thirty-five percent of the nations are free; more than 2.6 billion people are not free or are only partly free.

Today, in countries considered unfree, dissenters speak of human freedoms through *samizdat*, manifestos, or the underground press. In free nations, as never before, the national and international politics of human rights is everywhere apparent. Indeed, 1977 may well be remembered as the Year of Human Rights. The Carter administration in the United States established a climate that supported freedom activists in many countries. The 1975 Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Helsinki Accords, had spotlighted the procedural elements of human rights. The 1977-78 conference to review progress since the Final Act took steps to institutionalize the international assessment of human rights in the thirty-five signatory countries. Freedom of the individual citizen, whatever his nationality, has now been recognized as a concern of *all* peoples.

As an aspect of its thirty-seven year mission to promote the defense and development of civil and political liberties, Freedom House has

produced since 1950 an annual assessment of the status of freedom in the world. Beginning in 1972-73 these balance sheets were succeeded by an annual Comparative Survey of Freedom. This is published along with evaluative essays for each continent in the January/February edition of the organization's publication *Freedom at Issue*.

The Comparative Surveys have apparently filled a need for an improved perspective on the gains and losses, or threats and opportunities, in the field of human freedoms. They have been extensively quoted by the mass news media around the world. In March 1977, the Department of State incorporated data from the Survey in each of eighty-two reports to Congress on the level of human rights in countries receiving security assistance. Inquiries have been made by foreign governments in Asia, Africa, Europe, and Latin America relating to the Survey's ratings and criteria.

This interest suggests that the public might welcome a more substantial form of the Comparative Survey. Such an expanded survey should incorporate additional research, develop the theoretical underpinnings of the work, and show the relation of the work to current policy concerns. The volume before you is the first result of this effort at expansion.

The material is divided into three parts. The *first* presents the basic data of the Comparative Survey as of January 1, 1978, and explains the meaning of the categories and the methods that are employed. In this part we have also included discussions of the current issue of greatest importance in the area of freedom, the question of how effectively a country such as the United States under the Carter administration can hope to influence human rights in other countries, particularly communist and Third World countries. The discussion depends primarily on invited pieces by two experts on the USSR and Iran respectively.

The *second* part discusses in some depth four fundamental issues: the definition of freedom and constitutional democracy, the importance of the diffusion of democratic ideas, the relation of different economic systems to freedom, and the question of self-determination and subnationalism. The first, or definitional, essay, is complemented by selected writings from two leading authorities on freedom and democracy.

The *final* part of the book consists of summary discussions of individual countries giving the facts about each that were most determinative of the ratings found in Part I.

We acknowledge with deep appreciation the assistance in the conception of this volume provided by the Advisory Panel for the Comparative Survey consisting of Robert J. Alexander, Professor of Economics, Rutgers University; Richard W. Cottam, Professor of

Political Science, University of Pittsburgh; Herbert J. Ellison, Professor of History, University of Washington; Seymour Martin Lipset, Senior Fellow, the Hoover Institution; Lucian Pye, Professor of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Leslie Rubin, lawyer, professor and African specialist; Giovanni Sartori, Professor of Political Science, Stanford University; Robert Scalapino and Paul Seabury, Professors of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley.

We thank Professors Robert A. Dahl and Giovanni Sartori for permission to excerpt material from their recent books.

We acknowledge as well the guidance from its inception given the Comparative Survey of Freedom by Leonard R. Sussman, executive director of Freedom House.

And we are grateful for the support provided by the following foundations in the development of the Survey and the publication of this volume: the J. Howard Pew Freedom Trust, the John Dewey Foundation, and the Relm Foundation.

JOHN RICHARDSON, JR.
PRESIDENT OF FREEDOM HOUSE

PART I

The Study of 1977

The Comparative Survey of Freedom

World War II taught a generation the value of freedom, and the difficulty with which it is maintained. After the war it was optimistically assumed that the United States and its allies could bring freedom to the rest of the world. Under direct military occupation West Germany, Italy, and Japan developed democratic systems. The United States supported anticolonialism almost everywhere, and aid was freely given to what were considered proto-democracies. But disillusionment soon set in. Independence did not always mean freedom. Economic development was slow, and often its achievement did not bring a people closer to democracy. The communist states achieved considerable equality and development, but showed few signs of evolution toward free states. Anticommunist leaders too often turned out to be tyrants as well. Our economic aid provided little leverage for creating democracies: it was no substitute for the political control that had allowed us to transform the former Axis nations into democracies.

Disillusionment affected the political beliefs of leaders and intellectuals in both developed and underdeveloped countries. Lack of freedom in the underdeveloped world was said to mean that the people had evidently "chosen" not to be free, or that freedom "had no meaning" for them. It was said that political and civil liberties were not, after all, what most people really wanted; they were more interested in economic development and security, or in national success and pride. It was claimed that these could be achieved in poor nations only by establishing closely controlled societies. Real freedom was a luxury most nations could ill afford. In this climate of opinion, ambitious leaders of new nations who in a previous generation would have striven to emulate the models of America, Britain or France, strove to emulate the political and economic systems of the USSR, Nasser's Egypt, or Communist China. This choice was eased by the fact that for those with a chance at power, authoritarian systems

seemed to be easier and more secure models. Finally, in the 1960's internal criticism within the established democracies—that is, the primary areas where criticism is possible—led to a scientific relativism that insisted that Western democracy is only one of many desirable systems. Arguing that every "people" has a right to determine its own affairs, it was said that America had no business interfering in, or even judging, the activities of foreign governments in their own countries.

Against this background the Comparative Survey of Freedom was developed by Freedom House as a reaffirmation of the value and relevance of freedom.¹ We did not believe that realization of how hard it is to develop or preserve freedom should lead to its disvaluation. We question the proposition that anyone has significant information about the kind of government a people actually wants in a non-democratic state. We question the materialistic insistence that economic development is generally more important than freedom, that economic development produces freedom, or that nondemocratic systems are necessarily more efficient in propelling development. We believe that democratic states must be concerned with the internal affairs of other states. Intervention is not always wrong: the Allies intervened, or should have intervened, because the Nazis did not have a "right" to eliminate Jews; in the nineteenth century the British intervened in the slave trade because slavery was not a "right" for any people. Finally, while certain preconditions make democracy easier to achieve or preserve, we also know that democracies have historically developed in a range of different societies and at different stages of development, and that the development of democratic traditions can never start too early. After taking into consideration the socioeconomic correlates of democratic development, the fact remains that the extent of exposure to democratic ideas and experiences, and the pressures of outside powers, have had at least as great an influence as statistical correlates in drawing the map of freedom and oppression that we find today (see map, pages 20-21).

The Comparative Survey of Freedom has appeared annually or semiannually in *Freedom at Issue* since January 1973. The approach and purposes of the Survey have not changed, but the ratings and criteria of judgment have been continually revised. From the beginning, the Survey has been an attempt to give the public a tool to place international events in perspective. Because of intellectual fads and differences in the availability of information among different parts of the world, countries with the most highly publicized repressions of rights are often not those that on a day-to-day basis have the least freedom. How many newspaper readers know that the repressive

conditions reported in Chile or South Korea are commonplace in over one-third of the world's nations? The tendency of the media to concentrate on excitement and terror also leaves concerned citizens unaware of the high levels of freedom in many poor countries, such as Sri Lanka, India, and Botswana, or the progress toward freedom that has recently been made in Morocco, Egypt, or Ecuador. Too often repression in poor, non-Western countries is reported as though it is a regrettable necessity; the evidence suggests that repression is not as much a necessity in poor or illiterate countries as it is relatively easy to impose.

Political and civil freedoms are old ideas, but in institutionalized forms adapted to nation states they are new ideas for many people in the world, ideas that offer new hopes or alternatives. Our task is to chart the extent and fortunes of this "Democratic Revolution," the revolution that Preston James, a leading geographer, places alongside the Industrial Revolution as one of the two great revolutionary changes of our time.² To James the Democratic Revolution in individual status has six chief elements: equal treatment before the law; protection against arbitrary government; right of representation of all adult individuals in the formation of laws; majority rule and the secret ballot; free access to knowledge, and open discussion of issues of public policy; and right of freedom of choice—in work, residence, religion, even in right of resignation. The realization that these rights can exist has shaken every society, developed or underdeveloped, capitalist or socialist.

The Comparative Survey of Freedom is particularly concerned with the presence or absence of political and civil freedoms, such as the right to vote and the right to speak out on public issues. These are universal rights because all peoples can and should enjoy them in one or another effective form. We realize that these freedoms do not include all universal human rights. A free society may be quite imperfect, but we believe a perfect society would be free. The Survey has been objected to by many on the left who would have us emphasize the degree to which societies provide for the wants of their people. Alongside political and civil freedoms such critics would place provision of sufficient food, medical services, employment, housing, and education.³ A comparative study on this basis would be complementary and useful, but it is a materialist mistake to suppose that the peoples of the world always place material goods above political and civil freedoms, or that it is easy to distinguish between what a paternalistic observer thinks a people should have and what they really want. Without democratic forms, governments have a poor record in pro-

viding for the wants of peoples. As the Janata Party pointed out before the recent elections in India:

History is replete with instances when those who conspire against the rights of people attempt to undermine freedom by portraying it as a luxury. They conceal the fact that fundamental freedoms are weapons that the poor need to fight tyranny. Bread cannot be juxtaposed against liberty. The two are inseparable.⁴

Tyrannies can improve the distribution of food, but they are poor at promoting its production. They are more able than democracies to sacrifice their people to what the ruling elite or party sees as the national interest. Such sacrifice was common in the USSR of the thirties, and has been repeated in the middle 1970's in Kampuchea (Cambodia) with its widespread famine, and in Vietnam with severe food shortages resulting from a "reordering of priorities."⁵ Of course, the setbacks in population control that resulted from the Janata success in India are dangerous to long-run development and food balance. People make mistakes, majorities make mistakes, but majorities have a right to their mistakes that no educated elite has a right to deny. History would suggest that majorities are more likely to serve their long-run interests than elites are to serve these interests in the name of the majority. At least this is the faith of democrats.

Another objection to the Survey comes from rightists or capitalists who do not believe that we give adequate weight to the economic freedoms of nonsocialist regimes such as those in Chile or South Korea. Many people, and not only wealthy people, do appreciate the economic opportunities of capitalist societies. However, we define freedom primarily in terms of equality in ability to directly or indirectly influence the political process. In this definition, it is the right of the majority to choose between socialism and capitalism that expresses a society's freedom and not the nature of the choice. Therefore, while we give credit to capitalist countries for individualistic economic freedoms, and to socialist states for government provision of egalitarian opportunities, these are not the major concerns of the Survey.

The task of monitoring the state of freedom in all countries can be more effectively undertaken by a private organization than by even the most well-intentioned administration.⁶ Under any administration the Comparative Survey of Freedom will encourage those who are making efforts to preserve or enhance freedom wherever they are, while it will erode the righteous self-confidence of those who curtail freedom in the name of other goals. And, as it serves this function, the Survey will add to the knowledge of those interested

in the nature of freedom, and in so doing bring balance to the discussion of its future.

A WORKING DEFINITION OF POLITICAL AND CIVIL FREEDOM

Since freedom and democracy have come to have so many often contradictory meanings, these terms must be clearly defined before we can discuss them. In particular, we do not accept the definition of "democracies" as used in World War II, or that of the "Free World" used after the war. In the cold war period independence from Soviet control was enough to make a nation "free," but a noncommunist state may or may not exhibit traces of real freedom and democracy.

Democracy as we understand it is government by a people under law. Given the same operating constitutional structure, the percentage of people taking part in political activities is relevant to the extent of democracy in a society. However, the meaning of democracy under law, or constitutional democracy, is different in both reality and ideals from that of "peoples democracy." A society under law offers a predictable life, and allows its members to select a wide variety of private priorities. In a constitutional system the top leaders, and the justices, legislators, governors, and mayors under them, know that they can count on remaining in office between elections, or for fixed periods, unless their actions are wildly idiosyncratic and harmful. There is a rational, known procedure for attaining and for losing power. Such predictability is also accorded average citizens in the pursuit of their more modest objectives. In nonconstitutional systems, whether ostensibly democracies or not, lack of law affects everyone, including the supreme leader.

While law is necessary, it is not sufficient for a democracy. A democracy requires both political and civil freedoms. *Civil liberties* are the rights of the individual against the state, rights to free expression, to a fair trial; they are what most of us mean by freedom. *Political rights* are legal rights to play a part in determining who governs or what the laws of the community are. The two kinds of rights are interdependent: civil liberties without political rights are apt to be lost, and political rights without civil rights are meaningless.

Political rights exist when the majority decides on the policy of the society either directly or through regularly elected representatives. For political rights to be effectively utilized there should be an organized opposition to the government in power, as well as alternation in power among publicly competing groups. Civil liberties are more common in the world than authentic political rights. Except for extremist countries of the right and left, citizens in most countries are

willing and able to criticize or ignore the government. There are a number of states such as Mexico with considerable freedom of speech and yet a carefully controlled political system. If free expression is tolerated without being guaranteed in law, civil liberties exist by default. Fortunately, what is allowed by default often develops into a tradition of freedom.

Although our emphasis is on the freedoms of individuals, group freedoms are considered in two ways. First, a deliberate denial of self-determination to a significant territorial people may be regarded as a partial restriction on the freedom of that people, especially if the injustice is flagrant. For example, in 1970 East Pakistan was not a recognized state, but its population was larger than the rest of Pakistan and its people wanted independence. To continue to deny it in a free society would have been impossible. Secondly, if the members of a society belong to corporate groups with very little internal freedom (for example, families, religious orders, labor unions, or political parties), this intragroup authoritarianism need not be considered an important restriction on liberty unless one of these groups dominates society as a whole, or a significant percentage of adults are legally forced to live within such groups. Liberty consists in the freedom of adults to join or leave such corporate groups, *and* of the groups to operate freely within the larger society.

In the real world there are no democracies with the full spectrum of civil and political rights equally available to all. While there are some close approximations, especially in the smaller nations of Europe, the democratic tradition has grown slowly, with advances and setbacks, wherever it has thrived. It is only recently that even the best democracies have achieved the level of freedom that most people expect in a modern democracy. Few peoples had heard of constitutional democracy before the nineteenth century. Gradually knowledge of its principles have spread until today they are well known even to those leaders who have rejected them.

THE RESOURCES OF THE SURVEY

The basic references for the undertaking are the annual editions of the *Political Handbook of the World*, edited by Arthur Banks for the State University of New York and the Council on Foreign Relations, and the *Worldmark Encyclopedia of Nations*. Unlike most books and scholarly articles on nations, these references offer directly comparable information on the topics of most interest to the Survey. This information is modified by general background and reading, including wherever possible monographs on particular countries or comparative works.

Events relevant to freedom are followed in the press, especially in the *New York Times*, the *Christian Science Monitor*, *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, the *Africa Research Bulletin*, and *Latin America*. In addition, other journals are regularly consulted, such as the *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, *Foreign Affairs*, the *Middle East Journal*, *Asian Survey*, or the *Far Eastern Economic Review*. For the purposes of the Survey a special file has been established for each country, including clippings and references. Initially important for the comparison of press freedom were the reports of the Freedom of Information Center; more recently we rely on the reports of the International Press Institute, and the Freedom of Press Committee of the Inter-American Press Association. The reports of Amnesty International and other human rights groups are carefully considered, as are the opinions of those professionally concerned with particular countries. The U.S. State Department is another valuable source, particularly through its recent annual reports to Congress on the human rights performance of nations receiving American assistance. As mentioned in the Preface, an Advisory Panel has been established to provide informed critiques of both ratings and theory; other experts are consulted when needed.

THE TABULATED RATINGS

Tables 1 and 2 rate each state or territory on seven-point scales for political and civil freedoms, and provide an overall judgment of each as "free," "partly free," or "not free." In each scale a rating of (1) is freest and (7) least free. No state, of course, is absolutely free or unfree. Instead of using absolute standards, nations are grouped by comparison with those that appear more, or less, free. The test of the system would be whether most observers would judge states rated (1) to be freer than those rated (2), and so on.

When a country's standing in *political rights* is analyzed, attention is first directed to general elections. We want to know how recently there has been an election, and the extent of competition. We want to know if there is a one-party, no party, or competitive party system. A one-party system allows the least chance of opposition, while competitive parties allow the most. In an election we want to know the percentage voting for a particular party or candidate for head of state. If contested, majorities over ninety percent suggest massive government interference, while majorities of seventy to ninety percent are suspect. We also want to know how often the same results occur, and whether parties or leaders have replaced one another by democratic process. We are interested in whether there are elected regional

Table 1
Independent Nations:
Comparative Measures of Freedom

	Political Rights ¹	Civil Liberties ¹	Status of Freedom ²	Outlook ³
Afghanistan ⁶	6	6	NF	0
Albania	7	7	NF	0
Algeria	6	6	NF	0
Angola	7-	7-	NF	0
Argentina	6	6-	NF	+
Australia	1	1	F	0
Austria	1	1	F	0
Bahamas	1	2	F	0
Bahrain	6	4	PF	+
Bangladesh	6+	4	PF	0
Barbados	1	1	F	0
Belgium	1	1	F	0
Benin	7	7	NF	0
Bhutan	4	4	PF	0
Bolivia	6	4	PF	+
Botswana	2	3	F	0
Brazil	4	5	PF	0
Bulgaria	7	7	NF	0
Burma	7-	6	NF	0
Burundi	7	6	NF	0
Cameroon	6	5	NF	0
Canada	1	1	F	0
Cape Verde Islands	6	6	NF	0
Central African Emp.	7	7	NF	0
Chad	7	6	NF	0
Chile	7	5	NF	+
China (Mainland)	6	6	NF	0
China (Taiwan)	5	4+	PF	0
Colombia	2	3	F	0
Comoro Islands ⁶	4+	4	PF	0
Congo	7-	6	NF-	0
Costa Rica	1	1	F	0
Cuba ⁶	6+	6	NF	0
Cyprus	3	4	PF	0
Czechoslovakia	7	6	NF	0
Denmark	1	1	F	0

Notes to the Table

1. The scales use the numbers 1-7, with 1 comparatively offering the highest level of political or civil rights, and 7 the lowest. A plus or minus following a rating indicates an improvement or decline in 1977.

2. A free state is designated by F, a partly free state by PF, and a not free state by NF.

3. A positive outlook for freedom is indicated by a plus sign, a negative outlook, by a minus, and relative stability of ratings by a zero. The outlook for freedom is based on the problems the country is facing, the way the government and people are reacting to these problems, and the longer run political traditions of the society. A judgment of outlook may also reflect an imminent change, such as the expected adoption of a meaningful new constitution.

4. Formerly the French Territory of the Afars and Issas.

5. Formerly Cambodia.

6. This country has been reevaluated since the Survey was issued in January. (See *Freedom at Issue*, Jan.-Feb. 1978, p. 7.)

	Political Rights ¹	Civil Liberties ¹	Status of Freedom ²	Outlook ³
Djibouti ^{4/6}	3	4-	PF	0
Dominican Republic	4	2+	PF	+
Ecuador	6	4	PF	+
Egypt	5	4	PF	0
El Salvador ⁶	4	4-	PF	0
Equatorial Guinea	7-	7	NF	0
Ethiopia	7	7-	NF	0
Fiji	2	2	F	o
Finland	2	2	F	o
France ⁶	1	2	F	0
Gabon	6	6	NF	0
Gambia	2	2	F	0
Germany (E)	7	7	NF	0
Germany (W) ⁶	1	2-	F	0
Ghana	6+	5	PF+	+
Greece ⁶	2	2	F	+
Grenada	2	3+	F+	0
Guatemala ⁶	3+	4	PF	0
Guinea	7	7	NF	0
Guinea-Bissau	6	6	NF	0
Guyana	3	3	PF	0
Haiti	7	6	NF	0
Honduras	6	3	PF	0
Hungary	6	5+	NF	0
Iceland	1	1	F	0
India	2+	2+	F+	0
Indonesia ⁶	5	5	PF	0
Iran	6	5+	NF	0
Iraq	7	7	NF	0
Ireland	1	1	F	0
Israel ⁶	2	2	F	0
Italy ⁶	2	2-	F	0
Ivory Coast	6	5	NF	0
Jamaica	2-	3	F	0
Japan	2	1	F	0
Jordan	6	6	NF	o
Kampuchea ⁵	7	7	NF	0
Kenya	5	5	PF	0
Korea (N)	7	7	NF	0
Korea (S)	5	5	PF	0
Kuwait	6	4+	PF+	0
Laos	7	7	NF	0
Lebanon	4	4	PF	0
Lesotho	5	4	PF	0
Liberia	6	4	PF	0
Libya ⁶	6	6	NF	0
Luxembourg	1	1	F	0
Madagascar	5+	5	PF+	0
Malawi	7	6	NF	0
Malaysia	3	4	PF	0
Maldives	4	4	PF	0
Mali	7	7	NF	0
Malta	2-	2	F	0
Mauritania	6	6	NF	0

Table 1 —Continued

	Political Rights ¹	Civil Liberties ¹	Status of Freedom ²	Outlook ³
Mauritius	2+	2	F	0
Mexico ⁶	4	3	PF	+
Mongolia	7	7	NF	0
Morocco ⁶	3+	4+	PF	+
Mozambique	7	7	NF	0
Nauru	2	2	F	0
Nepal	6	5	PF+	0
Netherlands	1	1	F	0
New Zealand	1	1	F	0
Nicaragua	5	5	PF	0
Niger	7	6	NF	0
Nigeria	5+	4	PF	+
Norway	1	1	F	0
Oman	6	6	NF	0
Pakistan	6-	4+	PF	0
Panama	6+	5+	NF	+
Papua New Guinea	2	2	F	0
Paraguay	5	6	NF	0
Peru	6	4	PF	+
Philippines	5	5	PF	+
Poland	6	5+	NF	0
Portugal	2	2	F	0
Qatar	5	5	PF	0
Rhodesia ⁶	6	5	NF	+
Rumania	7	6	NF	0
Rwanda	7	5	NF	0
Sao Tome and Principe	6	5	NF	0
Saudi Arabia	6	6	NF	0
Senegal	5+	3+	PF	+
Seychelles	6-	3-	PF-	0
Sierra Leone	5+	5	PF	0
Singapore	5	5	PF	0
Somalia	7	7	NF	0
South Africa	5-	6-	PF	0
Spain ⁶	2+	3	F+	0
Sri Lanka	2	2+	F	0
Sudan	6	5+	NF	0
Surinam	2	2	F	0
Swaziland	6	4	PF	0
Sweden	1	1	F	0
Switzerland	1	1	F	0
Syria	5+	6	PF+	0
Tanzania	6	6	NF	0
Thailand	6	5+	NF	+
Togo	7	6	NF	0
Tonga	5	3	PF	0
Transkei	6	5	NF	0
Trinidad & Tobago	2	2	F	0
Tunisia	6	5	NF	0
Turkey	2	3	F	0
Uganda	7	7	NF	0

	Political Rights ¹	Civil Liberties ¹	Status of Freedom ²	Outlook ³
USSR	7	6	NF	0
United Arab Emirates	5	5	PF	0
United Kingdom	1	1	F	0
United States	1	1	F	0
Upper Volta	5	4+	PF	+
Uruguay	6	6	NF	0
Venezuela	1	2	F	0
Vietnam	7	7	NF	0
Western Samoa	4	2	PF	0
Yemen (N)	6	5	NF	0
Yemen (S)	7	7	NF	0
Yugoslavia	6	5	NF	0
Zaire ⁶	6+	6	NF	0
Zambia	5	5	PF	0

or local governments. Unless the country is very small, the more secondary elections there are, and the more power the winners gain by election, the more democratic the society. In all elections we want to know what percentage of adults participate, and the reasons for nonparticipation. Irrespective of elections, we examine the degree to which power is divided among a wide variety of persons and groups. A de facto balance of power among competing groups in a society may offer as much political freedom as an ineffective electoral system. Finally, the Survey asks whether the political system is free of foreign or military control or influence.

In states rated (1) in political rights the great majority of persons (or families) in the state have both rights and opportunities to participate in the electoral process. In addition, all have the right to compete for political office, and political parties are freely formed for this purpose. The *United Kingdom* or the *Netherlands* are good examples. In a state ranked (2) electoral processes remain open, but their effectiveness is reduced by factors such as extreme poverty, a feudal social structure, violence, or agreements to limit opposition. Examples are *Colombia* or *India*. In a state ranked (1) or (2) a leader or a party can be voted out of office, or will stay in office the constitutionally prescribed length of time. This is more doubtful in a state ranked (3) or below. The people of a state at rank (3) often elect their leaders and representatives, but coups, massive interference with electoral results, or other nondemocratic procedures also occur. Major parties may boycott elections, or occasionally be excluded. Examples are *El Salvador* or *Guyana*. A state may be ranked (4) either because there is a constitutional block to the full democratic significance of elections, or because they appear to make little difference on the resulting power distribution. Examples are *Mexico* and *Brazil*. In states ranked

Table 2
Related Territories:
Comparative Measures of Freedom

	Political Rights ¹	Civil Liberties ¹	Status of Freedom ²	Outlook ³
Australia				
Christmas Island (in Indian Ocean)	4	2	PF	0
Cocos Islands	4+	2+	PF	0
Norfolk Island	4	2	PF	0
Chile				
Easter Island	7	6	NF	0
Juan Fernandez	7	6	NF	0
Denmark				
Faroe Islands	2	1	F	0
Greenland	4	1	PF	0
France				
French Guiana	3	2	PF	0
French Polynesia	3+	2+	PF	0
Guadeloupe	3	2	PF	0
Martinique	3	2	PF	0
Mayotte	2	2	F	0
Monaco ⁴	4	1	PF	0
New Caledonia	4	3	PF	0
Reunion	3	2	PF	0
Saint Pierre & Miquelon	3	2	PF	0
Wallis and Futuna	4	3	PF	0
Israel				
Occupied territories	5	4	PF	0
Italy				
San Marino ⁴	2	1	F	0
Netherlands				
Neth. Antilles	2	1 +	F	0
New Zealand				
Cook Islands	2+	2	F+	0
Niue	2	2	F	0
Tokelau Islands	4	2	PF	0
Portugal				
Azores	2+	2	F+	0
Macao	3+	3+	PF	0
Madeira	2+	2	F+	0
South Africa				
Bophuthatswana ⁵	6	6	NF	0
South West Africa (<i>Namibia</i>)	6	5	NF	+
Spain				
Canary Islands	2+	2+	F+	0
Places of Sovereignty	2+	2+	F+	0

Notes to the Table

1., 2., 3. See Notes, Table I.

4. These states are not listed as independent because all have explicit legal forms of dependence on a particular country (or, in the case of Andorra, countries) in the spheres of foreign affairs, defense, etc.

5. A homeland which became independent on December 6, 1977. Its geography causes us to rate it initially as less independent than the similar Transkei.

6. West Indies Associated States.

	Political Rights ¹	Civil Liberties ¹	Status of Freedom ²	Outlook ¹
Switzerland				
Liechtenstein ⁴	4	1	PF	0
United Kingdom				
Anguilla	2	2	F	0
Antigua and Barbuda ⁶	2	2	F	0
Belize	1	2	F	0
Bermuda	2	1	F	0
Brit. Virgin Islands	3	2	PF	0
Brunei ⁴	6	5	NF	0
Cayman Islands	2	2	F	0
Channel Islands	2	1	F	0
Dominica ⁶		3	F	0
Falkland Islands	2	2	F	0
Gibraltar	1	2	F	0
Gilbert Islands	2	2	F	0
Hong Kong	3	2	PF	0
Isle of Man	2	1	F	0
Montserrat	3	2	F	0
St. Helena	2	2	F	0
St. Kitts and Nevis ⁶	2	3	F	0
St. Lucia ⁶	2	3	F	0
St. Vincent ⁶	2	2	F	0
Solomons (Brit.)	2	2	F	0
Turks and Caicos	3	2	PF	0
Tuvalu	2	2	F	0
United States				
American Samoa	3	2	PF	0
Canal Zone	5	3	PF	-
Guam	3	2	PF	0
Puerto Rico	2	1	F	0
Micronesia	4	2	PF	0
Northern Marianas	2+	2	F+	0
Virgin Islands	3	2	PF	+
France-Spain Condominium				
Andorra"	4	3+	PF	0
France-United Kingdom Condominium				
New Hebrides	3	3	PF	+

(5) elections are either closely controlled or limited, or the results have very little significance. Examples are *Indonesia* or *Sierra Leone*. In states ranked (6) there is either no generally operating electoral system, or opposition candidates are not allowed to compete. At this level there remains some distribution of political power, and voting may offer limited choice at the local level. Examples are *Yugoslavia* or *Liberia*. States ranked (7) are tyrannies with little legitimacy either in a national tradition or a modern ideology. Examples are *Kampuchea* (Cambodia) or *Uganda*.

Turning to *civil liberties*, we look first for the existence of a critical press. We ask: Do editors support persons or alternative systems that might replace those now in power? Is the press privately owned, or if owned by the government, how is it controlled? Beyond the press, we want to know how much government control there is over television

Table 4
Nations by Civil Liberties

Most Free

1
Australia
Austria
Barbados
Belgium
Canada
Costa Rica
Denmark
Iceland
Ireland
Japan
Luxembourg
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States

2
Bahamas
Dominican Republic
Fiji
Finland
France
Gambia
Germany (W)
Greece
India
Israel
Italy
Malta
Mauritius
Nauru
Papua New Guinea
Portugal
Sri Lanka
Surinam
Trinidad & Tobago
Venezuela
Western Samoa

3
Botswana
Colombia
Grenada
Guyana
Honduras
Jamaica
Mexico
Senegal
Seychelles
Spain
Tonga
Turkey

4
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Bhutan
Bolivia
China (Taiwan)
Comoro Is.
Cyprus
Djibouti
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Guatemala
Kuwait
Lebanon
Lesotho
Liberia
Malaysia
Maldives
Morocco
Nigeria
Pakistan
Peru
Swaziland
Upper Volta

5
Brazil
Cameroon
Chile
Ghana
Hungary
Indonesia
Iran
Ivory Coast
Kenya
Korea (S)
Madagascar
Nepal
Nicaragua
Panama
Philippines
Poland
Qatar
Rhodesia
Rwanda
Sao Tome
& Principe
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Sudan
Thailand
Transkei
Tunisia
United Arab
Emirates
Yemen (N)
Yugoslavia
Zambia

6
Afghanistan
Algeria
Argentina
Burma
Burundi
Cape Verde Is.
Chad
China (Mainland)
Congo
Cuba
Czechoslovakia
Gabon
Guinea-Bissau
Haiti
Jordan
Libya
Malawi
Mauritania
Niger
Oman
Paraguay
Rumania
Saudi Arabia
South Africa
Syria
Tanzania
Togo
USSR
Uruguay
Zaire

Least Free

7
Albania
Angola
Benin
Bulgaria
Central African
Emp.
Equatorial Guinea
Ethiopia
Germany (E)
Guinea
Iraq
Kampuchea
Korea (N)
Laos
Mali
Mongolia
Mozambique
Somalia
Uganda
Vietnam
Yemen (S)

and radio. Unfortunately, even in countries where the press is relatively independent and untrammled, radio and television systems are frequently under government control, and they may reach a much higher percentage of the population. Although government control may be carefully hedged about with legal restrictions, only in a few states with long and continuous democratic traditions, such as Great Britain, are we reassured by legal guarantees of impartiality. The Survey is interested primarily in censorship that is applied in defense of a ruling party or its policies; there is only marginal interest in censorship applied for social or religious reasons. Perhaps the most important civil rights in the average person's life are the right to openly express oneself, to discuss public affairs with one's friends without fear, and the right to belong to an independent private organization free of government supervision.

Civil rights also include the right to a fair trial, and for this right to be effective the judiciary must be relatively independent of administrative control. There is little detailed information readily available on the behavior of many judicial systems, but the press often reports cases that indicate whether an individual in a particular country can or cannot win in court against the government.


In some states security or police forces generally respect individual rights; in others they systematically persecute or destroy persons of whom they disapprove. The number of political prisoners arrested for opinions rather than violent actions and the existence of torture or brutality are important indicators. Finally, civil rights are generally more operative when there is peace in a nation; as levels of political violence rise, increasing numbers of persons feel intimidated into silence. The Survey also takes account of the partial denial of rights implied by illiteracy, except on the local level.

With a high level of civil liberties, rights are safe for nearly everyone and nearly everywhere against violence or arbitrary action by police or mobs. If there is a high level of civil liberties, then there are nongovernment, uncensored newspapers, and newspapers are not closed down for political reasons. At this level there is a general protection of individual civil liberties at least for most classes and ethnic groups. At a medium level of civil liberties nongovernment or nonadministration papers exist and engage in criticism, but are under periodic threat of censorship, seizure, or suspension. In such societies threats to life and property are common, often by security forces over which the government has incomplete control. With a low level of civil liberties no direct criticism of national leaders is allowed in the press, although individuals may speak freely on most topics to small groups or for outside consumption. The ordinary person feels heavy pressure

not to be critical, particularly if all work is government work. With a very low level of civil liberties people have no rights, except insofar as competing factions within the system can protect them. At this level no actions are beyond the attention of the government.

In a nation ranked (1) in civil liberties the rule of law is unshaken; there is a variety of news media, and freedom of expression is both possible and evident. Examples are *Denmark* and *Australia*. States ranked (2) aspire to this level, but because of violence or ignorance, or lack of sufficient or free media of expression, civil liberties are less effective. There may be special laws that restrain rights more than would seem required by the needs of order; these may result from an authoritarian civic tradition or the influence of a particular religious tradition. Examples in the less developed world are *Venezuela* and *India*, while in Europe political terror and the repression of this terror reduces liberty in *West Germany* and *Italy*. States ranked (3) have most of the trappings of civil liberty; the government may, for example, be regularly and successfully opposed in the courts. Yet for one or another reason, such as severe threats to the state or an unresolvable political deadlock, there are serious imperfections. These may include repeated reliance on martial law, jailing for sedition, or suppression of publications. Examples are *Colombia* or *Turkey*. In states ranked (4) there are broad areas of freedom, and publication may be relatively free, yet there are also broad areas of repression. States may be found in this ranking because of incomplete transition from traditional society or recent emergence from a revolutionary situation. Examples are *Guatemala* and *Nigeria*. In states ranked (5) civil liberties are often denied, but there is no doctrine that denies them. The media may be weak, government controlled, or frequently censored. Complaints that civil rights have been violated may simply be ignored. Examples are *Brazil* and the *Philippines*. In states ranked (6) the rights of the state or its governing system are given legal priority over the rights of other groups or individuals (for example, in the new Soviet constitution discussed below by Herbert Ellison). Nevertheless, criticism is allowed to appear in limited ways, and a few favored individuals are allowed considerable freedom. Examples are *Burma* or the *USSR*. In states ranked (7) the outside world almost never hears of internal criticism except through the government's condemnation of it. Citizens have no rights vis-a-vis the state. Examples are *Albania* and the *Central African Empire*.

The Survey's judgments of civil and political rights are always on a comparative basis, and they are based on behavior rather than laws or formal systems. Reviewing the flow of material on the behavior of nations suggests that it is the pattern of rights, and not a simple



Free

Partly Free

Not Free

The Map of Freedom

1978

checklist of pluses and minuses, that is critical for evaluation. For example, apparent political peace and literacy help establish the ranking of Costa Rica in the Survey, because they exist in conjunction with a fully functioning multiparty system and free news media. But peace and literacy make no contribution to the freedom of a person in a thoroughly dictatorial and totalitarian state such as Albania. Likewise, multiple political parties are of positive value for political rights in Venezuela, but in Angola where one party governs and the others wage war against it, political parties do little for the average person's political rights.

A cumulative judgment of "free," "partly free," or "not free" is made on the basis of the foregoing seven-point ratings, and an understanding of how they were derived. Generally, states rated (1) and (2) will be "free"; those at (3), (4), and 5 "partly free"; and those at (6) and (7) "not free." It must be remembered, however, that the ratings are not arithmetical units, but merely categories on arbitrary scales. When the ratings for political rights and civil liberties differ, the cumulative judgment is decided by averaging. Although political rights are given slightly more weight in borderline cases, such cases are generally decided by a judgment of the position of a state within the numerical categories. For example, (6) and (5) may lead either to a rating of "not free" or "partly free," depending on whether the (5) and (6) are a high (5) or low (5), a high (6) or low (6).

Between free states in which there is a large measure of freedom and not free states in which there is little freedom, there are the states that we have labeled partly free. These cover a broad spectrum, but all make an attempt to provide constitutional or democratic forms and processes. In a modern, partly free state evidence of one of the following must exist: 1) a legally organized and authentic opposition group; 2) a generally free and open election process for an institution with actual political power; 3) a tradition of judicial independence; 4) a strong independent press; or 5) an open market place of ideas and general freedom from fear in expressing them publicly. The reader should note a group of states, such as Poland, Hungary, Panama, Yugoslavia, and the Ivory Coast, at the upper edge of the not free group. With relatively small changes these states might enter the partly free category. Yet none of them offer sufficient evidence of achievement in any one of the critical areas.

Trends in freedom in particular countries are shown in the column labeled *Outlook* in Tables 1 and 2. The analysis of trends is incomplete. For the Survey to take notice of a trend, there generally has to be both a publicly announced and observable progression toward a freer or less free system. For example, announced intentions

to emulate Albania or to establish a democratic constitution suggest negative and positive outlooks if followed by appropriate behavior.

Distinguishing between independent nations and the related territories considered in Table 2 is not always easy. In general we follow the practice of accepting the definition of the government that actually controls an area. There are many nations whose independence is tenuous, such as the Soviet satellites, Transkei, or the smallest island states of the South Seas. However, these are formally freer than the ministates of Europe such as Monaco, Liechtenstein, or the Isle of Man that along with the more traditional colonies and the protectorate of Brunei are classified as related territories. The local governments of these territories do not meet the formal United Nations criteria for independence established in 1953 as: full power to make international agreements, right to provide for national defense, freedom to choose the form of government, freedom from control or interference of another state in internal affairs, and complete economic, social, and cultural autonomy.⁷ Lack of information compels us to be much less precise in our judgments of freedom in Table 2 than in Table 1. (The major denials of freedom through modern colonialism are discussed below in the section "Peoples Without National Rights.")

COMPARISON WITH OTHER SURVEYS

The annual publication of the tabulated ratings since 1973 have provided the only continually revised, international surveys of freedom, but they were preceded by a number of individual surveys. The most comprehensive of these was Arthur Banks and Robert Textor, *A Cross-Polity Survey*.⁸ Based on an analysis of qualitative and quantitative data for all nations in the period 1960-62, Banks and Textor ranked and categorized polities on a wide variety of indices. These included economic development, literacy, and degree of urbanization, as well as indices more directly relevant to our study. The purpose of their work was to find correlations among the variables developed. For this purpose their indices were generally more specific than ours; for example, instead of civil and political liberties or freedom, Banks and Textor reported more detailed information on items such as the nature of the party system, presence of military intervention, freedom of opposition groups to enter politics, or freedom of the press.

The next major effort was by R. A. Dahl, R. Norling, and M. F. Williams at Yale.⁹ They attempted to update Banks and Textor's study by placing all nations along a variety of scales directly relating to democracy. The resulting scales were then aggregated into scales representing the two fundamental dimensions of "polyarchy" according to Robert Dahl, that is, "opportunities for political opposition" and degree

of popular "participation in national elections." (See the excerpts from Dahl in Part II.) The resulting data were then used to produce a list of polyarchies and near-polyarchies.

Although the detailed work of Banks and Textor as brought up-to-date by Dahl and associates represented a careful quantitative effort, the fact that most of the basic categories and ratings were highly judgmental, and based on a small set of alternative "boxes" for each dimension, could lead to arbitrary results. For example, after the statistical tabulations were in, Dahl noticed that on a scale for democracy France was placed in the same category as Bolivia in both 1962 and 1968. Since intuitively he saw this as an error, Dahl took France out of this category and placed it much higher. In this case the "data" used as well as the final aggregation seem to have been at fault: in 1962 press freedom in France had been listed as the same as that in Syria while the party system was put on a par with Paraguay's. Unfortunately, in the political atmosphere of academia in 1969, the intuitions of Dahl and associates were blind to some errors. For example, on the democratic scale South Vietnam should not have been placed in the lowest category along with Ethiopia and Haiti (in a system with thirty-one categories). In spite of any reservations the reader might have, South Vietnam had recently held contested elections; many opposition leaders had been elected to the legislature, and Vietnamese papers had openly criticized the government.¹⁰ These events and conditions of partial freedom were essentially absent in Haiti or Ethiopia.

In Table 5 a comparison of Dahl's revision of Banks and Textor with the "democratic systems" of D. Rustow¹¹ has been extended by comparing these with the results of the Freedom House "Survey of Freedom" as of summer 1972. In considering Table 5, several points should be remembered. First, the important distinctions between free and partly free are obscured.¹² Secondly, our definition of freedom is not as closely identified with political opposition and participation as are the definitions of Rustow and Dahl. In the Survey civil liberties include more than politics, and participation is not given weight outside of a pattern that suggests the ability of the people to oppose policies. Rustow, in particular, appears to weight too heavily the sheer fact of elections, except where they are blatantly meaningless. For example, Mexico has not had sufficient opposition in its elections to be classified as a democracy. Third, there will obviously be changes over time—for example, Greece both left and returned to the democratic column since Rustow wrote; Chile is certainly no longer a democracy; and the "special cases" of the Dahl list would no longer be special cases. Finally, the reluctance of Dahl and associates to place Ceylon

Table 5
Comparison of Surveys

Dahl and associates "Fully inclusive polyarchies" (12/68)	Dankwart Rustow "Democratic sys- tems" (1966)	Survey of Freedom "Major free states" (8/72)
Australia	Australia	Australia
Austria	Austria	Austria
Belgium	Belgium	Belgium
Canada	Canada	Canada
Chile*	Ceylon	Ceylon
Colombia**	Chile	Chile
Costa Rica	Colombia	Colombia
Cyprus**	Costa Rica	Costa Rica
Denmark	Denmark	Cyprus
Dominican Rep.**		Denmark
		Dominican Rep.
		El Salvador
		Fiji
Finland	Finland	Finland
France	France	France
Germany (W.)	Germany (W.)	Germany (W.)
	Greece	
		Guatemala
		Guyana
Iceland	Iceland	Iceland
India	India	India
Ireland	Ireland	Ireland
Israel	Israel	Israel
Italy	Italy	Italy
Jamaica		Jamaica
Japan	Japan	Japan
Lebanon	Lebanon	Lebanon
Luxembourg	Luxembourg	Luxembourg
Malaysia**		Malaysia
		Mauritius
	Mexico	
Netherlands	Netherlands	Netherlands
New Zealand	New Zealand	New Zealand
Norway	Norway	Norway
Philippines	Philippines	Philippines
Sweden	Sweden	Sweden
Switzerland*	Switzerland	Switzerland
Trinidad & Tobago		Trinidad & Tobago
Turkey**		
United Kingdom	United Kingdom	United Kingdom
United States*	United States	United States
Uruguay	Uruguay	Uruguay
Venezuela**		Venezuela
		<i>Other free states</i>
		Barbados
		Gambia
		Malta
		Nauru
		San Marino
*Special cases		
**Nearpolyarchies		

in the democratic column was not founded on comparative evidence. In fact, in 1968 Ceylon (Sri Lanka) was one of the very few underdeveloped nations to have changed the party in power by democratic processes since independence, a change that did not occur in India until 1977.

Compared to the efforts of Banks and Textor or Dahl and associates, our approach is less precise and differentiated, but at least as reliable. Our primary tool is comparison. No matter what the result of the addition of judgmental details, the important point, as Dahl himself emphasizes, is to consider as a whole the evidence for a nation, and decide whether it belongs above, below, or alongside another particular nation in terms of freedom, or political and civil liberty. We recognize that the informed reader will often object to particular placements in Table 1. Yet we believe that this disagreement will not result in the displacement of a nation more than one position on a particular scale if the criteria used in our rankings are fully understood.

As far as we can determine, there has been remarkably little worldwide comparative work on freedom since Dahl. For example, a scholarly comparative study of human rights in 1976 used the Comparative Survey as the basis for correlations between freedom and other variables.¹³ Similarly an Italian critique of comparative studies of democracy and liberty noted no more recent studies.¹⁴ The most recent comparative study of which we are aware is an unpublished sketch of a "Geography of Human Rights."¹⁵ The author's definition of "human rights" is very similar to ours for "freedom." The resulting classification of states into six categories arranges the countries of the world in an order similar to our tables of political and civil freedoms. The major difference is that the geographer places weight on interpersonal ethnic discrimination (this leads to only two very homogeneous states—Denmark and Iceland—being placed in the top category), and on nongovernmental violence (resulting in the placing of Lebanon in the lowest category along with Cambodia, Ethiopia and Uganda). Another study that should be mentioned is Duff and McCamant's comparative study of Latin American repression.¹⁶ Working in the correlational tradition of recent political science, the authors compare Latin American countries at successive times during the 1950's and 1960's. Their bases of judgment are quite similar to our own. Obviously contrasting emphases in parallel studies will lead to more understanding of what we are all about. It will be useful if the studies mentioned above are developed further in accordance with present plans.

In pointing to these direct comparisons with the Survey I do not mean to ignore the much larger body of studies generally considered

under the heading of comparative politics. Most of this work is germane to the consideration of political freedoms, and includes consideration of voting statistics, attitude polls, and qualitative historical data. A representative work in this field is Almond and Verba's *The Civic Culture*, a comparison of voter attitudes that shows how expectations of politics in countries such as Mexico and Italy impede the achievement of a stable and democratic "civic order." A detailed comparison of the political process in democracies, with emphasis on European states and especially Norway, is offered by Stein Rokkan's *Citizens, Elections, Parties*. A recent socio-historical approach to political development is offered by a variety of analysts in Charles Tilly's *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*. Using a broader focus, Samuel Huntington covered much the same ground in *Political Order in Changing Societies*. A topical approach is provided by the volumes of the Prentice-Hall series in comparative politics edited by Joseph La Palombara. Representing a recent change of emphasis Richard Claude's *Comparative Human Rights* goes beyond politics to consider economic and legal questions.¹⁷

One of the most valuable contributions of this body of work is presented by J. Blondel in the La Palombara series.¹⁸ Blondel usefully characterizes legislatures from a variety of political systems on the basis of the time available to an average member to consider legislation, and of the topics brought before the legislature. The first type of legislature is found in East Germany or the USSR. Its largely symbolic significance is reflected in the fact that it seldom meets. Blondel found that in the course of a year the average member of the East German parliament would have no more than one minute to speak—compared with 50 minutes in Switzerland, 110 in the U.S. or 415 in New Zealand. A second type of legislature allows a modicum of meaningful discussion on bills and policies, yet the legislature is not allowed to consider many important governmental questions. This situation characterizes authoritarian states, such as Senegal or Singapore, with an average member's speaking time in the thirty to forty minute range. A third type of legislature is found in much of Latin America, and until recently, at least, in India, Lebanon, and France. Legislators here have fifty to one hundred minutes, and they consider a wide range of topics. However, broad policy is generally decided by the executive, with legislative consideration usually confined to matters of detail. Above this, a fourth type of legislature was found in the United States, the Commonwealth countries, and most of Western Europe. At this level everything was discussed. The American Congress may represent the highest development of this type. In the United States lack of party discipline means that an executive can never be

sure of his ability to direct the nation free of legislative dictation, and an elaborately developed committee and research ability allows the legislature to compete with the executive and the civil bureaucracy in a way it cannot elsewhere.

One must be careful, however, not to go directly from Blondel's categories to judgments of the level of political freedom. Switzerland, for example, ranks at the bottom of the third level, yet its major parties are all represented in the executive, the people are given a direct voice through the initiative and referendum, and elected provincial and local governments have a large share of political power. On the other hand, the fact that the Yugoslav parliament allows considerable discussion is greatly reduced in significance when we remember that the one-party executive closely controls entry to this parliament.

The attempt of the Survey to appraise the current behavior of all nations fair-mindedly, without considering a nation's international connections or relative popularity, and to integrate information about a broad range of political and civil freedoms leads to somewhat different judgments than those of other human rights organizations. For example, in spite of its broad charter, Amnesty International focuses on an important but comparatively narrow range of issues—political imprisonment, torture, and execution. Unfortunately, although it claims neutrality, examination of its reports suggests that the people associated with Amnesty International are more interested in the repression of right-wing than of left-wing regimes. Regardless of the fact that the official policies of communist and one-party socialist regimes are to deny the civil rights of political opponents, and that there is massive evidence of a systematic carrying out of these policies in the majority of such states, among the twenty-two states upon which Amnesty International had reports available in 1977, only four were communist or one-party socialist regimes. The Survey suggests that the vast majority of people in "not free" states live under regimes of this type (we place over forty percent of the not free states in this category). It is true that Amnesty publishes a great deal directly and indirectly on the USSR, yet it has not issued separate reports on the massive imprisonments and relocations in China, North Korea, Kampuchea (Cambodia), Cuba, and the many small "socialist" tyrannies of Africa, but it has issued such reports on Taiwan, South Korea, Indonesia, South Africa and Namibia, and several of the right-wing tyrannies of South America. Recently an Amnesty official was quoted as saying about Indonesia: "In no other country are so many political prisoners being held without trial for so many years."¹⁹ Even if there were "up to 100,000" (which was the high estimate) this would still have been a far smaller number than the several million in China

that have been kept indefinitely in labor reform camps because of their beliefs or class background.²⁰

The media report on those societies to which reporters have access and in which there seems to be current interest; these are usually *not* the most closed and oppressive tyrannies. A recent study has documented the difference in media attention to infringements in South Korea and Chile on the one hand and North Korea, Cuba, and Cambodia (Kampuchea) on the other.²¹ Although no knowledgeable person doubts the greater oppression in the latter states, media attention has been comparatively slight. How many Americans know that there were probably as many Buddhist monks and nuns burning themselves to death in protest against the communist repression in South Vietnam after July 1975 as there were in the entire decade of the 1960's against noncommunist repression?²²

A serious imbalance may also result from the attempt of human rights organizations to be "fair," to remove the mote in our own eye first. For example, in 1977 Amnesty International claimed eighteen Americans were in jail for their political beliefs.²³ Although these are cases we should be concerned about, in most instances the ostensible cause for imprisonment was felonious and violent actions having nothing to do with belief or expression. If the biases of law enforcement officers or courts have led to a misreading of evidence, perhaps even a deliberate misreading, then the cases represent miscarriages of justice. As Amnesty says in one case, the person "may have been wrongly convicted of killing a white youth and the reason for this miscarriage of justice may have been his ethnic origin." Such errors, even willful errors, will take place in even highly rated democracies, but these errors should not be equated with the political imprisonment as deliberate policy that characterizes unfree states. Amnesty apparently failed to find a case of imprisonment directly related to matters of nonviolent political activity or conscience. This reminds us of the recent report of the writer's organization PEN that listed 606 writers as victims of persecution, 78 of which were in the Soviet Union. It did not, of course, fail to list six in the United States, most notably acknowledged exploiters of pornography such as Larry Flynt and Al Goldstein.²⁴ Whatever we may think of pornography, it is an insult to the serious writers of the world who have been tortured, jailed, and even executed for their ideas to have them placed in the same category as the most blatant and unabashed exploiters of sex in our own country. Moreover, it is doubtful if PEN even knows of the fate of comparable pornographers in the generally puritanical tyrannies of right and left.

We make these criticisms to suggest the need for a more authentic balance. This is not just an academic nicety. Since in the struggle

of ideologies people are attracted by the evidence of life under competing systems, it is imperative to give this evidence fairly. Of course, organizations such as Amnesty International perform a valuable function in striving for the human rights of those persecuted persons whose lot they emphasize, and in publicizing the horrors inflicted on peoples in many countries. The noncommunist world will be strengthened the more such groups succeed in exposing the criminality that unfortunately often hides behind the mask of anticommunism. The Survey has benefited from the data developed by Amnesty, particularly on the generality of physical torture. (A more balanced reputation would, however, be even more useful. For example, since right-wing tyrannies seem less purposeful and rational than left-wing—probably because they are frequently low-morale systems—they may commit the greater proportion of the crude physical torture in the world today. But because of the apparent bias of attention exhibited by Amnesty International, their studies cannot tell us whether this apparent advantage of leftist over rightist tyranny actually exists.)

CHANGES IN 1977

In 1977 gains for freedom in Asia, southern Europe, and northern Africa were substantial, with the electoral affirmation of democracy by India's 620 million of particular importance. Advances in political and civil freedom far exceeded declines.

Although every year the Comparative Survey has reported both gains and losses for freedom, the conclusion for the past several years has generally been somber. A large part of the world was reported to suffer from tyranny, and the evidence appeared to show more losses than gains. This year the record is different. There are still many tyrannies, and the leading communist states are perhaps militarily stronger than ever. To stay in power the minority regime of South Africa has markedly increased the political and civil oppression of black South Africans. Nevertheless, attention to the details of change in political and civil life of the countries of the world reveals that 1977 was a year of progress, a year in which it was once again possible to regard democracy as the eventual goal of all peoples.

Major losses in freedom. Comparison of Table 1 with its equivalent in previous years will show that in 1977 the setbacks for freedom were minimal, reflecting primarily the continuation or confirmation of previous trends.²⁵ If the elements of consensus we had perceived in *Angola* in the immediate postindependence period were ever present, they were no longer. The evident need to maintain Cuban troops, deadly power struggles within the top layers of the governing party, and the

continuing success of opposition guerrilla groups suggested little reliable popular support. The courts and schools were thoroughly organized to serve only the governing faction's interests. There was no sign of private expression—a result reinforced by both ideology and the security situation.

In *Argentina* there remained some ability to stand against the government, particularly in the courts and labor unions. However, the threats of imprisonment, torture, and death by private and public organizations that hung over all who expressed opinion or supported political tendencies, and the weakened ability of the formerly strong press to stand against the government, made it difficult to rate Argentina above (6) on civil liberties.

There was some freedom of expression and economic activity in *Burma*. Yet the control of the ruling party has been further extended at all levels, and many high civil servants have been dismissed and imprisoned, while murderous coup attempts by political leaders have been plausibly justified as the only available means to affect the system.

In the *Congo* reviving hopes for freedom received a decisive setback with the assassination of the president and the murder of a cardinal (Archbishop of Brazzaville). In the aftermath, a former president was executed and direct rule by an army junta was established. In *Cuba* limited elections in late 1976 were a slight advance.

For some years *Equatorial Guinea* has been one of the world's most complete tyrannies. This year we find a continuing reign of terror with arrests and executions supplemented by the general institution of forced labor. The fact that the president was elected in 1969 seems no longer of sufficient relevance to give political legitimacy to today's president-for-life tyranny.

The past year also saw the last substantial elements of civil freedom evaporate in *Ethiopia*. Ostensibly, the government still allowed some expression of differing opinion among officially approved Marxist groups, but such expression was often met with lethal violence from ideological and tribal competitors even in those areas where there remained a semblance of government control. At the top the revolution continued to devour its own leaders.

In *West Germany* continuing terror and the repression of terror seem to have exacted a price in civil liberties, shown both through increased surveillance of dissidents and in the denial of jobs to those with radical views.

The status of freedom declined slightly in *Jamaica* as the result of an election that required a state of siege, the banning of political rallies, and government supervision of publicity. The future seemed clouded by the fact that government leaders related their objectives to those

of Cuba and other models that have in the past been inimical to democracy. A similarly violent election, combined with the government's interference in a court's hearing of a complaint against the electoral process, reduced *Malta's* rating for political rights. In the *Seychelles* guns were brought in to make possible a coup against the ruling party, followed by the installation of the electorally unsuccessful opposition government. However, the media and courts have apparently been only slightly affected.

South Africa's democracy for whites continued, and plans were laid to extend it to Coloureds and Indians if they would agree. But for the overwhelming black majority, and some of those who speak for them, political repression grew noticeably worse, with unexplained deaths, evictions, and suppression of the leading black newspaper and many black organizations. At the same time there were continued relaxations of social *apartheid* (for example, in athletics) and continued growth in both the moral consensus in favor of more rights for the black population among the nonblacks and increasing consciousness of injustice among the blacks. The anti-apartheid white vote grew in 1977, but the international community's condemnation of continued repressions led to an increase in the government's parliamentary majority.

Major advances in freedom. In 1977 advances far outweighed declines in both significance and number. *China* (Taiwan) experienced a relatively good year for civil liberties. There were few if any suppressions of publications or arrests of the nonviolent opposition. In preparation for the provincial elections in November, a broad spectrum of opinion was voiced, and several critical books and other publications were published.

In *Ghana* a serious strike by the nation's professionals forced the government to announce a timetable for return to elected government. Although harsh new measures were announced against rumor and defamation, there was a de facto opening up of expression, and, economically, more scope was offered to private enterprise.

Over the past several years civil freedoms have improved in *Hungary*. The media are by no means free, but through plays and books, and especially the ready availability of foreign publications, some diversity has been attained. Fear is largely replaced by resignation, de facto private property exists, religious controls have been relaxed, and travel into and out of the country is now easier. *Poland's* retention of selected civil freedoms within the communist bloc has always placed it in an anomalous position. The strength of the Catholic Church and the preservation of private agriculture were especially noteworthy. In the past year there appears to have been a further liberalization of the

government's attitude toward private business, protest movements against various repressions have stubbornly arisen, and travel outside of the country has been liberalized. Freedom in *Yugoslavia* has different strengths and weaknesses, but its relatively free agriculture and open travel make it necessary to adjust its ranking to equal that of Poland and Hungary.

The most dramatic gains for freedom were in *India*. At the beginning of the year few observers realized the degree to which the repressions of the Congress Party government had generated a profound hatred in the masses of the people. In part, the Prime Minister called the election in order to strengthen her position. Although it represented only a small shift in electoral percentages, this was enough to give an overwhelming victory to the opposition parties that had campaigned on the issue of freedom. The new government moved quickly to strengthen the courts and dismantle the antidemocratic constitutional and administrative changes the Gandhi government had forced through. Yet there were dangers in the heady atmosphere that followed. In particular, the understandable attempt to bring the leaders of the previous government to court for misuse of authority and corruption could make return to responsible government more difficult.

Apparently as a result of change in U.S. policy, *Iran* lightened its repression by allowing critical manifestos to be published, releasing prisoners, and reducing torture (although early 1978 saw a demonstration bloodily suppressed). In *Kuwait* the formerly lively press managed to recover some of its independence in spite of remaining censorship.

Madagascar is ruled by a leftist military system with the support of elected institutions on a variety of levels. In several elections during 1977 the government front received overwhelming support in a manner characteristic of one-party states; in national elections no other candidates were allowed. However, since the front consists of a spectrum of apparently independent parties (a dispute even led to a withdrawal of one), a national parliament was elected that represented most of the prior political forces. In December of 1976 *Mauritius* successfully held an election after a long hiatus. Although the governing party lost heavily, it managed to hold on to power through coalition. The event confirmed the country's political rights and free status.

Morocco carried through elections at local, provincial, and national levels, with all major parties participating. The elections were not thoroughly competitive in all districts, nor is the resulting assembly powerful vis-a-vis the king. But progress toward a fully functioning constitutional monarchy has been substantial. In spite of the reimprisonment of an opposition leader a slight advance in both the

political and civil areas was sufficient to move *Nepal* from the "not free" to "partly free" category. A wider range of personages was included in the government, the role of direct elections in the political process was increased, most political prisoners were freed, and bans on several newspapers were lifted. *Nigeria* successfully carried through local and constituent assembly elections. Although the latter were indirect, and political parties were not allowed, the process and the broad political spectrum of those elected indicate continued progress toward democracy. In searching for acceptance of the Canal Treaty both at home and abroad, the *Panamanian* government allowed the expression of opposition opinion and conducted a referendum that achieved the kind of favorable majority that is characteristic of partly free states. Subsequent changes suggest that this process will be extended by more definite moves toward democracy.

Senegal continues to move toward democracy. Multiparty participation began with municipal elections (although the new parties did very poorly), and has developed with the appearance of a more independent opposition party and opposition papers. On the other hand, *Sierra Leone's* advance in the ratings is quite equivocal. The opposition reestablished a small representation in parliament at an election this year; but violence, apparent governmental interference in the process, and government unwillingness to recognize the opposition's role cause little satisfaction in the result.

A great success story of this year was *Spain's* progress in achieving freedom. Although not yet secure, civil freedoms have been extended in large measure to formerly excluded groups such as the communists and the Catalan and Basque minorities (excluding their most violent fringes). Several free elections have demonstrated popular acceptance of the system, and have resulted in the establishment of an approximation of European-style parliamentary government. Formally, the monarch still has broad powers, and the prime minister is responsible to him rather than the parliament. However, the reality of both plebiscitary and parliamentary support for the present rulers seems to justify a "free" rating.

Sri Lanka fought an election largely on the issue of the suppression of freedom. Government control of the media and of economic and communal life had become cause for concern. Reacting against these dangers, the voters gave the opposition a much more overwhelming victory than in India. But freedom's gain was less dramatic: Sri Lanka has often alternated rule between its major parties, and the oppressions of the previous regime were not as flagrant as they had been in India.

Civil freedoms have recently improved in the *Sudan* as the result of the reconciliation of contending political forces, the consequent

freeing of most political prisoners, and a return to more acknowledgment of private property rights. Liberalization has been proceeding in *Syria* for several years. In 1977 an election was held that demonstrated both competition and an ability to publicly express limited disapproval of the system. Groups urging a boycott of the poll achieved such a low turnout that the government was forced to extend the electoral period. Several independents won against a front dominated by the ruling party but not simply an extension of it. There have also been slight improvements in civil freedoms, resulting especially in a reduction in fear of repression for private expressions of criticism. In *Thailand* the generals decided that the movement away from democracy had gone too far. They plan elections for early 1979, and have released large numbers of prisoners, improved court procedures, and reduced government control of the press. By lifting its ban on political parties, *Upper Volta* increased the openness of discussion and breadth of political participation in its continuing movement toward democracy.

Self-determination was enhanced in a number of related territories. Among American territories the *Northern Marianas* achieved effective commonwealth status after elections in December 1977. *American Samoa* elected its first governor, although for comparative reasons (especially the partly free but independent Western Samoa) this could not lead to an improvement in rating.

Other changes in ratings or freedom. For this Survey we have experimentally slightly raised the ratings of mainland *China* for both civil and political freedoms. Communist China remains one of the most totalitarian states in the world. However, the events of the past decade suggest that a much larger public has recently been involved in decision-making and in the formation of political opinion at all levels than is true in other communist states in which factional disputes are fought out behind closed doors.²⁶ Apparently, Mao unleashed politics by placard and popular demonstration as a tool of factional politics, and the resulting popular consciousness of political rights has been hard to contain. In civil liberties, comparison of China with communist states such as the USSR leads to more mixed results. Intellectuals and other members of the Soviet elite have felt much freer in recent years than their Chinese counterparts to express their own opinions. However, on a popular and group level, Chinese have been willing to express through demonstrations and other group activity opinion and resistance to bureaucratic demands in a way not found in the Soviet Union. The indiscipline that Chinese leaders now decry in workers at the factory level is based on a populist sense of group rights that Soviet factory workers might well envy. It should be noted that in making these changes, we do not make predictions of future trends; present leaders

Table 6
National Elections or Referenda

Nation and Date	Type of Election	Percentage Voting	Results and Remarks
Algeria 11/20/76	constitutional referendum	93%	99% yes; highly controlled
12/10/76	presidential referendum	95%	99% yes; highly controlled
2/25/77	parliamentary	79%	party approves all candidates; personality choice only
Australia 5/21/77	referendum	unknown	3 of 4 constitutional amendments approved
12/10/77	parliamentary	unknown	conservative government reelected with large majority; new party obtains 9% of vote
Bahamas 7/19/77	parliamentary	92%	ruling party wins 55% of vote and 30 of 38 seats
Bangladesh (1/77; 8/77)	local councils	unknown	reported fair and competitive; winners represented a variety of parties)
5/30/77	referendum on president	85%	99% yes; inadequate
Belgium 4/17/77	parliamentary and provincial	95%	slight gains for conservative center; coalition government
Brazil (11.15 76	municipal	unknown	opposition won in some cities; overall percentages unchanged)
China (Taiwan) (11 19 77	local and provincial	unknown	opposition improves position; gains 4 of 20 mayors, 21 of 77 provincial seats)
Comoro Islands 10 28 77	presidential referendum	92%	55% yes, 42.5% no; fair for this kind of election

Denmark 2/15/77	parliamentary	88%	largest party improved position; still minority government
Djibouti 5/8/77	independence referendum	77%	99% yes; perhaps legitimate
5/8/77	parliamentary	77%	90% for single list; other parties abstained and asked for blank ballots; apparently fair; coalition government
El Salvador 2/20/77	presidential	unknown	government candidate—800,000, opposition—400,000; alleged cheating before and after election; extent unknown
Fiji 3/19/77 to 4/2/77	parliamentary	unknown	opposition won, but failed to form government
9/17/77 to 9/24/77	parliamentary	77.5%	previous ruling party won
France (3/13/77 to 3/20/77)	municipal	78%	gains for left; first mayor of Paris in a century)
Gambia 4/4/77 to 4/5/77	parliamentary	82%	ruling party won 70% and 27 of 34 seats; opposition made slight gains
Greece 11/20/77	parliamentary	81%	ruling party returned with 42%; main left party doubled vote to 25%, far left 12%, far right 7%
Grenada 12/7/76	parliamentary	64.5%	opposition greatly improved position to 6 of 15 seats
Guinea-Bissau (12/76 to 1/77)	regional councils	below required 50% in some areas	80% for single list, but unofficial opponents won in some areas; regional councils then elected national assembly)
India 3/16/77 to 3/20/77	parliamentary (lower house)	60.5%	opposition won dominant position with 43% versus 34.5% for the government; prime minister lost seat
Indonesia 5/2/77	parliamentary	90%	government front slightly declined to 62%; still has great majority of seats; all candidates approved by government

Table 6 *Continued*

Nation and Date	Type of Election	Percentage Voting	Results and Remarks
Ireland 6/16/77	parliamentary	76%	opposition party won decisively with 5% swing in votes
Israel 5/17/77	parliamentary	79%	opposition won, taking over leadership of a new coalition; 13 parties gain seats
Jamaica 12/15/76	parliamentary	85%	government won 57% and 47 of 60 seats; violence and restrictions accompanied election
Japan 12/5/77	lower house	72%	ruling party suffered losses; retains power with aid of independents
7/10/77	one-half of upper house	36-39%	slight decline of ruling party
Korea (North) 11/11/77	parliamentary	100%	100% approval, single list of candidates
Liberia 10/4/77	vice-presidential	unknown	only one candidate; exact totals unknown
Madagascar (3/20/77)	local councils	unknown	some competition)
(5/29/77)	indirect provincial	unknown	95% of seats to ruling front; other parties won a few, especially in capital)
6/30/77	parliamentary	officially—90%; opposition claimed only 30-40% voted	one national front list, including an authentic spectrum of parties; one party withdrew in dissension before vote
Malta 9/17/76 to 9/18/76	parliamentary	95%	ruling party improved position slightly; violence and questionable election complaint adjudication
Mauritius 12/20/76	parliamentary	unknown	first election since independence in 1968; opposition won most seats, but not majority; ruling party retained position by coalition with third party

Mongolia 6/19/77	parliamentary	99.99%	99.99% approved nominated candidates
Morocco 6/3/77	parliamentary	82%	44.5% won by (royalist) independents who support government; 21.5% to main opposition party; relatively authentic process
Mozambique (9/25/77ff. 12/4/77	village, district, town, province parliamentary	unknown unknown	public meeting elections; only approved candidates) elected by provincial assemblies; central committee of FRELIMO list "almost unanimously" elected
Nauru 11/12/77	parliamentary	unknown	ruling party 9, opposition 8, independents 1 seat
Netherlands 5/25/77	parliamentary	87.5%	three largest parties increased strength
Nigeria (11/76 to 12/76 8/31/77	local constituent-indirect	unknown unknown	reasonable representation of local strengths, but campaigns curtailed) candidacies restricted, no parties, but a reasonably competitive process
Norway 9/11/77 to 9/12/77	parliamentary	81%	minority ruling party preserved edge; both major parties increased shares
Panama 10/23/77	plebiscite on Canal Treaty	unknown (high)	two to one in favor, reasonably good showing for opposition in a repressed society
Papua New Guinea 6/18/77 to 7/9/77	parliamentary	58.5%	highly competitive, party allegiances fragile and many independents; some changes result, but new coalition similar to previous government
Paraguay 2/6/77	constituent	82%	government won; 13% blank ballots represented opposition protest
Philippines 12/18/77	presidential referendum	unknown	opposition called for boycott; Marcos received 90% of the votes, but much less in some areas; high turnout probable

Table 6 *Continued*

Nation and Date	Type of Election	Percentage Voting	Results and Remarks
Rhodesia 8/31/77	parliamentary	81%	85% of white vote won by ruling party; opposition competed fairly in wartime situation; 95% largely disenfranchised (blacks)
Senegal (11/21/76	municipal	unknown	opposition party for first time obtained 9% of vote and control of 2 rural councils)
Sierra Leone 5/6/77	parliamentary	unknown	opposition won some seats (after being shut out), but was harassed by arrests, intimidation and postponements of elections in certain areas
Singapore 12/23/76	parliamentary	95% (in contested districts)	ruling party won all seats; government repression of opposition before and after election
South Africa 11/30 77	parliamentary	whites only, 65%	governing party increased share to 134 of 165; official opposition now an anti-apartheid party
Spain 12/15 76	referendum on reform	78%	94% yes; fair process
6/15,77	parliamentary	80%	centrist ruling party won 34%, socialists 28.5% and communists 9%; fair elections
Sri Lanka 7/21 77	parliamentary	86%	opposition won 54% of vote, 84% of seats; government, 31 % of vote, 4% of seats; Tamil nationalists, 7% of vote, 10% of seats
Sudan 4 3 77	presidential referendum	unknown	99% approved continuance in office
Surinam	parliamentary	77 over 65%	government won 24 seats to opposition's 15
Switzerland 9 25 77	referendum	50%	rejected change in abortion law

12/4/77	referendum	38%	overwhelmingly defeated constitutional amendments that would have harmonized cantonal income taxes and made possible conscientious exemptions from military service
Syria 8/1/77 to 8/2/77	parliamentary	low; had to extend election period to obtain 50%	National Front including independent parties won most seats; independents won others; dissident call for boycott almost succeeded
Tanzania 12/18/77	in Zanzibar only for Tanzanian parliament	92%	choice among candidates nominated by ruling party only; most parliamentarians from Zanzibar remain appointees
Turkey 6/5/77	parliamentary	unknown	major parties gained, but still impossible to rule without difficult coalition; far left party allowed to compete for first time in the 70's
Upper Volta 11/27/77	constitutional referendum	71%	98% approved; broad consultation of parties suggests a legitimate result
Zaire 10/15/77 to 10/16/77	parliamentary	unknown	one-party election, but extensive choice among individuals
12/2/77	presidential-party leader	unknown	98% support; one candidate

may well move China toward a more elitist regime on the Soviet model.

In 1977 *Pakistan* experienced a highly controversial election, persistent demonstrations and strikes, the interference of a reluctant military, and finally an unwillingness of the military to return power until after the previous ruler has been tried. Our judgment is that by fall the country found itself with less political freedom but somewhat more respect for civil freedoms than had been true at the beginning of the year.

In 1977 *Indonesia* carried through an election with limited competition; these results confirmed rather than changed our previous judgment. The release or improvement in the conditions of thousands of long-term political prisoners represented a gain in civil freedoms. (At the beginning of 1978, however, students were arrested and the nation's main newspapers were closed.) *Papua New Guinea* confirmed its free rating with a successful parliamentary election. Also, increased power was granted to provincial governments to overcome secessionist movements.

During the past year *Djibouti* became a fully independent nation. Although the election that led to independence was boycotted by the opposition, election procedures were relatively fair and the resulting government represented several parties and both major ethnic groups. However, by the end of the year mounting violence had resulted in major resignations from the government and much of the small state had become divided into warring camps.

ELECTIONS AND REFERENDA

Evidence for political freedom is primarily found in the occurrence and nature of elections or referenda. Therefore, as a supplement to our ratings we have attempted in the accompanying Table 6 to summarize those national elections that occurred in independent countries in 1977. The table is generally restricted to national elections or referenda, but in a few cases it includes local or regional elections because of their particular importance, such as the role they play in a process of change. (Non-national elections are enclosed in parentheses.) The reader should assume that the electoral process appeared comparatively open and competitive unless our remarks suggest otherwise. Except in rare cases extremely one-sided outcomes imply an unacceptable electoral process. For a few countries elections held in late 1976 are included if they occurred after our judgments for the 1976 Comparative Survey were essentially complete, if they are referred to elsewhere in this text, or if they were part of a series of votes extending into 1977.

THE RELATION OF POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS TO FREEDOM

The categorization of states by political-economic systems in Table 7 fills two needs. The first is to offer the reader additional information about the countries we have rated. For example, those with libertarian views may wish to raise the relative ratings of capitalist countries, while those who place more value on redistributive systems may wish to raise the ratings of countries toward the socialist end of the spectrum. Table 7 also makes possible a rough-and-ready analysis of the relation between political and economic forms and the freedom ratings of the Survey. Perusal of the table will show that freedom is directly related to the existence of multiparty systems. The further a country is from such systems, the less freedom it is likely to have. (This is, of course, not a uniform result, and there is a good deal of variation especially among traditional nonparty systems.) This could be considered a trivial result, since a publicly competitive political system is one of the criteria of freedom, and political parties are considered evidence for such competition. However, the result was not simply determined by our definitions: We searched for evidence of authentic public competition in countries without competitive parties, and seldom found the search rewarded.

The relation between economic systems and freedom is more complicated and, because of our lack of emphasis on economic systems in devising our ratings of freedom, is not predetermined by our methods. Statistically, the table suggests that freedom can exist in all economic systems except the strictly socialist. Capitalist states can be free or unfree; socialist states can only be unfree. Historically, the table suggests that there are three types of societies competing for acceptance in the world. The first, or *traditional* type, is marginal and in retreat, but its adherents have borrowed political and economic bits and pieces from both of the other types. The second and third, the *Euro-American* and *Sino-Soviet* types, are strongest near their points of origin, but have spread by diffusion and active propagation all over the world. The Leninist-socialist style of political organization was exported along with a socialist concept of economic organization, just as constitutional democracy had been exported along with capitalist economic concepts. In this interpretation, the relation of economic systems to freedom found in Table 7 may be an expression of historical chance rather than necessary relationships (unless one's definition of freedom depends upon the nature of those relationships).

In Table 7 economies are roughly grouped in categories from "capitalist" to "socialist." Labeling economies as capitalistic or socialist has a fairly clear significance in the developed world, but it may be

Table 7 Political-

POLITICAL		Multiparty				Dominant-Party	
		Centralized		Decentralized			
ECONOMIC	Capitalist	Industrial	Bahamas F Barbados F Colombia ⁴ F Costa Rica F Djibouti PF Dominican Republic ⁴ PF El Salvador ¹ PF France ³ F Greece F Grenada F Iceland F	Ireland F Italy ³ F Japan F Korea (S) PF Luxembourg F Mauritius F New Zealand ⁵ F Spain F Surinam F Trinidad & Tobago F	Australia F Belgium F Canada F Cyprus PF Germany (W) ³ F Lebanon PF Malaysia PF Switzerland F United States F		
		Pre industrial	Fiji ⁴ F Gambia ⁴ F Guatemala PF Lesotho PF Morocco PF Papua New Guinea ² F		Botswana F	Nicaragua ^{1/4} PF Sierra Leone PF Transkei ² NF	
	Capitalist-Statist	Industrial	Malta F South Africa PF Sri Lanka F Turkey ⁴ F Venezuela F		Brazil ^{1/3/4} PF	China (Taiwan) PF Mexico PF Singapore PF	
		Pre industrial	Rhodesia ⁴ NF		India F	Indonesia ^{1/4} PF Paraguay ^{1/3/4} NF	
	Capitalist-Socialist	Industrial	Austria F Denmark F Finland F Guyana PF Israel F	Jamaica F Netherlands F Norway F Portugal F Sweden F United Kingdom F		Egypt ^{1/4} PF Senegal ^{1/4} PF Syria ^{1/4} PF	
		Pre industrial	Comoro Islands ² PF				
	Socialist	Industrial					
		Pre industrial	Notes				
		1. Military dominated. 2. Analogous to this category, although actually nonparty. 3. Close decision on capitalist-to-socialist dimension. 4. Close decision on industrial/preindustrial dimension. 5. Over 50 percent of income from remittances of persons working in South Africa.					

Economic Systems

One-Party			Nonparty			
Socialist	Communist	Nationalist	Military	Traditional		
			Chile ^{2/3}	NF	Jordan ³	NF
		Cameroon ³ NF Central African Empire ¹ NF Gabon NF Haiti NF Ivory Coast ⁴ NF Kenya PF Liberia PF Malawi NF Philippines ^{2/3/4} PF	Chad ¹ NF Ecuador ¹ PF Honduras ^{1/4} PF Niger ¹ NF Thailand ^{1/3} NF Uganda ¹ NF Upper Volta ^{1/3} PF Yemen (N) ^{1/3} NF		Bhutan ³ PF Maldives PF Nepal ¹ PF Swaziland PF Tonga PF Western Samoa PF	
Libya ^{1/3}	NF		Argentina ¹ NF Ghana ^{1/4} PF Panama ^{1/3} NF		Bahrain PF Kuwait PF Nauru F Qatar PF Saudi Arabia NF United Arab Emirates PF	
		Afghanistan ¹ NF Iran ⁴ NF Zaire ¹ NF	Bangladesh ¹ PF Nigeria ^{1/3/4} PF Pakistan ¹ PF		Oman NF	
Tunisia ⁴	NF	Poland ³ NF Yugoslavia ³ NF	Seychelles ³ PF	Uruguay ¹	NF	
Burma ¹ NF Burundi ³ NF Congo ^{1/3} NF Somalia ^{1/3} NF Zambia ¹ PF		Madagascar ^{1/3} PF Mali ¹ NF Mauritania ³ NF Rwanda ^{1/3} NF Sudan ¹ NF Togo ¹ NF	Bolivia ¹ PF Peru ^{1/4} PF			
Algeria	NF	Albania NF Bulgaria NF China (Mainland) NF Cuba NF Czechoslovakia NF Germany (E) NF Hungary NF Kampuchea NF Korea (N) NF Mongolia NF Rumania NF USSR NF Vietnam NF				
Angola NF Benin ^{1/3} NF Cape Verde Is. ^{3/4} NF Equatorial Guinea ⁴ NF Guinea NF Guinea-Bissau ³ NF Iraq ^{1/3/4} NF Mozambique NF Sao Tome and Principe ³ NF Tanzania NF Yemen (S) NF		Laos NF		Ethiopia ^{1/3}	NF	

doubted that it is very useful to label the mostly poor and largely agrarian societies of the Third World in this manner. Raymond Aron, for example, casts doubt on the legitimacy of calling any third-world, noncommunist society "socialist," regardless of what it may call itself.²⁷ However, third-world states with dual economies, that is with a modern sector and a preindustrial sector, have economic policies or goals that can be placed along the continuum from socialist to capitalist. A socialist third-world state has usually nationalized all of the modern sector—except possibly some foreign investment—and claims central government jurisdiction over the land and its products, with only temporary assignment of land to individuals or cooperatives. The capitalist third-world state has a capitalist modern sector and a traditionalist agricultural sector, combined in some cases with new agricultural projects either on family farm or agribusiness models. Third-world economies that fall between capitalist and socialist do not have the high taxes of their industrialized equivalents, but they have major nationalized industries (for example, oil) in the modern sector and their agricultural world may include emphasis on cooperatives or large-scale land reform, as well as more traditional forms.

Turning to Table 7 itself, states with *industrialist capitalist* forms are generally developed states that rely on the operation of the market and on private provision for individual welfare. Taxes may be high, but they are not confiscatory, while government interference is generally limited to subsidy and regulation. States classified as *preindustrial capitalist* are generally poor states, such as Liberia or Thailand, with a small part of the population involved in a capitalist modern economy, and the bulk of the population still living traditionally. In such states the traditional economy may be individual, communal, or feudal, but the direction of change as development proceeds is capitalistic.

Capitalist states grade over into capitalist-statist or capitalist-socialist nations. *Capitalist-statist* nations are those such as Brazil, Turkey or Saudi Arabia, that have very large government productive enterprises, either because of an elitist development philosophy or major dependence on a key resource such as oil. Government interferes in the economy in a major way in such states, but not primarily because of egalitarian motives. *Capitalist-socialist* systems, such as those in Israel, the Netherlands, or Sweden, provide social services on a large scale through governmental or other nonprofit institutions, with the result that private control over property is sacrificed to egalitarian purposes. These nations still see capitalism as legitimate, but its legitimacy is accepted grudgingly by many in government. Governments of other states grouped here, such as Iraq or Poland, proclaim themselves to be socialist, but in fact allow rather large portions of the economy to remain in the

private domain. Both variants also have *preindustrial* versions, such as India or Madagascar.

Socialist economies, on the other hand, strive programmatically to place an entire national economy under direct or indirect government control. States such as the USSR or Cuba may allow some modest private productive property, but this is only by exception, and right to such property can be revoked at any time. The leaders of *pre-industrial socialist* states have the same goals as the leaders of industrial socialist states, but their relatively primitive economies or undisciplined peoples cannot yet be completely socialized. Such states generally have a small socialized modern economy and a large preindustrial economy in which the organization of production and trade is still largely traditional. It should be understood that the characterizations in Table 7 are impressionistic; the continuum between capitalist and socialist economies is necessarily cut arbitrarily into categories for this presentation.

Political systems range from democratic multiparty to absolutist one-party systems. Theoretically, the most democratic countries should be those with *decentralized multiparty systems*, for here important powers are held by the people at two or more levels of the political system, and dissent is legitimated and mobilized by opposition parties. More common are *centralized multiparty systems*, such as France or Japan, in which the central government organizes lower levels of government primarily for reasons of efficiency. *Dominant-party* systems allow the forms of democracy, but structure the political process so that opposition groups do not have a realistic chance of achieving power. Such limitations may be through vote fraud, imprisonment of opposition leaders, or other devices.

The now classical form of one-party rule is that in *communist one-party* states such as the USSR or Vietnam. All of these states have proclaimed themselves to be communist. The slightly larger group of *socialist one-party* states are ruled by groups that use Marxist-Leninist rhetoric, organize ruling parties very much along communist lines, but either do not have the disciplined organization of communist states or have explicitly rejected one or another aspect of communism. A final group of *nationalist one-party* states adopts the political form popularized by the communists (and the fascists in the last generation), but the leaders either reject entirely the revolutionary ideologies of socialist or communist states or show little inclination to develop the totalitarian controls that characterize these states. There are several borderline states that might be switched between socialist and nationalist categories (for example, Libya or Syria). It should also be noted that "socialist" is used here to designate a political rather than economic

Table 8
Major Peoples Without a Nation-State¹

	Population (millions)	Location	National Consciousness	Political Equality/ Status of Freedom
Achehnese	2	Indonesia	high	fair/ partly free
Arabs of Chad	1.5	Chad	medium ⁴	fair/ not free
Armenians	2 (plus scattered millions)	USSR	high	good/ not free
Assamese	10	India	medium	good/free
Aymara	1	Bolivia	low	fair/ partly free
Azerbaijani	4	USSR	low	fair/ not free
	5	Iran	low	fair/ not free
Baluchis	2	Pakistan (& Iran)	medium ⁴	poor-fair/ partly free
Bamileke	1.5	Cameroon	medium ⁴	fair/ not free
Bantu of Rhodesia	6	Rhodesia	medium ⁴	poor/ not free
Bantu ² of S. Africa	14	S. Africa	medium	poor/ partly free
Bashkir	1	USSR	low	fair/ not free
Basques	1	Spain (& France)	high ⁴	fair/free
Batak	2.5	Indonesia	medium	fair/ partly free
Berbers (various)	5	Algeria	low	fair/ not free
	5	Morocco	low	fair/ partly free
Bosnian Muslims	1	Yugoslavia	medium	fair/ not free
Bretons	1	France	high	fair/free
Buginese	3	Indonesia	low	fair/ partly free
Byelorussians	7	USSR	low	good/ not free
Catalonians	5	Spain	high	good/free
Chuang	8	China (Mainland)	low	good/ not free
Croats	4.5	Yugoslavia	high	fair/ not free
Edo	3	Nigeria	medium	good/ partly free

Notes to the Table

1. In several states, such as China, Indonesia and the USSR, a number of large ethnic groups have been omitted because of either their geographical dispersion or limited evidence of national consciousness. Such groups have generally not had a history of political independence beyond the local level.
2. Many of the Bantu peoples of South Africa may define themselves in tribal terms as Zulu, Xhosa, Sotho, etc. However, millions live outside of their home areas and have become an urban, largely detribalized people.
3. Although Israel itself is rated free, most Palestinian Arabs live in the occupied territories controlled by Israel or in other lands no better than partly free.
4. Known to have had active armed movements against central government in recent years.

	Population (millions)	Location	National Consciousness	Political Equality/ Status of Freedom
Eritreans	1.5	Ethiopia	high ⁴	poor/ not free
Estonians	1	USSR	high	poor/ not free
Ganda	2	Uganda	high	poor/ not free
Georgians	3	USSR	medium	fair/ not free
Gujerati	25	India	high	good/free
Hausa-Fulani	25	Nigeria	medium	good / partly free
Hui	4	China (Mainland)	high	fair/ not free
Ibibio	3.5	Nigeria	medium	good/ partly free
Ibo	14	Nigeria	high ⁴	fair/ partly free
Ilocanos	4	Philippines	low	good/ partly free
Kannada	25	India	medium	good/free
Kanuri	4	Nigeria	medium	good/ partly free
Karens	3	Burma	high ⁴	poor/ not free
Kazakh	4.5	USSR	medium	poor/ not free
Kirghiz	1.5	USSR	low	poor/ not free
Kongo	2	Zaire	medium	poor-fair/ not free
	2	Angola (& Congo)	medium ⁴	poor-fair/ not free
Kurds	2	Iraq	high ⁴	poor/ not free
	2	Turkey	medium	fair/free
		Iran	high	fair/ 1 not free
Latvians	1.5	USSR	high	poor/ not free
Lithuanians	2.5	USSR	high	poor/ not free
Luba-Kasai	1.5	Zaire	low ⁴	fair/ not free
Luo	1	Kenya	medium	fair/ partly free
Makassarese	2	Indonesia	low	fair/ partly free
Malayalam	20	India	high	good/free
Marathi	45	India	high	good/free
Mayans	4	Mexico, Guatemala	very low	fair/ 1 partly free
Mende		Sierra Leone	medium	fair-poor/ partly free
Miao	2.5	China (Mainland)	low	fair/ not free
Minahassans		Indonesia	medium	good/ 1 partly free
Minangkabau	5	Indonesia	medium	fair/ partly free
Moluccans		Indonesia	high ⁴	poor-fair/ partly free

Table 8—Continued

	Population (millions)	Location	National Consciousness	Political Equality/ Status of Freedom
Montagnards	1	Vietnam	medium ⁴	poor/ not free
Nilotics of Sudan	4	Sudan	medium ⁴	good/ not free
Nkole	1	Uganda	low	poor/ not free
Nupe	1	Nigeria	medium	good/ partly free
Oriyan	20	India	medium	good/free
Oromo (Galla)	2-10	Ethiopia	medium ⁴	fair/ not free
Ovimbundu	2	Angola	medium ⁴	poor/ not free
Palestinians	3+	Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria	high ⁴	poor-fair/ partly free ³
Pampangans	1.5	Philippines	medium ⁴	fair/ partly free
Papuans	1	Indonesia	medium ⁴	poor/ partly free
	1	Papua New Guinea	medium	good/free
Punjabi (India)	17	India	low	good/free
Quebecois	5	Canada	high	good/free
Quechua	5	Peru, Bolivia	low	fair/ partly free
	1	Ecuador	low	poor-fair/ partly free
Scots	5	United Kingdom	high	good/free
Shan	1.5	Burma	high ⁴	poor/ not free
Sidamo	2.5	Ethiopia	low ⁴	poor/ not free
Sindhis	9	Pakistan	medium	fair/ partly free
Slovaks	4.5	Czecho- slovakia	high	good/ not free
Slovenes	1.5-2	Yugoslavia	high	fair/ not free
Soga	1	Uganda	low	poor/ not free
Sundanese	16	Indonesia	medium	fair/ partly free
Taiwanese	14	China (Taiwan)	low-med.	poor-fair/ partly free
Tamil	40	India	high	good/free
	2.5	Sri Lanka	high	fair/free
Tatars (various)	4	USSR	medium	poor-fair/ not free
Telegu	50	India	high	good/free
Teso	1	Uganda	low	poor/ not free
Tibetans	3	China (Mainland)	high ⁴	poor/ partly free
	2	India, Pakistan, Nepal & Bhutan	medium	fair/ partly free
Tigrinya	3	Ethiopia	high ⁴	poor/ not free

	Population (millions)	Location	National Consciousness	Political Equality/ Status of Freedom
Timorese (E)	1	Indonesia	medium ⁴	poor/ partly free
Tiv	8	Nigeria	medium	good/ partly free
Turkmen	1.5	USSR	medium	fair/ not free
Uighur	4	China (Mainland)	medium	poor/not free
Ukrainian	35-40	USSR	high	fair/ not free
Ulster Scots	1	United Kingdom	high	good/free
Uzbek	9	USSR	high	fair/ not free
	1	Afghanistan	medium	fair/ not free
Visayans	10	Philippines	low	good/ partly free
Welsh	2.5	United Kingdom	high	good/free
Yi (Lolo)	3	China (Mainland)	medium	fair/ not free
Yoruba	16	Nigeria	high	good/ partly free

system. A socialist "vanguard party" established along Marxist-Leninist lines will almost surely develop a socialist economy, but a state with a socialist economy need not be ruled by a vanguard party.

Nonparty systems can be democratic, as in the small island of Nauru, but generally they are not. Such systems may be *traditional nonparty systems* ranging from Tonga to Saudi Arabia. Much more important are the many *military nonparty* systems, such as those in Argentina or Uganda.

PEOPLES WITHOUT NATIONAL RIGHTS

In a world in which national self-determination is considered to be a fundamental political right, it is necessary for a survey of freedom to consider the extent to which this right is respected. The United Nations finds the denial of self-determination primarily in the remnants of European colonialism, and limited the concept to this application.²⁸ However, today the most significant limitations of national rights are not to be found in Table 2 on related territories. A broader picture of the real and putative denials of national expression existing today is offered by Table 8, *Major Peoples Without a Nation State*, and Table 9, *Major Peoples Separated from Existing Nation States*.²⁹ In each case, only relatively large ethnic groups (generally over one million) that have given some evidence of national consciousness are included. The tables consider only territorial peoples, and thus ignore

scattered, largely urban peoples, such as the Jews of the USSR or American blacks and Mexican-Americans. To be included in these tables, the ethnic group must not be the *Staatsvolk*, or dominant people in an existing state, nor can it be a truly equal party in a binational state. The first requirement excludes, for example, Serbians in Yugoslavia, Russians in the USSR, or Tagalogs in the Philippines; the latter requirement excludes the Walloons in Belgium. To reduce the tables to manageable size, in marginal cases the decision was most often to omit rather than include a people.

It is expected that many significant peoples that are not now included in the tables will develop national consciousness in the future. This is especially true in Africa, where the definitions of "a people," of ethnic-group domination, and of political consciousness are particularly difficult. The table of separated peoples assumes that a nondominant people in one state would prefer life in another state where the separated people are the dominant group or *Staatsvolk*, but such may not be the case—the Hutu of Burundi, for example, may wish to dominate their own state. Where a group would reject inclusion with its ethnic group in a neighboring state, the group has not been considered a separated people. For example, because of religious differences the Punjabi of India do not want to live in Pakistan. Some peoples could as well be included in Table 8 as Table 9: The Papuans of West Irian might wish to join the independent state of Papua New Guinea, or the Moros might rather be independent than join Malaysia.

While Tables 8 and 9 are not definitive, they suggest the size of the populations involved and the degrees of national consciousness they feel. The final column in the tables presents an evaluation of the political equality of the group in the state that incorporates it, placing this in relation to the status of freedom of this host state as found in Table 1. These tables do not imply that the affected peoples should immediately be granted independence, or that borders should be changed. They do imply that the national rights of peoples cannot be ignored: These rights are taken into account in our evaluation of political rights, and the case for these rights will be developed below in Part II ("Self-Determination, Subnationalities, and Freedom"). As we will argue, however, adequate rights can be granted within the boundaries of larger states. For example, the Gujeratis of India, with internal self-government, would gain little by complete independence.

To aid in understanding the issues involved and the reasons for some of our inclusions and exclusions, Tables 8 and 9 need to be supplemented by a survey of the nature and political situation of subnational peoples by geographical region, type of polity, and country. The following treatment is necessarily brief, but it will give the reader

Table 9
Major Peoples Separated from
Existing Nation-States

	Population (millions)	Desire for Reunion or Independence	Political Equality/ Status of Freedom
Albanians of Yugoslavia	1	unknown	fair/ not free
Alsations of France (to Germany)	1	medium	good/free
Bengalis of India (to Bangladesh)	45	low	good/free
French of Switzerland	1.5	very low	good/free
Irish of Northern Ireland	0.6	high	fair/free
Hutu of Burundi (to Rwanda)	4	high	poor j not free
Kashmiri of India (to Pakistan)	3	med.-high	good/free
Koreans of China	1	unknown	fair/ not free
Macedonians of Yugoslavia (to Bulgaria)	1	unknown	fair/ not free
Malay of Thailand	1	unknown	fair/ not free
Magyars of Rumania (to Hungary)	2.5	high	fair/ not free
Moldavians of USSR (to Rumania)	2.5	unknown	fair/ not free
Mongols of China	1.5	high?	fair/ not free
Moros of Philippines (to Malaysia?)	2	medium	fair-poor/ partly free
Pathans of Pakistan (to Afghanistan)	6	med.-high	fair/ partly free
Somali (of Ethiopia) (plus Kenya and Djibouti ¹)	2	high	poor/ not free
Tadzhiks of USSR (to Iran)	1.5-2	low	fair/ not free
Tadzhiks of Afghanistan (to Iran)	5	low	fair-good/ not free

1. Are now the *Staatsvulk* of their own free country.

at least an overview of the situation of those major peoples in the world today that do not have nation states.

In 1977 group rights in free states—primarily, that is, among the traditional democracies—were relatively well guaranteed, although there was continued interest in expanding these rights. It is only recently that states such as France and England that proudly guaranteed individual rights removed severe limits on subnational group rights. The democracies had continued the long record of suppressing conquered cultures by dominant peoples, but where these cultures survived, there is now a revival of separatist expression. This expression is meeting increasing favor; yet as late as 1960 French children were

required to report to their teachers students who conversed in Breton, and in the 1970's Breton can still not be used in the regular school curricula.³⁰

In recent years increasing attention has been given to the rights of the Flemish and Walloon peoples that divide the Belgian state. The United Kingdom has extended additional rights to the Welsh and Scots, although it is not able yet to resolve the conflicting claims of the Ulster Scots and Irish in Northern Ireland. In this case, to recognize the rights of one of these intermixed communities would be to deny the rights of the other. In France there has been more attention given to ethnic enclaves such as those of the Bretons or Alsatians as part of a general European interest in decentralization.³¹ The Corsicans are pressing vigorously for increased self-determination. Violence has been suppressed, but over the last years some demands have been met. In Switzerland, Jura separatists have seen their desires for a new French-Catholic canton proceed toward realization, and the Basques and the Catalans in Spain have recently attained a measure of self-government.³²

In the United States and Canada, respect for Indian and Eskimo rights has increased as pressure groups have come to represent the interests of these peoples. However, ethnicity for these native groups is broken into many small fragments; in particular, the sense of an American "Indian Nation" is largely an urban minority response. A similar progression is found in the histories of the native peoples of Australia and New Zealand. The Maori of New Zealand are perhaps the most fully and fairly incorporated primitive group in a modern political system. The freeing of Papua New Guinea by Australia in the 1970's represents an important enhancement of self-determination. Yet it is important to note that in ethnic terms Papua New Guinea consists of a maze of small units that should in turn have their rights respected in the new state.

The problem of the self-determination of French Canada is the most outstanding issue in the developed democracies. Quebec nationalists came to provincial power in late 1976, but too much must not be inferred from this. First, their party did not stress separatism in this election to the extent it had previously, and, secondly, it did not receive a majority of the votes. We cannot speak of any denial of rights until a majority of the people affected ask for separation and it is denied by the central government. Within Canada's federal system special rights have been advanced to the province of Quebec that amount to a very high degree of self-determination without independence. This includes the right to have permanent foreign missions, the growing use of French as the official language in the province, and the right

to opt out of many federal social programs and replace these with provincial programs.³³

The communist world has developed a unique combination of theoretical and practical approaches to self-determination. Communist universalism has traditionally implied that there should be only one socialist system ruled by one socialist party in the world. Many communists assume that so-called ethnic conflicts are class conflicts, and represent "false consciousness."³⁴ From this perspective, even the East European states represent a temporary expedient—at least to the extent that their governments should be ultimately coordinated on the party level.

On another level, communist systems, especially the USSR and Yugoslavia, have emphasized the creation of ethnic administrative divisions, and to some extent the preservation of local cultures and languages. However, on the one hand these units have never been given a real chance for self-determination because of centralized party structures, while, on the other, communism has been unable to change the nationalistic spirit of the ruling people in each communist state to emphasize its own nationalism. Russians in the USSR and Han Chinese in China, as well as Serbs in Yugoslavia and Rumanians in Rumania, have come to use their power in numbers or position to deny or diminish political and even cultural self-determination to other peoples. The most frequent and devastating means has been to simply move in Russians and Chinese, respectively, until the local people no longer have a majority in their own territory. This has happened notably in Kazakhstan in the USSR, and more rapidly in Inner Mongolia, Tibet, and Sinkiang in the Chinese People's Republic. However, where such a policy does not succeed, the creation of subnational cultural units tends to gradually create an increasingly vital basis for unity and opposition—especially where the ruling people is not willing to give up its special privileges. In the USSR, since the non-Russian population is growing faster than the Russian, non-Soviet nationalisms may be growing more rapidly than the sense of Soviet unity. A similar phenomenon may be observed in Yugoslavia, particularly among the Croatians. For both countries, the central government's desire to control separatist expressions accounts for the major part of the repressive acts of the regime. An exception is Czechoslovakia, where relative harmony and a desire by Russian masters to play off Czechs and Slovaks will probably keep the interests of both the groups in the state in a rough balance.³⁵

Ethnic struggles in Latin America have had a muted existence. While a number of countries have large, subordinate, American Indian populations, especially Peru and Guatemala, this fact has not engendered

subnational desires for self-determination.³⁶ Racially, Hispanic dominance is accepted—for example, by the seventy percent of Dominicans who are black and the many millions of black Brazilians or Colombians. In most Latin American nations it appears to be passively accepted that Hispanic or Mestizo-Hispanic culture is the guiding national culture, and that mobility for the poor must involve Hispanization. It is curious that symbolic pro-Indianism—for example, in Mexico—has seldom been a movement sponsored by actual Indians. This is also true of Peru, yet here the recent glorification of the Inca past did lead to the adoption of Quechua as a second national language. More recently Bolivia has recognized both Aymara and Quechua as official languages. In Paraguay, culturally and biologically the most Indian Latin American state, Spanish and Guarani are the languages of nearly everyone, and the cultures play complementary roles in the lives of most individuals.

The main exceptions to the Hispanic-Mestizo pattern in the Americas are found in the Caribbean, where many small states are overwhelmingly black, using either French, English, or Dutch as their primary language. Where the population is not homogeneous, as in Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, and Surinam, politics generally revolves around the ethnic clash of African and East Indian. Yet in these relatively democratic polities there is little suppression of peoples, and little separatist demand for self-determinism. A different issue, that of an island's right to self-determination, has broken up several attempts at closer unions of islands, and is even breaking up the small units that do exist (for example, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, or the Netherlands Antilles).

Small Indian tribes, particularly in the Amazon basin, continue to struggle against encroaching settlers from the dominant societies. Ruthless movement into the lands of these groups goes on today, in its most publicized form, in Paraguay and Brazil, with or without government support. This is not a process we condone, but it is an old story of ethnic destruction along an advancing frontier that Americans should understand as we continue to try to repair the damage of the process in our own history.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, self-determination is a burning issue almost everywhere. Small elite populations rule over larger subordinated groups in Rhodesia and South Africa, five and eighteen percent of the people, respectively; in Burundi fifteen percent of the people, the Tutsi, rule over the Hutu majority. South West Africa presents a similar but more complex situation. It might also be said that Liberia is still ruled by a small elite of Americo-Liberians (three percent). Except in Burundi, a combination of external and internal pressures

may soon result in turning over portions, or all, of such minority states to their majorities.

Homogeneous countries in Sub-Saharan Africa with essentially no ethnic problem include Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Transkei, and Somalia. A few African states have the developed racial or ethnic oppositions of peoples such as we are familiar with elsewhere in the world. Most notable is that in the Sudan between the Muslim, largely Arab, northern majority and the non-Muslim, largely Nilotic, south. This situation is repeated immediately to the west in Chad, although here the ruling black peoples of the south are opposed by the nomadic Arab north. Continuing revolt in Chad is partially supported from Libya (which incidentally appears to have annexed a section of northern Chad without the world noticing). There is no reason, however, why Chad must be one state.³⁷

More commonly, Sub-Saharan Africa is characterized by countries with a large number of ethnic groups. Such groups may vary widely in size and strength of group consciousness. Two types of states should be distinguished. In the first, the scattering of small groups is so extreme, and their consciousness so undeveloped, that ethnic conflict and the related question of self-determination have not been critical issues.⁸⁸ Examples are Tanzania (exclusive of Zanzibar) or the Central African Empire. Legitimate demands for self-determination may be raised later by small groups as they become more conscious, or, in the process of development, groups with related linguistic, religious, or other bonds may come to identify themselves as a people within a state.

In the second type, the scattering of peoples exists on two levels. On the first, there are some major peoples, or groups of peoples within the state, with an established subnational identity, while there are many other, generally smaller, peoples that are only rising to consciousness, or that tend to be ignored while attention is focused on the larger groups. Ghana, Uganda, and Angola belong in this type, but Nigeria is the best known example.³⁹ Nigeria began with a federal system based on three peoples—Yoruba, Hausa-Fulani, and Ibo. Subsequent events have caused the state to develop regionalizations that give a degree of self-determination to broader and broader ranges of peoples. This reduces the degree of self-determination of the larger groups, and strengthens the relative power of the central government. Yet finer regionalization is fully justified by an ethnic situation in which many smaller peoples felt oppressed by their neighbors. The Ethiopian state, emerging from the medieval stage into the age of nationalism, finds itself beset internally and externally by divisive demands comparable to those plaguing the Austro-Hungarian Empire before World War I. There is no particular reason why the constituent peoples of Ethiopia,

at about the state of consciousness of those in Nigeria, should find their liberty within an Ethiopian state. In both cases constituent peoples have a long history of group independence, and in some cases the experience of an independent historical state.

In most of the Arab Middle East and North Africa, the relation between Arabs and other peoples is similar to that of Hispanic cultures and minority peoples in Latin America. In particular, the Berbers of Morocco, Algeria, and elsewhere in North Africa have slowly lost out over the centuries to encroaching Arabs.⁴⁰ While there have been Berber revolts, the prestige of Arab culture, the carrier of Islam, is such that serious Berber nationalism seems to be absent. Much the same is the case in the northern Sudan, where a number of non-Arabic groups are gradually being Arabized. Further east, however, we find the religious ethnicity expressed in yearnings for greater self-determination among the peoples of Palestine-Israel, Lebanon, and Syria. Religion is the basis of political divisions in the former two but not officially in Syria. In Turkey, Iraq, and western Iran the primary issue is Kurdish nationalism, flaring most recently in Iraq because of the recurrent inability of the Iraqis to suppress it. While the Kurds have a long history as an ethnic group, their first disappointment with nationalism in its modern form came at the end of World War I. Since that time, Turkey has actively tried to assimilate millions of Kurds, even by the device of relabeling them "Mountain Turks." In Iran a Kurdish Republic was suppressed at the end of World War II after brief Russian sponsorship. In the last few years, an interminable guerrilla war against Iraq was ended when Iranian support was withdrawn, but today renewed Iraqi oppression, including an attempt to scatter the Kurds, is leading to yet another resistance movement.

From Iran to the east, Asia is characterized by a variety of states with old and new ethnic groups. Japan and Korea are almost entirely homogeneous. Other states with long continuity, such as China, Iran, and Thailand, have a dominant core culture and recognized boundaries, yet have had autonomist ethnic movements at the periphery. The historical states of Indochina are similarly constructed, with minorities especially important (but scattered) in Laos.⁴¹ In Burma the people of the core are continually struggling with peripheral peoples striving for their own independence. A somewhat different pattern exists in India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan, where political boundaries have been superimposed arbitrarily on a geographical pattern of historical peoples that does not correspond with these political boundaries. At least a third of the population of Afghanistan is made up of Persians, while the ruling Pathans of Kabul often have their tribal homelands in Pakistan.⁴² Bengalis continue to be divided between

Bangladesh and India. Pakistan is now a thoroughly Muslim, pluralistic society whose dominant language and elite are from northern India. Independence movements in Pakistan have been against the centralizing state, but not clearly against a particular people, although the Punjabis are now the great majority. In India the adoption of Hindi alongside English as a national language goes part of the way toward developing a core culture or *Staatsvolk*.⁴³ Thirty to forty percent of the people speak Hindi or a closely related dialect, and both the ancient and modern Indian capitals are in the Hindi-speaking area. Indian states have been founded on regional linguistic subnationalisms; and many of these, such as those based on Bengali, Tamil, and Marathi, have fully developed literatures and a corresponding subnational consciousness.

It is important to note that in both India and Pakistan the tendency of state boundaries to enhance a region's sense of identity has often led to a drive for regional self-determination at the same time as these divisions have met in large part the legitimate demands of the people concerned (especially in India). However, crosscutting allegiances of religion, caste, custom, party—and of English language among the elite—have tended to counteract the separatist tendencies of regional self-determination. It should also not be forgotten that millions of the so-called tribal peoples of India, such as the Nagas and Mizos northeast of Bangladesh, do not identify with Indian culture. India must keep these relatively small groups within its boundaries by force, much as Burma has tried less successfully with similar peoples.

Finally, in Southeast Asia there are several artificial states created by colonial masters out of previously fractured societies. Malaysia is a union of Malay states now united largely by a determined government attempt to reduce the role of the Chinese and Indians in the economy. Indonesia and the Philippines lack a dominant core culture, yet for different reasons have managed to create state nationalisms for most of their peoples above the level of the particularities.⁴⁴ The Philippines had no organized state before the Spanish conquest, but there had developed in southern Luzon a cultural core based on the Tagalog-speaking peoples. These were the people that became most fluent in Spanish and, under the Americans, in English. Although no more than twenty-one percent of Filipinos speak Tagalog, the language of the core culture, when nationalism developed a demand for a national language, the language chosen was essentially a form of Tagalog, rechristened Pilipino. By 1960 over forty percent also spoke English (compared with three percent in India). Competitive subnational groups, such as the Visayans or Ilocanos, have developed an ethnic self-consciousness, but not in a threatening manner. More important

is the separatist feeling of the 3.5 million Muslims in the southern islands that are pressed hard by land-hungry Christians (especially Visayans) and supported by Muslims in the outside world. Periodically in revolt, they evidently do not feel they have a part in Philippine culture.

Javanese culture forms the cultural core of Indonesia, although many Indonesians have little in common with Javans. The sense of oppression by Javanese is muted by several factors. First, in most of the islands substantial ethnic identity is poorly developed, either because of socioeconomic underdevelopment (interior Sumatra or Borneo), or crosscutting allegiances. Indonesia has also been fortunate in being able to choose an old Malay *lingua franca* (converted into Bahasa Indonesia) as a national language rather than Javanese. There have been, however, movements for self-determination in outlying areas, particularly in the Moluccas, Sulawesi, and northern Sumatra.⁴⁵ These have been suppressed without significant recognition of the desires of the people. Of course, there is no reason why West Irian should be a part of Indonesia, while Papua New Guinea becomes independent from Australia. West Irian is simply an Indonesian colony, as may in fact be East Timor; independence movements exist in both.

CONCLUSION

In many countries democratic advances in 1977 laid the basis for further progress, often through planned elections under new constitutions. We think especially of Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal in Africa, and of Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador in Latin America. Elsewhere human rights organizations have been established, or more liberal laws enacted. In Eastern Europe and the USSR, new hope has been raised by the U.S. administration's insistence on the importance of freedoms in connection with the Helsinki agreement. Regional self-determination in Spain, Canada, and the United Kingdom is now receiving serious internal attention, as it is in the push and pull of U.S. policy that affects the Middle East and southern Africa. Of course, there will always be setbacks, but a moral shift may be beginning to affect a wide spectrum of societies from communist to capitalist, and from poor to wealthy. The people of the world seem increasingly impatient with the argument that freedom must be deferred in order to obtain more desirable social benefits.

NOTES

1. This section borrows heavily from R. D. Gastil, "The New Criteria of Freedom," *Freedom at Issue*, January-February 1973 (No. 17), and R. D. Gastil, "The Comparative Survey of Freedom VIII," *Freedom at Issue*, January-February

1978 (No. 44). The tables and maps are revised from the latter, with the exception of the Table of National Elections or Referenda, which is new.

2. Preston James, *One World Divided: A Geographer Looks at the Modern World* (Lexington, Mass.: Xerox College Publishing, 1974), pp. 21-22.

3. For criticism of the Survey from this point of view, and our response, see *Worldview* (November 1974), pp. 39-41.

4. Quoted by William Kintner, "A Program for America: Freedom and Foreign Policy," *Orbis*, 21, no. 1 (Spring 1977): 139-56.

5. *New York Times*, October 2, 1977.

6. See Kintner, "A Program for America," especially p. 155.

7. *Annex to the Resolution of the General Assembly, 27 November 1953*. Quoted by Daniel Thiirer, *Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker* (Bern: Stampfli, 1976), pp. 233-35.

8. Arthur Banks and Robert Textor, *A Cross-Polity Survey* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1963).

9. Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 231-49.

10. See, for example, Allan Goodman, *Politics in War* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1973), and the numerous pieces by Robert Shaplen in *The New Yorker* during the late 1960's.

11. Dankwart A. Rustow, *A World of Nations* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1967), pp. 290-91.

12. For this purpose the reader should compare Table 1 of the Survey with Dahl's Table A-1 in *Polyarchy*, pp. 232-34.

13. Richard P. Claude, ed., *Comparative Human Rights* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), pp. 51-67.

14. Leonardo Morlino, "Misure di Democrazia e di Liberia: Discussione di Alcune Analigi Empiriche," *Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politico*, V, no. 1 (1975): 131-66.

15. Thomas Anderson, "A Geography of Human Rights: Preliminary Remarks and a Classification," Paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Great Lakes Division of the Association of American Geographers, Windsor, Ontario, October 15, 1977.

16. Ernest Duff and John McCamant, *Violence and Repression in Latin America: A Quantitative and Historical Analysis* (New York: Free Press, 1976).

17. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); Stein Rokkan, *Citizens, Elections, Parties: Approaches to the Comparative Study of the Processes of Development* (New York: David McKay, 1970); Charles Tilly, ed., *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Joseph La Palombara, *Politics within Nations* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1974) (as an example of the series); and Richard P. Claude, ed., *Comparative Human Rights* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976).

18. J. Blondel, *Comparative Legislatures* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1973), esp. pp. 59, 137-39.

19. Prenay Gupte, "Indonesia Accused by Rights Group," *New York Times*, October 19, 1977, p. 2.

20. See Ross Munro, "China, for Want of a Formal Legal Code Looks to Community to Reeducate Offenders," *New York Times*, October 10, 1977, p. A-3; see also October 13, 1977, p. A-10.

21. *Accuracy in Media*, VI, no. 21 (November 1977).

22. Personal communication from Ted Jacquenay (based on reports to him by representatives of the monks of the An Quang Pagoda).

23. *New York Times*, November 7, 1977.

24. *New York Times*, November 3, 1977.

25. See R. D. Gastil, "The Comparative Survey of Freedom VII," *Freedom at Issue*, January-February 1977 (No. 39), pp. 5-17.

26. For corroboration, compare James R. Townsend, "China's Populism and the Legacy of Mao Tse Tung," *Asian Survey*, XVII (November 1977): 1003-15.

27. Raymond Aron, "My Defense of our Decadent Europe," *Encounter* (September 1977), pp. 7-50, especially p. 33.

28. See A. Rigo Sureda, *The Evolution of the Right of Self-Determination: A Study of United Nations Practice* (Leiden: Sijthoff, 1973), and Thiirer, *Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker*.

29. Those familiar with previous Surveys will note that the presentation is reversed from that in the Table of Major Subordinate Peoples in the Surveys for 1976 and 1977. See Note (1) above. Additional information and somewhat different criteria have also been used.

30. Manfred Wenner, "The Politics of Equality Among European Linguistic Minorities," in Claude, *Comparative Human Rights*, pp. 184-213.

31. See especially James Cornford, ed., *The Failure of the State: On the Distribution of Political and Economic Power in Europe* (London: Crown Helm, 1975), especially pp. 14-43.

32. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, pp. 27503, 27870, 27169, 27404. Also Wenner, *The Politics of Equality*.

33. See Richard Pious, "Canada and the Crisis of Quebec," *Journal of International Affairs*, 27, no. 1 (1973): 53-65.

34. Roman Szporluk, "Nationalities and the Russian Problem in the USSR: An Historical Outline," *Journal of International Affairs*, 27, no. 1 (1973): 22-40.

35. M. G. Zaninovich and D. A. Brown, "Political Intervention in Czechoslovakia: The Implications of the Prague Spring and Soviet Intervention," *Journal of International Affairs*, 27, no. 1 (1975): 66-79.

36. This discussion is based primarily on Crawford Young, *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976), pp. 428-59.

37. On the Earlier Situation see John Ballard, "Four Equatorial States," in G. M. Carter, *National Unity and Regionalism in Eight African States* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976), pp. 231-36. On ethnic divisions in recent fighting see *African Research Bulletin*, 12, no. 9 (September 1975): 3757-59; on Libya, *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, p. 28136.

38. For the factual situation see Donald G. Morrison, and others, *Black Africa: A Comparative Handbook* (New York: Free Press, 1972). The interpretation relies heavily on Young, *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism*, especially pp. 163-326.

39. This is, of course, also the situation in Chad and the Sudan, for within both sides of the basic cleavage there are subgroups that only for a time will subordinate their interests. On Chad, see above. On the Sudan, see Young, *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism*, pp. 407-10, 489-504.

40. Discussion based on Young, *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism*, pp. 373-427.
41. Frank Lebar, Gerald Hickey, and John Musgrove, *Ethnic Groups of Mainland Southeast Asia* (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1961).
42. Compare Richard Newell, *The Politics of Afghanistan* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972).
43. Ainslee Embree, "Pluralism and National Integration: The Indian Experience," *Journal of International Affairs*, 27, no. 1 (1973): 41-52; also Young, *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism*, pp. 274-326, 114-21.
44. Young, *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism*, pp. 121-25, 327-72; *New York Times*, July 18, 1976.
45. On the Moluccan movement, in addition to Young, see *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, pp. 27537-38.

The Year of Human Rights:

Introduction

Nineteen seventy-seven was the year that a new American president reaffirmed America's dedication to the worldwide support of human freedom. The year began with an inaugural address in which the president said: "Because we are free we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere. Our moral sense dictates a clear-cut preference for those societies which share with us an abiding respect for individual human rights."¹ This position was accompanied by policy changes in support of human rights on three fronts: Observance of human rights became a condition of aid to our friends; it became an important aspect of our political and ideological struggle with our opponents; and the appointment and activities of Andrew Young symbolized a new dedication to the equality of blacks everywhere.

In making human rights an aspect of aid policy, Congress had made the first moves under previous administrations. Many Congressmen had continued to stress the importance of human rights in foreign policy and foreign aid after the liberal idealistic consensus of the Kennedy era broke down.² During the Kissinger period, Senator Henry Jackson had tried to tie economic relations with the USSR to the question of the right to emigrate, and, under Congressional prodding, the United States had brought pressure on Chile to improve its sorry performance in civil liberties. Congress mandated that the State Department report regularly (or on request) to Congress on the condition of human rights in countries receiving American security assistance. By early 1977, these reports were forthcoming from a still reluctant State Department, and by 1978 the reports covered all countries receiving economic as well as military aid. The State Department has always claimed to be working behind the scenes for human rights. Whatever the case, the official reporting, and the establishment of new human rights staffs, have brought the effort out in the open. Leading members of the administration have directly coupled U.S. foreign aid and human rights in speeches, and State Department in-

investigators have noisily visited Latin American nations with a reputation for violating human rights.

The second thrust of the Carter policy was to actively campaign for the interests of dissidents in the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. Condemnation of the well-known suppression of the rights of dissenters came from both State and the president himself, and the president took the unusual step of directly contacting recent exiles. Part of this thrust extended the actions of the previous administration, specifically the Helsinki agreement of 1975 in which the USSR and its satellites agreed to respect human rights, including the free flow of ideas and people. Probably the new administration took examination of compliance with the Helsinki agreement more seriously than previous administrations would have, although any administration would have found itself under considerable pressure from members of Congress to take this agreement seriously.

The activities of the American Ambassador to the United Nations, Andrew Young, have expressed the good intentions of a liberal establishment that in African policy is fixated on the problem of racial justice. The inability of Ambassador Young to couple this concern with an equal one for oppression in the black-ruled states of Africa is based on his acceptance of the self-serving argument of Third World dictators that civil and political rights are luxuries for the future.⁸ (For a consideration of this argument, see Part II, "Freedom and Democracy: Definitions and Distinctions.")

At the end of the year the visits of the president to Poland, Iran, and India gave both positive and negative signals. Visiting Iran seemed to many an endorsement of tyranny, for it was a friendly gesture to a regime with a very poor human rights record, as Richard Cottam spells out below. Visiting India honored the world's largest democracy and emphasized its recent victory over authoritarianism. In Poland the president unnecessarily praised the modest level of freedom, and yet his presence and actions there may have strengthened the cause of freedom in Eastern Europe. President Carter's 1978 State of the Union message mentioned human rights and freedom, but this was not a major theme. It is still unclear whether 1978 will see the initiatives of the past year maintained and institutionalized, or quietly replaced by other interests.

But what were the results in 1977? Predictably, the USSR and its allies have condemned American gestures toward their governments as dangerously provocative. Although some Canadian and British spokesmen supported directly and indirectly the new American position,⁴ French and German officials initially reacted in dismay to the unsettling effect of making public statements about internal conditions

in communist countries—a reaction shared by a large percentage of the American foreign policy establishment.⁵ (France's official horror at our interference in the affairs of others did not affect their willingness to give official support to the Quebec separatists.)⁶ Threatened right-wing dictators have reacted with a mixture of alarm, fear, and outraged nationalism. Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, El Salvador, and Guatemala announced they would refuse more U.S. military aid because of threatened cuts due to human rights violations, but the Latin American campaign seemed to have had a generally positive effect.⁷ By mid-summer, French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing was urging human rights on the Russians as a requirement of detente. At the end of his meeting with Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev, Giscard d'Estaing proudly announced that their joint statement supporting fundamental freedoms and human rights marked the first time the Soviet Union had officially subscribed to these principles in a bilateral document.⁸

It is difficult to determine what the Carter initiatives have actually accomplished in furthering human freedom.⁹ What changes have occurred are likely to either be marginal or due to a complex mixture of causes of which the new policy is only one. Yet government and opposition elites in many nations have recognized a possible shift in American policy and have reacted with efforts to put their country at least outwardly in more conformity with the new policy. Many have apparently been reminded that, as foreign policy analyst and former ambassador to Thailand William Kintner remarks, "It was easier for U.S. public officials to support the independence of Thailand against externally supported insurgency when Thailand was aspiring to be a constitutional democracy than since the return of Thailand to military rule."¹⁰

Certainly the opponents of the repression in India, and of the milder and more potential than real suppression in Sri Lanka gained heart and possibly support from the new U.S. position. Because of this position, Pakistan's leaders may have been unable to overcome the opposition after a mishandled election. Advocates of freedom in Egypt appear to have been strengthened. More vaguely, many governments, such as those of Nepal and Ghana, have expressed concern over American reaction to their denial of freedoms, and Ghana has moved forward toward a return to democratic government. Indonesia and Guinea agreed to sign a human rights clause in the Food for Peace Program.¹¹ Precise linkages are few, but it seems that the hand of those favoring freedom has been strengthened by the Carter initiatives. At the same time, lack of immediate successes that can be directly attributed to the policy, and the persistent criticism of the policy by highly placed officials and academics has already led to some

back-pedaling, noticeably in regard to the Soviet Union.¹² While policy reassessment is always necessary, this should not go so far as to dash the hopes of those we have encouraged. In the struggle for human rights, as in so much else, the question of morale is critical, and we must maintain our position to sustain the hopes of others.

Aside from the statements of Andrew Young, the Carter administration's definition of freedom emphasizes interests rhetorically very close to those of the Survey. Carter's statements have stressed the importance of "individual human rights," and State Department reports to Congress have emphasized the same political and civil freedoms as the Survey.¹³ These reports, however, tend to emphasize the letter of the law as much as actual practices. The discussion of human rights in the press and by some government spokesmen tends to concentrate on political imprisonment and torture in noncommunist countries, on the suppression of intellectuals in a few selected communist countries, and on the denial of rights to black majorities in southern Africa.

However politically justifiable, this selectivity was the outstanding flaw in President Carter's human rights policy in 1977, for it severely limited the impact of the policy on international opinion. The selectivity was one of focus on certain failures of particular governments, while ignoring the egregious failures to live up to any standards by other states. Communist countries with which we evidently wanted to improve relations, such as China, Vietnam, Laos, or Cuba, might expect to have their general disregard for individual freedoms passed over in relative silence; we expanded military aid to Yugoslavia, a country with a highly controlled press and many political prisoners.¹⁴ We heard very little criticism of the flagrant oppression by governments in Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, Mozambique, or even Haiti, while we heard much of the comparatively restrained and controlled repressions of South Africa. Indeed, the rulers of Tanzania, a state with one of the higher percentages of political prisoners in the world, came in for high praise. Brutal South American governments were taken to task, but South Korea was handled more gently. The right to self-determination for the Palestinian Arabs was unnecessarily brushed aside.

In part, U.S. selectivity was due to fashion, the fashion that favors blacks, East Asian communism, and certain types of socialist leadership. In part, the selectivity was due to political pressures, both internal and international, including the machiavellian desire to forge or maintain desirable alliances. In part, it was due to a lingering ethnic racism (or culturalism) that assumes that high standards in the achievement of human freedom can only be expected from peoples with a Western European heritage. But whatever the reason, selectivity blunts the edge

of human rights policy, and confuses those Americans or foreigners that would use American policy as a guideline or supporting bulwark for their efforts in favor of freedom.

We do not mean to imply that U.S. policy should only be responsive to questions of human freedom. As I have pointed out,¹⁵ U.S. foreign policy should express three kinds of American interests. There are, first of all, the narrow *national interests* upon which the State Department and Foreign Service must spend the bulk of their time. There are also *world interests*, such as those of peace and war, or environmental pollution, that can only be resolved by dealing with the responsible leaders of all countries, regardless of ideology. But there are also *co-national interests*, or interests that peoples have in the fate of others irrespective of the governments that may rule them at the moment. Carter has pointed to our co-national interest in the freedoms of all peoples. This was politically wise, because Americans historically have always supported, both privately and publicly, the expression of co-national interests of this kind.

In seeking to support the co-national interests of others, our goal should not be to impose our values. Kintner presents a moderate view of what our goal should be, when he writes:

We should encourage [other nations] to adopt a democratic system compatible with their own cultures, and should respond with positive incentives to any steps they make take toward democracy. We should recognize that each nation should choose its own government, and that some form of circumscribed democracy may be appropriate at a particular stage of development. In any circumscribed democracy, however, what must remain is the diversity of opinion and institutions that will provide the basis for the eventual flowering of freedom and democratic rights. Perfect tyranny, too easily created, produces a barren earth in which freedoms will never grow.¹⁶

These generalizations do not, of course, suggest very clearly what actions might aid or conflict with the attainment of a freer world. Nor have we considered how our striving for increased human freedoms in other countries might interfere with our national or world interests.¹⁷

The remainder of this section consists of two essays on the human rights situations in the USSR and Iran respectively, and the possible relation of Carter's human rights policies to these situations. In the first, Herbert Ellison makes a case that intellectual and religious dissent in the Soviet Union must be, and is, taken very seriously by Soviet authorities, for it represents the spearhead of a growing realization that civil and political freedoms will not be achieved by Soviet communism through internal evolution alone. Both the dissenters and

their repressors believe that the Soviet and East European dissidents need outside support to continue their struggle to achieve these freedoms. Ellison suggests that it is our responsibility to provide it. In the second essay, Richard Cottam reviews the history of American involvement in the growth of the oppressive Iranian monarchy, and the material and moral dependence of Iranians of most political tendencies on the United States. Against this background he points to the seriousness with which the Shah and his opponents responded to the words of the new administration. Temporarily this has led to a flowering of dissent within Iran and some relaxation of repression. But U.S. actions relative to Iran have not so far reflected Carter's ostensible human rights commitment. If our actions continue to reflect indifference to repression in Iran, the result will be deep disappointment in liberal Iranian circles, and serious danger to those individuals who have been encouraged to bring their dissent to the surface. The result, I might add, cannot help but be a deepening of anti-Americanism on both the left and right of the political spectrum. Cottam's remarks give us an inspiring but sobering awareness of the importance of human rights declarations by United States officials.

NOTES

1. Inaugural address, January 20, 1977 (*Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 1977, p. 28245).
2. For the background of the Carter policy, see Robert Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973).
3. Sheila Rule, "Young Cites Variety of Rights Meanings," *New York Times*, December 12, 1977.
4. See the Canadian remarks in Kathleen Tedtsch, "Brazil, in U.N., Answers Its Critics," *New York Times*, September 27, 1977.
5. For a typical critique see Samuel Pizar, "Let's Put Detente Back on the Rails," *The New York Times Magazine*, September 25, 1977, pp. 31 ff.
6. Henry Giniger, "Quebec Issue: A New Phase," *New York Times*, November 7, 1977.
7. See *Keesing's*, 1977, pp. 28762-64.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 28578.
9. The government's own view of what the policy has been and what it has accomplished is encouraging. See the Statement of Mark Schneider, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Human Rights, released by the Department of State, October 25, 1977 (also, *New York Times*, October 26, 1977).
10. William Kintner, "A Program for America: Freedom and Foreign Policy," *Orbis*, 21, no. 1 (Spring 1977): 139-56 (144).
11. Seth King, "Link to Food-Aid Program Helping Carter's Human Rights Campaign," *New York Times*, December 18, 1977.
12. This is the way I interpret the appointment of Marshall Shulman, known for his disapproval of the Carter approach, as head of a committee to coordinate

relations with the USSR. Bernard Gwertzman, "Interagency Unit Under State Department. . .," *New York Times*, July 19, 1977, pp. 1 ff.

13. U.S. 95th Congress, First Session, Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance of the Committee on Foreign Relations, *Human Rights Reports Prepared by the Department of State*, Washington, D.C., March 1977, no. 85-7350. The government includes in human rights the provision of human needs such as those of shelter, food, etc. (see Schneider Statement). However, as we point out below, this is a concern distinct from that for freedom.

14. Bernard Weinraub, "U.S. to Sell Arms to Yugoslavia and Widen Military Cooperation," *New York Times*, October 14, 1977, p. A6.

15. R. D. Gastil, "Affirming American Ideals in Foreign Policy," *Freedom at Issue*, no. 38 (November-December 1976), pp. 12-15.

16. Kintner, "A Program for America," p. 148.

17. During the year this question has, of course, been addressed by others. See International League for Human Rights, *Report of the Conference on Implementing a Human Rights Commitment in United States Foreign Policy*, New York, March 4, 1977.

The Year of Human Rights:

Human Rights East and West

Herbert J. Ellison

The issue of human rights has received much attention in the discussion of U.S.-Soviet relations in the period since the Helsinki Conference of June 1975, and especially since the inauguration of President Carter. Official American statements on human rights in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have drawn sharp responses from the Soviet side, often accompanied by charges that the U.S. is interfering in Soviet internal affairs and that such behavior threatens *détente*. On the American side, meanwhile, there has been some evidence of a muting of official statements on human rights in the Soviet Union and considerable debate in both governmental and nongovernmental circles about whether human rights should be a major issue of U.S.-Soviet relations and, if so, in what form and to what purpose. The present article is intended to contribute to that debate. Its thesis is fairly simple: that there has rarely been a more propitious moment for stress upon human rights in American-Soviet relations. To support that thesis requires careful attention to three elements that tend to be inadequately treated or ignored in most of the contemporary discussion of the issue; namely, the conflict between Soviet and Western concepts of human rights, the development of United Nations and American policy and thought on the human rights question since World War II, and the dynamics of the human rights movement among dissenters in the Soviet Union since Stalin.

One needs only a brief excursion into the literature of United Nations declarations and debates to recognize the elusiveness of the expression "human rights." It is an omnibus term covering civil, political, economic, and social rights, and it is used in its broadest form in the United Nation's Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, a document often cited by Soviet human rights activists. These activists stress

Herbert J. Ellison is professor of history, University of Washington; he is an authority on modern Russia and the Soviet Union.

civil and political rights, much as do Western spokesmen, official and private. In Soviet official statements, however, the emphasis is almost entirely upon social and economic rights.

This is a fact of crucial importance, and brings one immediately to the edge of the ideological chasm which still separates the non-communist world from the official spokesmen of the communist world. Thus in a recent Soviet official statement denouncing Western critics of the Soviet human rights record it is claimed that human rights "can be ensured only by the socialist system." But when these rights are then enumerated there is no mention of the civil rights which have been the central concern of Soviet dissenters, and the only significant political right mentioned—"to elect and be elected to bodies of power and administration at all levels . . ."—offers little assurance to an outsider familiar with the Soviet one-party state and the tradition conventionally called "democratic centralism."¹ Another important clue to the special Soviet perspective is provided by an unrecognized self-contradiction in a passage dealing indirectly with freedom of speech and press, rights unmentioned in the article's list of human rights:

The truth is that in the Soviet Union no one is persecuted for his beliefs. But, in accordance with Soviet laws, charges may be brought against individuals who engage in anti-Soviet propaganda and agitation aimed at undermining or weakening the social and political system . . . or who engage in the systematic dissemination of fabrications which they know are false, defaming the Soviet state and social system.²

Translation: one is not persecuted for expression of his beliefs unless they challenge the established system.

Thus one of the central facts about Soviet official exchanges with the West on the subject of human rights is the concentration of the Soviet leaders upon economic and social as opposed to civil and political rights. While serious and informed discussion of the former would not be as much to the Soviet advantage as is often imagined, the perils of open discussion of the Soviet performance and views on civil and political rights are great.³ For civil and political rights are intended to protect the citizen against arbitrary actions by the state, implying a concept of limited sovereignty of the state over the individual which is fundamentally incompatible with the communist ideology and system.

It is instructive, in this context, to examine the new Soviet constitution that was adopted by the Soviet Union in 1977 after much publicity. Soviet leaders profess to be very proud of Chapter 7, entitled "The Basic Rights, Liberties and Duties of USSR Citizens." It is no less extraordinary or inadequate a document than its Stalinist predecessor.

The emphasis of the first articles is upon economic and social rights (employment, rest, health, social security, housing, education, etc.), a section which even includes an article (46) promising public access to public libraries and museums. The section on civil and political rights is quite brief, and is followed by a much lengthier list of citizens' duties which include the obligation "to bear with dignity the lofty title of USSR citizen" (Art. 59) and "to protect nature .. ." (Art. 67).

Two kinds of comments need to be made about the provisions on civil and political rights. The first is that many of them are severely limited even by the terms of the constitution. Thus "freedom of scientific, technical and artistic creation" is guaranteed (and thus severely limited) "in accordance with the goals of communist construction," (Art. 47) a constitutional expression of the notion of *partiinost'*, or partisanship, that is central to the whole system of intellectual and cultural control, which many Soviet intellectuals have wished to dismantle for the sake of genuine freedom of intellectual inquiry. Similarly, the provision of "freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of mass meetings, and of street processions and demonstrations" must be "In accordance with working, people's interests and for the purpose of strengthening the socialist system. .." (Art. 50). The "protection" of religious liberty (Art. 52) contains the familiar Stalinist phrasing providing the right "to perform religious worship" and "to conduct atheistic propaganda." A new ingredient in that article is the prohibition against "incitement of hostility and hatred in connection with religious beliefs," a vague formula which has been much used in recent years to justify repressive measures against Protestant evangelicals.

The second point about the civil and political rights provisions is, of course, that they must be viewed in their Soviet context. Thus guaranteeing freedom of speech with the promise of "the opportunity to use the press, television and radio" (Art. 50) has little meaning in a society in which communications media are monopolized by the state. Similar comment can be made about the "right to participate in the administration of public affairs" (Art. 48) in the context of a one-party dictatorship.

It is obvious, then, that the views of official Soviet spokesmen on human rights have not changed in any significant way since the Stalin years. What has changed is the appearance within Soviet society of unofficial spokesmen expressing very different views. The views of that group stress precisely the civil and political rights of citizens in the tradition of the Western constitutional democracies, a tradition which its own leadership seeks either to ignore or to repudiate. But before examining that group and its views it is essential to review some of the history of human rights discussions on the international

scene, particularly in the UN since World War II. Western statesmen and Soviet dissenters have profound common interests in the area of human rights. But without careful review and understanding of the quite different experiences that led to these common interests it is possible to miss both the fact and the significance of the convergence.

It is important to recall the long effort of statesmen in the United Nations, beginning in the early postwar era, to define an international code of human rights as a goal of the international community and to establish means of extending and guaranteeing those rights. The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the General Assembly on 10 December 1948, represented concepts of human rights borrowed from the legal and constitutional traditions of the states of Western Europe and North America. These were regarded "as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations . . .," and the hope was expressed that with the Declaration in mind member states would "strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance. . . ." The task of overseeing the implementation of the listed human rights was assigned to a special Human Rights Committee.⁴

It was fully recognized by the authors of the Declaration that the human rights enumerated represented an ideal, that they were as often ignored as observed in the behavior of member states. Nonetheless, the establishment of an objective had its own importance. There was also a recognition—and the issue became a subject of extended discussion—that human rights would have to find definition and protection in the national laws of member states. For protection the accepted view was that there must be a concept of legality, that limitations upon human rights would have to be openly justified and authorized by reference to a higher norm within the context of a legal system. As Mr. Garibaldi has noted in a recent article, the concept of legality within national states was central to the whole notion of the extension and protection of human rights.⁵

The breadth of the term "human rights" as used in the UN Declaration of Human Rights was enormous. It included conventional civil rights (free speech, press, assembly), democratic representation, the rule of law and an independent judicial system, the right of self-determination of nations, and a wide range of social and economic rights which included most of the aspirations of the postwar welfare state programs. There was inevitably great potential for disagreement and debate on the meaning, the validity, and the feasibility of the various "rights" enumerated. Since most of the UN member states

of the postwar era have been either authoritarian or totalitarian the "right" of popular sovereignty was scarcely enforceable. Equally unlikely, in a world where poverty was widespread and affluence the lot of a handful of nations, were the welfare "rights." The lack of clarity and common sense priority has created many subsequent problems.

It is all too easy to find other fault with the United Nations effort. While the president of the General Assembly could take pleasure that the UN "had recognized the existence of human rights and fundamental freedoms transcending the laws of sovereign states . . ." the organization had no power of enforcement. In fact, the UN Charter specifically enjoined members from intervening in the internal affairs of member states (Art. 2, paragraph 7).⁶

Predictably, subsequent opinions on the appropriateness of intervention have been both inconsistent and highly political. Moreover, the UN leadership decided against permitting the right of petition by individual citizens, or groups of citizens, in member states, and in the years since its founding (1946) the Committee of Human Rights has been, on balance, extremely ineffective even as an impartial agency for reviewing the condition and problems of human rights worldwide. The efforts of such nongovernmental agencies as Freedom House, the International League for Human Rights, and Amnesty International have provided more impartial and reliable reviews and analyses.

The reasons for the neglect of the question of human rights by the UN since 1948 are not hard to find. For one, the Declaration appeared at the very peak of the Stalin tyranny in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The new communist domain in Eastern Europe, China, and North Korea represented a victory of a political ideology which repudiated the very premises that underlay the United Nations statements on civil and political rights. In place of the principle of legality and the rule of law, communist legal philosophy postulated the unqualified claims of the Revolution and the Party. And though communist constitutional documents contained many of the phrases familiar from the constitutions of pluralist democracies, the political leadership subscribed to the notion that the state was the instrument of the ruling party and that the law was the instrument, not the master, of state power.

The polarization of world politics in the era of the Cold War was more than a mere power struggle; it was a competition of ideological systems. At the base of that conflict were fundamentally opposed concepts of law and of civil and political rights. Whereas the United Nations Declaration and its attendant discussions began by postulating human rights on the basis of natural law, and worried endlessly over careful definitions of the term under which these rights could be limited, the

communist rulers began with the objectives of the socialist revolution and of party power and treated both the definition and limitations of human rights as subjects relative to the revolutionary mission and limited by the current interests of the revolution as defined by the party leadership. The enormous repression of human rights which derived from this philosophy, particularly as applied during the paranoid despotism of Stalin, has been extensively reported, most recently and powerfully in Alexander Solzhenitsyn's *Gulag Archipelago*. The point here is that not only the practice but also the principles of the communist leaders contradicted the principles of the United Nations Declaration. However, the Soviet leaders had their own constitutional documents reflecting, at least in part, the concepts of "bourgeois" constitutionalism. They also signed the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Neither fact was to be lost on the dissident intellectuals who appeared on the scene in the period of cultural thaw that followed the end of the Stalin years.

During those years, however, the influence of the UN concept of human rights was undermined by more than the Cold War division of the globe. There was also a loss of interest in the human rights issue, and its attendant legal and constitutional concerns, on the part of the Western and Third World intellectual and governmental leaders. The prevailing concerns were those of decolonization and economic development. During the 1950's and 1960's attention was focused on the means of economic development of underdeveloped countries, and very often it was assumed that only at a fairly advanced stage of economic development would the niceties of Western constitutional practice and attendant human rights guarantees be relevant or realizable. Many writers emphasized the unique pattern of historical development out of which Western constitutional traditions had arisen and the very limited area of the globe in which that tradition was applicable or feasible. The confident Enlightenment universalism expressed in United Nations documents gave way to a more pessimistic view stressing the uniqueness of individual societies and the absence of cultural universals, or universal cultural aspirations, such as human rights. It was easy enough to say that human rights were irrelevant to a Chinese peasant with an empty belly, and easy to prove that in the Russian tradition state power had always been the overwhelming force and that individual rights had little meaning.

It is, therefore, one of the most striking paradoxes of our time that the new, and perhaps the most vigorous, pressure for renewed commitment to a system of human rights founded on the principle of legality should come not from the Western parliamentary democracies, but from the dissident intellectuals of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Most of the history of Soviet intellectual dissent can be described in terms of the struggle to establish human rights. Freedom of speech and freedom of information, freedom of movement and choice of employment, freedom of national cultural development and political self-determination, freedom of religious worship and the independence of religious organizations—all of these have been a part of the human rights struggle that has proceeded over the course of the last two decades in Soviet society.

There are two aspects of the Soviet dissent movement that are particularly important to understanding the sharp response of the Soviet government to the American stress on human rights during the Carter administration. The first concerns the seriousness of the dissent movement as measured by the scope of the challenge it has offered to the existing order. The view presented in the following remarks is that the dissent movement has challenged virtually every major tenet of the Soviet system.⁷ The second, and corollary comment, is that the Soviet leaders have been deeply concerned—even frightened—by the scope of the dissent movement, a movement which in all of its dimensions—scientific, literary, national, and religious—has come at some point to issues of civil and political rights.

For Soviet intellectuals the question of censorship has been central to the whole dissent movement. In the Soviet context censorship means not just negative restrictions on criticism of the government or its policies. The Soviet censorship inherited from Stalin was totalitarian. Nadezhda Mandelstam has described it succinctly in her memoirs:

Censorship, which everyone damns, is in fact a sign of the relative freedom in literature. It forbids the publication of anti-state material, but even, as, is usually the case, it is moronic, censorship cannot destroy literature. Stalin's editorial machine worked far more expeditiously; it simply threw out everything which did not correspond to a state order.⁸

It is one thing to challenge the mainly negative censorship system of an authoritarian regime. It is quite another to challenge the vast structure of both negative and positive (directive) thought control which is the foundation of a teleological culture, as the Soviet dissenter Andrei Sinyavsky has so brilliantly described.⁹ The challenge of the intellectuals came modestly at first in the form of requests for more sophisticated application of the official literary critical concept of socialist realism, and as pressure from scientists for an end to destructive ideological intervention in such fields as biology, psychology, and physics. Frightened by the 1956 Hungarian Revolution the government retreated temporarily from its policy of concessions, but then pushed aggressively

forward again in 1961 with the second de-Stalinization campaign which sought to exploit dissent politically by having it focus upon the failings of the Stalin years. The early 1960's became the most relaxed in post-Stalin Soviet history in terms of the official censorship.

Unfortunately for the Soviet leadership, the flood of criticism of the Stalin years could not be contained and politically controlled. Though the limits of official censorship had been much expanded, Soviet intellectuals sought new means of broadening communication-circulation of officially unacceptable manuscripts internally in type-written form (*samizdat*), and the export of manuscripts for publication abroad. The celebrated trial of Yulii Daniel and Andrei Sinyavsky in 1965 for export of manuscripts to the West imposed severe penalties on the offenders, but proved immensely awkward for the government. The defendants had violated no law in existence at the time of the presumed offense, and prosecution efforts to challenge the contents of their works failed disastrously in court. The government's embarrassment was further compounded by the subsequent circulation of a *samizdat* copy of the transcript of the court proceedings.

By the mid-1960's the structure of official control of internal communication was gravely weakened. The official channels had been brought under control again with reshuffling of editorial boards and other measures, but the internal *samizdat* was growing apace, and more manuscripts were being sent abroad for publication. Moreover, the scope of the intellectual dissent had broadened substantially to include national and religious dissent as well.

As in the nineteenth century Russian Empire, the movement for political reform in the border territories of the Soviet Union came quickly to take on nationalist overtones. The most celebrated trial of "bourgeois nationalist" intellectuals—those in the Ukraine whose trial was reported by the journalist Vyacheslav Chornovil—concentrated heavily and very consciously on issues of civil and political rights, with constant references to the Constitution of the USSR and to the UN Declaration of Human Rights.¹⁰ Ukrainian intellectuals provided some of the most wide-ranging and forthright statements of criticism of the Soviet nationalities policy, making use of national rights guaranteed in the constitution. The most important—and controversial—was the right to secession of a Union Republic from the Soviet Union guaranteed in Article 17 of the 1936 Constitution (Art. 71 of the 1977 Constitution). One Ukrainian dissident reported being told by the official investigator of his case that "The Constitution exists for foreign use."¹¹ Surely no one had any expectation of implementation of the constitutional provision. Yet as with other dissenters they pressed not only for open discussion of such issues, but also for exposure

and elimination of unconstitutional provisions of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian S.S.R., such as Article 62 of a section detailing "Particularly Dangerous State Crimes":

Agitation or propaganda conducted for the purpose of undermining or weakening the Soviet rule . . . ; the spreading, for the same purpose, of slanderous fabrications which discredit the Soviet State and social system; as well as the circulation, production, or keeping for the same purpose, of literature of similar contents, are punishable by imprisonment for a term of from six months to seven years, with banishment for the term of two to five years. . . .¹²

In the trials of Ukrainian intellectual dissenters, reference was made repeatedly by the defendants to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, especially to Article 19 concerning freedom of opinion and expression, and to Article 11 which deals with the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty in a public trial.¹³

One of the most important sources of protest against violations of civil rights in the contemporary Soviet Union is the religious communities. The Soviet government prepared in 1957-58 and launched in 1959 the most extensive attack upon religious organizations since the early Stalin era.¹⁴ An unexpected consequence of the attack was the powerful resistance of believers and their articulate defense of their cause by appeal to the Soviet Constitution itself. Since most of the repressive measures taken both against clerics and against churches and synagogues involved violation of previous agreements, the religious could point to such legal violations and also to the extensive violation of Article 124 of the Soviet Constitution providing freedom of religious worship. But the resistance to the attack had even broader consequences. Specifically, the renewed antireligious campaign served to convince many religious believers that most, if not all, compromise with the Soviet government which accepted and regularized governmental restrictions upon religious organizations, religious worship, and religious education was a mistake, that the Soviet government was engaged in a campaign for destruction of religion by progressive stages, and that the only way to stop the process was to refuse to collaborate.

It was inevitable that those clerics and laymen who advocated firm resistance to further governmental intervention in religious life also would come into conflict with the officially sanctioned leadership of their own ecclesiastical organizations. Such conflicts soon divided both Orthodox and Protestant groups, and where the control and discipline of the ecclesiastical organization did not suffice to impose discipline the government entered, frequently engaging in exceedingly cruel and illegal treatment of the religious dissenters. The main point for the pres-

ent discussion is that the issues raised by the dissenters were the constitutional separation of church and state and freedom of religious worship. When dissident Baptists organized private prayer meetings in individual homes they defied the government's right to limit religious worship to registered places of worship, and when they included children in these services they defied the government's proscription of religious education of minors. Their intention was to repudiate the unconstitutional intervention of the Soviet government in religious life and the extensive curtailment thereby of the civil rights of religious believers.

What has been said thus far about the questions of civil rights posed by the Soviet dissent movement leads to some important questions that relate to the future of civil rights, and of human rights more broadly, in Soviet society. The first question is whether the pressure for civil and political rights is a challenge to the Soviet system. The answer may seem an obvious one; in fact it is not. There are distinguished specialists on Soviet affairs who do not see the intellectual dissent as a fundamental challenge to the system as such, and individual dissenters have themselves endorsed this view.¹⁵ If this view were correct, one would regard the harsh treatment of intellectual dissenters as the irrational excesses of a frightened leadership, a leadership that overreacted because it was unaccustomed to any public disagreement with its policies and habituated to arbitrary use of power.¹⁰ A logical corollary of such a view would be the prediction that over time the arena of public discussion would broaden and the limitations upon civil rights would also expand.

The dissent movement has challenged the basic institutional and ideological foundations of the Soviet system—the party dictatorship, socialism, official atheism, political direction of intellectual and cultural life, and "proletarian internationalism," or the assimilation of all nationalities into a multinational communist state. Not all of the dissenters have challenged the system on all of the foregoing issues, though the prominent scientist-dissenter, Andrei Sakharov, has done so. Most have preferred to concentrate on specific areas and issues. The fact remains, however, that the cumulative impact of the dissenters' challenges in all areas amounts to a fundamental challenge to the whole Soviet system. That the leadership has reacted strongly—returning ideological control responsibilities to the secret police (KGB) in 1969, and embarking upon a very extensive program of repression since—could be described as brutal and harsh, but certainly not as irrational in terms of its own purposes and commitments.

If one accepts this point, a further question follows. What is the expectation for the future? The harsh suppression of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was intended to reaffirm both Party dictatorship and censor-

ship, the most vital elements of a threatened Communist system. And the subsequent policy within the Soviet Union has aimed to end the publications and intimidate, imprison (in ordinary prisons or psychiatric hospitals), deport, or exile the leadership of the various currents of the dissent movement. These actions have shown scant concern for human rights, except where the individual or the episode has received sufficient publicity abroad to compel the Soviet government to deport or allow the emigration of its victim.

One can expect the Soviet leadership to maintain its pressure upon intellectual dissent in all its manifold forms, and to curtail civil rights and abuse human rights broadly defined in the process. Yet in projecting the future one ought to remember that the government's response is not just defensive, and therefore passive. This is not a traditional dictatorship or oligarchy seeking to maintain the *status quo*.¹⁷ The religious and national policies against which intellectual dissenters have directed their criticism in recent years continue to be pursued. The party leadership sees itself as engaged in a continuing and long revolution. Resistance is expected, but it is certainly not to be tolerated, except temporarily and out of political necessity. The chief instruments are the party dictatorship and the control of communication. The "right"—the human right—of information (*glasnost'*) which was so central to the dissent movement in all its forms is seen by the Party leadership as its own right of information control.

It is precisely on the question of information that the Soviet dissidents count most heavily upon the support of the Western democracies. In contrast to Stalin, the post-Stalin leadership proved to be highly sensitive to foreign public opinion. The dissenters were able to draw extensive international attention to their writings, their political difficulties, and their internal underground publications. The underground *Chronicle of Contemporary Events*, which detailed the political actions taken against them, increased the pressure on the Soviet leadership, and no doubt helped protect many of the dissenters by gaining publicity in the foreign communications media. However, the faith of Soviet intellectuals in the possibility of developing effective legal protection within their own society was rudely shattered by the experience of the public trials of the mid-1960's. The trials provided a useful and unaccustomed public forum for their protests, but the article of the Criminal Code on which most were tried was so vaguely worded, and the court procedures, with politically motivated judges and procurators dominating the scene, were so heavily weighted against the defendants that the outcome of the trials was a foregone conclusion.¹⁸ To use a favorite Soviet official phrase, "it was not accidental" that not a single defendant in a political trial was found innocent.

Significantly, the most aggressive KGB attacks on intellectual dissenters coincided with the introduction of the Soviet-American *détente*. It was clearly the purpose of American policy under Secretary Kissinger to minimize American official support for dissenting intellectuals in the Soviet Union. One of the most important facets of this policy was the reduction of U.S. government funding for the radio stations—Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, and Radio Liberty—broadcasting to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The latter policy decision was immensely important, for the only weapon of the dissidents in the uneven battle with a powerful government, which had even the law and the judicial system firmly in its hands, was the possibility of breaking through the government's monopoly of information. Foreign communications media were used not only to provide Soviet citizens with alternative sources of foreign and domestic news, but they could also be used to disseminate the views of the dissenters themselves. Hence the American decision to reduce support for broadcasts to the USSR, and the increasingly bland tone of Voice of America, represented a significant reduction in foreign support for the human rights movement inside the Soviet Union.

Against this background, it is perhaps clearer why the Soviet leaders have reacted so sharply to the change in American policy—especially the heavy emphasis on human rights—that has come with the Carter presidency. Official American support of dissenters had been much reduced during the *détente* initiated under President Ford. Moreover, the massive campaign against the dissenters from 1972-75 had removed most of the leaders, intimidated many of their followers, and closed down most of the underground publishing activity. Only against this background can one understand the Soviet willingness to take the risk of accepting the human rights statements in the Helsinki Agreement in June 1975, for those provisions were essentially a concession to Western leaders.

The Soviet leaders had for many years sought recognition by the Western powers of the position they had consolidated in Eastern Europe at the end of World War II. This meant, most importantly, the acquisition of the three Baltic republics (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) and the territories formerly in Poland and Romania, and the achievement of direct control over the satellite states. The most immediate concern was the actual territorial borders of the Soviet Union, which had never been formally accepted by the Western leaders. The Helsinki meeting of heads of state and foreign ministers gave formal recognition to those borders. The effect of recognition was both to discourage still very lively national sentiments, particularly among the Balts, and to reassure the Soviets of Western acceptance of their territorial gains.

What became significant about Helsinki was that in exchange for these concessions the Western leaders required that the Soviet leaders endorse a series of statements on human rights, including rights of migration across international borders. There were many other elements of the Helsinki agreements, especially the so-called "Basket Three," but the foregoing have been the most important in subsequent human rights discussions. No doubt the Soviet leaders counted on a continuation of the *détente* era policies of Mr. Kissinger. They got, instead, repeated reminders that the Belgrade Conference of 1977 would be an occasion for reviewing the performance of the Helsinki signatories on human rights issues.

If one reads the human rights statements in the final act of the Helsinki Conference, the striking fact is the brevity of the treatment of the subject. Article 7 refers to "respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief." This guarantee had implied elaboration in the statement that "the participating states will act in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." The specific human rights discussed in the Helsinki agreement, and treated in greater detail in the United Nations Declaration, had been for several years the central concern of the Soviet dissidents. They therefore seized upon the language of the agreement, and the implied commitment to the United Nations declaration, and saw the Soviet signing of the Helsinki agreement as an opportunity for further pressure on their government.

The consequence of these developments was an increasingly awkward position for the Soviet leaders. Already faced with continuing internal dissent focused on the human rights issue, they were now faced, by the advent of President Carter, with increasing American financial allocations for the radio broadcasts to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and frequent public statements by the President concerning his determination to uphold human rights, including the rights of Soviet dissenters. The anxiety of the Soviet leaders was further increased by obvious pressure of dissidents developing during 1976 and 1977 in Czechoslovakia (the Charter of 1977) and East Germany. In brief, seemingly innocent, even platitudinous, statements in the Human Rights Agreement, which at the time had seemed a modest price to pay for the concessions made by the Western powers to the Soviet and East European position, had now become an international issue and a focus for international attention to Soviet misdeeds in the human rights field. It was not surprising, therefore, that the Soviet leaders responded to the president's statements with charges of interference in Soviet domestic affairs and sought by every possible means

to raise fears on the part of the Western public that the president's indiscretions would damage the cause of disarmament by putting obstacles in the way of effective cooperation between the Soviet and American governments.

When one reviews the human rights question in the broad context of American efforts in the field since World War II, and with due attention to the views of intellectual dissenters in the Soviet Union, it seems strange that there has been so much American criticism of President Carter's human rights policy. Certainly it is difficult to object to the statements that present that policy. The inaugural address affirms that "Our moral purpose (as a nation) dictates a clearcut preference for those societies which share with us an abiding respect for individual human rights," a statement of preference which is not incompatible with sensible diplomatic conduct in relations with societies that do not share our commitments. And it seems odd that a frequent charge against him is that his policy threatens to renew the ideological conflict in Soviet-American relations. He has not shrunk from the charge that he has undertaken an ideological competition with the Soviets:

. . . the Soviet Union has always maintained that an ideological struggle was legitimate. . . .

I don't feel any inclination to refrain from . . . it either.¹⁹

Interestingly, Soviet commentators since Helsinki have repeatedly emphasized that the conference should not mean an end to ideological competition. Mr. Carter has, however, repeatedly stressed that his policy is based not on "a desire to impose our particular political or social arrangements on any other country" but a wish to let "the world know where we stand." And he has denied believing that "actions we take will bring rapid changes in the policies of other governments," while affirming that "neither do we believe that world opinion is without effect."

Speaking to the United Nations General Assembly in March 1977, the president affirmed the obligation of that body to uphold the cause of human rights to which all UN charter signatories had pledged themselves.²⁰

. . . no member of the United Nations can claim that mistreatment of its citizens is solely its own business. Equally, no member can avoid its responsibilities to review and to speak when torture or unwanted deprivation occurs in any part of the world.²¹

In the same address Mr. Carter took note of the deficiencies of the human rights performance of the UN—" . . . we have allowed its human

rights machinery to be ignored and sometimes politicized."²² He then appealed for renewed commitment to the principles of human rights enunciated in the UN Charter and Declaration of Human Rights and the Helsinki agreements. His concluding summary of the four major concerns of American foreign policy included human rights, which he urged "be taken just as seriously as commercial or security agreements."

Why, then, was it asserted at the beginning of this article that "there has rarely been a more propitious moment for stress upon human rights in Soviet-American relations?" Chiefly because, in the post-Stalin years, a new understanding has developed among intellectuals in the Soviet Union of the vital importance of civil and political rights. As among many Third World intellectuals today, Soviet intellectuals of the 1920's and early 1930's were inclined to believe in what official Soviet spokesmen continue to affirm—the central importance of social and economic "rights" and the Marxist notion that democracy and socialism are one. The tragic experiences of the Stalin years have taught them a costly lesson: Civil and political rights are the foundation and prerequisite of social and economic rights; such rights are never guaranteed by a particular economic system or level of economic development. For this reason Soviet dissident intellectuals eagerly seek the leadership and support of Western democracies as they press for the observance of basic civil rights by their government. Their statements and their actions tend to confirm a significant observation made by Lewis Feuer a few years ago:

A closed technological system under Communist totalitarian rule, where there exists no competitive situation posed by the active presence of a liberal society, would still be capable of maintaining itself while at the same time keeping its scientists and intellectuals subservient. . . .²³

Soviet dissidents now recognize the importance of the competitive models of pluralist democratic societies in all spheres, and especially in the sphere of human rights.

To help them requires great understanding and sophistication in American policy and policy statements. Policy must rest upon a clear perception of essential priorities and possibilities in human rights in the context of a totalitarian communist society. It must recognize that the most powerful instrument of progress is not a sermon or a polemic, but relevant and accurate information combined with clear statements of consistent support for basic political and moral principles. Against overwhelming odds Soviet intellectual dissidents have broken their government's jealous monopoly on information. The dissidents have used their new-found voices to reaffirm the primacy in the building

of a just and free society of maintaining the civil and political rights of individuals. But they still have a very long way to go. Only if we can deepen our understanding of the complexity of their situation, and profit from the experience they have gained in their struggle, can we effectively help them realize their dream of a free society.

NOTES

1. *Pravda*, February 12, 1977; as quoted in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Columbus, XXIX, No. 6, p. 4.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

3. See, for example, the comprehensive review of social and economic conditions in contemporary Soviet society in Andrei D. Sakharov's *My Country and the World* (New York: Knopf, 1975), pp. 11-50.

4. *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly Resolution 217 A [III] of 10 December 1948), Part 4, Art. 28, 1.

5. Oscar M. Garibaldi, "General Limitations on Human Rights: The Principle of Legality," *Harvard International Law Journal*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Summer 1976): 556-57.

6. *Charter of the United Nations*, Art. 2, par. 7.

7. As is indicated in the following pages, the dissent movement has many branches—scientific, literary, religious, national, etc. Only a few leading figures, such as Andrei Sakharov (note 3 above), have brought the criticism together comprehensively so that one can see the full scope of the challenge.

8. Nadezhda Mandelstam, *Hope Against Hope* (London: Atheneum, 1970), p. 277.

9. Abram Tertz (pseud. of Andrei Sinyavsky), *On Socialist Realism* (New York: Pantheon, 1960).

10. See Vyacheslav Chornovil, *The Chornovil Papers* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), pp. 6-7.

11. Michael Browne, ed., *Ferment in the Ukraine: Documents by V. Chornovil, I. Kandyba, L. Lukyanenko, V. Moroz, and Others* (London: Macmillan, 1971), p. 89.

12. Chornovil, *Chornovil Papers*, pp. 6-7.

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 127-30.

14. Nikita Struve, *Christians in Contemporary Russia* (New York: Scribner, 1967). See especially chapters XII and XIII on the renewed attack on religion under N. S. Khrushchev, 1959-64.

15. Marshall Shulman writes, for example, that "it must not be assumed that their [the dissidents'] pressure on the regime for less Party interference or their private criticism of particular officials is equated with a rejection of the system as a whole." "Transformations in the Soviet System," in Joseph L. Noguee, ed., *Man, State and Society in the Soviet Union* (New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 554.

The dissident Piotr Yakir told an American reporter, "You don't understand the situation correctly. Those people who protest—they are not opposed to

the government—they simply criticize its actions . . . are simply people who are asserting themselves as human beings and on the basis of the Human Rights Charter of the United Nations."

16. It is revealing to read Khrushchev's comment about the early post-Stalin literary thaw. He writes that, "We in the leadership were consciously in favor of the thaw. . . ." But he also says, "We were scared—really scared. We were afraid the thaw might unleash a flood. . . ." N. S. Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), pp. 78-79. Quoted in Frederick C. Barghoorn, *Detente and the Democratic Movement in the USSR* (New York: Free Press, 1976), pp. 159-60.

17. The argument that the posture of the Soviet leaders is essentially static and defensive is cogently made by one of the leading dissident intellectuals, Andrei Amalrik, in *Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), pp. 21-44.

18. The transcript of the Daniel-Sinyavsky trial, with commentary, is available in Max Hayward, trans. and ed., *On Trial: The Soviet State versus 'Abram Tertz' and 'Nikolai Arzhak'* (New York: Harper and Row, 1967).

19. Interview with three European broadcast journalists, May 2, 1977.

20. Quotations from NATO Ministerial Meeting, 10 May 1977. From *Presidential Documents*, 13, no. 20 (1977): 698.

21. *Ibid.*, no. 12, p. 401.

22. *Ibid.*

23. Lewis S. Feuer, "The Intelligentsia in Opposition," *Problems of Communism*, XIX, no. 6 (November-December 1970): 16.

The Year of Human Rights:

The Case of Iran

Richard W. Cottam

For Americans and Englishmen concerned with the state of freedom in the world, the case of Iran merits particular attention. The American and British governments were direct participants in the overthrow of an Iranian regime in 1953 that was at least "partly free" and its replacement by a regime that fully deserves the current ranking of "not free" in the Comparative Survey. In some civil freedoms the Iranian society under Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq in the early 1950's would have merited the judgment of "free." The press of that period was vital and contentious, with some papers attacking the government and Dr. Mossadeq personally with abandon. Indeed, a major American complaint was the government's refusal to suppress Iranian communist political activity.¹

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Iran in the early 1950's was typical of Third World societies undergoing rapid change. Probably no more than ten percent of the population was literate or sufficiently aware of the political process to be described as participant. Much of the population existed at a subsistence level, and the electoral system mirrored this societal picture faithfully. In the large cities elections were competitive and reasonably free, but in the small towns and countryside landowning candidates opposed to change could, if the government did not control the election, transport uncomprehending peasants to the polls and win the election. When it became apparent that the uncontrolled election of 1952 would result in a substantial majority for traditional elements, Mossadeq suspended the election after a quorum had been attained and most of the pro-Mossadeq urban deputies elected. To this extent the electoral process was flawed in a manner characteristic of states rated "partly free" by the Survey.

Richard W. Cottam is professor of political science, University of Pittsburgh; he is an authority on modern Iran and international relations.

Opposition to Mossadeq came primarily from the traditional elites of Iran—landowners, conservative Moslem clerics, and members of the civilian and military bureaucracy with ties to traditional elements. There were in the last months before the coup a few recruits from more progressive elements. Disappointed aspirants for the leadership of Iranian nationalism, such as the former allies of Mossadeq, Dr. Mozaffar Baqai and the religious leader Ayatollah Kashani, and the leaders of the Qashqai tribe were prepared to accept American or British help to overturn the regime. But these leaders were not called upon in August 1953 when the coup was executed.

Although both the American and British governments in 1953 participated in the overthrow of Mossadeq, the bases of their opposition were sharply different. For the British the primary grievance was the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the unwillingness of the Mossadeq government to enter into a new relationship with the AIOC on terms the British considered acceptable. Prior to Mossadeq's ascendancy, the British had been full, functional participants in Iran's traditional, essentially oligarchic, political process. Operating through the AIOC, the British Bank and other commercial concerns, a cooperative and mutually profitable relationship had been established with most of Iran's leading families. Since British interests were reasonably well secured, British influence was directed toward maintaining the socio-political status quo. Nationalist opposition elements, Mossadeq and his allies, were viewed from an imperial perspective in which nationalist leaders were dismissed as agitators, self-serving at best, and hopelessly "irresponsible." The imperial-minded believed that only the most romantic observer could take seriously Mossadeq's claim to represent a vital national movement. Quite understandably, the British were more attracted to a strategy of restoring previous relationships than to dealing with the Mossadeq regime. Equally understandably, Mossadeq and his allies believed that it would be better to produce no oil and thereby lose a vital source of governmental revenue than to allow the reestablishment of British power and influence. In 1952 diplomatic relations with Britain were broken. This forced British participation in the later coup to be indirect and clandestine, though only thinly concealed.

The American view was simpler—classically cold war. Mossadeq was permitting communists to operate at will. By allowing a chaotic internal situation to develop, he opened the country to communist subversion, and set an unfortunate example for other "popular" leaders in the Third World. Americans saw little functional distinction between "nationalists" and communists. Regardless of the rhetorical use of liberal symbols, Mossadeq was at best a naive, easily manipulated

dupe of the communists, who was leading Iran toward a smothering totalitarian control inside the Soviet bloc. The decision followed naturally that, in the interests of Iranian and world freedom, an alliance be made with the British and Iran's traditional opposition groups to replace him. The decision was typical of the cold war and is an essential feature of the context within which American concern for human rights in the 1970's must be viewed.

In terms of present day consequences, the most important aspect of the coup was that it failed initially. Mossadeq's government was fully informed of the plan and easily suppressed it on August 16, 1953. The Shah (who at the time had little power and had been a reluctant participant in the conspiracy) fled the country in unseemly haste; Iran appeared to be on the edge of becoming a republic. For the next three days the American embassy engaged in a frantic and fully overt effort to bring down Mossadeq. Ambassador Loy Henderson, who was discretely abroad on August 16, returned to Tehran to orchestrate the operation. By so doing, any possibility that the American role in replacing the regime could be disguised or minimized was lost. When, on August 19, 1953, Mossadeq was overthrown, no politically aware Iranian doubted the American origin of the successor regime. The consequence of this attribution of foreign origin to the current royal dictatorship makes exceedingly difficult carrying out a liberalization policy under the Shah's auspices.

There was some possibility that the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, could have escaped the onus of foreign sponsorship. He had been highly skeptical of the coup plan and the efforts that had to be made to bring him along were publicized abroad. According to the Anglo-American plan, a military officer, General Fazlollah Zahedi, was to be Iran's dictator, not the Shah. It was under Zahedi that a new oil agreement was signed—an act widely assumed to have been insisted upon by Zahedi's American and British sponsors. But Zahedi proved to be an inept leader and was considered corrupt at a level rarely seen in an Iran noted for corruption. In 1955 the Shah dismissed Zahedi and soon became the unquestioned dictator of Iran. Conceivably the Shah in 1955 could have made some effort to dissociate himself from the coup. But such an effort would surely have required freeing Mossadeq and it was dangerous to permit a leader with broad charismatic appeal any freedom of action. The Shah chose not to take that risk and instead to follow the Zahedi path in consolidating power.

In the period 1953-1961 a degree of freedom persisted in Iran. It was true that to remain in power the government had to satisfy its traditional coup allies, and in some areas this led to violations of civil rights. For example, to satisfy reactionary religious allies, the

government suppressed with some brutality the Bahai community, considered heretical by the Moslem right. But in the electoral process elements of free competition survived. Although the issue was decided before the actual votes were cast, pluralist considerations were often involved in the decision of who was to be allowed to win a particular seat. Since press censorship was negative, a clever editor could get away with an adventurous play of nuance. Remnants of due process in legal procedures were observed in some political trials; under the leadership of General Pakravan, there was even an element of humanity in Iran's security agency.

The regime's control strategy was clear from the beginning. For the time being the price of satisfying the traditional allies had to be paid. But the regime moved in two directions to reduce this dependence. One was to construct a reliable security force. The problem was that a great many military officers, particularly at the junior level, had been enthusiastic supporters of what they saw as a nationalist revival under Mossadeq. Other officers, chiefly represented at the general officer level, had close ties with Iran's traditional elite. The latter were allies against Mossadeq but could be expected to resist any movement toward a tight royal dictatorship. To deal with the former group, the strategy was to retire, as rapidly as they could be replaced, all officers believed to be sympathetic to Mossadeq. In the meantime, they would be stationed far away from Tehran and transferred frequently. Their replacements would be recruited from lower middle class and even lower class youths who would therefore be in the debt of the government for their rapid upward mobility. In addition, the security forces recruited energetically from the ranks of suppressed communists, particularly for the security agency SAVAK. These officers have proved most loyal.

To control the general officers, the Shah employed a divide and watch-each-other strategy. Key appointments were given to ambitious and mutually hostile officers who, the Shah correctly assumed, would carefully monitor each other's activities. Although some military officers did plan a potentially successful coup that was aborted only at the last minute in 1958, in general the security forces became reliable enough to reduce the Shah's dependence on his traditional allies.

The other major aspect of the regime's control strategy was utilitarian. The Iranian Plan Organization, poorly funded under Mossadeq's oilless strategy, became the major recipient of renewed oil income and began to blossom institutionally. At the urging of Abdul Hassan Ebtehaj, director of the Plan Organization, the Shah recruited highly qualified young technocrats to staff the organization. Many, if not most of these young people, had been strong Mossadeq supporters.

But with the promise of influence and good salaries, they accommodated to the regime. The success in effecting the purchase of some of Iran's most talented youths was an essential feature of the consolidation of power. Not only did it bring some high quality leadership into planning, it decimated the ranks of potential revolutionary leaders.

Most essential for the Shah's continued control in this period was the full and unequivocal support of the United States government. Accustomed to foreign interference in their affairs, Iranians had come to believe that no coup could succeed without major external support. By giving full diplomatic support and technical, economic and military aid, and by the presence of hundreds of American advisors, the impression was given of total American commitment to the regime. Opposition elements tried to persuade American officials that American interests would be better served by a government with a broad-based support, but their efforts were to no avail.

In late 1960 the Shah felt sufficiently confident of the security of his position to take two major risks. There followed the shakiest years of his dictatorship. But the two moves gave concrete evidence that the Shah would have liked to have moved in a direction of greater freedom both in the political and human rights areas.

First, the Shah experimented with greater political freedom. Four years earlier he had created two political parties. One, the Nationalist Party, was to form His Majesty's Government. The other, the Peoples Party, was His Majesty's loyal opposition. Artificial in creation, the two parties were not permitted the kind of freedom of choice necessary for developing any credibility as independent political entities. Party interactions appeared to be a charade and Iranians tended to view their activities as grotesque comedy. But in 1960 the Shah promised real freedom for inter-party competition in the election and invited the world press to witness the occasion. Results later indicated that in fact the Nationalists were programmed to win two-thirds of the seats and the Peoples Party one-third. The rigging was artless—each party winning big in its allotted districts. But other parties and politicians took advantage of the presence of many foreign correspondents to put on their own shows without real fear of arrest. Dr. Baqai, seeking to recover his lost nationalist purity, led a number of demonstrations and made speeches that came dangerously close to criticisms of the Shah. Confronted with real partisan activity, Peoples Party candidates took heart and began to make some embarrassingly pointed criticisms. There were even some serious stirrings from within Mossadeghist ranks. The engineered results were greeted with such cynicism that the Shah felt compelled to nullify the election.

This deterioration in the Shah's political position was furthered by

a developing economic crisis in Iran. In need of help, the Shah turned to a prime minister, Ali Amini, who had the competence to deal with the financial crisis but who would not play the role of a puppet. Worse for the Shah, since Amini was broadly considered Washington's favorite Iranian politician, the appointment was interpreted as an indication that the United States was dissatisfied with the Shah and no longer willing to grant him unqualified support. There is no overtly available evidence to support this popular supposition, but the consequences were the same as if there were. Beginning in 1961 and with increasing confidence, pro-Mossadeq factions began surfacing and demanding a free press, freedom of speech, and free elections. At one point in 1962 an estimated 100,000 people turned out for a religio-nationalist pro-Mossadeq rally.

Secondly, in this same period, the Shah made a bridge-burning move away from his traditional allies. On the advice of Amini's Minister of Agriculture, Hassan Arsenjani, who argued that the Shah should anchor his support in the agricultural and laboring masses, land reform and advanced labor legislation were promulgated, and moves in the direction of implementing land reform were taken. Though in theory this was a reasonable control strategy, it carried a heavy risk. Once convinced that the land reform program was real, the landowning allies of the regime moved into sullen opposition long before there could develop tangible support from the politically inert peasantry. In 1962 the Shah was confronted with an increasingly assertive opposition which considered him the product of Western imperial interference, the loss of support from his one societal ally, and an independent-minded prime minister who appeared to be the favorite of the Shah's own American mentors. His primary asset was a large and, as events would show, generally reliable security force capable of exercising coercive control in the country.

In January 1963 the Shah suddenly arrested the entire pro-Mossadeq political leadership. Those he considered most dangerous, mostly members of an alliance of religious, intellectual, and bazaar elements called the National Resistance Movement, were kept in prison for some time. He had previously replaced Dr. Amini after pointedly visiting the United States. He also gave the royal blessing to a new government party, New Iran, that was closer to the authoritarian single-party model than had been the Nationalist Party. Although the Peoples Party and occasionally other groupings were allowed to function, New Iran was the party to join for the careerist minded. By far the most imaginative aspect of the Shah's strategy, however, was his broadly proclaimed White Revolution. A national plebiscite was scheduled to approve this new program which focused mainly on land reform, labor reform,

and women's rights. The ninety-nine percent affirmative vote reflected a willingness to drop even the pretense of electoral pluralism.

On June 5, 1963, the regime faced its real test. Deep unrest that was rooted in economic distress led to serious rioting particularly in the lower middle and lower class sections of south Tehran. To a major degree, this was a spontaneous outburst, a public convulsion. But it is revealing of the change in Iranian mass attitudes that the outraged public did not turn to the secular, intellectual Mossadeqist leaders. It looked rather to religio-political leaders, of which the most important was Ayatollah Khomeini, a political mullah whose opposition remains a major problem for the regime. The leaders of the religious faction of the Mossadeqists, the National Resistance Movement, were still in jail in June 1963. Had they been free to provide organization and direction to the rioting, it might well have brought down the regime. As it was, security force discipline held; there has not been a challenge to the regime's stability at anything approaching this level since that time.

Government spokesmen hinted darkly of external (Nasser) sponsorship of the rioting and described the leaders as religious reactionaries opposed to land reform and women's rights. But this was a self-serving dismissal. Religious leaders in Iran are anything but monolithic in their social philosophies. Some favor reform far more radical than that called for by the White Revolution, while others are highly resistant to any change. For whatever reason, since significant elements of the Islamic leadership are opposed to the regime in degrees that range from passive to highly aggressive, the Shah's legitimacy is in question on both religious and national grounds. There are many religious leaders who are fully mobilized in support of the regime, but the existence of serious opposition among the clergy is, as recent arrest patterns indicate, a major concern of government leaders.

In the years 1960 to 1963, then, the Shah was experimenting with his control strategy. He attempted to relax security restrictions in the areas of speech, press, and electoral behavior, but political polarization proved too sharp for a gradual liberalization strategy to succeed. He boldly moved to transfer his primary base of public support from traditional leaders to urban labor and the peasantry, yet the anti-regime riots of June 1963 were mainly products of unrest among labor and recent immigrants from villages. He attempted to replace Mossadeq as the symbolic leader of the Iranian nation. He saw himself as a man fully within Iran's ancient monarchical tradition who at the same time would give his people a revolution that would transform and enrich their lives. But the events of June 1963 indicated not only that he could not recover from the burden of his regime's imputed

foreign origin, but also that he was, for many, placed symbolically in opposition to Islam. Therefore, by late 1963 the Shah was again compelled to rely primarily on terror.

However, with a steadily growing oil income, the regime was able later to shift from primary reliance on terror for maintaining its authority to a more materialistic control strategy. Coercion is still an essential feature of regime control, but the regime's stability for the past decade and a half is a consequence of having satisfied at a sufficiency level the material and power demands of two important societal elements: the bureaucracy and the commercial and industrial elites.

THE SITUATION IN THE MID-1970'S

Outside of defense and internal security the strategy for dealing with the bureaucracy has been a continuation of the Ebtahaj strategy adopted in the 1950's. Technically competent young people are recruited for government service even though in many cases they have been anti-government activists in their student days. Salaries and prospects for advancement are relatively good, but bureaucrats share a pervasive sense of lack of efficacy. At the highest level the conviction that the Shah personally makes the important decisions reduces willingness to engage in imaginative and innovative policy planning. Since directives from on high are more random than systematic, there is little follow-through. The resulting sense of powerlessness makes unlikely anything approaching the Czechoslovakian liberalizing model in which elements of the bureaucracy had moved incrementally in the direction of greater freedom up to August 1968.

"Accommodationist" still describes Iran's bureaucratic technocrats. Genuinely positive proregime feelings have not pervaded, nor have there been any real expectations of regime change either by revolution or evolution. And such expectations are necessary if the bureaucracy is to be changed from within. However, within the defense and security bureaucracy, both uniformed and civilian, there is positive support. This is particularly true of the security agency, SAVAK, whose fate is tied to the regime. One prediction that can be made with some confidence is that in the event of a sudden regime change, SAVAK would be the target of citizen wrath and would be treated comparably to its Hungarian counterpart in those few days of freedom in October 1956.

Less certain is the attitude of the armed forces, particularly the officer corps. The gratitude that officers who rose in social status feel toward the regime declines as years pass and inevitable grievances

over promotion and assignments appear. A major effort is made to satisfy the officers' material and social needs. Pay is good and fringe benefits include housing, automobiles, clubs, and training programs in the United States. Government generosity in providing desired equipment is unexceptionable. Still, as was true with the civilian bureaucracy, the extraordinary role of the Shah in decision making may well reduce the military's sense of purpose. The aborted 1958 military coup offers concrete evidence that at that time there were alienated officers. However, the outside observer is in a poor position to learn about attitudes within the military and of factions that might be potentially dangerous to the regime.

The professionals and intellectuals that had provided essential support to the national movement and who had loyally supported Dr. Mossadeq had formed a major component of the bureaucracy. From a control point of view, therefore, the accommodation of the bureaucracy to the regime was a major triumph. Still, members of the professional-intellectual community are at the core of opposition to the regime today, and even though the Shah's strategy has effectively decimated the ranks of opponents in this community, their passive support for the regime could quickly evaporate were an internal challenge to develop.

Another major source of support for Iranian nationalism and modernization has been the commercial middle class. But that support was always conditional on the satisfaction of economic interests. Defections from the Mossadeq movement were significant well before the coup because of the economic distress an oilless strategy caused. Since 1963, members of the commercial community have prospered, some of them far beyond their most optimistic expectations. Indeed, Iran in the late 1970's seems at first glance to be a parvenu society. For the individual who understands and is willing and able to manipulate the system, there are greater opportunities than in most capitalist societies. Of course, even the most successful manipulator has bitter complaints. The manipulative process is inefficient and expensive; it may require corruption and illegality, such as paying bribes to government officials, or setting up fictitious corporations. Yet thanks to the enormous oil income, potential profits are so great that individuals of this variety not only would not support an opposition move, they would oppose it. From their point of view, the regime is badly defective but far superior to any conceivable alternative. However, without institutionalization the support of this community would probably count for little in the event of a crisis; there is simply no institutional device to mobilize its support.

There is inevitably a serious price paid for heavily favoring one

element of the population—in this case the private commercial sector. Criticism of the regime that has surfaced inside Iran in 1977 stresses in particular the neglect of the agricultural sector. In spite of land reform, the priority granted agriculture remains low. The regime, concerned with the possibility of consumer dissatisfaction, has kept the price of many staples at artificially low levels, and this has limited severely the potential for innovative entrepreneurship in agriculture—especially in comparison with that in real estate, service industry, and consumer products. The peasantry is victimized by a combination of low prices for basic commodities and an inflation rate that has been as high as twenty-five to thirty-five percent. Among the poorer peasants the gratitude earned by the regime through its land reform program has been dissipated.

A similar case can be made for labor. Strikes are most infrequent and are dealt with severely. And wages, though rising, lag well behind prices in the classical inflationary pattern. Unions are under strict governmental control, and union officials often have underworld ties. Furthermore, since both laborers and peasants are religious, both groups are susceptible to the appeal of antiregime clergy.

As the sensitivity to student activity indicates, the regime is very disappointed by the persistence of active opposition among the youth, especially university students both in Iran and abroad. To be sure, a large majority of youth is effectively apolitical and careerist in mentality. But of the most aware and politically vital students, a large proportion continues to be willing to risk the wrath of a security agency that the students perceive to be both ubiquitous and brutal. Rioting occurs in universities and the masked demonstrators abroad wear their masks more to dramatize suppression in Iran than to conceal their identity. Opposition activists assume that SAVAK informants in their groups maintain a file on those participating in antiregime activities, and they fear that their families will be persecuted because of their activities. Yet they persist. Within Iran there are two separate guerrilla movements that are ritualistically lionized by opposition activists abroad.

Estimates of the number of political prisoners in Iran vary widely. In 1976 an Iranian official estimated 3,200 political prisoners.² Opposition elements insist the number is in the 50,000 to 100,000 range. Equally impossible to verify are the reports of torture and murder of prisoners. Opposition circles outside Iran have published hundreds of pages of descriptions of tortures by individuals claiming to be witnesses or victims of these tortures. The government has recently permitted Red Cross officials to visit selected prisons and to interview alleged victims of torture. Not surprisingly, the officials saw no evidence of torture and the alleged victims were remarkably healthy.

The overall control picture, therefore, is one that reflects serious vulnerability, a good deal of acquiescence, and some positive support. Iran's oil income and a rate of growth that is among the world's most rapid provide an essential base of regime stability. But the regime continues to rely on coercion for survival.

With the exception of the years 1960 to 1963, coercion has been applied with steadily increasing severity and brutality from 1954 to 1977. The press gives easily available evidence of this trend. In the 1950's Iran's diversified press offered a wide variety of opinion and approach. Censorship was negative and after the fact, and clever editors were masters of evasion. Over time censorship became increasingly positive. Newspapers were told what they could say, and journalists took fewer and fewer risks. Nonpolitical features predominated, and the number of journals allowed to publish was sharply reduced. Control was resisted more in literary, artistic, and dramatic circles where subtle criticisms are still evident to the discerning. But even here the trend has been toward increasing rigidity.

Within states that are classified as "not free" there is still a wide variation in the severity of controls. For example, the presence and degree of tolerance granted literary and other intellectual dissenters, as shown by the appearance of individuals willing to incur the risks of dissent, has become a particularly useful indicator of the degree of relaxation of control in the Soviet Union. In Iran, again with the exception of the years 1960 to 1963, there was until recently a strong trend away from willingness to risk dissent. Most of the best-known dissenters were jailed, intimidated, or sent into exile, as was for example the recently deceased Ali Shariati.

Restrictions on freedom of speech have followed an identical pattern as that of freedom of the press. Evidence for this is strikingly apparent in the younger generation's ignorance of recent Iranian history. The official textbook history of the period between World War II and 1953 is a classical example of history rewrite. Iranian students going abroad to study appear to know nothing more of that period of their history than is included in these textbooks. Since many, if not most, of their parents had been enthusiastic supporters of the national movement and of Dr. Mossadeq, this ignorance reveals the pervasiveness of fear even within the nuclear family.

A parallel decline in freedom has eroded due process and legal procedure. Governmental control of the judiciary by 1976 had reached a level comparable to that of the least free societies. By 1976 SAVAK had, in an important sense, achieved the ultimate success of an internal security force seeking to exercise totalitarian control. It was widely perceived as virtually ubiquitous and capable of orchestrating the most

elaborate conspiracies. An individual who was willing to express serious dissent or, even more clearly, was willing to propose opposition activity, was presumed to be an employee of SAVAK. This state of mind has made cooperation among dissenters exceedingly difficult both within Iran and abroad.

The trend away from freedom is reflected in the electoral process. By 1975 the Shah apparently concluded that maintaining the appearance of a multiparty system was not worth the price. Obstreperous and ambitious individuals were always appearing in the "opposition" parties who were willing to test the length of their leash. Getting rid of them could be damaging to the image. One such individual, an official of the Peoples Party, was dismissed from his post and shortly after died in an automobile accident. Immediately he was placed by many of the politically aware on the list of prominent Iranians murdered at the Shah's order. Prominent in that list were General Timur Bakhtiar, the Shah's one time security chief, Hassan Arsenjani, the father of land reform, and General Khatemi, chief of the air force.

So the Shah abandoned the two-party model and organized the Resurgence Party in accordance with the single-party model. Heavy pressure is applied to join the party and anyone interested in a bureaucratic or political career must join. Still there are signs of the Shah's reluctance in taking this step. He has ordered that there be ideological factions within the party, and there are surface efforts made to comply with that order. This offers a limited opportunity for exploring and possibly expanding the degree of freedom of maneuver; yet early explorations by Iranians genuinely interested in expanding the degree of political freedom have met with a quick rebuff.

Representation in parliament is now also fully in tune with the modern authoritarian model. Managers of the selection process strive for the appearance of balance: farmers, workers, and women are well represented. Competition for these positions is intense, usually because of the access gained to the elaborate process through which great fortunes are being made. But as a factor in the decision-making process, Iran's parliament is comparable to that of the Soviet Union. The most that a dedicated proponent of, for example, women's rights who becomes a member of parliament gains from the position is access to the media and, thus, a platform for advocating a position.

The regime has succeeded in establishing control based on materialistic satisfaction of key societal elements and on coercion. However, the Shah has not been able to clothe the regime in attractive symbols. Certainly the effort has been made. The "White Revolution" could not have received greater media play. The Shah was given a delayed coronation in 1967, and to further strengthen his position as symbolic

leader he has taken the title of Aryamehr, "the light of the Aryans." Then in 1971 an extravaganza of unprecedented proportion—at a cost of many millions—was staged to identify the Shah with Iran's 2500 years of monarchical rule. But, as the Shah came close to admitting publicly, the effort to proclaim a new Cyrus was not a success. The Shah's difficulty in mobilizing support by invoking national and religious symbolism is a major problem in establishing a strong basis for regime legitimacy.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND AMERICAN POLICY IN IRAN: 1977-

There is a profound innocence in the advocacy of human rights as an essential goal of American foreign policy. Sincere advocates of such a goal, including President Carter, cannot know how that advocacy will be interpreted within the world's partly free and not free countries. Iran is a case in point. Its importance in international politics is energy-related and very recent. Its history of even twenty-five years ago is known to few Americans. Yet the Iranian response to the Carter human rights advocacy flows from that history.

What is an Iranian to make of an American policy grounded in a human rights concern? The United States government played an essential role in removing from Iran a regime whose governing elite included many individuals who placed a high value on freedom and social justice. Then the United States government gave protection and encouragement to a new governing elite that relied on coercion to stay in power—a coercion that steadily intensified and became more brutal. A cynical response should surely surprise no one, for assuming some continuity in American policy, an American concern for human rights in Iran reeks of hypocrisy.

Yet the Iranian response has been, at least initially, quite the contrary. This is explained in part by the history of American involvement in Iran during the first half of the twentieth century. Up until Mossadeq's time, American policy was perceived to have been supportive of Iranian political and human rights. Even in the time of Dr. Mossadeq an American ambassador, Henry Grady, in stark contrast to his successor, Loy Henderson, both understood and supported the national movement. This plus a view in Iran that Americans, a young people given to anticommunist hysteria, had been duped by the more clever and truly cynical British into ousting Mossadeq, left some basis for hope that an American administration would return to its previous values. The real or, more likely, imagined American role in bringing Ali Amini into office as prime minister, is almost universally cited in Iran as evidence by those looking for a change in American policy in a more liberal direction.

The regime is no less caught up in this picture than are those Iranians who would like to see fundamental change. The Shah knows as well as any Iranian the vital role the United States has played in his rise to power and in his consolidation of power. He is well aware that he is viewed skeptically by some Americans of influence—particularly within Congress. Judging from his response, he appears to consider Carter's human rights focus as a real but eccentric concern on the part of a man who could easily create serious problems for the stability of the Iranian regime. The appearance of American support is almost as important to the Shah as is the substance of that support. The Shah's response has been in several areas. Political prisoners have been released, the conditions of at least some of those still in detention have improved, and the torturing of at least the well known among political prisoners has ceased. Opposition spokesmen say that there is little change in conditions for political prisoners who are not well known. A human rights commission already on the books was activated, and some improvements in legal procedure have been made, and more promised.

Timidly at first but with a steadily increasing daring, opposition elements inside Iran are becoming publicly assertive. Reversing a trend of thirteen years, intellectual dissidents are reappearing in Iran and with each passing month are broadening the range of public criticism. For the most part, dissidents are employing the open letter device. Letters addressed to the Shah, the prime minister, or to newspapers are given as much private circulation as possible. One individual in particular, Ali Asghar Haj Sayyid Javadi, is beginning to play a symbolic role comparable to that of Sakharov in the Soviet Union. But a comparison of Haj Sayyid Javadi's relatively mild, scolding letters with those of the heavy-handed Sakharov reflects the relative infancy of the dissident movement in Iran.

There is a pattern and a trend in the letters of the dissidents. At the core of each is a demand for a return to the rule of law, and an end to corruption and the unconscionable waste of Iran's oil wealth. As competition among dissidents increases, the demands become more concrete: dissolve parliament and hold new elections, bring an end to all torturing and release political prisoners, and license truly independent newspapers.

Group dissent began with the appearance of a request by a number of Iranian artists, composers, and literati that they be allowed to form their own association without governmental control. They coupled this request with an attack on censorship, pointing to its deleterious effects on Iranian creativity, and demanded the right of self-censorship. Associated with this professional group is another group calling itself

the Radical Movement of Iran. This group whose name belies its centrist and nonrevolutionary complexion issued a number of manifestos calling for greater freedom, a return to the rule of law, and an end to corruption, waste, and extravagance. There followed increasingly open activity by leaders of the old National Front of Mossadeq, Marxist groups, and the religio-nationalist Freedom Front. On December 22, 1977, a strongly worded condemnation of the regime's oppression was made public and signed by twenty-nine individuals, several of whom are among the best known political and intellectual leaders in contemporary Iran. They represent all of the above groups—an extraordinary achievement given the atmosphere of suspicion that pervades the Iranian opposition.

Possibly even more significant, increasingly large demonstrations and mass meetings are occurring in Iran. Many of the largest are associated with religious holidays and are held at mosques. One such meeting north of Tehran is said to have attracted 30,000 people who listened to thinly veiled attacks on oppression and violation of human rights in Iran. (In early 1978 this challenge intensified.)

The Shah has yet to carry out an across-the-board suppression of opposition elements that are testing the waters of a new liberal policy. Selectively, however, the regime is continuing, even increasing, its suppression. Suppression is being intensified primarily against religio-political leaders, particularly those associated with the Freedom Front. A noted theologian, Ayatollah Taleqani, is the most prominent of the newly arrested. He has been sentenced to ten years in prison. Not only is the potential danger great from this political-religious element, but one of the two guerrilla movements is allied to it.

This is a critical moment in the history of human rights and freedom in Iran. Will the reversal of a thirteen-year trend away from freedom be a temporary aberration or will it be of long-term duration? Much depends on American policy. There is not the slightest question that the timing of opposition activity is directly related to Carter's pronouncements on human rights. It follows as well that the United States has direct responsibility for the fate of those individuals in Iran who are taking the American human rights pronouncements seriously. This is true even though those Iranians who are risking incarceration or worse in exploring the meaning of American policy and the Shah's responses are highly critical of the United States. Given the American role of the past twenty-five years, any public association with official American policy involves risking one's legitimacy as an Iranian patriot. But there is no private denial of their indebtedness to American policy for this small crack in the repressive wall.

The recent arrests in Iran and a series of brutal attacks on demon-

strators, opposition meetings, and striking Tehran University students can be viewed in this context as a test of American intent. Dissidents refer to the Resurgence Party with a particular contempt, and all their activity is well outside established governmental institutions. The regime need only look at the opposition press outside Iran to see the rhetorical path that would be followed if censorship continues to erode. The focus of the outside press is on the Shah personally, the wasting of Iran's precious oil income on weapons ordered from and for the strategic purposes of the United States, and a system so corrupt that corruption itself is a mainstay of the regime. Statements appear regularly by the exiled religious leader Ayatollah Khomeini denouncing the regime as a travesty against the philosophy and traditions of Islam.

Since there is economic distress in Iran among most people—including the middle class—and, at the same time, a highly visible one or two percent that is fabulously well off, the movement toward increasingly critical public statements could create a strong revolutionary potential.

The Shah, with an apparently still firm control over his security forces, would suppress internal dissidents long before the focus of their criticism moved directly onto him. Since he has had a painful experience with dissidents in the 1960-63 period, he would much prefer a return to the coercion-based stability of 1976; he is hopeful that he can do so without paying the price of damaged relations with the United States. The Shah's 1977 trip to the United States and the urgency of his wish to have President Carter make an official visit to Iran must be viewed in this context. The Shah clearly has been seeking reaffirmation of the previous administration's unconditional support of the royal regime.

In 1978 the Shah and his opposition will be looking closely for signals of the Carter administration's seriousness of purpose. How serious is that purpose? Carter's persisting and seemingly sincere advocacy of human rights everywhere in the world initially triggered both the government's and the opposition's responses. Since then, however, the signals have been negative ones for Iranians committed to testing his meaning. First was the choice of an ambassador for Iran. The man chosen, William Sullivan, had a reputation as a Vietnam hardliner who had worked with governments in Indochina. Unfortunately, the reputation of these governments bore a close resemblance to the opposition's view of the Shah's regime—highly coercive, tolerant of freedom only among self-interested entrepreneurs, tolerant of and participating in corruption, narrowly based in public support, and widely regarded as a tool of American imperialism. Second came the administration's endorsement of the Shah's request to buy a 1.2 billion

dollar advanced electronic warning system (AWACS) and its efforts to push this through a reluctant senate committee. Opposition elements see such a system as horribly wasteful of Iran's oil income, of no use to Iran strategically, but clearly a part of an American grand strategic design in the area. Third, President Carter chose to include the Iranian dictatorship on his itinerary at the end of the year. His visit seemed to reaffirm the previous administration's policy of unquestioned support. Fourth, in spite of the developments inside Iran, developments that Iranians in opposition have made certain the Carter administration is fully familiar with, neither the administration nor the American media has taken any note of the direct Iranian responses to the American policy initiative.

These signals may well imply to the Iranian observer—royalist and dissident alike—that the human rights position of the administration should not be taken seriously. If this interpretation is made within the government, an early suppression of the groups and individuals who have had the temerity to come above ground is predictable. But that response would be premature. There is considerable evidence, beyond the president's statements, that the administration is sincere in espousing the cause of human rights. Human rights staffs have been appointed in both the National Security Council and the Department of State. The administration has resisted heavy pressure to call a moratorium on its criticism of the condition of human rights in the Soviet Union. Still there is growing skepticism, and not only in Iran, regarding the administration's commitment to human rights. That skepticism flows from what appears to be growth in the distance separating administration rhetoric and the administration's policies toward friendly regimes that are in flagrant violation of the human rights code.

Advocates of an American foreign policy that has a concern for human rights and political freedom abroad could make no greater mistake than succumbing to the conclusion that the president's concern for human rights is a shallow one. That conclusion follows from expecting too much from a president. Having as an ally the president of the United States is indeed an enormous asset for human rights groups. But to make optimal use of that asset requires a clear understanding of the president's ability to influence foreign policy in this direction.

Without the advantage of a deep presidential commitment to human rights and political freedom, the pattern of behavior of American human rights groups is a familiar one. They are concerned primarily with publicizing violations of human rights in various countries and with insisting that our government do something about those violations.

They argue that trade, various forms of cooperation, and certainly arms sales and foreign aid should be made contingent on improvements in the human condition in the offending state. Human rights groups are not innocent of such complexities as American security interests in the offending state; they are unconcerned with them. Their role in an overall strategy is one of identifying and publicizing abuse and seeking to compel the administration to take that abuse into account. Since predictably the concerned bureaucracy will view such groups as bothersome, naive, and ultimately insincere (as indicated in the State Department quip "this year it is human rights, next year the south of France"), they will ignore them if allowed. The natural target for human rights groups is the public through the media, political party policy groups, and, most important, the staffs and members of the House and Senate committees concerned with foreign and defense policies. The bureaucracy and ultimately the administration normally respond only if compelled to do so by institutions, such as Congress, whose power must be respected. If such pressures can be mobilized, the foreign policy bureaucracy will take into account both the complexities of foreign policy objectives in the offending state and the need to mollify public opinion in the United States. Presumably there would emerge from this process a variety of strategies depending on the type of relationship with the offending state—and the security and other interests involved.

There has been a great deal of activity in this pattern. But in the early months of the Carter administration the president led rather than followed, and the pressure felt in the bureaucracy was from the president more than from Congress. But it has been an undifferentiated pressure failing to take into account the requirements of particular situations. The bureaucracy feels the presidential pressure but is spared any demands for specific policy responses. The bureaucracy feels a certain tension on the subject of human rights violations but gradually comes to understand that other policy interests need not be sacrificed on the altar of human rights. Yet the impact of the human rights pronouncements on other states creates its own dynamic—as the case of Iran illustrates.

The Carter human rights advocacy has precipitated in Iran the re-appearance of public opposition. But if the American administration has no strategic plan for encouraging a slow growth toward political freedom and a greater concern with the human condition of most Iranians, there is danger that Iranians responding to Carter's implicit encouragement will pay dearly for their indiscretions. The role of American human rights groups is a vital one, for public pressure is indispensable if the foreign policy and defense bureaucracies are to

feel any urgency in constructing strategies that will encourage gradual liberalization in Iran.

A human rights strategy for American policy in Iran must develop from a reevaluation of our strategic and economic interests. There is disagreement about American policy toward Iran in the areas of security, the economy, and human rights. Many Americans continue to see the Shah's regime as an essential element in an overall containment strategy. Their view is premised on the assumption of an imperialistic Soviet Union. Individuals holding this view may well value a concern for human rights, but are following the cold war pattern of giving overwhelming priority to the security concern. They favor close relations with and arms sales to the Iranian regime. Others are more concerned with the financial impact of the Iranian regime's oil-pricing policy. Assuming the relative stability of the regime, they are anxious to establish cordial and friendly relations with it. Still others are profiting greatly from investments and commercial activities in Iran. They have the same problems of operating in the Iranian entrepreneurial milieu as have their Iranian counterparts. But like those Iranians, they oppose any policy that could threaten the stability of the regime.

Thus, Americans concerned with defense, energy, and commerce constitute a powerful bureaucratic and financial interest group dedicated to the maintenance of excellent relations with the royal regime. They are predisposed to accept and to promulgate the highly favorable image of that regime that is so commonly portrayed in the world press. This is a picture of a heroic Shah who has overcome religious and landowning reactionaries, irresponsible demagogues, and communist agitators to lead Iran down a progressive path. He has given Iran land reform, women's rights, and welfare reform. He has infused life into the economy and has achieved a GNP and per capita income growth rate that rivals that of Japan. And he stands as a firm and unwavering foe of Soviet military expansion. Those holding this view either prefer not to see human rights violations, lack of political freedom, gross corruption, and income maldistribution, or are willing to accept the conclusion that those inequities are a price that has to be paid at this stage for rapid progress and that they will soon be rectified.

Those opposed to a policy of unconditional support for the regime are, more frequently than not, inclined to see a Soviet Union more *status quo* than imperialist in its foreign policy objectives. But among those who see a Soviet threat of serious proportion, there are at least a few individuals who believe a move toward greater political freedom would enhance rather than threaten Iranian security because such a

policy could result in broadened support for the regime. Nor, given the aggressive role the Shah has played in oil price policy, are those opposed to unconditional support convinced that cordial and friendly relations are particularly effective restraints on the Shah's oil-pricing policy. On the contrary, only when he felt the pressure from human rights advocates in the United States, did the Shah agree to oppose an oil price increase.

For those who accept this analysis, the favorable image of the royal regime has little currency. Instead the lack of political freedom, the large number of political prisoners, the suffering of much of the urban as well as rural population, and the wasteful and extravagant expenditures on military and luxury items are all clearly visible.

Should President Carter associate his administration with those with a primary security or economic interest in Iran, and evidence outlined above suggests he is doing that, the position of those concerned with human rights in Iran would be weak. Probably the most they could hope to achieve would be to maintain public awareness of human rights violations in Iran. This would result in the application of some minor pressure on Iran, but not so much as to affect adversely a close allied relationship. Hopefully, this could lead to a slow growth in the recognition of human and political rights inside Iran.

If, on the other hand, the administration or Congress should prove to be skeptical of the importance of Iran to American security or economy, the position of human rights advocates could be fairly strong. This is especially true because of the personal importance of human rights to the President of the United States. The regime's bargaining position even in this eventuality is strong because of its oil leverage. Ironically, the regime's vulnerability on national and religious grounds enhances rather than reduces its leverage. Even should Carter incline toward a policy of relaxing the alliance with Iran, he is most unlikely to wish to see the regime weakened to the point that its survival will be in question. The best strategy in this case would be to apply sufficient pressure to push the regime toward a liberalization policy, difficult though that would be, but not enough pressure to encourage opposition elements to make a direct challenge. A desirable development would be for the progressives in the Resurgence Party to begin to compete actively with dissidents in demanding programmatic change.

In any event, the details of a coherent and effective human rights strategy for Iranian-American relations must emerge from within the bureaucracy, not from human rights advocates. Regardless of the strategy chosen, the primary role of human rights advocates will be the same: to identify and publicize human rights abuse in Iran, and to make sure that those in Congress and within the political parties

who are in a position to apply pressure on the administration are aware of that abuse.

NOTES

1. Sources for this essay may be found by consulting Richard Cottam, *Nationalism in Iran* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964), and his forthcoming book, *The United States and Iran*.

2. *Amnesty International Briefing Papers*, no. 7, "Iran" (London: Amnesty International Publications, November 1976), p. 6.

PART II

Fundamental Issues

Freedom and Democracy: Definitions and Distinctions

As a popular and universally approved term, "freedom" is applied to a wide range of desired conditions or aspirations. For this reason the first step toward a comprehensible Survey of Freedom must be to reduce this range by suggesting a limited definition that encompasses the concerns of those who have historically developed the concept of freedom. The Survey's judgments of the presence or absence of freedom should be judged only in terms of this definition.

A discussion of freedom should begin by acknowledging the limits on freedom that are inescapably a part of human experience. We all know that our lives are determined to a large extent by forces within and around us that we cannot control. Some philosophers and scientists assert that our actions are all determined, so that the consciousness of free will that we sometimes have is only a trick played upon us by nature. This is not the place to resolve this issue; it is sufficient to point out that many philosophers make a credible case that free will is more than illusion,¹ and that few of the discussants of the nature and relative desirability of political rights and civil liberties deny this case. The Comparative Survey is based on the belief that the argument for the existence of freedom of choice is at least plausible.

The Survey of Freedom is primarily concerned, however, with the much narrower concept of *social freedom*, defined by Felix Oppenheim as a relationship between persons in which individuals do not constrain one another.² This means that my social freedom is not diminished by my personal inadequacies or the technical or existential inadequacies of the world in which I live; it is diminished by individuals or groups that block me from attaining my goals as I see them. The ancient Egyptians were not unfree because they could not take a plane to London. Similarly, a starving Ethiopian is not unfree unless some person or group has purposefully forbidden the Ethiopian access to food.

The Comparative Survey is concerned, then, with "negative freedoms," or "freedoms from." Within limits everyone both desires and has a right to be free from impositions or restrictions that represent

primarily the desires of others. A state that respects freedom is *permissive*, it allows people to act as they will, but the fact it allows freedoms does not mean that it is *enabling*. A free state does not necessarily make its people capable of doing as they want. If I am free to read or write, or to find a way to feed myself, I am "free" in the sense of the Survey. I am not unfree because I cannot buy as expensive a house as I would like. If I am given an education or a guaranteed annual income this does not increase my freedom; I may now be able to do what I could not before, but I am not "freer" in the sense considered here. There are many desirable goods that governments, parents, or environments may offer human beings, but the list is so long, and conflicts are so common between the "positive freedoms" that would enable everyone to have these goods and the more basic negative freedoms, that it is preferable to restrict ourselves to Oppenheim's social freedom as a relation among persons.

Because of the unfortunate inclusion of "freedom from want" in the "four freedoms" and the universal desire to make a good word like freedom serve all human needs,³ it is important to sharpen the discussion by emphasizing the distinction between guaranteeing political and civil rights to all, and providing positive goods such as food and employment to all. From the point of view of freedom there is no "right to food" unless it can be shown that someone is blocking this right. For a right to food to exist, food would have to be universally free to all—and there is no country in which this is true (even though on egalitarian grounds provision of a free minimum diet is probably desirable, especially in wealthy countries). Rights that derive from social freedom do not presume that individuals should take responsibility for one another's general welfare. A paternalistic government may or may not be desirable, but insofar as it accepts the positive right of all to food, it must take away social freedoms by increasing constraints, including restraints upon the recipients of the aid (See the discussion below of "The Relation of Alternative Political-Economic Systems to Freedom.") Analogously, insofar as a government implements a "right to full employment" it will necessarily force employers to take on added staff (directly, or indirectly through public service employment), and it will eventually deny the right of the unemployed to refuse unwanted employment. (This is not to say that poverty may not be relieved by truly free institutions. It will be pointed out later in this essay, and in Robert Dahl's discussion of "Democracy as Polyarchy" in the next section, that a free society must allow a just say in its affairs to all. A society that allows a just say will seldom allow avoidable starvation. In this sense freedom is the shield of the poor.)

The Survey directs public attention to the state of those negative

freedoms that have political relevance. It is primarily concerned with the extent to which freedoms are restricted by governments. This does not mean that we ignore restrictions by parents, employers (or even less, slave owners), and gangsters, but these are usually of subsidiary interest in the Survey. Our interest in government is primary because 1) governments have posed the greatest danger to freedom in recent times, 2) governments can change the behavior of oppressive subgroups in society more than the reverse, and 3) majorities have rights in free societies to restrict nonpolitical freedoms, but they cannot greatly restrict politically relevant freedoms without destroying the free institutions their own power depends on.

The right of the majority to ultimately determine the nature of a nation's political system may appear to be a positive right, and thus an exception to our emphasis on negative rights. However, if we exclude such unfortunate deviations as compulsory voting,⁴ political freedom in a democracy can be thought of as the lack of a barrier to the expression by the majority of its political will. Democracy not only permits people to strive to control their leaders, but it also provides a system that enables them to do so. One reason that freedom includes these political rights, in addition to a vast array of negative civil liberties, is that there is both empirical and theoretical evidence that without the check of the vote (popular and parliamentary) civil liberties will be steadily eroded. Those most likely to deny civil liberties are those in power, and those most likely to point out transgressions of civil liberties are those able to use such accusations as a means to gain power directly, or ensure their access to it.

Freedom as we understand it has been expressed since the beginning of human society through the assertion of collective rather than one-man rule in small face-to-face groups. In antiquity this primitive democracy was given legal form in the Greek *polis* in which governance was often through direct democracy, with lotteries or other devices to make possible organized rule as societies gained in size. With larger and more dispersed societies direct democracy became impossible—although examples of such democracy have persisted in smaller communities in Switzerland, New England, and elsewhere, as well as in occasional use of the initiative and referendum.

Representative democracy based on periodic voting for leaders or legislators was not highly developed in antiquity. In medieval Europe parliaments and councils rose and fell in influence with the development of the centralized state.⁵ It was not until the eighteenth century that the idea of the state being ruled by a fully elected parliament of representatives was generally accepted. Appropriate to our definition, representative legislatures were originally seen not so much as law-

making institutions as they were law-interpreting, defenders of the age-old rights of those represented.

Civil freedoms in the liberal tradition have a much more indefinite antiquity. Liberalism could not have developed without the concept of law as a set of fixed prescriptions and proscriptions limiting *both* government and subject. Seen as contracts between ruler and subject (or God and subject), civil liberties might be least secure when the people ruled directly. The majority in the Athenian democracy, for example, could decide more freely to deny an individual his rights than would a monarch less sure of the support of the multitude. Equally important in the genesis of liberalism was the concept of the worth of the human individual. This idea is no doubt universal, yet its codification in Judeo-Christian tradition was an essential step toward its full emergence in the modern liberal consciousness.⁶ Liberalism also derives from the evolution alongside representative democracy of the concept of the equality of all persons before the law. This is not the extended concept that asserts that all persons should be equal in all things, but it is the concept of equality as it was understood by Thomas Jefferson. According to his antique liberalism all should be treated equally, but not made to be equal.

Liberalism, as the tradition most supportive of civil liberties, is used here as a political term; it should not be confused with economic or moral liberalism. Property rights are not the same kind of rights as those of speech, assembly, or religion, for property rights can be accumulated, and the resulting inequalities must be defended by the state. As Giovanni Sartori points out, the classic political liberalism of the eighteenth century, the liberalism of Jefferson or Montesquieu, was by no means an apologetic for capitalism.⁷ It was in the middle of the nineteenth century that the popularity of both economic and political liberalism led to their unfortunate identification in the minds of many. Today the fact that the economic and political meanings of liberalism have again diverged confuses the public debate. It may be that capitalism provides an economic basis for the defense of civil liberties that is absent in either precapitalist or socialist societies. But this is a difficult and largely empirical question; we have not prejudged it by our discussion of the close relationship of freedom with political liberalism.

In the following pages I will first examine the assumptions of liberal democracy that underlie our definition of freedom. Then I will discuss the ideas of democracy as a cooperative organization, of private rights in a liberal democracy, and of the distinction of liberal democracies from artificially mobilized polities.

LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AS THE GUARANTOR OF FREEDOM

Freedom, as we conceive it, is achievable primarily within a liberal democracy. According to a recent definition:

There is democracy where rulers are politically responsible to their subjects. And there is political responsibility where two conditions hold: where citizens are free to criticize their rulers and to come together to make demands on them and to win support for the policies they favour and the beliefs they hold; and where the supreme makers of law and policy are elected to their offices at free and periodic elections.⁸

It is important to realize that this definition is a limited one, and makes no exaggerated claims. It recognizes the fact that since in the modern world most democracies must necessarily be representative, they will separate the vast mass of the citizenry from active decision making. There is no claim in the definition that democracies necessarily develop policies that are better for their subjects, or that democratic governments are necessarily more loved by their citizens. Perhaps democracies instill a critical attitude that may make love of any particular government or its leaders less likely. The definition does not imply that the parties or bureaus spawned by a democracy are necessarily liberal democracies internally. To the extent that in regard to such suborganizations there is the right of either leaving or criticizing, of "exit" or "voice,"⁹ the system is democratic. The definition does not imply that power elites will not arise, or that some persons will not, for a variety of reasons be politically more powerful than others. There will always be leaders and followers. But the definition does establish the limits on the inequalities that are acceptable within the definition of a free democracy.

A critical limit on the reality of liberal democracy that this definition does not deal with is what Schumpeter calls the "manipulated will."¹⁰ We are all products of our education, and each government and each ruling party or power elite contributes more than its fair share to our education—for example, through the mass media. Democracy in the West, especially in the United States, has often been criticized from this perspective. It is certainly true that on subjects that do not concern the average person, most people do not form autonomous opinions. However, it is a serious exaggeration to argue that capitalist democracies are no different from communist dictatorships because people in both kinds of society tend to passively reflect the opinions of the power elite.¹¹ As long as there are many avenues of influence, as in the truly plural state, with a vast array of information sources, alternative churches, school systems, and so on, then this problem resolves

itself into the more general question of freedom of the will with which this essay began. This is not to discount the danger that a highly modern, progressive democracy organized in accordance with rational or scientific principles will so align information sources that political determinism from the top will become uncontrollable even within what appears to be a responsible democracy. But this is a danger more likely to come from the active concept that the media should offer the public what it needs than from the passive concept that the media should offer the public what the public wants.¹² Through dedication to a people's communication "needs" those who would strengthen the democracy of the media may become a threat to a people's freedom.

We do not measure "freedom" by the subjective feelings citizens have of the lack of constraint in their lives.¹³ Similarly, liberal democracy is not to be confused with the attitudinal sense of "democratic," as when we speak of a "democratic ethos." Our definition refers to political responsibility rather than responsiveness. It may be, as Professor Sartori asserts,¹⁴ that responsible government inevitably leads to responsive government. Certainly it is true that democratic governments respond more directly to popular pressures than nondemocratic governments. But the essence of freedom is the right to choose, and this includes the right of private citizens to periodically delegate public decisions to others. Popular sovereignty remains as long as the public's delegates allow free discussion, obey the law, and accept dismissal when they can no longer meet the test of the vote.

There is no hidden assumption in this definition that liberal democracy is more efficient, stable, or productive of happiness than other forms of government. It may or may not be. But there is the assumption that the type of freedom it supports is a value-in-itself that is worth sacrifices in other realms. We believe liberal democracy allows human beings to live more dignified and responsible lives than are possible under any other system. This is a guiding value judgment of the Comparative Survey.

Perhaps the most common criticism of the liberal democratic criteria of freedom used in the Comparative Survey of Freedom is that the criteria are ethnocentric, that they ignore different and equally valid approaches to human rights. This is the claim of communists who assert that human rights are not possible in a class society, and that a classless society where the workers rule is by definition the best guarantor of freedom. This is also the assertion of those impressed by theories of cultural relativism or the claims of Third World leaders that they have established authentic political institutions in terms of their own cultural traditions.

Government spokesmen in Zaire, for example, speak of "Bantu

Humanism" in which oppositions are inconceivable. Just as body and soul are one unity, political, economic, and social life are unified. They claim that "Even the word 'enemy' belongs to a political vocabulary that is foreign to us, for Bantu society lives in solidarity." Such ideologists reject the multiparty state and parliamentary democracy with its institutionalized opposition; in Bantu Humanism there is no room for the separation of powers.¹⁵

Swayed by a need to give equal value to what he regards as "Eastern" and "Western" thought, one authority claims that democracy may be defined as a system in which either the common people rule through competitive elections or a group rules in their name without competitive elections.¹⁶ He argues that in the new states rulers have opted for the latter approach through attempting to represent the general will. They have consciously decided that because of nationalistic needs for unity and rapid social and economic progress, this is the kind of democracy that is most appropriate. He argues that in most underdeveloped countries new leaders have chosen socialist economic forms because they allow a more "democratic" (that is, egalitarian) distribution of economic power. The author fails to note that such idealism may easily serve as a rationalization for tyranny: in very few socialist states is the individual's control over his labor greater or the size of his share of the final product greater than in nonsocialist systems.¹⁷ There is no magic in the word "democracy" such that invoking it makes conditions more democratic in the Survey's sense of freedom from coercion by others.

Those who propose a broader view of freedom or democracy than our own fail to come to grips with the essential issues. These are: 1) Is there an alternative to liberal democracy in which the general public is given a reasonably fair opportunity to choose among a range of alternative persons *and* policies (generally as represented by persons)? and 2) In this alternative do those who fundamentally disagree with governmental policies have a right to rationally express their disagreement in public? If these rights are not present in a society then no amount of discussion of cultural relativism will wish them into being, or make it right to call that society free. It may be that some societies have developed generations that do not want freedom even when exposed to it. But the burden of proof must always be on those who claim that the people in a particular country do not want freedom.

The essential freedoms spelled out above are not, of course, denied by "societies"; they are denied by persons and groups of persons that claim to speak for societies, or to "sponsor" the interests of a people. Such persons claim that in their society a few should decide what is

best for the masses. The important issue is not whether these elite sponsors have the interests of the masses at heart, not whether in the long run their elite policies are "the best," but rather, whether adult human beings, no matter how misguided, should have to submit to such claims. Incidentally, in an age in which "authenticity" is held to be an important value, we should remember that the desires of majorities are no doubt more culturally relative, and thus more "authentic," than the more cosmopolitan and universalist attitudes of their self-proclaimed sponsors.¹⁸

DEMOCRACY AS A COOPERATIVE ORGANIZATION

Alfred Kuhn helps us understand the concept of freedom through democracy by contrasting government as a cooperative organization to government as a profit organization.¹⁹ In the cooperative (or democratic) organization all citizens are both sponsors and recipients of the actions of government staff. They pay the costs and receive the benefits of the organization. The staff works for the majority of the sponsors, and attempts of the staff to coerce sponsor decisions or defy sponsor control will ultimately result in staff dismissal. Sponsor members (the public) act generally in their private interest which they achieve through the formation of shifting dominant coalitions. Such coalitions are often organized through political parties. Political rights may be defined as the freedom of citizens to fully exercise their sponsor function. Civil liberties consist of limitations on the power of staff to interfere with sponsors either in their sponsor or recipient roles.

In contrast to government as a cooperative organization or democracy, Kuhn describes government as a profit-making organization. In this model the sponsors of the system are a small minority of the public, but the whole public is the recipient of the output of the system. Through both positive and negative inducements the sponsors try to get as much out of the system as they can. Here the staff works for the nonmajority sponsors. All governments use force to ensure order through enforcing the law, but the profit-making government also uses force to keep its particular leadership in power. Political rights are essentially nonexistent for those not in the sponsoring group, while civil liberties are granted only to the extent that they do not interfere with sponsor objectives. Kuhn sees this model as fitting both exploitative dictatorships or oligarchies, such as that in Haiti, and the ideological dictatorships of communist or one-party socialist states. In either case society is dominated by a small group with special interests that can be fulfilled only through nonmajority rule over the population. The most important benefits for the sponsors in the

ideological state are achieved through forcing the population to build the society the sponsors desire. Exploitative and ideological profit-making systems become indistinguishable to the extent that ideological leaders shift from pursuing their ideals to manipulating the system for purely personal objectives.

Both cooperative and profit-making models are pure forms; real systems will lie in between. But these models help to make clearer the essential distinction between democracy and its alternatives, a distinction too often obscured by the rhetoric of the spokesmen and apologists for nondemocratic systems. Kuhn's contrast is instructive in that it casts doubt on the assumption that Western democracy is attitudinally close to capitalistic organization while communism or one-party socialism is attitudinally closer to cooperative forms. If we look at the relationships involved instead of the rhetoric, we discover that liberal democracy is in essentials the more communitarian system.

The beauty of approaches such as Kuhn's is that they assume no more than that individuals will pursue their own interests, whether as leaders or followers. Kuhn assumes that leaders must be institutionally forced by threats of dismissal to respond to the interests of the people they govern. Otherwise they will soon respond primarily to their own interests. This has been a basic assumption of most social thinkers, including, of course, Marx himself. If we define interests in the broadest sense, elected representatives will generally reflect popular interests more surely than any elite or vanguard could reflect these interests. That voters will generally pursue their interests through the electoral processes of democracy, and that political parties will respond by trying to match these interests with programs has been shown by both theoretical and empirical evidence.²⁰ There is a crushing burden of proof on those who assert that a small vanguard party will rule indefinitely in the interests of the majority they exclude from rule.

PRIVATE RIGHTS IN A LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

To this point we have defined freedom only in political terms. However, liberal democracies that guarantee political freedom generally respect a number of private rights, rights that we have taken cognizance of in the Survey as auxiliary civil liberties. These include the rights to privacy, and to choose one's occupation, career, or marriage partner. These rights interact with public rights—such as those to vote or publish—and they are in themselves essential aspects of freedom as we understand it. The primary difference between authoritarian and totalitarian states is the greater interference in the private

sphere by totalitarian states; this is the reason such states are generally ranked lower in our Survey than authoritarian states: Authoritarian leaders have no cause to interfere in private affairs unless interference is necessary to maintain the power and privileges of the ruling group.

In considering private rights it is important to realize that liberal democracies are not necessarily libertarian democracies. It is obvious that a free society in which no one blocks the purposes of anyone else is an unattainable ideal. Attaining the purposes of some people is bound to interfere with attaining those of others. If I am free to drop a candy wrapper on the street, then you are less free to keep the street spotless. In a democracy this clash of freedoms is adjudicated most simply by favoring the desires of the majority. (However, if I drop candy wrappers in my own house, the advocates of spotlessness are not blocked; the penetration of majority rule into the private sphere is generally not justified.) To be true to their goal of responsibly serving the people a democracy must strike a balance between the interests of the majority and of the minority in those areas that are not directly related to maintaining free and open dissent on political questions. Laws and leaders must be freely discussed in all democracies, but beyond this, majority constraints on other forms of public action or expression are acceptable within our definition of liberal democracy, as long as these limits are actually confined to public and not private actions. Nonpolitical public expression through modes of dress, speech usages, the press, or theatre is open to the same kind of majority control as driving on the beaches, littering, or speeding.²¹ There are, of course, many pragmatic and normative arguments for libertarianism; they may be correct, but we are not advancing them here as defining the free society.

LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES RATHER THAN ARTIFICIALLY MOBILIZED POLITIES

Freedom is not the inevitable product of linear social and cultural evolution, nor does it necessarily accompany the attainment of other goals of our age such as modernization, economic development, peace, health, or the elimination of illiteracy. At every stage of societal evolution, from primitive band to bureaucratic state, some peoples have been free and some unfree, although the forms that guarantee freedom as we know it today were not developed or necessary until relatively large and complex political units came into being.

A critical question in the discussion of freedom is the degree to which it is independent of, or a product of, other changes in society. If it is primarily a dependent social variable, then perhaps we should

be reporting on more basic variables—such as, education, GNP per capita, or income distribution. However, we believe that freedom is significantly independent, and that the correlations that seem to show its dependence result from the recent history of diffusion in which packages of traits including liberal democracy were borrowed or imposed in conjunction. In particular, the societies of Northwestern Europe developed an economic and political dynamism that caused most of the world to fall under their sway, and most people began to follow European examples. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the English were particularly successful in expanding their influence. Therefore, it is not surprising that wherever the economic and technological forms of Europe and America have been most completely accepted, there we are most likely to find the political forms with which these were historically associated. This explains in large part the anomaly that India and Sri Lanka are relatively poor and illiterate and yet surprisingly wedded to freedom. This is a relationship reflected to some extent in most of the successor states of the British Empire. Perhaps in black Africa the British tenure was too short for British institutions to become as firmly embedded as elsewhere. At the other extreme of political and economic development, relatively wealthy West Germany and Japan are not democratic because they are literate and wealthy but because post-war democratic institutions were imposed on them after a disastrous war, and these could be integrated with earlier experience with democratic institutions. For both poor and wealthy nations the particulars of democratic transmission appear to have played a more decisive role in the growth of democracy than economic or social development.

Unfortunately the popularity of correlational and evolutionary methods in the social sciences have implicitly supported the tendency to view studies of political and civil freedoms as less scientific or reliable than studies of political modernization, mobilization, or participation that seem more culture-free. One of the most sophisticated and yet disturbing recent attempts of this sort is Huntington and Nelson's *No Easy Choice*. To avoid the appearance of cultural or political bias the authors deemphasize the terminology of freedom and democracy. Yet by remaining interested in the values behind freedom and democracy they frequently confuse their analysis. For example, Huntington and Nelson begin by defining *political participation* as "activity by private citizens designed to influence governmental decision-making."²² But then the authors go on to include in this definition "mobilized participation," so that when the Bulgarian people cast their ballots in a totally controlled election this is also labeled political participation.²³ Throughout the book such participation is regarded

as a desirable goal of the modernizing political system. And, strangely, Americans are said to desire the change of societies to participant models, including apparently models illustrating the manipulated participation of the Bulgarians.²⁴

The authors persistently equate communist and liberal democratic societies by emphasizing their equal dedication to "participation." In both the United States and the Soviet Union, they assert, "High levels of political participation, in forms that reflect the norms of the society, are viewed as a collective good just as high crime rates are viewed as a collective evil."²⁵ This may be true, but at least for a democracy it certainly should not be true. For, as they point out, there are many reasons why participation may be low. First, the more homogeneous a community, the higher the expected level of political participation. Secondly, poorer groups in a democratic society generally use participation to achieve specific goals and then relax back into nonparticipation.²⁶ Third, low participation rates could indicate that few persons or groups are interested in "mobilizing" the people, which for individual freedom is certainly just as well.

As we read on, however, we note that Huntington and Nelson employ the word participation in this broad sense *only* when they are dealing with those communist or one-party socialist regimes that they wish to praise for their degree of participation no matter how coerced. On one page the authors condemn elites for "restricting competition," and thereby reducing participation, as a way of staying in power. After giving examples of such restriction from Brazil, Kenya, Mexico, Peru, and the U.S. (at least formerly), they conclude: "In autocratic and technocratic societies, effective political participation is generally limited to elite factions operating within the inner precincts of the political system, and to counter-elite factions operating outside the system and attempting to destroy it."²⁷ This statement is, of course, also true of nearly all communist and one-party socialist states, but the authors do not want to say this. Instead they say that revolutionary change requires a participation explosion, saying:

At the local level in Vietnam, for instance, the takeover of a village by the Viet Cong normally expanded the circle of people playing critical roles in village decision-making by five to ten times. Unlike traditional village leaders, or those oriented toward the Saigon government, the Viet Cong leaders attempted to strengthen their control over the village and to achieve their socio-economic goals by expanding participation in the village government, which they dominated.²⁸

The critical point is, of course, was it the appearance of the participation or the actuality that they changed? Since the village was more

autonomous from national decision-making levels *before* communism than after, there appears to have been more "effective" political participation (the term Huntington and Nelson use only when discussing differences among right-wing governments) before communist control. Indeed, the Diem regime also tried to increase the show of popular participation in the villages, but insofar as it succeeded, it reduced effective participation.²⁹

The authors need to blur the difference between effective and facade participation in order to make more acceptable their evolutionary hypothesis that "the higher the level of socio-economic development in a society, the higher the level of political participation."³⁰ A very broad definition of participation helps the hypothesis, but it is, in any event, only weakly supported by evidence from either the capitalist or communist worlds. The USSR, for example, is hardly the most participant communist society, but it is surely one of the most developed.

Huntington and Nelson and many other political scientists find it surprisingly difficult to abandon the right-left dichotomy. They cannot quite bring themselves to admit that communist, one-party socialist, and authoritarian modernizing states are indistinguishable in their opposition to effective participation. The elites of both systems believe that they alone should rule, for they alone can effectively rule. This is shown most dramatically by a poll in India that indicated that it was the more highly educated that were in favor of communism, authoritarian government, or army rule, while the less educated preferred a democratic regime.³¹ The essential political struggle in the world is between those who would grant all adults a right to their say and those who would restrict rule to a few; it is along this dimension rather than that of participation that the Survey attempts to rank societies.

There is, however, another distinction that crosscuts that of political rights, and this is that between governments dedicated to equality of living standards as an absolute goal and those that place little absolute value on this goal. I believe that this is a question essentially decoupled from that of political or civil rights. There is, for example, ample evidence that many poor people freely choose to place other values ahead of equal living standards: the conservative vote is generally stronger in rural than urban areas, regardless of their relative poverty or patterns of land ownership.

However, it is also true, as Schumpeter pointed out, that as political rights are extended, larger and larger groups come to demand their economic rights. The more the government grants, the more people become accustomed to the government meeting their wants, and thus

there is an inevitable tendency for democratic governments to move in a socialistic direction. This is a problem that the adherents of capitalism must grapple with; it is also one that, as we argue elsewhere, may be fatal to freedom. But in and of itself a very wide range of governmental positions on the question of equality are compatible with democracy. Only at the extremes of inequality or forced equality is democracy seriously damaged. For example, in a population in which most people are ground down by illiteracy and poverty, or more particularly where they are directly dependent on members of a wealthy elite, democracy functions poorly. At the other extreme, attempts to give everyone the same wage, education, or stature, would necessarily interfere with the freedom of individuals to live where they will, marry whom they would, and work as hard as they want.

CONCLUSION

Freedom refers to a social relationship in which individuals do not have the right to block the achievements of one another's desires. Politically, the best means of achieving the maximum development of freedom for all in a modern society is through the institutionalization of a liberal democracy. A liberal democracy allows the largest possible percentage of people to concert their interests in such a way as to obtain their desires—that is, to eliminate the interference of others. A liberal democracy will not be a libertarian state unless the majority endorses libertarianism. To imagine freedom requires libertarianism or any other "ism" would be to deny the rights of the majority. At the same time a modern constitutional or liberal democracy grants to minorities a broad scope for freedom, since it prescribes that only in certain defined topical areas can the majority legislate for—that is, restrict the freedom of—minorities. In particular, minorities in a liberal democracy have a right to privacy, have a right to their own beliefs, and a right to participate in political and rational debate in defense of those beliefs.

A liberal democracy must be a freely competitive system both in elections and communications; otherwise potential majorities for new alternatives do not have a chance to develop or coalesce. There is little evidence that lack of dissent is part of the natural order of things in any society, and a great deal of evidence that dissent is generally endemic and healthy when given a chance. In any event, without it a society is unlikely to have freedom. For this reason the alternative expressions "political participation" or "political mobilization" do not help when we are looking for systems that will enhance the scope of freedom in the world.

Dictatorships of the right or left can be conceptualized as profit-making organizations dedicated to enhancing the interests of their rulers rather than the expressed interests of the people, as in cooperative organizations or liberal democracies. No matter how well-intentioned, no matter how well they mobilize their population, those elites (or vanguards) that do not accept the right of their own people to turn them out of office, or to reverse elite policies when the people become dissatisfied with them, are denying their peoples the freedoms they deserve.

NOTES

1. I have gone into this issue at greater length in R. D. Gastil, *Social Humanities* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1977), pp. 45-51.

2. Felix Oppenheim, *Dimensions of Freedom* (New York: St. Martins, 1961).

3. For example, "Report of the Conference on Implementing a Human Rights Commitment in United States Foreign Policy," International League for Human Rights, March 4, 1977, pp. 56 ff.

4. Oppenheim, *Dimensions of Freedom*, p. 111.

5. Compare Charles Tilly, ed., *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 35-38.

6. On Greek lack of a sense of individual rights, see Giovanni Sartori, *Democratic Theory* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1962), p. 258, *passim*.

7. See Sartori, *Democratic Theory*, p. 362, *passim*. For a more general discussion uniting all forms of liberalism, see J. Salwyn Schapiro, *Liberalism: Its Meaning and History* (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1958). On the distinction of property rights from other civil rights, see also Ralph Ross and Ernest Van den Haag, *The Fabric of Society* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1957), pp. 285-86.

8. John Plamenatz, *Democracy and Illusion* (London: Longmans Group, 1973), pp. 184-85. The rest of the paragraph is largely based on Plamenatz' critique.

9. See A. O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).

10. For discussion, see *ibid.*, pp. 122-29.

11. The opinion expressed, for example, by the Finnish authors in Kaarle Nordenstreng, ed., *Informational Mass Communication* (Helsinki: Tammi, 1973).

12. The position taken in *ibid.*

13. Oppenheim, *Dimensions of Freedom*, p. 146.

14. Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems, I* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 22.

15. Oscar Splett, "'Kulturrevolutionen' in schwarzen Erdteil," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 19/20 April 1975.

16. C. B. Macpherson, *The Real World of Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966).

17. See the discussion of equality in the subsequent essay in Part II, "The Relation of Alternative Political-Economic Systems to Freedom."

18. Clifford Geertz, "Myrdal's Mythology: 'Modernism' and the Third World," *Encounter*, XXXIII, no. 1 (1969): 26-34. Geertz severely attacks the assumption that the highly educated modernizers have the right to foist their views on underdeveloped peoples.

19. Alfred Kuhn, *The Logic of Social Systems* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1975), pp. 330-61.

20. See Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), and V. O. Key, *The Responsible Electorate* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966). Unfortunately this argument is often so phrased as to imply that rational interests are equivalent to personal satisfactions in utilitarian terms. See Plamenatz, *Democracy and Illusion*, pp. 148-79. Interests, of course, may be personal or social, self-regarding or altruistic.

21. For further discussion of these issues, see R. D. Gastil, "Societal Limits on Majority Rights," *Journal of Social Philosophy*, 7, no. 1 (1976): 8-12; and R. D. Gastil, "The Moral Right of the Majority to Restrict Pornography and Obscenity Through Law," *Ethics*, 86, no. 3 (1976): 231-40.

22. Samuel P. Huntington and Joan M. Nelson, *No Easy Choice* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 4.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 29.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 160.

26. For these generalizations compare, for example, Stein Rokkan, *Citizens, Elections, Parties* (New York: David McKay, 1970).

27. Huntington and Nelson, *No Easy Choice*, p. 30.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 35.

29. *Ibid.* Compare the remark (p. 50) that in a traditional society ninety percent of the decisions affecting the villager are made at the village level, and this percentage must inevitably decline with modernization. I would add that inevitably the villager has more influence on decisions made at the village level than nationally.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 43.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 83.

Complementary Views of Democracy:

A Realistic Appraisal of What Is Meant by Democratic Rule

Giovanni Sartori

Let us immediately settle a preliminary point by stating that democracy is not anarchy. If we start from the premise that being free and equal means that we should not be led or governed, it follows that as long as we are governed there is neither liberty nor equality. But that is not the question. "That question—as has been observed—was answered for us ages ago when civilization began. It was soon learned that a leaderless society is not a society at all, for whenever two or more men form a society and live together there is no such thing as uncontrolled, unrestricted, uninfluenced behavior."

The approach to leadership lies, in a democracy, somewhere between the extremes of the anarchic refusal to pose the problem and the autocratic non-solution of it. Anarchy simply revolts against power. Autocracy resigns itself to power: it submits to it as inevitable and as being justified, in the last analysis, by *Faustrecht*—the might-is-right principle. Democracy is instead the political form that both faces the problem of vertical structures and feels capable of solving it.

ELECTIONS, PHANTOM PUBLIC AND PUBLIC OPINION

We all agree that in order to have democracy we must have, to some degree, a government of the people; but we also know that if there is a government, it has to be a government over the people. The problem is how these two requirements can be reconciled. The question, then, is: "When do we find a 'governing people,' the *demos* in the act or the role of governing? The answer is well known: at elections. The assertion that in a democracy power is exercised by the sovereign people rests on our gauging the system in electoral terms. And not

Excerpted from G. Sartori, *Democratic Theory*, 2nd revised edition (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1979), manuscript pages 110-11, 82-91, 95-98. (See forthcoming book for footnotes.)

only are we perfectly justified in doing so, but it would be very wrong to overlook the importance of elections. Elections verify consensus and do away with imputed, "presumed consensus." However, we still must consider that elections are a discontinuous and elementary performance. Between elections the people's power remains quiescent; and there is also a wide margin of discretion between broad electoral choices and concrete governmental decisions. Furthermore, elections register the voter's decisions: but how are these decisions arrived at? Elections compute opinions; but where do these opinions come from and how are they formed? What, in a word, is the genesis of the will and opinion that elections limit themselves to recording? Voting has a pre-voting background. While, then, we must not downgrade the importance of elections, we cannot isolate the electoral event from the whole circuit of the opinion-making process. If the actual sovereign is not the citizen but the voter, in his turn the voter is none other than the citizen in the critical *instant* in which he is asked to act as sovereign.

The actual relevance of the obligatory transit of the political process through the sieve of popular sovereignty remains to be determined case by case, and depends on a series of conditions, the most important of these being the circumstances in which so-called public opinion is formed. Electoral power per se is the mechanical guarantee of the system; but the substantive guarantee is given by the conditions under which the citizen gets the information and is exposed to the pressure of the opinion-makers. Elections are the means to an end—the end being a "government of opinion" of the kind masterfully described by Dicey, that is, a government responsive to and responsible toward public opinion.

We say that elections must be free. This is indeed true, but it may not be enough; for opinion too must be, in some basic sense, free. Free elections with unfree opinion—that is, with no public opinion-express nothing. The retort might be that in every society, be it democratic or not, there is always, inevitably, a public opinion. This answer, however, calls our attention to the need of distinguishing between (i) an opinion that is public merely in the sense that it is disseminated among the public, and (ii) an opinion which the public to some degree has formed by itself. In the first sense, we have an opinion *made* public but in no way produced *by* the public: therefore public only in the trivial meaning that it is located *in* the public. In the second sense, we have instead an opinion *of* the public, meaning that the public is the subject. In the first sense, any society can be credited with a public opinion. In the second sense, no public opinion exists unless it is based on, or related to, personal and private opinions;

and thus a totalitarian mass society has no public opinion, but only State-made opinions enforced *upon* the public.

Until a few decades ago there was no reason to draw this distinction. Until the advent of mass media and of totalitarian controls, to say "popular opinion" meant, and could only mean, opinion *of* the people, that which the subjects, not the sovereign, had in mind. But nowadays we find a popular opinion which is in no meaningful sense the people's opinion. Hence the distinction is crucial, and, if so, we [should] refer to public opinion only when it is a relatively free and autonomous opinion, that is, when it expresses a relatively independent will of the people and not when it becomes a mere reflection of the will of the State.

Of course, even a free and autonomous public opinion is, in many senses, neither free nor autonomous. What is actually meant by these requirements is free from State seizure of the opinion-making processes and instrumentalities. That is to say that the conditions for a relatively self-sufficient public opinion are provided by a structure of plural and alternative centers of influence and information, that is, by free competition among mass media and between opinion leaders. This does not imply that the audience usually plays one source of information against another, and that it makes up its mind after having compared and discussed them. The benefits of mass media decentralization and competition are much more elemental and largely mechanical: they follow from the fact that a polycentric system of opinion-making helps to produce heterogeneous, and—above all—uncontrollable distributions of opinions. In essence, a plurality of persuaders reflects itself in a plurality of publics, and a plurality of publics is the minimal but necessary condition for a polity in which we can truthfully speak of the power of public opinion.

To acknowledge that under a monopoly of the "symbolic process" (communication and socialization) there is no true public opinion, does not settle the question of just how true public opinion is in a loose, polycentric system of opinion formation. If the expression "public opinion" is supposed to evoke the common man, it is appropriate to ask: to what extent does the public of the common people actually play a role of its own and exert a real influence in all this? Voting studies have, in effect, brought out a very poor picture of the ordinary voter, so poor that one is forced to wonder whether the public in question is anything more than a merely passive audience. The average citizen is neither interested nor active in the political discourse. His information is indeed thin and his perception of the issues is distorted and aprioristic. His choices generally add up to identifications connected with a prevailing allegiance or affiliation to

the family, the peer group, the class, the church, and so forth. Psephology, the study of electoral behavior, has abundantly shown to what extent the citizen's vote depends on his social, economic, and religious environment, and also—as the French electoral sociology points out—on historically-based collective electoral predispositions. We are thus forced to recognize that the expression "public opinion" stands for an *optimum*. In many respects and instances the public has no opinion, but only a very inarticulate public feeling, made up of moods and drifts of sentiment. Behind the so-called public will what we often find is, as Walter Lippmann said, a "phantom public." But this conclusion needs some qualifications.

When we invest public opinion with making intelligent and/or rational decisions on definite questions, it is true that we are dealing with a phantom public. Schumpeter exaggerated little, I believe, when he wrote that "the typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental performance as soon as he enters the political field. He argues and analyzes in a way which he would readily recognize as infantile within the sphere of his real interests. He becomes a primitive again. His thinking becomes associative and affective. . . ." He exaggerated little because a similar drop in mental performance can be observed whenever we cross the border from our field of specialization. An astronomer who discusses philosophy, a chemist who passes judgment on music, or a poet who talks about mathematics will not utter less nonsense than the average citizen interviewed by a pollster. The difference is that the astronomer, the chemist, and the poet will generally plead ignorance, whereas the citizen is asked to concern himself with politics and in the midst of the general incompetence no longer realizes his own. So the difference is that in other zones of ignorance we are discouraged from trespassing while in the political realm we are encouraged to do so, and thus we end by not knowing that we know nothing.

But there is another way of approaching the question. If, instead of asking public opinion to express ad hoc judgments that are articulate, informed, and rational, we think of public opinion as a pattern of attitudes and a cluster of basic demands, then our phantom takes on consistency and stability. In this connection Berelson has suggested an illuminating analogy. "For many voters political preferences may be considered analogous to cultural tastes. . . . Both have their origin in ethnic, sectional, class, and family traditions. Both exhibit stability and resistance to change for individuals, but flexibility and adjustment over generations for the society as a whole. Both seem to be matters of sentiment and disposition rather than 'reasoned preferences.' While both are responsive to changed conditions and unusual stimuli, they

are relatively invulnerable to direct argumentation. . . Both are characterized more by faith than by conviction and by wishful expectation rather than careful prediction of consequences."

From this angle, then, as long as the public is allowed to have an opinion, public opinion is a protagonist that does carry weight. It would be entirely mistaken to infer from the poor quality of the ordinary citizen that he amounts to an absentee. He may well be politically illiterate, but he is there. Tenacious in its tastes, identifications, and expectations, impervious to direct argument, public opinion potently conditions decision-making. While policy-making does not spring from a "cultural taste" any more than music from the people who attend a concert, or literature from readers, yet public opinion assures the success or failure of a policy.

Let us not go, however, from the extreme of public opinion impotence to the opposite extreme of public opinion omnipotence. If public sentiment, or opinion, accounts for the success or failure of a policy, it does not initiate a policy. The average voter does not act, he reacts. Political decisions are not generated by sovereign people, they are' submitted to them. The processes of opinion formation do not start *from* the people, they pass *through* them. Thus, it is only by looking at elections and forgetting about electioneering that democracy may be viewed as a one-way decision-making flow going from bottom to top. Actually, we are confronted with a continuous circular process whose dynamics are activated from the top rather than from the bottom. Even in the most favorable circumstances it almost never happens that popular sovereignty is the real starting point. Before exerting an influence the people are influenced. Before they want something, they are often made to want it. "What we are confronted with in the analysis of political processes is largely not a genuine but a manufactured will. . . The will of the people is the product and not the motive power of the political process."

Moreover, elections should not be considered only *a parte ante*, but *a parte post* as well. In the latter focus, it is only in a very vague sense that elections can tell how to govern. Primarily, voting establishes who shall govern. And it is not the fault of the instrument, that is, the imperfection of the electoral system employed, if elections hardly reveal the will of the majority in regard to specific policy issues. I mean that before searching for a remedy in more sensitive instruments and channels, we should demonstrate that the machinery is more imperfect than its utilizers—the voters. A demonstration that nobody has yet afforded.

The average voter is confronted with numberless questions about which he knows nothing. In other words, he is incompetent. And the

decisions that each of us make in fields beyond our grasp are, obviously, decisions that have been suggested by someone else, either a competent or a pseudo-competent person. Moreover, since incompetence consists precisely in not being able to tell the difference between competence and incompetence, the crucial advisor becomes—if for no other reason because he largely outnumbers the few that are competent—the pseudo-competent one. How, then, can we reasonably expect electoral instrumentalities to say more than the voter has to say? We are lucky enough if the voter is not tricked into choosing a representative that in no way impersonates his feelings and desires. All in all, there is little point in the complaint that voting does nothing more than indicate, within a general political orientation, the person or the party that we are "coinciding in opinion with."

The initial question may now be reformulated as follows: can our voting power be rendered as, and equated with, a "governing power"? The answer is clearly in the negative. The voting *demos* exercises a power of control and/or of pressure that confronts the governors with a set of vetoes and basic claims. But while the people condition a government, they do not themselves govern.

PARTY COMPETITION

In the sphere of economics, given that perfect competition never exists, no serious economist would infer from this that all cases of imperfect competition are "more or less alike" in that they are all equally imperfect. In the sphere of politics, however, this kind of logic, or of argument, is widespread. So let us pursue the analogy.

The common ground of economic theory and the theory of democracy is competition: a competition among firms for buyers on the goods market, in the first case, and a competition among parties for voters on the electoral market, in the latter case. In economic theory competition ends with monopoly; and more or less competition relates to more or less oligopoly. *Mutatis mutandis*, the single party state corresponds to monopoly, whereas two or more parties correspond to the oligopoly that allows for competition. However, with no small part of the current theory of democracy competition does not end with monopoly. The argument is that if competition does not occur *between* parties, it will still occur *within* the single party (that is, among its rival factions). So, the argument goes on, we have competition among leaders in any case, and this entails that between one party and multipartism the difference is of degree, not in kind. A momentous conclusion indeed, since the structural property that best divides democracy from dictatorship is the party system, and precisely whether we have multiparty competition or single-party monopoly.

. . . Let us confront the argument that when the single party allows for internal competition i) this competition can be assimilated to an "internal democracy," ii) that this intra-party democracy feeds back into the political system as a whole, and thereby, iii) that a "one party democracy" is a conceivable possibility.

We may swiftly dispose of the first step by noting that the assimilation is very dubious: internal rivalries and factional battlings are a far cry from what competition means and requires when it belongs to the instruments of democracy. The crucial step in the argument is, however, the second one. In the single party state, leaders "compete" among themselves only in order to gain control of the party and/or of the state—whichever matters more. And this is very much the end of the story. How and why should the outs, the people as a whole, benefit from this so-called competition? Since I cannot find any plausible reply, I am led to suspect that the whole argument rests, very simply, on the failure to grasp how and why inter-party (not intra-party) competition does produce democratic feedbacks, and indeed a democratic polity.

The difference that makes all the difference is that when parties (in the plural) have to compete with each other for the voter, it is the voter that decides the destiny of the party (and, thus, of its leaders). In a competitive setting parties must not only promise, but also deliver; and this need affects the very outlook, and in this sense the *forma mentis*, of a political class. The democratic leader tends increasingly to assume a marketing orientation. This development is not without drawbacks, because an outer-oriented leader may become incapable of leading; but the more this happens, the more it confirms the extent to which autocratic rulership and democratic leadership fall wide apart. It is one thing to win control of a party (an intra-party election, if you will), and an entirely different thing to win an out-party election. And it is only when the *demos* is offered a choice that the party, indeed each party, owes its chances of governing to how it takes the part of the governed.

Complementary Views of Democracy:

Democracy as Polyarchy

Robert A. Dahl

DEFINITION AND FAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR POLYARCHY

I should like to reserve the term "democracy" for a political system one of the characteristics of which is the quality of being completely or almost completely responsive to all its citizens. Whether such a system actually exists, has existed, or can exist need not concern us for the moment. Surely one can conceive a hypothetical system of this kind; such a conception has served as an ideal, or part of an ideal, for many people. As a hypothetical system, one end of a scale, or a limiting state of affairs, it can (like a perfect vacuum) serve as a basis for estimating the degree to which various systems approach this theoretical limit.

... in order for a government to continue over a period of time to be responsive to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals, all full citizens must have unimpaired opportunities:

1. To formulate their preferences
2. To signify their preferences to their fellow citizens and the government by individual and collective action
3. To have their preferences weighted equally in the conduct of the government, that is, weighted with no discrimination because of the content or source of the preference.

These [are the] three necessary conditions for a democracy, though they are probably not sufficient. Next, I assume that for these three opportunities to exist among a large number of people, the institutions of the society must provide at least eight guarantees. These are indicated in Table 10.

Excerpted from Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 1-8, 202-9, 17-32. (See original text for footnotes.)

Table 10

Some Requirements for a Democracy Among a Large Number of People

For the opportunity to:	The following institutional guarantees are required:
I. Formulate preferences	1. Freedom to form and join organizations 2. Freedom of expression 3. Right to vote 4. Right of political leaders to compete for support 5. Alternative sources of information
II. Signify preferences	1. Freedom to form and join organizations 2. Freedom of expression 3. Right to vote 4. Right of political leaders to compete for support 5. Alternative sources of information 6. Eligibility for public office 7. Free and fair elections
III. Have preferences weighted equally in conduct of government	1. Freedom to form and join organizations 2. Freedom of expression 3. Right to vote 4. Right of political leaders to compete for support 4a. Right of political leaders to compete for votes 5. Alternative sources of information 6. Eligibility for public office 7. Free and fair elections 8. Institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preferences

From examination of the list of eight institutional guarantees, it appears that they might provide us with a theoretical scale along which it would be possible to order different political systems. Upon closer examination, however, . . . the eight guarantees might be fruitfully interpreted as constituting two somewhat different theoretical dimensions of democratization.

1. Both historically and at the present time, regimes vary enormously in the extent to which the eight institutional conditions are openly available, publicly employed, and fully guaranteed to at least some members of the political system who wish to contest the conduct of the government. Thus a scale reflecting these eight conditions would enable us to compare different regimes according to the extent of

permissible opposition, public contestation, or political competition. However, since a regime might permit opposition to a very small or a very large proportion of the population, clearly we need a second dimension.

2. Both historically and contemporaneously, regimes also vary in the proportion of the population entitled to participate on a more or less equal plane in controlling and contesting the conduct of the government: to participate, so to speak, in the system of public contestation. A scale reflecting the breadth of the right to participate in public contestation would enable us to compare different regimes according to their inclusiveness.

The right to vote in free and fair elections partakes of both dimensions. When a regime grants this right to some of its citizens, it moves toward greater public contestation. But the larger the proportion of citizens who enjoy the right, the more inclusive the regime.

Public contestation and inclusiveness vary somewhat independently. Britain had a highly developed system of public contestation by the end of the eighteenth century, but only a miniscule fraction of the population was fully included in it until after the expansion of the suffrage in 1867 and 1884. Switzerland [had] one of the most fully developed systems of public contestation in the world. Probably few people would challenge the view that the Swiss regime is highly "democratic." Yet the feminine half of the Swiss population [was until recently] excluded from national elections. By contrast, the USSR still has almost no system of public contestation, though it does have universal suffrage. In fact one of the most striking changes during this century has been the virtual disappearance of an outright denial of the legitimacy of popular participation in government. Only a handful of countries have failed to grant at least a ritualistic vote to their citizens and to hold at least nominal elections; even the most repressive dictators usually pay some lip service today to the legitimate right of the people to participate in the government, that is, to participate in "governing" though not in public contestation.

Needless to say, in the absence of the right to oppose, the right to "participate" is stripped of a very large part of the significance it has in a country where public contestation exists. A country with universal suffrage and a completely repressive government would provide fewer opportunities for oppositions, surely, than a country with a narrow suffrage but a highly tolerant government. Consequently, when countries are ranked solely according to their inclusiveness, not taking into account the surrounding circumstances, the results are anomalous. Nonetheless, as long as we keep clearly in mind the fact that the extent of the "suffrage" or, more generally, the right to

participate indicates only *one* characteristic of systems, a characteristic that cannot be interpreted except in the context of other characteristics, it is useful to distinguish between regimes according to their inclusiveness.

Suppose, then, that we think of democratization as made up of at least two dimensions: public contestation and the right to participate. . . . Let me call a regime [with neither contestation nor participation] a closed hegemony. If a hegemonic regime moves toward greater public contestation, . . . one could say that . . . this involves the liberalization of a regime; alternatively one might say that the regime becomes more competitive. If a regime changes to provide greater participation, . . . it might be said to change toward greater popularization, or that it is becoming inclusive. A regime might change along one dimension and not the other. [A regime with contestation but low participation might be called a competitive oligarchy. A regime without contestation but general participation might be called an inclusive hegemony.]

Democracy might be conceived of as [the end result of progress along both dimensions.] But since democracy may involve more dimensions than the two, and since (in my view) no large system in the real world is fully democratized, I prefer to call real world systems that are closest to [perfecting both contestation and participation "polyarchies." Any change in a regime toward either contestation or participation may] be said to represent some degree of democratization. Polyarchies may be thought of as relatively (but incompletely) democratized regimes.

. . . The chance that a country will be governed at the national level for any considerable period of time by a regime in which opportunities for public contestation are available to the great bulk of the population (that is, a polyarchy) depends on at least seven sets of complex conditions. These are summarized in Table 11, which necessarily ignores the subtleties and qualifications in the argument.

In principle it would be possible—and as better data become available no doubt it will be possible—to rank the various countries of the world according to these variables. For the sake of exposition let us suppose that countries were ranked in deciles. If about one country in five is governed by a polyarchy, we should expect that in the 1960's and 1970's a very high proportion of the countries in the upper deciles would be polyarchies and negligible proportions in the last two or three deciles. Thus a country with [high scores on all criteria] would almost certainly be a polyarchy, and . . . a country with [low scores] would not be a polyarchy; very likely it would be a hegemony.

However, [there will be] deviant cases with profiles very different from these. Thus some polyarchies would not be in the upper deciles

Table 11
Conditions Favoring Polyarchy

	Most favorable to polyarchy	Least favorable to polyarchy
I. Historical sequences	Competition precedes inclusiveness	Inclusiveness precedes competition. Shortcut: from closed hegemony to inclusive polyarchy
II. The socioeconomic order		
1. Access to		
a. Violence	Dispersed or neutralized	Monopolized
b. Socioeconomic sanctions	Dispersed or neutralized	Monopolized
2. Type of economy		
a. Agrarian	Free farmers	Traditional peasant
b. Commercial-industrial	Decentralized direction	Centralized direction
III. The level of socio-economic development	High: GNP per capita over about \$700-800	Low: GNP per capita under about \$100-200
IV. The level of inequality		
1. Objective	Low, or dispersed inequalities	High: cumulative and extreme inequalities
2. Subjective: relative deprivation	Low or decreasing	High or increasing
V. Subcultural pluralism		
1. Amount	Low	High
2. If marked or high	None a majority None regional None indefinitely out of government Mutual guarantees	One a majority Some regional Some permanently in opposition No mutual guarantees
VI. Domination by a foreign power	Weak or temporary	Strong and persistent
VII. Beliefs of political activists		
1. Institutions of polyarchy are legitimate	yes	no
2. Only unilateral authority is legitimate	no	yes
3. Polyarchy is effective in solving major problems	yes	no
4. Trust in others	high	low
5. Political relationships are		
a. strictly competitive	no	yes
b. strictly cooperative	no	yes
c. cooperative-competitive	yes	no
6. Compromise necessary and desirable	yes	no

on all variables; the outstanding exception would surely be India, which would probably fall in the lower deciles on conditions IV and V, and (because of traditional peasant society in which about 80 percent of the Indians live) fairly low on condition III. Moreover, some hegemonies would be very high on one or more characteristics; East Germany, for example, would rank high on both IV and VI, and perhaps fairly high on V. [Denmark is surely a polyarchy, yet it took the unfavorable shortcut from hegemony to polyarchy. Argentina, on the other hand, scores high on many variables, yet is not a polyarchy.]

Why are these profiles, the reader may inquire, allowed to stand as hypothetical or, better, impressionistic representations of the data? In fact, why have I not tested the theory by actually undertaking the rankings that would provide an actual profile for every country or at least for a sufficiently large number of countries to provide a moderately good test of the theory? The answer points directly to one of the severe limitations of the theory: I have not done so because, given the kinds of data now available, the results would, I believe, be misleading and illusory. To be sure, it is possible to find satisfactory data on some of the variables—notably on the level of socioeconomic development. No doubt one reason why so much attention has been given to the relationship between regime and socioeconomic level is simply that reasonably acceptable (if by no means wholly satisfactory) "hard" data are available from which to construct indicators. This is a perfect example of how the availability of data may bias the emphasis of theory. . . . For example, data on objective and subjective inequalities are very poor, and. . . only the most fragmentary comparative information is available on the beliefs of political activists in various countries, particularly in countries with hegemonic regimes.

. . . The argument of the book seems to me to have some implications for strategies of change. Although the problem of how to transform hegemonies into polyarchies would be a whole subject by itself, it may be useful to tease out of the general argument a few conclusions, general as they may be, that are more directly relevant to action.

One can hardly reflect on the various conditions that seem to account for differences in regimes without concluding that a country that has had little or no experience with the institutions of public contestation and political competition and lacks a tradition of toleration toward political oppositions is most unlikely to turn into a stable polyarchy in the space of a few years. It is also true that countries with a long history of toleration, competitive politics, and broad participation rarely turn into hegemonies.

It is unrealistic to suppose, then, that there will be any dramatic change in the number of polyarchies within a generation or two. Some

hegemonic regimes may be transformed into mixed regimes, some nearly-hegemonic mixed regimes may become near-polyarchies, and some near-polyarchies may become polyarchies. Doubtless, too, there will be some movement in the opposite direction, but short of extensive conquest by imperialistic hegemonies the number of polyarchies is unlikely to diminish much. As with a great many things, the safest bet about a country's regime a generation from now is that it will be somewhat different, but not radically different, from what it is today.

This view of regimes is sobering, perhaps, and some readers may feel that it is unduly pessimistic. It is far removed, certainly, from the boundless optimism of much democratic thought, particularly among Americans. Yet it is worth recalling that the Age of the Democratic Revolution, as Palmer has called the last third of the eighteenth century, ended without any enduring "democracies"—or, in the language of this book, polyarchies—except in the United States. Even in the United States, it is no great exaggeration to say that what is called the American Revolution only legitimized or, in some cases, speeded up a bit the processes of democratization that had already been taking place in the colonies, processes that were by no means completed by the end of the struggle for independence. I am not arguing that the revolutionary movements had no long-run effects, nor that these effects were unimportant or undesirable; in the long run the revolutionary movements of the eighteenth century helped to create some of the conditions for polyarchy, particularly in the matter of beliefs and the dispersion of inequalities. But they failed pretty completely in their major objective, which was to achieve lasting representative republics based upon popular suffrage—that is, polyarchies. The revolutions that swept over Europe in May 1848 also had long-run consequences, but they too failed to build durable polyarchies.

DOES POLYARCHY MATTER?

Some readers might be inclined to think that differences in national regimes do not matter. For example, one might share the view of those like Gaetano Mosca who argue that every regime is, after all, dominated by a ruling minority. As an astringent challenge to the belief that portentous consequences for the people of a country must necessarily follow a transformation of the regime, Mosca's skepticism has a good deal to be said for it. Moreover, what appear superficially to be changes of regime are sometimes not really changes in regime at all, but simply changes in personnel, rhetoric, and empty constitutional prescriptions.

Yet few people seem able to adhere consistently to the view that differences in regimes—for example, differences between polyarchy and inclusive hegemony—are at base negligible. In fact, I have the impression that this view is most often espoused by intellectuals who are, at heart, liberal or radical democrats disappointed by the transparent failures of polyarchies or near-polyarchies; and that, conversely, intellectuals who have actually experienced life under severely repressive hegemonic regimes rarely argue that differences in regime are trivial.

. . . There are good reasons for thinking that a transformation of a regime from a hegemony into a more competitive regime or a competitive oligarchy into a polyarchy does have significant results.

1. To begin with, there are the classic liberal freedoms that are a part of the definition of public contestation and participation: opportunities to oppose the government, form political organizations, express oneself on political matters without fear of governmental reprisals, read and hear alternative points of views, vote by secret ballot in elections in which candidates of different parties compete for votes and after which the losing candidates peacefully yield their claim to office to the winners, etc. In the well established polyarchies, these freedoms have long since lost the attraction of a new cause, let alone any revolutionary appeal. Familiar, imperfectly achieved, clearly insufficient to insure a good society, trivialized over many generations by rhetorical overkill, they are easily taken for granted as an inheritance of quite modest significance. Their value no doubt appears greater to those who have lost them or have never had them. It was liberties of this kind that critics of the pre-Fascist parliamentary regime in Italy like Mosca, Croce, and Salvemini took so much for granted that they failed to foresee how oppressive Italy would become under a new regime. It was largely to expand freedoms of this kind that the liberalizing forces were moving in Czechoslovakia before their revolution was halted and reversed by the Soviets. To gain liberties like these for Spain is the one goal that many of the oppositions to Franco's dictatorship have shared.

2. Broadened participation combined with political competition brings about a change in the composition of the political leadership, particularly among those who gain office by means of elections—mainly, then, members of parliament. As new groups are granted the suffrage, candidates closer in their social characteristics to the newly incorporated strata win a greater share of elective offices. Thus when the narrow suffrage of a competitive oligarchy has been extended to the middle classes, the number of party leaders and members of parliament drawn from the middle classes has increased. Something of the same kind has occurred when the working classes have been en-

franchised, particularly in countries where labor or socialist parties have acquired a large share of working-class votes. When Reconstruction provided southern Negroes with the suffrage after the American Civil War, black Southerners for the first time began to hold office; when Reconstruction came to an end, blacks disappeared from public life. When they began to regain the suffrage after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, they once again began to win public offices.

This is not to say that political leadership and parliaments ever become a representative sample of the various socioeconomic strata, occupations, or other groupings in a society. They never do. In contemporary legislative bodies, middle class and professional occupations are numerically overrepresented; blue collar occupations are numerically underrepresented (even among representatives of labor, socialist, and communist parties) as are many other categories—farmers and housewives, for example. Even if the "political class" is never a fair sample of a country's social and economic categories—and many advocates of representative democracy would argue that it need not and should not be—a broadening of the suffrage together with political competition does nonetheless make parliaments in particular and political leadership in general considerably less unrepresentative in the purely statistical sense.

3. As a system becomes more competitive or more inclusive, politicians seek the support of groups that can now participate more easily in political life. The response of politicians to the existence of new opportunities for participation and public contestation are manifold and have far-reaching effects. I have just described one of these: to offer candidates whom the voters feel are in some sense "closer" to themselves. Another is to adapt rhetoric, program, policy, and ideology to what are thought to be the desires or interests of the groups, segments, or strata not hitherto represented. Thus the rise of socialist and labor parties in Western Europe is intimately tied to the grant of the suffrage to urban and rural working strata. When, as was true in many countries that are now polyarchies, political parties were relatively free to organize before the suffrage had been broadened, among the first demands of socialist and labor parties was universal suffrage. Once the working classes had the vote, naturally these parties initially directed most of their efforts to mobilizing these strata.

Competition and inclusiveness bring about changes in the party system itself. The most drastic and visible changes occur, of course, when a one-party hegemonic regime is rapidly replaced by a polyarchy: the hegemony of the single party suddenly gives way to two or more competing parties, as in Italy, Germany, and Japan at the end of

World War II. Countries in which opportunities for participation and contestation expand over a lengthier period of time display somewhat similar developments in slow motion. When the suffrage moves beyond the notables and their clients, the old parties and factions based mainly on the social connections among the notables—on ties of family, class, residence, life style, and tradition—are displaced or supplemented by parties more effective in appealing to the middle classes. The process is repeated again when the working classes are granted the suffrage. In Britain, the old Whigs gave way to the Liberals after the Reform Act of 1832; the Reform Acts of 1867 and 1884 facilitated the formation and growth of the Labor party. In Norway, the struggle over the mobilization of the peasantry in the 1860's and 1870's led to the development of electoral and parliamentary coalitions of the Left and Right. The struggle over manhood suffrage and its achievement in 1900 produced new parties. While the old Right became the Conservative party, the old Left alliance fragmented into its main components of Liberals, rural Christian fundamentalists, and farmers, while the Labor party acquired a large share of the working classes. Although the details vary from country to country, a similar pattern seems to emerge wherever polyarchy has evolved over a considerable period of time.

The parties also change in structure and organization. As has often been pointed out, the need to mobilize a bigger electorate triggers off the development of "modern" party organizations. For as the electorate grows, the traditional, mainly informal arrangements that worked well enough with a tiny group of voters (many of whom were in any case under the thumb of the notables) are simply inadequate. If a party is to survive in the new competition, it must reach out to its members, followers, and potential voters with organizations at the level of ward, section, cell, and the like. Many of these now familiar forms of party organization were initially developed in the country where mass suffrage was first established—the United States—but they rapidly appear wherever political competition takes place in the midst of a broad suffrage. In Britain, for example, the formation of local Conservative and Liberal associations, and the famous Birmingham Caucus followed hard on the heels of the broad suffrage created in 1867 and the introduction of the secret ballot in 1872.

The change in the organization of parties and their increasing penetration of urban and rural areas trips off still further changes in political life. Political competition and participation are both heightened. As the nationally organized parties reach out to mobilize their voters, the number of uncontested or nonpartisan elections declines. And the competition for members, adherents, and voters increases the

politicization of the electorate, at least in the initial stages; participation in elections, for example, is likely to be higher in constituencies where there are competing parties.

4. In any given country, the greater the opportunities for expressing, organizing, and representing political preferences, the greater the number and variety of preferences and interests that are likely to be represented in policy making. In a given country at a given time, therefore, the number and variety of preferences and interests represented in policy making are likely to be greater if the political regime is a polyarchy than if it is a mixed regime, and greater under a mixed regime than under a hegemony. Hence in any given country the transformation of a hegemony into a mixed regime or a polyarchy, or a mixed regime into a polyarchy, would be likely to increase the number and variety of preferences and interests represented in policy making.

5. The consequences for government policies of lower thresholds for participation and public contestation are, unfortunately, obscure. Cross-national studies confront extraordinary difficulties in this area. Even studies of variations among the fifty American states in policies, politics, and socioeconomic variables have not so far produced unambiguous findings on the extent to which variations in policies are related to variations in political competition and participation—though of course the range of variation on all these variables must be markedly narrower than among countries. Because of the powerful impact on governmental policies of such factors as a country's level of socioeconomic development, the characteristics of its social and economic systems, and its traditions, it may well be that the character of the regime has little independent effect on most governmental policies.

We probably need to look elsewhere to find the impact of regime on policy, in particular, on the extent to which the government adopts policies that involve severe physical coercion for relatively large numbers of people. The lower the barriers to public contestation and the greater the proportion of the population included in the political system, the more difficult it is for the government of a country to adopt and enforce policies that require the application of extreme sanctions against more than a small percentage of the population; the less likely, too, that the government will attempt to do so.

The evidence on this point is impressionistic. However, so far as I know, no polyarchy has ever undertaken policies involving anything like the degree and extent of coercion used during the forced collectivization of farming in the USSR in 1931-32, when millions of people were deported to Siberian labor camps or died from execution or starvation. Stalin's purges in the thirties sent many more millions to prison, torture, and death. Hitler's policy of extermination of Jews

and all political opponents is too well known to need emphasis. Changes of leadership and basic policies in hegemonic regimes frequently entail considerable bloodshed. When Indonesia shifted from a procommunist to an anticommunist dictatorship in October 1965, it is estimated that at least a quarter of a million people lost their lives over the space of a few months, [and by] late 1969, some 116,000 persons suspected of communist sympathies had been incarcerated.

I do not mean to argue that such massive coercion inevitably occurs in hegemonies nor, certainly, in mixed regimes, but only that the risk is significant, whereas it does not occur in polyarchies. The seeming exception that most readily comes to mind actually supports the point.... In order for the white people to coerce Negroes in the American South, the South had to develop a dual system, a kind of polyarchy for whites and hegemony for blacks. It is important to keep the distinction in mind, not for the sake of logic chopping, definitional purity, or "saving" polyarchy at all costs, but precisely because of the empirical generalization that it reinforces: if freed Negroes had been allowed to participate in the system of public contestation in the South, they could not have been subjected to systematic repression by coercion and terror, I believe, for they were much too large a minority. It was only by excluding them forcibly from the polyarchy that the system of coercion and terror could be maintained in the South. And precisely to the extent that black people were excluded, polyarchy in the United States was not fully inclusive.

The thrust of the argument is, however, clear enough. It seems reasonably evident that different regimes do have different consequences. Although some people may deny the importance of these consequences, at least the advocates of polyarchy and their opponents both agree that the consequences are significantly different and important. If the consequences of polyarchy were no different from those of nonpolyarchy, or if the consequences were unimportant, there would be no reason to advocate a polyarchy rather than a one-party dictatorship—or the converse. Probably most readers will also agree that the consequences—particularly the first—are important.

. . . Nonetheless, I do not assume that a shift from hegemony toward polyarchy is invariably desirable, [and]... I want to make clear that I make no assumption that a shift from hegemony toward polyarchy is historically inevitable. Just as the outcome of the third wave of democratization remains in doubt and could even lead to a regressive narrowing of the opportunities for public contestation now available in polyarchies, so it would be absurd to suppose that some sort of historical law of development imposes on societies an inevitable transition away from political hegemony to public contestation—or,

for that matter, in the opposite direction. Since modern nation-states have displayed movements in both directions, a few well-known cases are enough to falsify any simple law of unidirectional development. One might reflect, for example, on the histories of Argentina, Brazil, Germany, Italy, Russia, Czechoslovakia, and Japan. One of the implications of the analysis in this book is . . . that the conditions most favorable for polyarchy are comparatively uncommon and not easily created.

The Importance of Ideas: How Democratic Institutions Become Established

Many nations have free democratic systems of government, others have elements of such systems or some degree of freedom, and the largest number grant their citizens few if any political or civil liberties. Many nations have tried but been unable to maintain democratic institutions and are now less free than they were, while a few have little if any experience with political and civil freedoms. Partially because of this record, the comparatively value-free concept of "political development" rather than the value-laden "democratic development" has come to absorb the interest of most political scientists.¹ However, insofar as the distribution of democracy is still studied, political scientists, historians, and sociologists have generally reached a consensus that democracy is possible in a country only if one or the other of two preconditions are met, and preferably both. These are: 1) a political tradition and basic cultural inheritance favorable to liberal democracy, and 2) a social, economic, and political evolution that has "modernized" the state sufficiently for democracy to be meaningful. According to this determinist and evolutionary analysis anyone is naive who would promote or defend democracy or part-democracy, or condemn tyranny, in those countries that do not have a northwestern European cultural inheritance and a high standard of living.

Writing on the basis of field experiences in Peru and Korea, William A. Douglas casts doubt on these easy assumptions.² First, he questions whether anyone knows laws of political development such that democracy must necessarily succeed only after modernization, nation building, and the other desiderata. Secondly, he questions whether the alternatives to democracy have by and large proved any more successful in achieving economic, social, or even national development. And finally, he believes he can show a method (party-building) that has a good chance of overcoming the barriers to democratic success in poor nations.

SOCIOECONOMIC PRECONDITIONS OR DIFFUSIONARY PRESSURE

Let us, then, attempt to place in perspective the cultural and democratic barriers to democratic success that are proposed by many political scientists.³ Without denying that the preconditions said to be essential to democratic development increase the probability of democratic success, the resulting analysis will suggest that at least equally predictive of success are the strength of diffusionary pressures exerted from outside individual countries, the situation in particular countries at critical points in their individual evolution, and the degree to which compromise among conflicting interests comes to be accepted as a political value.

Liberal democratic systems are produced and maintained by both internal and external iterative processes. As pointed out above (Part II, "Freedom and Democracy: Definitions and Distinctions"), within a society, decisions can be thought to be made by sponsors, staff, or recipients. Since the results of these decisions will be continually evaluated by the same three groups, over time this process will exert pressures to change or maintain the system, and these pressures will move the society toward or away from liberal democratic forms. This internal process is the primary focus of those that see the success or failure of democracy as determined by the "objective" requirements of a nation's situation.

At the same time as this "objective" internal process is going on, an external process of the development and diffusion of relevant ideas is bringing new concepts and judgments into the internal system. These ideas influence the evolution of the internal political culture in partial independence from the internal processes. For example, Thailand repeatedly experiments with democracy because most of its elite are educated in democracies. Of course, if the externally derived cultural elements lead to internal disaster, they will tend to be thrown out through the working of the internal system, insofar as it is independent (as communist systems are not, for example, in the Soviet satellites). There is, in addition, feedback from experience in one country to the external diffusionary input for another. The influence of what happens in any one country on the strength, availability, and prestige of available external ideas depends on the connections and size of the country. Obviously, democratic success in India has international reverberations, while success in the Barbados primarily affects Caribbean neighbors. However, the sum total of interactions of this sort and more general trends in international economic, political, and military affairs will have an important influence on all diffusionary inputs, and, separately, on the internal situation in most countries.

For example, the economic difficulties caused by the oil embargo influenced the standing of many political systems internally, while at the same time reducing the attractiveness and availability of the Israeli version of the Western democratic model in the underdeveloped world.

Given this generalized sketch, let us consider at more length the argument for placing enhanced emphasis on the role of outside forces or "diffusionary pressure" in the acceptance or rejection of democracy.

In every country constitutional freedom or liberal democracy is embedded in an operating political culture. The "operating political culture" is what the people running the system or passively letting others run it have evidently learned to expect or accept. It is an amalgam of traditional culture, current ideology, and very recent experience in the way to do things politically. The operating political culture and the other evolving characteristics of a country produce the opportunities and constraints felt by those who are at the forefront of political action. In these terms those who possess power individually or collectively make political decisions, the results of which, in turn, alter the society. According to the now standard academic doctrine of preconditions, constitutional freedom could only exist in a country if the politically relevant culture of the society had previously evolved elements supportive of a liberal democratic tradition, and if the economic, social, and political culture of the nation had been "modernized," however this is defined. According to this theory only this condition would make possible real rather than pseudodemocratic decisions, or ensure that feedback from the democratic decisions that are made is positive in terms of the cultural values of the society.

While not denying that these propositions have some validity, the force and fashion of diffusionary pressures is often of as great or greater importance in determining operating political cultures and the positive nature of feedback. We can identify at least the following propositions about the diffusionary pressure of external ideas:⁴

1. The acceptability of new political ideas will depend upon their prestige, their availability, and the receptivity of the society.
2. The prestige of new ideas will depend on the status of their proponents and the success of these proponents both in the propagation of ideas and in the implementation of ideas once accepted.
3. The availability of new ideas depends upon their use in the media, partisan activity in their behalf, and the educational background of elites and other citizens.
4. The receptivity of a society to new ideas will depend upon traditional attitudes toward borrowing, on the current "success" of the society in comparison to those it competes with, on the benefits that

present and prospective leaders see in the new ideas for their own position or society, and on the inherent attractiveness of the new ideas to other groups in society (including to some extent how they fit into previous cultural patterns).

The influence of these factors will vary greatly from situation to situation. Clearly when the Allies forced democracy on West Germany and Japan at the end of World War II, they gave potential leaders little choice as to the way to achieve power. Defeat had lowered the prestige of previous systems, while the prestige of the political ideas of the conquerors was very high. After democratic systems were established, they were supported by the new situation. For example, after coming to power through the operation of free institutions, by and large new leaders could more easily continue to achieve success through the new institutions than in any other way.

We also believe that free institutions are inherently attractive in any nation to a wide spectrum of social groups as long as these institutions do not bring economic disaster. Lack of relative attractiveness of the totalitarian institutions imposed on Eastern Europe apparently led to revolt in Hungary and incipient revolt elsewhere. Compounding the unattractiveness of the totalitarian political ideas was, of course, the relatively low prestige of the Soviet Union in most of Eastern Europe, as well as the inability of satellite political elites to achieve power (independence of action) to the extent achieved by analogous leaders on the Western side of the iron curtain. These considerations must be combined with the high status of intellectuals in Hungary and Czechoslovakia and their particular irritations with the restrictions of their systems.

Societies, then, operate in a tension between the perceived self-interests of the actors and the available social forms by which these self-interests may be achieved. The forms "available" in political systems include both those inherited from the past and those backed by strong diffusionary pressure, with the strength of the diffusionary pressure determined by external and internal power relations, elite and mass education, and the beliefs of significant groups of intellectuals. Those with the most concentrated power will tend to choose social forms or rules that will legitimate concentrated power in their hands, while those with less power will choose alternatives that broaden the base of power (with appeals to the "people" being used sometimes to concentrate and sometimes to broaden power). The intellectuals can by near unanimity make return to the old forms unimaginable, but in most developing countries they have not uniformly supported a particular political and economic choice.

For a free system to be stabilized it *must be* inherently more at-

tractive to the people than alternatives, a requirement that does not exist for unfree systems. For the availability of alternative ideas is by definition greater in a free society, particularly for elites. Therefore, in difficult times of internal crisis, alternatives will be intellectually available to potential leaders in a free democracy to a degree not imaginable in more authoritarian states. In addition, unless those with the most power are heavily imbued with democratic ideals, or imagine their people to be, they will try to reduce freedom whenever it is in their immediate interest.

In the older and wealthier democracies volatility produced by the pressure of external ideas is much reduced. In the United States, for example, Americans have little reason to be concerned with the development of this pressure. The people are by and large satisfied, and the traditional elite and popular political cultures are integrated with one another and with American tradition. Yet there continue to be pressures in the United States for change generated both by gaps between expectation and performance and by changes in the external environment. In recent years there has been more and more pressure for increasing egalitarianism, culminating most dramatically in the drive for equality in the 1950's and 1960's and for affirmative action in the 1970's. There has also been an increasing tendency to emphasize the need for more centralization, for more planning, and for more government control. There has been periodic interest in adopting a European parliamentary system, or of extending the Swiss initiative and referendum to the national level. While it can be argued that many of these pressures come from the realistic requirements of the internal situation, an equally good case can be made that they are primarily responses to an external political, social, and cultural environment. Marxist and socialist thought in its several varieties were developed in England and on the continent, and their strongest exponents in America have often been exiles or recent immigrants. Experience in Sweden and Great Britain is held up as an example that we should follow. The most influential study of the Negro in America was by a Swedish economist.⁵ In the 1920's and 1930's the Soviet Union inspired reform by its example (however poorly understood) and was used as a threat to obtain change by its local partisans; in the early 1970's China has played much the same role. If external pressures operate in the United States in this way, how much stronger they must operate in societies whose elites see themselves continually faced with failures on a much more dramatic scale.

Let us, then, turn to specific histories of attempts to establish free democratic states, and ask what was the role of human choice and the diffusion of ideas as compared with the role of the development

of the preconditions of a modern democracy such as Western liberal tradition, a high standard of living, or political integration.

SWITZERLAND

The first case is that of Switzerland.⁶ Switzerland has always preserved elements of primitive democracy in its most rural areas. However, the meaning of "freedom" before the end of the eighteenth century in Switzerland was first of all in the sense of communal and cantonal independence, in the virtues of a general decentralization. There was little central government. Civil rights were not well developed and strict censorship generally led newspapers to avoid politics. As far as political freedom was concerned the people in the major cantons such as Bern and Zurich had less freedom than they had had centuries before, especially in the countryside. After the Reformation cantonal governments were generally not tolerant, either in Protestant or Catholic areas.

Although liberal ideas, such as those of Rousseau and of English constitutionalists, were accepted by a segment of the Swiss intelligentsia, it was not until the French conquest of Switzerland in 1798 that the ideas of human freedom in the modern sense became a part of Swiss law, and then in a constitution imposed by France. In 1803 and again in 1815 there were retreats from liberalism, yet the losses were only partial, and after the French Revolution of 1830 the Swiss cantons introduced more and more liberal legislation until finally in 1848 after the defeat in battle of the conservative cantons (those with the ancient "freedoms") the Swiss federal state with general democratic freedom was established.

Hans Kohn asks why it was that during this period (1815-1848) the Swiss liberals were able to succeed in firmly establishing a liberal constitution in Switzerland while under very similar circumstances the leagues of German and Italian states did not succeed. The reason he suggests is that the Swiss intelligentsia concentrated on entrenching in law their liberal ideas (to a large extent borrowed) in the institutions of their cities, cantons, and finally confederacy, and placed second those dreams of national power and unity that so moved and misled others. It was their openness to a more humane vision that made possible the compromises that were necessary to succeed.⁷ It also appears to be the case that the oligarchs of the largest cantons never regained their power and confidence in spite of the restoration of 1815, which was again largely imposed from outside. After 1832 there was no one left in the major cantons who could put down the radicals, and the radicals became more responsible as they expanded

their power. They made only one misstep: it was their excess in barring the Jesuits from Aargau in contravention of the stipulations of the constitution of 1815 that led to the splitting of the country by the conservatives, a conservatism based in this last showdown on Catholic mountain peasantry rather than the urban oligarchies that ruled before 1798.

But what was established in 1848 (and later revisions), and what relation did it have to Swiss history and culture? The new system represented a compromise formula that allowed the peaceful reunification of the country. This meant that the old claims to autonomy of cantons and of communes within cantons were infringed to a lesser extent than in any other modern state. The American two-house parliament was adopted in which one house is based on population and the other on two representatives per canton, and in which legislation had to pass both houses. The Swiss tradition of a weak executive was preserved by making the executive a seven-man council in which the presidency revolved. This was reminiscent of the old confederation Diet in which a centralized executive hardly existed. Liberal ideas of the people's sovereignty, of freedom of the press and religion were codified at this time or in 1874. The legislative initiative and referendum developed out of Swiss tradition strengthened by the French Revolution, and was later borrowed by some American states.⁹ In 1919 proportional representation was accepted on the federal level after first having been borrowed from elsewhere for use on the cantonal level. The collegial principle of government in which all important parties and interests are represented in government was developed early, was strengthened by proportional representation, and continues down to today.

Although there has been change, Switzerland remains a remarkably conservative country. Women could not vote in national elections until the 1970's; even today the government is more representative of the "people's interests" (religious, cantonal, linguistic, trade) than of the interests of the classes or masses that are said to characterize a modern polity. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries many elite Swiss have seen the existence of Switzerland as an anachronism: earlier demands that it "reunite" with Germany have been replaced by demands that it join the Common Market. But no matter how conservative the Swiss polity, the result has been remarkable stability, a high quality of life, and what is often called the best government in Europe. Today there is strong pressure from the more educated Swiss for change in the system to achieve a more responsible and active government. This appears to be due less to the "structural requirements" of the modern world than to the fashions of contemporary

social and political thought. Recent referendums have shown that this viewpoint is not generally accepted by the populace.

Switzerland's democracy has been based on a process of gradual change from a league of largely oligarchical states to semimodern democratic forms in which peoples or estates rather than economic classes remain most significant. The peoples have reluctantly accepted the changes because of 1) the natural appeal of equal freedoms, 2) the experience of unity imposed on them by the French, 3) the acceptance by their elites of liberal political ideas and constitutional models from France, England, the United States, and Germany (at times), and 4) the acceptance of compromise as the basis of government. Emphasis on compromise was determined in Swiss history by the stubbornness of the contending parties, and by the liberal humanism of the elites. Insofar as there was a revolutionary movement before 1798 it was inspired by English and French writing and action, and *then* was related back to the roots of freedom in the early years of the Swiss confederacy. The demand for the new liberty certainly did not come from the Forest Cantons that had preserved the institutions of direct democracy. The liberal movement in the 1830's and 1840's seems to have been inspired primarily by ideas and actions from abroad. In all this I do not imply that there were not important Swiss political thinkers during the period 1700-1850. There were a remarkable number. But the point is their ideas were not reflecting the requirements of the Swiss situation in particular, or even very well. Neither were they a natural development of Swiss tradition as it had evolved prior to 1700.

To recapitulate, by 1790 a loose alignment of small peasant democracies and larger oligarchies, and the dependencies of both, was functioning fairly well in Switzerland, although there was a good deal of intellectual ferment, particularly in the western areas, under the inspiration of English, French, and Swiss thinkers and activists. There was very little more political or civil liberty in the cantons than in a comparable group of small German states. The French subverted the French speaking areas, and finally in 1798 conquered the country. Swiss military tradition had been rusting for a long time, and there was little unity or fighting. A constitution was forced on the Swiss by the French, and later a restoration of the old system was forced on them by the Allies. After both pressures relaxed the Swiss accepted the egalitarian and civil libertarian ideals of the French but rejected in part the centralizing ones. In 1848 they set up a system founded on French and American experience combined with elements of Swiss tradition and Swiss requirements. Yet at no time can it be shown that there were structural changes in Switzerland that 1) required

the movement toward a liberal democracy, or that 2) did not "require" the much more centralized and rationalized systems that were eventually established in the rest of Europe.

COSTA RICA

As a second example, Costa Rica is a nation often cited as an exception to the general "failure" of democratic institutions in Latin America.¹⁰ The area of Costa Rica was one of the least urbanized of the Spanish colonies at the time of independence; indeed in the nineteenth century it was one of the least interested in independence and least nationalistic of Spain's former colonies. Like the other new states of Latin America its constitution with civil and political rights was borrowed from the United States, and though revised many times, the American model has remained the basic form of government down to today.

During the first forty years of independence the succession of elections, juntas, and repressions in Costa Rica followed the general Latin American pattern. But starting in the 1860's there began a buildup of political and civic traditions of responsibility that culminated in 1889 in an election that has traditionally been accepted as the beginning of real democracy in Costa Rica. There have been interruptions since. A coup in 1917 led to a brief dictatorship. It was ended by the combined pressure of the United States and the other Central American states to return to constitutionalism. Interferences with the electoral process by the regime in power after 1940 led to revolt in 1948, resolved again by the involvement of inter-American as well as national elements. Since repressions immediately following this revolt, both civil and political rights have been scrupulously observed.

The basis of colonial society in Costa Rica was a rural peasantry not too different from that of medieval Switzerland, but far removed from the industrial and commercial nineteenth century Swiss confederation. While literacy and culture have come to be emphasized by the small upper and middle class groups, and the country became generally literate in the twentieth century, in 1864 eighty-nine percent of the people were illiterate and in 1892 sixty-nine percent remained illiterate.¹¹ The "basic culture" of the nation is Catholic and Spanish, hardly a combination ordinarily related to democratic success. The intelligentsia and the sons of the wealthy have frequently had European or North American educations, and feel closely tied to these cultural worlds.

On closer analysis the history of Costa Rica's struggle to achieve democratic institutions is not so different from that in most of Latin

America.¹² What is remarkable in all Latin America is the extent to which the only truly legitimate political system has remained, at least until very recently, the North American system. Spanish (and perhaps to some extent Indian) cultures have offered deviant legitimations, as have a succession of international fads (Bonapartism, fascism, communism, one-party socialism). The only exceptions are states with non-Spanish backgrounds (including to some degree Brazil and Paraguay), and Uruguay with its adoption of a Swiss executive structure. Often the borrowings and reborrowings are indirect, but the repeated return to democratic forms, and their realization in practice in several Latin American countries at any one time is often overlooked by the emphasis of the media on the conspicuous reappearance of tyrannies.

Against this background Costa Rica has only been somewhat more successful than the others. Several reasons are offered for its relative success. There is widespread peasant proprietorship, but in fact land holding has been quite concentrated during the period of democratic success. There has been and is more interest in education for everyone than in most of Latin America. In general, the enlightened oligarchy, which in fact ruled before the 1940's and to a large extent still rules, seems to have been more seriously interested than other Latin American elites in developing good social services. The Catholic Church in Costa Rica has been relatively powerful, but has also been relatively progressive. Civilians have generally dominated Costa Rican politics; the army, before it was abolished, was seldom powerful enough to subvert a popular government, or uphold a government against popular feeling. As a final reason for success, there has been the tendency to work for compromises, a willingness so often lacking in Latin America. When the Costa Rican system has broken down, it has been due to the weakening of this spirit even in those who would defend democracy.

AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan provides a third example of experience with constitutionalism.¹³ Poor and illiterate, and little affected by the diffusion of modern ideas, Afghanistan was traditionally either a grouping of tribes or a kingdom uniting many tribal and nontribal peoples. The autocratic rule of the king was controlled by custom, by Islamic law as expressed by religious leaders, and by the necessity to balance off the tribal groups that made up the country, as well as competing factions in the royal lineage. The tribes have supplemented the rule of their chiefs by the use of tribal councils or *jirgas*. National *jirgas* (*loya jirgas*) have been used in this century as a way of bringing together representatives of all tribes, as well as nontribal elements, for advice and support.

After 1900 modern ideas began to sift in, especially to Kabul, through expanded education, overseas travel, more contact with foreigners, and the establishment of newspapers. In the 1920's King Amanullah attempted to modernize the country twice: first, with a series of reforms in 1923-24, and then with radical proposals in 1928.¹⁴ Among his reforms were proposals to establish a representative government and extend the full panoply of civil rights to the people. But the proposals that were most bitterly opposed by conservative factions were those increasing central governmental power, those relating to a change in the status of women, and the secularization of law. The first and more modest reforms culminated in what amounted to a constitution in 1923, followed by a serious revolt. A *loya jirga* was convened to stabilize the state, and it succeeded after rejecting the more offensive reforms. Following an extended stay in Europe during 1927-28, the king returned to propose a radical new group of measures. Before these had become law, revolution broke out again and culminated in Amanullah leaving the country in 1929.

The best student of this period insists that it is not correct to say that the people revolted against the king's innovations.¹⁵ Actual revolts stemmed from old tribal disputes and new attempts to control tribes that were formally independent. Revolts were fueled by desire for plunder, and the ambitions of pretenders to the crown. Yet it was the propaganda of the religious leaders, who had a great deal to lose both spiritually and materially, that gave the necessary ideological content to the rebellious movements that eventually undermined the regime. Religious opposition subtly took away from the soldiers and officers of Amanullah the will to fight that they might have otherwise had. Of course, every change hurts someone, and when someone is hurt, someone else is going to take advantage of his dissatisfaction. Apparently Amanullah was unable to understand the necessity to strengthen the forces allied to him or benefiting from proposed changes *before* trying to impose radical changes on the country.

Yet much of Amanullah's constitution was incorporated formally in the new constitution of 1931. Although largely ignored in practice, this constitution had political effect during the period 1949-1952 when over one-third of the parliament was elected by a more or less free process, newspapers appeared attacking the government, and students demonstrated. Fearing the situation would get out of control, the royal family ordered repressions; then to assuage subsequent discontent the popular Prince Daud was appointed Prime Minister, and a few arrested students were released. Daud was a modernizer, but with primarily economic, social, and national interests. He ended

the democratic interregnum and emphasized nationalist claims against Pakistan.

In 1963, with a desire in ruling circles to improve relations with Pakistan and reduce reliance on the USSR, Daud was asked to step aside. He acquiesced in spite of his reputed control of the army and police. Now a new phase of constitution building began, based on a draft actually prepared under Daud's auspices that went beyond the 1931 constitution. The draft was revised, and then debated and revised again, at a long session of the *loya jirga* in 1964. As a result this constitution represented better than previous attempts a compromise among a wide variety of interests. Unfortunately, Prince Daud was excluded from the forum of the *jirga*; the constitution prohibited the participation of any member of the royal family in the government other than the king.

For almost nine years the constitutional monarchy with two houses of parliament, and a separate judiciary and executive survived. Under the constitution elections were not perfect, but elections were freer than they had ever been. There were periodic closures of papers, but the press was much freer and more varied than it had been, with nearly all the private press in opposition. The sessions of parliament were broadcast. Political parties were never formally permitted, but to some extent they developed anyhow. Religious leaders were incorporated in both the judiciary and the educational system. There were recurrent crises: opposition leaders were unwilling to restrain their villification of the system; students recurrently went out of control; foreign aid dropped off after Daud's time; and in the early 1970's one of the most severe famines in recent Afghan history occurred. Despite all this, the system seemed to be performing reasonably well in Afghan terms.

Yet in mid-July 1973, while the king was out of the country for medical treatment, Prince Daud was able with the support of the army to renounce the constitution, disband parliament, and declare a republic under his leadership.¹⁶ Why at this time? The incumbent prime minister, one of the original authors of the constitution, had been quite successful and popular compared to previous occupants of the position. There was an unresolved constitutional problem involving the supervision of impending fall elections, but economic conditions were improving. Perhaps most important in giving Daud his chance was a rigorous collection of back taxes in Kabul and a plan to revalue property. Also strengthening Daud's hand may have been the threat of American withdrawal from Asia, and perhaps the expansionist talk of Iran. Pakistan's vulnerability after the loss of Bangladesh offered new chances for Afghan expansion. An ostensibly pro-Russian and

expansionist military leader such as Daud must have seemed more useful at this juncture to military and tribal elites than democratic forms.

To return to our earlier theoretical analysis, the king apparently hoped in 1963 to be able to legitimize his right to rule free of the encumbrances of his family by excluding them through a modernizing constitutional reform. Since Amanullah's time modernism in Afghanistan had been seen by some portion of the elite as necessarily including political and civil rights. With the king's education and that of most of those in the Afghan elite, it seemed useful to contrast these rights with Daud's authoritarianism. This meant that the king had to rely on support from the modern middle classes and intelligentsia that were most impatient for change. But the democracy was sure to disappoint many modernizers. After the drafting of the constitution the educated inevitably lost control to the illiterate majority; the more democratic parliament became, the more the voice of the conservative peoples was decisive.¹⁷ At the same time modern elements were disappointed by the failure to legitimize political parties (the king's advisors feared the radical left-wing would be the only group with organizing talents). So by 1973 the democratic system had existed long enough for the relatively conservative masses to start to use it, but not long enough for them to have strong allegiances to it. As in 1928-29, when reaction came there were few around to defend the democratic reforms.¹⁸

POLICY CONCLUSIONS

The preconditions conventionally thought to be necessary for the establishment of democratic systems are only part of the story of their successful implementation. In the modern world elites in or out of power have often chosen a free democratic system as the alternative mode of political organization that will be most desirable for their purposes. Diffusionary pressures may push so strongly in this direction that leaders are practically forced to this choice, as in Switzerland during the French Revolution, in Costa Rica at critical moments, or in the former Axis states after World War II. These pressures are weaker, but still palpable, in many less developed countries, such as Afghanistan. In other cases, particularly in the communist states, Africa, and the Middle East, diffusionary pressures for non-democratic alternatives are stronger than democratic pressures. For leaders who do not feel under strong democratic pressure, either from the outside or from their own peoples or masses, nondemocratic systems will appear more reliable and attractive.

If one were interested in supporting the coming into being of

democratic systems, their maintenance or reestablishment, then he would be interested in achieving three goals: 1) A positive balance of diffusionary pressures. At a minimum this should produce countries with a democratically inclined intelligentsia and middle class. 2) The relative success of actions under a democratic system. He should work toward a positive balance for the feedback of democratic decisions, and the relative failure of alternatives. For particular countries success or failure in neighboring states will affect the diffusionary pressure. 3) The adoption of cultural traits by all societies that support democratic forms and oppose their denial. The third goal is usually the product of a long period of experience with democracy, and is the ultimate guarantee. Yet many countries have enjoyed the advantages of constitutional freedoms for many years without having ever reached this point of evolution. The development of experience with freedom is frequently interrupted, as recently in India, the Philippines, or Uruguay. One can only hope to stretch the time that democracy lasts, to reduce the opportunities and success of interruptions, and to dissipate the influence of antidemocratic diffusionary pressures.

The willingness of those with power at the moment to accept compromise among class, factional, or sectional interests has been critical to the success of constitutional democracies. This facility may be due initially to situational chance, such as a nation's possession of responsible and farseeing leaders at critical points in history. It is due in part to the political cultures of the successful states, yet to a degree all societies have included the acceptance of compromise as a part of their cultures. Later, however, once the particular compromises necessary to a liberal democratic state have become institutionalized, the continued success of the system is based upon the gradual evolution of a native political culture fully supportive of democratic forms.

But these marginal remarks should not be allowed to obscure our main point: the importance of the diffusion or acceptance of political ideas. No one has made this point better than John Stuart Mill when he wrote:

If any one requires to be convinced that speculative thought is one of the chief elements of social power, let him bethink himself of the age in which there was scarcely a throne in Europe which was not filled by a liberal and reforming king, a liberal and reforming emperor, or, strangest of all, a liberal and reforming pope; the age of Frederic the Great, . . . when the very Bourbons of Naples were liberals and reformers, and all the active minds among the noblesse of France were filled with the ideas which were soon after to cost them so dear. Surely a conclusive example of how far mere physical and

economic power is from being the whole of social power. It was not by any change in the distribution of material interests, but by the spread of moral convictions, that negro slavery has been put an end to in the British Empire and elsewhere. The serfs in Russia owe their emancipation, if not to a sentiment of duty at least to the growth of a more enlightened opinion respecting the true interest of the State. It is what men think that determines how they act; and though the persuasions and convictions of average men are in a much greater degree determined by their personal position than by reason, no little power is exercised over them by the persuasions and convictions of those whose personal position is different, and by the united authority of the instructed. When, therefore, the instructed in general can be brought to recognise one social arrangement, or political or other institution, as good, and another as bad, one as desirable, another as condemnable, very much has been done towards giving to the one, or withdrawing from the other, that preponderance of social force which enables it to subsist.¹⁹

NOTES

1. See Edward Shils, *Political Development in the New States* (The Hague: Mouton, 1965); Dankwart Rustow, *A World of Nations* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1967); Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

2. See William A. Douglas, *Developing Democracy* (Washington, D.C.: Heldref, 1972). See also R. D. Gastil, "U.S. Support for Democracy in Poor Countries," *Freedom at Issue*, no. 10 (1971), pp. 9-14.

3. The diffusion of political ideas has, of course, been previously considered as an important explanatory factor by some political scientists. For example, Carl Friedrich, *The Impact of American Constitutionalism Abroad* (Boston: Boston University Press, 1967). Robert Dahl devotes a large portion of his *Polyarchy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971, pp. 124-88) to the "Beliefs of Political Activists." His discussion mixes questions of national culture with those of the historical diffusion of political ideas, but it accepts seriously the ideological as opposed to materialistic explanation of political behavior that is an important component in the concept of diffusionary pressure.

4. Research in diffusion has a considerable record; this research is interesting primarily because of particular studies rather than derived generalizations, which are mostly obvious. The most important theoretical issue they raise is whether the process of innovation—diffusion—testing—acceptance or rejection is influenced primarily by questions such as availability, prestige, fads, and cultural compatibility, or by the structural-functional requirements of a society and its leading sectors at a particular time and place. The characteristics of an innovation that determines acceptance have been identified in the literature as relative advantage, compatibility, complexity (negative), divisibility, and communicability. Diffusionists have also pointed to dangers of overadoption. See Everett M. Rogers, *Diffusion of Innovations* (New York: The Free Press, 1962), especially pp. 124-34, 142-45.

5. Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma* (New York: Harper and Row, 1962).

6. This discussion is based especially on Hans Kohn, *Nationalism and Liberty: The Swiss Example* (New York: Macmillan, 1956). See also Klaus

Schumann, *Die Regierungssystem der Schweiz* (Koeln: Carl Heymann, 1971). In this and subsequent cases the story is brought up to date beyond the above sources by reference to Arthur Banks, ed., *The Political Handbook of the World: 1977* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977), and *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*.

7. Kohn, *Nationalism and Liberty*, especially pp. 57, 68-69.

8. See also William Rappard, *The Government of Switzerland* (New York: Van Nostrand, 1936), especially pp. 22-23.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 47. See also Thomas McClintock, "Seth Lewelling, William S. U'Ren and the Birth of the Oregon Progressive Movement," *Oregon Historical Quarterly*, 68 (1967): 197-220 (206-7, 219).

10. See especially Chester L. Jones, *Costa Rica and Civilization in the Caribbean* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Studies in the Social Studies and History, 23, 1935); John P. Bell, *Crisis in Costa Rica: The 1948 Revolution* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1971). Also, John Stephans, *Incidents of Travel in Central America, Chiapas and Yucatan* (New York: Dover, 1966 [1891]), pp. 349 ff., and Charles Gibson, *Spain in America* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), pp. 98, 176, 205 ff.

11. See Jones, *Costa Rica and Civilization in the Caribbean*, p. 52.

12. See Robin Humphreys, *The Evolution of Modern Latin America* (London: Oxford University Press, 1946); Frederick B. Pike, ed., *Freedom and Reform in Latin America* (South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959).

13. See especially Richard Newell, *The Politics of Afghanistan* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972). Also W. K. Fraser-Tytler, *Afghanistan: A Study of Political Developments in Central and Southern Asia* (London: Oxford University Press, 1953); Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973); Vartan Gregorian, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics of Reform and Modernization, 1880-1946* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969).

14. On this period, see especially Leon Poullada, *Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, 1919-1929* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1973).

15. *Ibid.*

16. See especially the "Epilogue" in Dupree, *Afghanistan*, pp. 753-60.

17. Samuel Huntington points to the generality of this trend in similar polities as the vote is extended. (*Political Order in Changing Societies*, pp. 443-61 [also, pp. 374-443]).

18. The point is democracy was not overthrown because of its "failure," but because its allies were not powerful enough. Many of the reversals of democracy in the Third World have been of this sort. Compare, for example, the ending of Nepal's experiment with parliamentary democracy when the democracy was in fact functioning quite well. See Leo Rose and Margaret Fisher, *The Politics of Nepal* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), pp. 106-7.

19. John Stuart Mill, *Utilitarianism, Liberty and Representative Government* (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1951), p. 247.

The Relation of Alternative Political-Economic Systems to Freedom

A common criticism of the Comparative Survey is that it does not address the crucial concerns of most of the world's peoples. Two lines of criticism are expressed in this objection. Some critics believe that the values represented by civil and political freedoms are not as important as other values such as food, health, artistic creativity, religious experience or sense of community. For example, Charles Yost says: "...the American position focuses almost all of its attention on political and civil rights, where its own traditions are clear and its performance, at least recently, excellent, while minimizing economic and social rights which, to a large part of mankind that is never sure where its next meal is coming from, are far more urgent."¹ This objection may lead to the assertion that our definition of freedom is too narrow, that it should include enabling freedoms such as those provided by the welfare state, or even to the assertion that equality is more important than freedom. A second line of criticism is based on the assumption that in societies with certain economic systems civil and political freedoms are rendered meaningless by the institutional structure. On the left those who advance this position believe that without economic equality there can be no political equality. On the right, critics of this persuasion point to the loss of economic freedoms in socialist society for consumers, capitalists, and workers. The following discussion will be primarily concerned with exploring both left and right arguments that economic conditions or relationships are more fundamental than political relationships in the question of freedom.

FREEDOM AS AN IMPORTANT BUT NOT EXCLUSIVE VALUE

Before examining the respective advantages of capitalism and socialism for freedom, it is necessary to remind the reader of the argument advanced above (Part II, "Freedom and Democracy: Definitions and Distinctions") for a relatively narrow definition of freedom. The Survey addresses only one range of quality of life issues. We

recognize the importance of improved sanitation under the Chinese Communist regime, and hail the artistic accomplishments of the ancient Egyptians. The world would be poorer without the accomplishments of these societies. Yet neither society added greatly to the achievement of civil and political freedoms, and we assert that political and civil freedoms are important human values in themselves. They are important philosophically, in that respect for the individual demands that all adults be given a share in determining how their communities are governed. Respect also demands that individuals have the right to freely present their point of view and to maintain their own beliefs. These rights clash with other rights and necessities, but they are not by this fact rendered valueless. It is for this reason that in John Rawls's "just society" liberty is placed ahead of all other goods.² Political and civil freedoms are also important empirically. Evidently when they lose these freedoms, the mass of people strive to regain them—as we may note most recently in India, Greece, and Iberia.

As a variant of the argument for alternative values it is frequently asserted that empirically people are interested in food and shelter and only after these are obtained do they become concerned with the liberties compared in the Survey. This argument is often related to the Maslovian concept of a hierarchy of values in which food and water, sex, security, and love are seen as the necessary ground for all other concerns.³ For the average Euro-American the plausibility of this hypothesis is reinforced by the gap between his standard of living and the extreme poverty of much of the world. Viewing this disparity the Westerner assumes that the very poor will surely sacrifice any values for a little more food and security. But in fact people strive economically only in terms of their expectations. How much stronger such expectations may be than objective reality is suggested by a cross-national attitude survey that found that the people of India were less likely to be concerned about their health than people in the advanced industrialized countries.⁴ Traditionally poor peoples such as the Australian aborigines, the Bushmen of Southwest Africa,⁵ or Indian peasants do not labor continuously; they may, indeed, spend more time in leisure or ceremonial activities than bourgeois Westerners. To shift the focus, recent reports on the destruction of the Ache Indians of Paraguay ascribe their psychological destruction as much to their loss of independence and right to carry on their customs as to murder and enforced starvation.⁶ In all societies most individuals have a pervasive need to have other people listen to and respect their opinions; only this can give them a meaningful part in the community. Without civil and political freedoms these needs cannot be fulfilled.

It may also be argued that freedom is not as important to many

people as equality, a sense of justice, of getting what they "deserve" from life. This can mean more to the average person than receiving more material goods. For example, a recent poll found that in England eighty percent would rather have an equal and lower wage than a higher wage if others received still more.⁷ However, it is generally true that people prefer a world in which all receive their just desserts to one in which outcomes are equal regardless of effort or virtue.⁸ For few believe that hard work and virtue are, or should be, their own reward. As long as we assume that it is possible to make choices, there is no normative basis to assume that all should receive the same rewards from life. Pragmatically, it can also be shown that it is hard to efficiently allocate persons to necessary roles in society without income differentials, a fact that has caused all communist governments to maintain such differentials.⁹ (Of course, if such pragmatic concerns were the only reason for inequality in communist societies, income and statuses would not be distributed as they are. Economic efficiency is only one reason for inequalities in ostensibly egalitarian societies.) There are similar reasons of efficiency for establishing inequalities in political power among individuals, such as the value of having someone lead and the desirability of selecting leaders from among the best qualified.

A critical problem for all societies seeking justice is to control the powerful, and specifically to control their tendency to expropriate economic surplus. In all complex societies it is necessary for the system to give the worker a reduced share of what he produces. The remaining surplus is used for essential services, national defense, and reinvestment. Leaders, capitalists, and commissars must also live off this surplus, and their power makes it likely that they will take far more than their due, thereby "exploiting" the situation.¹⁰ The rulers in all societies live better than the masses (with the emphasis on perquisites of office rather than income in socialist states). Controls over this "staff exploitation" in capitalist states are economic and political, in socialist states, primarily political. The relative weakness of socialist controls may, however, be compensated for by the greater institutional commitment of socialist leaders to egalitarian living standards.

FREEDOM IN PRECAPITALIST SYSTEMS

After clearing away this ground, let us look directly at the relation of economic systems to the achievement of freedom. The reader will recall that the model of democracy preferred by Jefferson was that of a rural society consisting primarily of small landed proprietors—today we would speak of a society made up primarily of family farms.

This was an important aspect of society in Jefferson's America, as it was in other rural democracies such as Switzerland. It stood to reason then, as now, that agricultural states consisting of plantations with many slaves or serfs, or industrial states with unorganized and dependent workers serving large corporations, were not likely to be ideal breeding grounds for democracy. This picture seems to be confirmed by countries with extensive landlordism where the vote appears to be delivered year after year for reactionary forces.

The foregoing picture needs, however, several modifications. First, much of the evidence for this picture is inferred from the wide discrepancy between city and rural voting, with the rural generally much the more conservative. Yet rural voters are generally socially and culturally more conservative, so that on many issues a conservative rural vote cannot be used as evidence of compulsion.¹¹ Secondly, the vote in many areas is organized by "someone," and there may be little gain in replacing the landed gentry with another organizing group under a succeeding system. Finally, it is possible for landlordism to be countered without land reform. For example, worker or tenant organizations can be instituted. Labor organizations have reduced capitalist control over workers to next to nothing in political terms. In some countries this organization is primarily for economic goals as in the United States, while in others it is for political and economic goals. In either case the ability of the landlord or capitalist to control the political system is nullified. For a number of reasons organizing agricultural workers is more difficult than industrial, but it can succeed—as most recently in California.

FREEDOM AND CAPITALISM

In fully developed industrial capitalism what, then, is the balance sheet for freedom? First, there is a high degree of economic freedom for both management and labor. There is latitude for investment, for choice of occupation, as well as change of occupation and residence. One can choose to be self-employed or work for a large firm; one can join a union or create a new professional association. One can freely choose to spend more or less money on health care, the children's education, or housing. These are permissive rather than enabling freedoms. The poor may not have the ability or the luck or the money to take advantage of such permissive freedoms. But most people take advantage of one or more of these freedoms in capitalist states. This is evidenced, for example, by the much wider variety of housing styles or forms of education available in capitalist societies as compared to socialist.

There has never been a pure capitalist society; in our century there has been a steady evolution toward mixed capitalist forms. This has been due, in part, to the general acceptance of egalitarian ideologies, but even more to the inevitable tension between the demands of the economic market place of capitalism and the demands (for votes) of the political market place with an expanding electorate.¹² At first interference by the government in the operations of the market appears to broaden the choice of individuals in such areas as education, health, old age insurance, or transportation. A rich mixture of public and private facilities and services offers a broad range of choice, and indeed brings opportunities to the generality of the public that otherwise would have been unavailable. At first government expansion concentrates on areas such as roads or electric power. Government control of such natural monopolies expands freedom, because it adds to the political power of the average man by bringing more directly under his control that economic activity that is most imperfectly controlled by the market place. However, as government continues to expand its range of activity larger and larger sections of the public become aware of the fact that their growing tax burden sharply reduces the income the individual personally controls. As private net income declines, private choices narrow. Private facilities in areas such as education or medical care may come to be priced out of reach, or private decisions in fields such as education or housing become almost impossible to make (for example, in the United Kingdom or Sweden). Capitalist societies, then, range from those in which unfettered private enterprise rides roughshod over the interests of workers and consumers to those societies in which there is only a restricted range for the free market, a range that is maintained only for pragmatic reasons because of its relative efficiency. Such societies may come to be essentially socialist when there is no longer majority or staff respect for the freedoms that capitalism offers to investors, managers, workers, and consumers.

Let us, then, turn back to consider the defects of a capitalist system before it has reached this point. The essential problem its critics address is the economic inequality upon which capitalism is based. The market determines both wages and profits, and these can be very low for unproductive persons in unproductive industries that face the alternatives of bankruptcy and unemployment, or they can be very high for highly productive (or lucky) persons where unit profits are high or the units produced very numerous. This situation is criticized because of the inequality produced, but we have already set this objection aside because it raises a value issue with which this discussion is not directly concerned. However, economic inequality is also

criticized because it inevitably produces inequalities in political and civil freedoms. This argument concerns us, for although we have pointed out that our concept of freedom is permissive rather than enabling, nevertheless, we must consider the objective ability of people to express the permissive freedoms that are considered in the Comparative Survey.

A burning controversy in recent political science literature has been that between those who see our society as necessarily run by a "power elite," usually but not necessarily defined in terms of the economically powerful and their allies, and those who see society in the pluralistic terms we have emphasized here. One recent analysis and summary of this argument has pointed out that the truth lies in between.¹³ The analysis points out that while power elites do not actually determine many of the decisions that are overtly made in a community or nation, by their greater continuity of interest members of the power elite tend to determine what questions are asked and what kinds of decisions are made. If the political process works in free societies, their special power is effective primarily in areas of public inattention.

Such inequalities in political power are universal but can only be studied in free societies. What few point out in the discussion of the power elite controversy is that detailed knowledge of political decisions in terms of where decisions (or important nondecisions) are made comes almost exclusively from the study of more or less capitalist polities. The issue becomes the degree to which capitalism interferes with the attainment of democratic ideals. If studies were made of the relative attainment of democratic ideals in capitalist and non-capitalist societies, then the democratic shortcomings of capitalist societies would appear insignificant.

Capitalist society puts concentrated economic power into the hands of a few persons. This power can be used to buy votes, corrupt legislatures, or intimidate workers. Even where the political and legal system keeps such interference to a minimum, such power can be used to finance campaigns for self or friends and to mount direct or indirect educational campaigns to influence citizens in favor of the kind of society that is most beneficial to the wealthy. Private universities in America, for example, are supported largely by the wealthy, and the wealthy dominate their boards of trustees. The same is true of the largest clubs, the ownership of newspapers, the movie industry, and so on. However, the picture is complicated by the fact that capitalist societies have developed a number of power centers, or "countervailing powers," that oppose the interests of their constituents to those of the industrial capitalists. Most prominent among these are "big labor" and "big government," each with its own hierarchies and goals. In

addition, other interest groups have been formed by educators, the military services, media representatives, consumers, doctors, and intellectuals. While the leaders of each of these groups have ties to the other power groups, sometimes quite close ties, in a showdown their interests often diverge. This is the basis for the industrialists' complaint that they have become essentially powerless to stem the currents of change in American society.¹⁵ In Euro-America the person paying the bill cannot any longer determine what is said in the most important newspapers, universities, or pulpits. For in the long run the careers of individuals in the professions are much more determined by their acceptance by their peers and by the general public than by a sponsoring individual.

The reader should note that we are not saying that political and civil freedoms can be equally utilized by all persons in modern capitalist states. Obviously a poor man is less able than a rich one to finance a campaign or place an advertisement in the paper to enlist support for a candidate or idea. Through organization poor people can and do engage in political advocacy, but on a per capita basis less frequently. What we are saying is that in modern society wealthy capitalists cannot convert their economic power into a general denial of political and civil freedoms to others. They have a real but restricted advantage.¹⁶

FREEDOM AND SOCIALISM

Analyzing the relation of socialism to freedom is perhaps the most critical ideological task of our time. For this analysis socialism must be understood in terms of two political-economic models, and these should be considered separately. Socialism in the *one-party model* is represented primarily by the communist states, although there are a variety of one-party socialist states in the world that have adopted this model without in fact establishing an effective party analogous to the communist. Socialism in the *multiparty model* does not actually exist in the world today, although societies such as Sweden or the United Kingdom, and indeed most industrialist capitalist states have moved part of the way toward achieving this model.¹⁷ Advocates of both socialisms have in common the belief that the economy should be under the direction of the society as a whole, which generally means operated by the state in the interests of all. The critical difference between the socialisms is that the one-party model assumes that at least for a long developmental period a vanguard party should organize society in order to lead it toward the goals that the party's leaders believe are for the good of all. The multiparty model, on the other

hand, is based on the assumption that people have a right to choose or not choose a socialist state, to choose the priorities that the state should follow, and ultimately to reject both socialist leaders and theory should they so desire.

Few readers are apt to quarrel with the assumption that political and civil freedoms are not respected in one-party socialist states. Apologists claim that these states are in any event good for their peoples, or that tyranny makes no difference because civil and political freedoms are largely a facade everywhere. These are not claims that such freedoms are respected. When one-party states hold elections, government spokesmen in such countries state explicitly that persons opposing the policy or ideology of the ruling party will not be allowed to compete for office. One-party governments forbid opinion disrespectful of the leaders of the party or their programs to be presented in the media.¹⁸ The superficial appearance of unanimity of the people in one-party states is a managed unanimity, which is surely less democratic than are partially managed competitions. Evidence on public opinion in one-party societies is scanty, yet the reservoir of opposition is so large that attempts to allow a more open expression of opinion in societies such as the USSR, Czechoslovakia, or China have led repeatedly to renewed repressions.

One-party socialist states ruled by governments that do not need to pass the test of elections, and are organized on the assumption that the leaders know what is best for the people, generally deny a wide range of civil liberties. For example, if more people are needed in a particular industry, individuals may be forced into it by orders against which there is no recourse. Education is determined less by preference than by the needs of the state. Individuals cannot simply decide to move—indeed they may never be allowed to move. Yugoslavia is probably the only communist state with a relatively effective right of emigration, and then only because of the economic needs of the state. Single "company unions" are organized for purposes of the state rather than the workers.¹⁹ The state has the right to interfere with religion, and frequently closes churches when and where it feels itself sufficiently strong. Inequalities in political and civil freedoms are extreme. Those outside of the party apparatus have essentially no rights—they are the recipients and employees of government, not its sponsors or authors. Members of the ruling party have vastly greater power than the ordinary subjects of the state, and yet most decisions in one-party states are made by a very few leaders at the top without any effective means of questioning the decisions by the party rank and file.²⁰ We have knowledge of very few instances where the top leadership of a governing communist party was successfully resisted

by the rank and file. It is probable, however, that in cases of extreme factionalism, as in Communist China, that those rank and file party members willing to take chances do have significant political rights.

A variation on the one-party system is the "dominant party" system²¹ of such states as Mexico. In this case the limited functioning of an opposition party allows some political pressure to be put on the rulers, and it certainly enhances opportunities for freedom of speech. Since the minority party is not given a chance to rule, it does not approximate the freedoms of a true multiparty system. In theory factions within one party can play the same role as several parties, but unless these factions compete openly for the voter's favor the enhancement of political freedom is insignificant for the average person.²² Partyless systems are more likely to coexist with a high level of freedom, especially in small states. Parties in many American states are little more than convenient labels for arranging elimination contests before general elections. As long as primaries were held such parties could be eliminated without real loss to democracy.²³ However, many nations without parties forbid them in order to prevent effective public opposition to incumbent rule. Such a nonparty state may be as undemocratic as a one-party state (although generally it has fewer totalitarian goals).

Multiparty socialism, or social democracy, has or should have, quite a different relation to freedom, for the leaders of the state must regularly submit to the judgment of the voters in a competitive political system. While the government owns nearly all property and provides nearly all services, if it does not by and large offer what the people want, those who run the government will be replaced with a new group more amenable to popular desires. As in a capitalist democracy the people are the sponsors and the recipients of the actions of government.

The difficulty with understanding the multiparty socialist alternative is its evanescence. That there has never been a truly democratic socialist state in spite of a number of attempts to create one should be a major concern of its advocates.²⁴ However, as pointed out above, there has been a steady socialist drift in many modern democracies. It appears to be much easier to nationalize an industry than to denationalize it, to get a legislature to vote an added benefit for the people than to vote to take an accepted benefit away. If the drift continues, a people may not know when it arrives at a socialist state, but it will arrive. It will have arrived when there is no longer concern to respect on principle the rights of private property, when the presumption is in favor of government ownership and the exception is private ownership. This stage would not be disastrous for freedom,

unless it can be shown that multiparty socialist states will necessarily evolve into essentially one-party states.

The great advantage for freedom offered by a multiparty socialist state should be the commitment of the state to equality in both political and economic realms. Whether incomes are more equal in a socialist state is an empirical question; in fact large income differentials may be allowed by such societies to increase efficiency as they were under Stalin. But the differentials in socialist states should not allow that accumulation of money in the hands of a few that leads to differences in both economic and political power in capitalist states. In socialist states so much of socioeconomic life is essentially free or subsidized that in theory the poorest have as much access to the media and what is required for political organization as the richest. Freedom should also be enhanced by equality under socialism because nearly all of the property of the state is politically controlled, and politics is theoretically in the hands of all the people. The capitalist will argue that only a capitalist economic system produces what the people want, because it is the only system that responds to market demand. Theoretically, in socialist society people could bring pressure on industry directly through their elected representatives to produce what people want, but this might be a very clumsy procedure, especially for those with minority desires. Socialist society should certainly be better able than capitalist society to decide on the balance between what is determined by the market and what should be determined non-economically.

The possibility that a socialist society might operate a market economy, with the efficiency and enhanced consumer choice of that economy, has recently been explored by Raymond Aron.²⁵ He points out that Joseph Schumpeter proposed that such an economy would not only be more efficient than one centrally planned but would also be more compatible with other liberties. But Aron concludes that direct and indirect evidence casts doubt on the reality of this alternative. He writes:

There is no *logical* contradiction between the collective ownership of the means of production and consumer sovereignty; but there is both a social and a psychological incompatibility. Why should we now witness, for the first time in history, a powerful minority of such virtue that it bows before the wishes of a majority which it has the effective power to constrain?²⁶

Therefore it is likely that even multiparty socialism would have to live with both the advantages and disadvantages of a high level of political interference with prices, wages, and the allocation of capital.

Since experience with multiparty socialism is so scanty, the problems of freedom in multiparty socialist states must to a large extent be conjectural. We can, however, outline some possibilities. The essential problem of socialism in a modern state is the size and power of the staff of government vis-à-vis the ostensible sponsor, the unorganized public. In a modern capitalist state the staff of government is powerful, but it must compete with a large and powerful range of alternative power groups such as labor unions, corporations, and private media that are not autonomous, or strong enough to balance the staff in a socialist society. There will be aspects of pluralism in multiparty socialist states, particularly if they have strong churches and opposition parties. Pluralism is, however, limited in these states and this is particularly so if the party in power is identified with organized labor, as is so often the case in democracies outside of the United States.

In order to see why the socialist state may be a threat to freedom, let us consider briefly some basic differences between economic systems. Economic systems may emphasize either reciprocal, redistributive, or market mechanisms. In many ways reciprocal systems are the most idyllic, but since their effective functioning is restricted to families and small groups we can concentrate our inquiry on a comparison of redistributive systems such as characterize socialist states and the market mechanisms of capitalist states. It is necessarily the case that redistributive systems will offer more economic security but at a cost in economic freedom. For example, a pure market society does not guarantee full employment or a living wage—if individuals do not make themselves sufficiently useful, there is no place for them. By contrast, a redistributive society has as its task the employing and support of all regardless of their usefulness. The result, however, in operating socialist systems is that people are compelled to work where and how the government determines. The socialist Incas severely punished anyone for laziness or vagabondage, while Cuba in the 1970's was jailing people under its new antiloafing law directed against absenteeism and leaving work early.²⁷ According to a recent decree of the Presidium of the Russian Republic:

Able-bodied citizens of full legal age (18) who do not want to fulfill the most important constitutional duty—to work honestly in accordance with their abilities—and evade socially useful labor, leading parasitic lives, are subject to eviction to localities especially set aside for this purpose for a term of two to five years.²⁸

The examples taken from one-party states may not apply to multiparty socialist states, yet it is significant that those states that most closely approach this model, such as Sweden, couple their full employ-

ment policies with a much firmer attitude toward the jobless than is common in the United States.²⁹

The argument that socialism leads to compulsion is inescapable, even when it is couched in the language of "freedom." For example, Richard Titmuss believes that all blood should be provided voluntarily to state-controlled blood banks. He believes that people should have a right to give but not to sell their blood, or to determine to whom it shall go. What Titmuss does not explore is what happens if there is not enough blood; evidently instead of raising the price, people will be compelled or coerced into giving. Now Titmuss may be right about blood, but his intention is to use the argument to establish a general principle for all goods, one that "frees" man from the aberration of the market society and "integrates" him with the redistributive.³⁰ Accepting such implications Karl Polanyi believes that since compulsion is a necessary aspect of all societies, it is preferable to establish a majority-controlled distributive system that compels both adequate production and adequate consumption, and thus frees the individual from the most compelling burdens of life, as well as from excessive individualism and alienation.³¹

In the thorough-going multiparty socialist state, newspapers, radio and television, schools, nearly all potential employers, all available housing, and most domestic products are provided by, and administered under the aegis of, the government. Here one could not simply "start his own business" to try to fill what seems to be an unfilled need. Opportunities to earn more by working longer hours will be very restricted; it is unlikely that one could simply decide to take a year off and live on accumulated savings. One would find it harder to start an alternative school or launch a new journal.³² These are civil freedoms that socialism need not extinguish, but will tend to extinguish through its direct bureaucratic control, and the fact that groups that are sufficiently organized to resist overextension of governmental power are fewer and relatively less powerful in socialist states.

In a multiparty socialist system inequalities in income would tend to be less than in capitalist states, but inequalities in power could easily become greater. For with fewer checks on those in power and with fewer alternatives, the bureaucrat or government official would have less reason to listen to public voices. The only place the individual could turn for effective support might be to an opposition party, and when opposition parties are too weak to resist, there would be no place to turn. In the area of consumer choice socialist societies are particularly unlikely to meet the special needs of those with tastes other than those of the masses (or in a corrupted socialist state, the masses and the ruling elite).

Supporters of the socialist model will insist that the monolithic socialist state is an illusion. It is true that recent theorists of bureaucracy have pointed out the inevitable conflicts within any system on both personal and organizational levels.³³ In terms of these considerations, within broad limits any social system will develop competing power relationships among major groups analogous to the countervailing powers of industrial capitalism. For example, the educational bureaucracy of the socialist state will be opposed by its trade unions which will be opposed, in turn, by the military. Tight party control of all bureaucracies makes such opposition almost meaningless for the expansion of freedom for average people in one-party states, but this should not be the case in multiparty states where it is not assumed that there is any one locus of right. The multiparty socialist society is theoretically open to control by a public that can mediate between the bureaucracies through the use of its vote. Socialist societies might also increase popular control by increasing regional and local decision-making, and expanding the power of party committees at these levels. In this way independent and indestructible institutions might be built that would successfully resist the government juggernaut even in socialist systems.

DIFFERING REQUIREMENTS FOR FREEDOM OF CAPITALISM AND SOCIALISM

In summary, let us suggest that precapitalist systems (such as landlordism) or unfettered capitalism are not conducive to the full expression of democratic freedoms. As an earlier essay showed, however, freedom can develop under these systems. At the other extreme, one-party socialism is an even poorer environment for the development of freedom (unless the one-party is a fiction, concealing within its framework several competing parties that can, in fact, "go to the people").

The best economic systems for the expression of civil and political freedom are modern limited capitalism under multiparty control or multiparty socialism. Although the free socialist model is not yet realized it might be a good environment for freedom if sufficient controls were built in, and if the ideologies of the ruling parties were populist rather than elitist. Because of its monolithic character such a populist faith seems more critical for freedom under socialism than capitalism.

The great advantage of capitalism for the preservation of freedom is its hard-headed individualistic view of mankind. Capitalist society is built on the assumption that everyone will pursue his own interests. In an earlier era, William Graham Sumner most clearly enunciated

the capitalist principle that "each man is guaranteed the use of all his own powers exclusively for his own welfare."³⁴ To Sumner social classes owe nothing to each other aside from this degree of respect. The individual is assumed to be the own best judge of his own interests. No person or group is called upon to decide the larger interests of society, for no one sets himself up to decide what is best for others. The state as a whole has only the minimal goal of establishing the framework within which free individuals may live. The problem is that the economic inequalities inevitable under pure capitalism will be used unfairly for both the political and economic advantage of those already successful. Under capitalism the government needs to take on the added burden of controlling the extension of private power if it is to guarantee freedom.

The great advantage of socialism is its idealistic assumption that group interests can and should be put above individual interests. Socialists assume that societies should plan their futures for the benefit of all. These assumptions of altruism and uniform public interest too easily make socialist theoreticians and leaders imagine that they can speak in the public interest and plan in the public interest without allowing the public an effective say. Socialism leads to paternalism and arrogance eroding freedom and ultimately entrenching special privilege in a society in which those in command are supposed to be integrated into a selfless society.³⁵

Let us conclude by suggesting models of capitalist and socialist systems that would guarantee the highest levels of freedom. The free capitalist system must be modified so that owners of capital are balanced by organized power such as that of labor, organized religion, political parties, consumer groups, and regional and local interests. Freedom would be enhanced to the extent that neither capital nor labor has monopoly interests in particular industries. To follow a preferred line of work in the community no one should be forced to work for a particular corporation or join a particular union. And, except for natural monopolies such as water, power, or gas, consumers should always be offered a choice between free competitors. Where there is a necessary monopoly it should either be government owned or closely and effectively regulated. A capitalist system supports effective freedom by providing basic welfare benefits to the needy, a system of public education, and public parks and roads. Yet it threatens freedom when provision of these services consumes such a high percentage of income that the choices of average persons are sharply reduced, and the government staff comes to overbalance competing nongovernmental centers of power.

A free socialist system must be combined with a multiparty political

system. It must be organized to minimize socialism's greatest threat to freedom—the concentration of power in the government staff—and maximize its greatest advantage for freedom—the fact that with the minimization of economic inequality effective political equality can be more easily attained. Freedom under socialism requires the organization of strong, competitive political parties that are frequently able to wrest power from one another. It is imperative in a socialist system that there should be a strongly institutionalized set of competing power groups. The classic separation of powers, particularly between the judiciary, the legislative, and the administrative branches, is important, as is the separation of the economic interests of organized labor from those of any particular political party, and those of regional and local government from those of the national administration. A free socialist state of this type might have a slower pace of political-economic change than a more streamlined society. However, it can be argued that once socialism is attained the desirability of rapid change will be less important than resistance to power concentration.

NOTES

1. Charles Yost, "How U.S. Harms Human Rights Policy," *The Christian Science Monitor*, August 26, 1977, p. 27.

2. See John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971). Rawls, however, places other values first in very poor societies. For further discussion of this point see B. Barry, "John Rawls and the Priority of Liberty," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 2, no. 3 (1973): 274-90.

3. See Abraham Maslow, *Motivation and Personality* (New York: Harper and Row, 1954).

4. Quoted in Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 101-2.

5. John J. Honigmann, ed., *Handbook of Social and Cultural Anthropology* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1973).

6. Richard Arens, ed., *Genocide in Paraguay* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1976).

7. Samuel Brittan, "The Economic Tensions of British Democracy," in R. E. Tyrrell, Jr., ed., *The Future That Doesn't Work* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1977), p. 141.

8. E. Walster, E. Berscheid, and G. Walster, "New Directions in Equity Research," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 25, no. 2 (1973): 151-76.

9. On income differentials see Jacqueline Kasun, "United States Poverty in World Perspective," *Current History*, 64, no. 382, pp. 247-52, 274-75. There is in fact surprisingly little difference in the extent of inequality in the distribution of income in modern countries. Norway and Taiwan are the most egalitarian noncommunist states, but U.S. figures are not significantly different. Figures for communist states are often not reliable, but Kasun shows that even

mainland China has a wide range of incomes. The lack of extreme wealth and poverty in communist states is, however, suggested by Raymond Aron's calculation that the incomes of highest and lowest tenths of the population shows twice the disparity in the U.S.A. as in the USSR. However, he finds differences in power and perquisites to be perhaps greater (Raymond Aron, "My Defense of our Decadent Europe," *Encounter*, September 1977, pp. 7-50). See also A. B. Atkinson, *The Economics of Inequality* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), especially pp. 245-51.

10. See the discussion by George Dalton, "Further Remarks on Exploitation," *American Anthropologist*, 79, no. 1 (March 1977): 125-34, and the references cited.

11. Compare Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 445-61.

12. Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1942, 1950). Also, Tyrrell, *The Future That Doesn't Work*.

13. Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, *Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970).

14. See John K. Galbraith, *American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1956).

15. See L. S. Silk and David Vogel, *Ethics and Profits: The Crisis of Confidence in American Business* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1976).

16. An intuitive feeling for the extent to which they have some but not very much advantage can be seen by reading Charles Lipsen's racy account of Washington lobbyists (*Vested Interest* [Garden City: Doubleday, 1977]). Actually, most of the time Lipsen was chief lobbyist for the Retail Clerks International.

17. Raymond Aron points to the large gap between an authentic socialist economy and a monopoly capitalistic economy such as Sweden's where the government strives to redistribute income without affecting ownership or the operation of the market ("My Defense of Our Decadent Europe," *supra*, pp. 30-32).

18. For example, in the Soviet Union rights such as freedom of speech, demonstration, religion, or privacy are granted only "in conformity with the interests of the working people and for the purpose of strengthening the socialist system." According to the criminal code: "Agitation or propaganda conducted with the purpose of undermining or weakening Soviet power, or defaming the Soviet State and social system" are crimes punishable by up to seven years (Daniel Shipler, "Soviet Makes No Legal Changes on Human Rights in New Charter," *New York Times*, June 5, 1977, pp. 1, 16). How the single party works in elections is suggested by a recent election in Tanzania in which "candidates were required to adhere strictly to the TANU manifesto, which broadly underwrites a policy of socialist programs.... At election meetings neither candidate was allowed to attack his opponent, and a party official was in the chair at every public meeting to make sure that the rules were obeyed" (*Africa Research Bulletin*, November 1975, p. 3790).

19. International Labor Office *Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations*. Report III (Part 4A) (Geneva: 1977), pp. 141-42, 165-67.

20. This accumulation of power, and its possible inevitability was most effectively expressed by Milovan Djilas in *The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System* (New York: Praeger, 1957).

21. See Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, pp. 419-20.

22. See Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).

23. Political scientists such as Huntington (*Political Order in Changing Societies*, pp. 397-408) insist on the necessity of parties in democracy, in spite of the implications of the actual situation in the United States. The important point is to distinguish between Huntington's "no-party state" which a democratic polity may well prefer, and the repressive "antiparty state."

24. This is a major theme in Jean-Francois Revel's *The Totalitarian Temptation* (New York: Doubleday, 1977).

25. Raymond Aron, "My Defense of Our Decadent Europe," *supra*, pp. 15-23.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

27. Garcilaso de la Vega, *Royal Commentaries* (London: Hakluyt Society, 1869-71); *Latin American Digest*, March 1972.

28. Quoted by Aaron Levenstein, "Work—What is its Future?" in *Freedom at Issue*, no. 26 (July-August 1974), pp. 5-10.

29. A Swedish official of the Employment Bureau said, "To have education and training and not to work is to be an enemy of society." "Blick auf Schweden—Blick in die Zukunft," *Der Spiegel*, no. 42 (1972), pp. 122-45. See also R. H. Weber, "Sweden Inc. The Total Institution," *Worldview*, 18, no. 3 (March 1975): 20-30.

30. Richard Titmuss, *The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1971), especially pp. 242, 275-76.

31. Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (New York: Rinehart, 1944), especially p. 258A.

32. As witness the difficulty the English have recently had in establishing a private university in the face of the establishment assumption all education must be government controlled and paid for. Barbara Crosette, "Dispute Over New British College Reflects Nation's Ideological Split," *New York Times*, July 18, 1977).

33. For example, Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).

34. William Graham Sumner, *What Social Classes Owe to Each Other* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1920), p. 34.

35. This is, of course, the primary message of the new antisocialist philosophical movement in France. See Bernard-Henri Levy, *La barbarie à visage humain* (Paris: Grasset, 1977).

Self-Determination, Subnationalities, and Freedom

At the end of World War II Alfred Cobban succinctly summed up the history and prospects of the doctrine of self-determination.¹ To Cobban the idea of self-determination had arisen as a concomitant of the idea of democracy, and its justification lay in its rationale as a further extension of individual liberties. However, Cobban felt that by the 1940's it had been carried to such extremes, and twisted to support so many undemocratic regimes, that the idea was as much a threat to individual liberties as it was a guarantee. When he wrote Cobban was concerned with the weakness of small states, and he hoped for controls over fissiparous and anarchic nationalisms through new mechanisms of international order. With these concerns, Cobban proposed that independence be the primary goal of self-determination only when a sovereign state fails to grant the legitimate rights of peoples to their own way of life through regional or other alternatives.

In the decades since World War II many have hoped that the cosmopolitan force of economic and educational development would gradually reduce interest in local nationalisms through the growth of more universalistic societies. However, as Walker Connor points out, there is now a growing lack of faith that education, modernization, and enhanced communication will lead to the assimilation of communal groups into "new nations."² If we define assimilation as loss of a popular sense of separate group identity, at least in this century, "No examples of significant assimilation are offered which have taken place since the advent of the age of nationalism and the principle of the self-determination of nations."³ This suggests that the world faces continuing upheavals fueled by an unending chain of peoples rising to self-consciousness. Of the 132 states Connor surveyed only twelve were ethnically homogeneous, while in twenty-five the largest ethnic group accounted for more than ninety percent of the population, in twenty-five between seventy-five and eighty-nine percent, in thirty-one for fifty to seventy-four percent, and in thirty nine the largest ethnic group accounted for less than fifty percent.

With this degree of heterogeneity the dilemma faced by advocates

of freedom is a very real one. When a territorial minority, such as the Welsh or Québécois, claims that the state it finds itself in does not allow it a sufficient right to govern itself, then for the members of this group political freedom might be argued to exist only to the extent that this group is a self-governing unit. The fact that there is seldom a compelling case for the boundaries of any political unit other than the vagaries of history casts doubt on the nature of political rights for anyone who desires a different state identity. The fact that so many tiny islands have opted for independence—and many island groups continue to face threats of further fragmentation—suggests that there is no territorial dimension, or degree of ethnic homogeneity that may be counted on to limit the centrifugal effects of the desire for self-determination. Once people perceive the opportunity to perfect their political freedoms by reducing the size of the unit in which they live, and thus increasing their personal chance for participation and influence, they may demand this right. Economic or defense requirements may delay fragmentation, but in the long run such considerations are likely to do no more than retard centrifugal demands.

In constructing the tables of the Comparative Survey of Freedom, whether or not the peoples in an area are independent is given significant but minor weight in determining the level of political rights. This inclusion is supplemented by presenting separate tables of subnational peoples (Tables 8 and 9). To justify our interest in this question and its relation to political and civil freedoms, it is necessary to carefully consider the present state of the international acceptance of the right of self-determination as well as the basic principles upon which the right is asserted. While many recent discussions point to the kinds of symbols of separateness that might be employed by a people, and to the characteristics of demands for self-determination that receive widespread support,⁴ few go further and inquire seriously into the boundaries and conditions of legitimate demands for self-determination. In this section I will attempt to fill part of this gap. After making some distinctions and definitions in the area of self-determination, considering the present range of pragmatic or adjustive responses that are given to demands for self-determination, and summarizing the present position of self-determination in International Law, I will suggest an adaptation of Cobban's principle for considering claims to self-determination, and relate this principle to other policy values.

THE DEFINITION AND CONTEXTS OF SUBNATIONALISM

Walker Connor has persuasively argued that an important cause of confusion in discussions of the right of self-determination has been

the contradictory use of the words "nation" and "nationalism" as both synonymous with and distinct from "state" and "statism."⁵ Serious political scientists have within one paper warned against the confusion of terms and then proceeded to confuse them. Connor particularly points out that one result of the confusion is that "nation-building" is generally used in the literature to describe what is in fact the destruction of the existing peoples or nations in an area and their replacement by a new "nation" coterminous with a state whose dimensions may be no more than an accident of colonial history.

The confusion, however, goes deeper, for "nationalism" has frequently been invoked to overcome or disregard internal communal conflicts through establishing a powerful we-they distinction across an actual or potential state boundary. As Connor himself points out, the American and French revolutions established the principle that a people has a right to determine who will rule it, the principle upon which "national self-determination was later to be based."⁶ American, French, and British nationalisms have always had as one of their objectives the overcoming of internal ethnic cleavages, just as Bukharan nationalism in the early twentieth century had as its goal overcoming the opposition of Turkish and Persian ethnic units and tribal groups within the Bukharan Emirate (see the discussion of Tadjikistan below).⁷ Analysts cannot dismiss the use of expressions such as "Nigerian nationalism" when they are long acquainted with the integrative meaning of American, Canadian, Belgian, or Swiss nationalisms.

For this discussion my solution is to speak of nationality and nationalism only when referring to feelings of loyalty, pride, or partiality engendered in a people defined by the boundary of an independent state (or in some cases a territorially distinct colony). People with these feelings often live outside the boundaries of the state with which they identify. We will refer to *subnationality* and *subnationalism* when discussing a group that presently or potentially strives for enhanced self-determination with purposes and feelings analogous to those of state nationalities, and often with political independence as a goal.⁸ Given this distinction, nation-building can be "people destroying" (that is, destructive of present or potential subnationalisms) without the contradiction that Connor finds.

For the denial of group rights to exist must there be a definable group of people that feel they are a group? Do subnational rights exist separately from this consciousness? These are serious questions because external perceptions of subnationality may initiate activities that eventually create a group consciousness that did not previously exist. Yet for many purposes analysts and administrators wish to anticipate expressions of subnationalism that are likely to occur with modernization

and democratization. It is also no more than just to consider those groups that would make subnationalist demands were they not encapsulated within totalitarian or other anticomunal systems.

It is notoriously difficult to define a people. One of the reasons statistical samples comparing cultures cannot be relied on in anthropology is the impossibility of deciding on the appropriate units. What one text may define as one cultural unit, the next may divide into four groups. Should we, for example, speak of European culture, American culture, or Texan culture? Similarly, for the purpose of political analysis the concept of "a people" is frequently evanescent and shifting. Repeatedly, those who have moved from the level of broad generalization to consider ethnic conflicts in detail find that the peoples thought to exist in a particular country do not have a substantial existence in the minds of the inhabitants themselves, exist only in certain narrow contexts, or have come to have psychological reality only in the last few years.⁹

The self-identification that we label subnationalism usually develops when there is a confrontation of peoples that requires a change in traditional forms of identification. For the average peasant villager or primitive tribesman, the only meaningful contacts are with the inhabitants of his immediate vicinity. For him the "peoples" of interest are defined by village boundaries or lineage distinctions, or a cluster of these. Except for a few peoples fortunate enough to find themselves on small islands, such micro-units are not what is usually taken seriously in discussions of subnationalism. However, this dismissal is too hasty; the micro-units that the people themselves understand must be taken seriously wherever they exist if we are really concerned with the question of self-determination.

Beyond this simplest level subnationality grows out of contact, usually competitive contact, in political or economic spheres. Such contact is especially aroused by common experiences such as invasions, slave raids, or migrations, but in recent years is primarily traced to the mixing of peoples from different backgrounds in cities. Under these conditions, as a self-defense mechanism in a search for allies, individuals who formerly identified themselves only in local terms are willing to take on a broader communal identification or ethnicity.

It is not surprising that the most common source of politically relevant group identity is based on identification with a political unit of the past. For instance, in Zaire the Kongo people of the lower Congo who identified with a medieval kingdom, and in Uganda the Ganda who had an operating kingdom up to the 1960's were the peoples with the most developed sense of their separate identities. If there has never been a previous political unit, it is harder for

language, racial, religious, or other marks of difference to become politically salient.¹⁰

Whatever the distinction, we must carefully consider how significant an assumed group difference is to the people concerned, and why it has become a salient issue. The reason for our concern is that outsiders—colonizers or others—have often found it useful for their own reasons to label groups on the flimsiest of evidence as though they constituted tribes, nations, religious communities, or other self-conscious units. If actions are then taken on this basis—for example, setting up special provinces for the people, translating the Bible into "their language" (thereby necessarily abstracting a subnational language from a variety of dialects), or signing a treaty with "them," then the outsiders unintentionally may have established the basis for a new subnational consciousness. Extreme examples are the creation of the "Ngala" by the migration into Leopoldville of several unrelated up-river peoples, or of the Teso of Uganda by the centralizing and organizational actions of British administrators. "Visayan" was a linguist's term for a variety of related dialects in the Philippines, yet when speakers of these dialects go to other parts of the Philippines they now refer to themselves as Visayans.¹¹ Competing in a strange environment new identifications help the members of an incipient group to achieve their individual needs, and reduce the isolation attendant upon a more mobile life. The new communal attachment gives the individual a fairer chance to achieve his just share of goods and respect in a new world made up of others who already rely on such identification.

Finally we must note the extent to which subnationalism is exploited by both internal and external forces. The British colonialists were often accused of divide-and-rule tactics. For whatever reason they encouraged ethnic identification and division, sharpening such identities in order to combine indirect rule with administrative responsibility. More recently, conflicts such as that in Cyprus have seen a variety of outside pressures push the local peoples further apart. Muslim intransigence in the Philippines, and Pathan intransigence in Pakistan have certainly been partially defined by external support. It is not to deny the legitimacy of any subnationalist movement to point out that it is not simply a natural welling up of sentiment for eternal group values.¹²

Given these caveats, let us define a *people* as a group of persons with generational continuity that is objectively distinguishable from other groups in terms of features such as language, religion, customs, special history, or residential territory. Generally such a group is not a caste, a social class, or a lineage grouping (such as the tribes

of Somalia or Arabia), but it may be based on a political (including tribal) division even within the same ethnic group (as in Botswana). A *self-conscious people* exists when some members of a group label themselves as belonging to a separate people. If in the name of this people, these members ask for official acknowledgment of their people's special rights at any level, then we may speak of a *subnotion* within a state or within a nation where the nation is identified with a state.

In the Southern Sudan investigators have identified peoples within peoples within peoples.¹³ This segmentary analysis is applicable to many areas, including Switzerland where the people of one commune may hate those of the next, join with them collectively in hatred of the people in the next canton, join with people of the next canton vis-a-vis Swiss of other religious or language groups, and identify with the peoples of all cantons as Swiss nationals against the world. One person may also belong to several different peoples in non-segmentary form, for example, as a person who is both a good nationalist American *and* a good nationalist Irishman with special interests in the future of the Irish in Ireland. The nonexclusiveness of nationalism is generally not confusing when we direct our attention only to those nationalistic peoples, of whatever variety or interrelationship, that are interested in political self-determination as a group, or we have reason to believe may come to be so interested.

After a detailed study Crawford Young has suggested that heterogeneous states be distinguished as follows:

1. Single dominant group with minorities, such as Rwanda and Sri Lanka,
2. Core culture with peripheral cultures, such as Peru or Ethiopia,
3. Bipolar polity, such as Cyprus or Belgium,
4. Multipolar without dominance, such as most sub-Saharan African states,
5. Multiplicity of cultures with cross-cutting allegiances, such as India, Nigeria, Indonesia, and Uganda.¹⁴

This is a useful classification for describing the complexity of the situation, but it fails to emphasize those distinctions most relevant to an evaluation of the claims to self-determination of a particular group. In these terms the most important distinction is between heterogeneous societies in which the peoples represented are territorially distinct, and those in which they are essentially intermixed. Employing by analogy the concepts of English grammar we might distinguish between *compound states* consisting of territorially distinct peoples and *complex states* characterized by a variety of intermixed peoples. Some states such as the USSR are, of course, compound and complex. Compound states may, then, be either *ethnic*, in which subnational peoples are

officially recognized as the building blocks of society, or *transethnic*, in which national political organization and symbols are meant to be separate from and eventually supersede those of any particular ethnic group. Either ethnic or transethnic states may include peoples that currently or potentially demand a larger degree of self-determination. Transethnic, compound states such as Tanzania or Zaire are typically made up of many ethnic groups, with the top leaders either from a variety of groups, or the key leader from one of the less important groups. In such states peoples that have reached a conscious level of subnationalism may be absent, or nearly so. In some cases, however, they include one or more highly articulate subnationalities, such as the Ganda of Uganda.

PRAGMATIC REACTIONS TO DEMANDS FOR SELF-DETERMINATION

The United Nations Charter refers to a right of self-determination for all peoples, and later declarations and covenants have confirmed this right.¹⁵ Yet, paradoxically, an operative right of secession exists in no state in the world. The right was granted to certain peoples in Soviet constitutions, but was most certainly denied in practice.¹⁰ It has been pointed out that almost every state founded in the recent past on a plea of self-determination has immediately denied the same right to those peoples that happened to lie within its newly won borders. The United Nations and former Secretary General U Thant have supported these denials in spite of the organization's abstract support of self-determination.¹⁷

Since there have been no generally accepted definitions of "a people" or of a group that has a legitimate right to call itself a nation, informed opinion on present and potential issues of national justice around the world are casually swayed by the fads and accidents of communication. In spite of continuing rhetoric the time is long past when overseas colonialism was the main obstacle to self-determination. The traditional division of the world into independent countries and non-self-governing territories is useful primarily for historical reasons or the satisfaction of United Nations delegates.¹⁸ On the one hand, the overwhelming number of units described as colonies are small French, British, or ANZUS island communities. Most of their peoples have either expressed through democratic procedures their desire to remain colonies, or recently have voted in favor of independence and are well on their way to obtaining it. People in these societies live far freer and more democratic lives than most peoples in the world. On the other hand, there are much larger communities with long historical traditions of a distinct cultural and political heritage within states such

as the USSR, China, Uganda, or Iraq that are denied self-determination and do not have access to democratic forms. Yet these peoples are conventionally regarded as neither colonial peoples nor nonself-governing. Where are the limits? Surely not all peoples with some claim to identity have a moral right to independence. Even within one country, such as the USSR, would not the most utopian idealist sooner or later discover peoples with so few members that he would not recommend independence?

In international law every state is granted a right of self-defense. Since international law regulates relations among states, this right applies to all states as independent systems of control over particular territories. Then, if a challenge comes from within that would diminish a state's territory, it has a right to defend itself against this threat as surely as against an external threat.¹⁹ What established its territory as its own was the state's previous ability to control it. But why, then, did the informed public applaud anticolonialist revolts in Africa, but not those of the Biafrans and Bugandans? Apparently it is control at a distance that is discountenanced. But international opinion is more upset by the control of Rhodesia by the whites than of Burundi by the minority Tutsi. Evidently control by "outsiders" disturbs modern consciences. But why do not liberal Euro-Americans raise money for liberation movements among Georgians or Uzbeks in the USSR? The relative lack of publicity might be the answer, yet the well-known case of the Kurds of Iraq, who have fought year after year for their independence, has also elicited little international sympathy. Apparently, according to world opinion, everything else being equal, a people at a distance from their rulers has a much more acceptable right to independence than one living contiguously to them.

At first glance it appears inexplicable that the United Nations or the media should differentiate between the rights to self-determination of contiguous and noncontiguous groups. This is particularly so if we consider that in President Wilson's day self-determination had primarily to do with contiguous peoples. But this position becomes understandable when we reflect that while most UN states do not have overseas colonies, most states do include areas with dissatisfied or potentially dissatisfied peoples. Therefore, it is in the interest of most statesmen to selectively note the unfulfilled desires for self-determination of those ruled by outsiders at a distance, while ignoring demands for self-determination by contiguous peoples.

Parenthetically, in raising issues of self-determination, we do not attempt to deal with the fact that a people may control its own state, but this state may, in turn, be controlled to some extent by other states. Less powerful states, and their peoples, are less able to

act freely on a world scale than the more powerful. However, as long as there is not direct physical intervention and imposition of control, the people controlling a state will be regarded as self-determining for our purposes. The only exceptions might be states such as Czechoslovakia and Mongolia where outside pressure appears overwhelming. Otherwise, the claim that the economic or military power of the wealthier states greatly reduces the self-determination of peoples in smaller or less wealthy states is not generally substantiated in the modern world. Taking population size alone into account, there may be a gain in per capita political power as we move from larger to smaller states—although not, of course, in military power. As to wealth, the ability of weak states to enforce 200-mile claims to ocean frontiers, or of small banana-producing states to successfully fight the great fruit companies in recent years, or of even the poorest states to expropriate the multinationals should put to rest any general assumption that the strong exploit the weak. By and large the multinationals have more reliable power in their home countries than they do in even the poorest foreign countries.

However, weakly developed political systems may be highly susceptible to corporate bribery or the actions of clandestine agencies such as the CIA or KGB.²⁰ This influence is primarily due to the willingness of local political leaders and publicists to work for foreign governments, and reflects more the weakness of some nationalisms than the strength of wealthy or powerful foreigners.²¹ For this reason such "control" is highly unreliable and transitory. Even with the massive scale of our presence in Vietnam, we could not reliably influence the behavior of Thieu and Ky.²² The man we helped set up as ruler in Guyana has now turned away from both capitalism and pro-Americanism, for he needs us no longer. Even though in the Dominican intervention the United States went far beyond the use of the CIA, the results of our actions could have been quietly and quickly reversed in any year since our intervention without the United States being able to make an effective counter. Perhaps better than any other example, the Bay of Pigs adventure showed how feeble the American ability to control small states is whenever determined opposition is encountered.

Interstate self-determination, then, is thriving in most of the world, but only in special situations will intrastate self-determination receive worldwide support now that the era of European colonialism is ended. What is the nature of these situations? In a paper on the drive of the East Bengalis for self-determination, Ved Nanda suggests six bases for their unusual success, or for the world's acceptance of it.²³ These were: physical separation, the impressive size of the population

of East Bengal, the cultural gulf between Bengalis and other Pakistanis, the apparent exploitation of East Pakistan by West Pakistan, the West's refusal to accept the electoral victory of the East's autonomists, and the brutal suppression of their resulting revolt. Of course, as important as any of Nanda's reasons for success was the willingness of the Indian government to drive out the West Pakistanis; this intervention was influenced by India's understandable desire to reduce Pakistan's size, importance, and consequent threat. India, in turn, was supported by a USSR desirous of expanding contacts in the area, and interested in weakening the China-Pakistan alliance. The unwillingness of the United States or China to counter effectively in support of Islamabad was due to both our internal weakness and the location of the struggle. But it was also due to the reasons that Nanda lists. For these reasons American and Chinese leaders could not win points in the arenas of domestic or international opinion by opposing the Indian invasion—in spite of the dangerous precedents that it set.

Moving beyond Nanda, let us consider the full range of common-sense criteria that world elites consider in attempting to adjust political action to current or prospective claims to self-determination. These are:

1. **SYMBOLIC DIFFERENTIATION OF THE GROUP:** To rise to attention peoples or subnationalities must be distinguished by badges of separate-ness, such as race, language (or dialect), religion (or sect), civilization, and historical experience. Self-consciousness as a group is generally regarded as a prerequisite for world concern, yet most groups have only a small elite with such consciousness. One of the most dynamic aspects of the problem is the fact that a group's sense of difference changes over time, with education often increasing its manifestation.

2. **SIZE OF POPULATION:** The group demanding self-determination must be of reasonable size relative to the rest of the state. While a few thousand may be sufficient in a world of small islands (for example, Anguilla under St. Kitts) or in very unpopulated areas, hundreds of thousands might be ignored in large countries (such as non-Bengalis in East Bengal).

3. **SIZE AND DISTINCTIVENESS OF TERRITORY:** Again, islands are obvious units, but peoples in large territories on the map, even when very few in number such as Eskimos, are more often given attention than much larger populations in smaller areas, such as the Spanish in northern New Mexico. Generally, a distinct home territory makes self-determination more feasible, but some degree of self-determination is possible even without a territorial base (see below).

4. **EXPECTED GROWTH OR DECLINE IN THE DEMAND:** Some sub-nationalities have for reasons of state educational policy, population

growth differentials, or longer historical trends, grown or declined in size or distinctiveness relative to other peoples, and particularly in regard to their state's dominant people (*Staatsvolk*). Equally important is growth or decline in the people's interest in self-determination. Karl Deutsch has shown from examples in India and Finland how increasing literacy has led to a rise in the consciousness of vernacular peoples that leads to demands to either displace the previous *Staatsvolk* in the state, or for increasing autonomy and separation.²⁴ Everything else being equal, evidence cited above indicates the likelihood of increasing interest in self-determination by a people in the process of social and economic development.

5. RECENCY OF SEPARATE EXISTENCE: Historically, Burke's doctrine of "prescription" has been the basis of establishing right through passage of time.²⁵ South China was originally not Chinese, but no one would today propose *on this basis* that there is a good case for the self-determination of the "Southern Chinese." However, the Soviet Union finally extinguished Bukharan independence only in the 1920's. This is a perilously short time. Still, Soviet rule of Bukhara is based on a better temporal claim than that of most newly independent states over their minority peoples. It is not only time, however, but the nature of the previous situation. In particular, a people may be more likely to have its claim listened to if historically it was a *Staatsvolk* of a now defunct state than if it was only a minority in a previous state, or previously without complex political forms.

6. THE CRIMES OF THE PAST: The doctrine of prescription was often countered by the claim that wrong could never be righted by time.²⁶ This seems particularly true if the wrongs are overwhelming and pernicious. It is on this basis that opinion leaders have supported the ancient claims of the Jews of Palestine in the twentieth century, in spite of the inordinate passage of time. After the persecution of Jews reached its climax in Europe, recompense was in order (though unfortunately for Christian consciences Nazis were not Palestinian Arabs).

7. THE STATUS OF SELF-GOVERNMENT: The support of the outside public for the autonomy of a subnationality within a democratic state is influenced by how large a vote they can muster for their cause. There is less persistent support for independence where the people involved have voted against independence, as in Puerto Rico and Northern Ireland (taken as a whole). In the latter case the demand of the majority is not for independence but for local control—a situation repeated, and for many of the same reasons, in the case of Belize (British Honduras).²⁷ A people that votes for self-determination and is then denied it will generally receive strong support in Euro-America.

On the other hand, if a people is incorporated in a nondemocratic state with little authentic means of expression, support in Euro-America will occur only if there is a strong outside interest group associated with its cause (as is the case for Soviet Jews).

8. LEVEL OF PUBLIC AWARENESS OF MOVEMENT: Obviously, if the informed public does not know about a self-determination movement, there will be no generation of public opinion in its favor. The elite pushing the cause of an ethnic or territorial group must be able to make it an issue and keep it an issue before it will be able to influence public interests or consciences.

9. LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS: Independence movements generally receive little recognition if they face strong and implacable governments. As one analyst points out, ". . . it is a matter of historic record that no totalitarian regime has been overthrown in this century save through defeat in war."²⁸ Therefore, short of war, what good would it do to support Tibetans under present conditions? To encourage their efforts today might be to go against the just war doctrine that it is wrong to fight without a reasonable expectation of success.²⁹ Fruitless death and suffering have few defenders. At the opposite extreme, it has been eminently practical to support the cause of Turks in Cyprus, or Bengalis in East Pakistan, because of the likelihood that they could receive strong outside support.

10. NONTHREATENING TO OTHER INTERESTS: AS has been pointed out, Western publics find it in their interest to recognize the rights of suppressed people that are far away, and battling for self-determination against an isolated state that is unlikely to cause trouble to others, or to call in friends. Lack of interest in the rights of self-determination of subnationalities in communist states rests in part on the fear that interest in them would lead to dangerous counteractions. It is safer to support Rhodesian blacks or Amazon natives.

11. PRESSURE GROUP SUPPORT OR OPPOSITION: The success or failure of national movements is often due to the existence of special interest groups within major world states. Israel and Ireland have been fortunate in this regard and the Palestinians unfortunate.

SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

Vernon van Dyke relates the relative inattention of the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to group rights, such as self-determination or other minority rights, to the individualistic conception of man in both communist and non-communist intellectual traditions.³⁰ Individuals are expected to have responsibilities to, and rights from, the state (or humanity), and not

be submerged in less universalistic groupings. He points to this attitude as the basis for the argument before the International Court of Justice that territories such as Namibia or Rhodesia should not be considered in any other terms than those of one man/one vote unitary states. A recent and extreme expression of this position is found in a lengthy article in the *American Journal of International Law* asserting that states have no right to differentiate between citizens and noncitizens, for such discrimination goes against the "newly emerged general norm of nondiscrimination which seeks to forbid all generic differentiation among people in access to value shaping and sharing for reasons irrelevant to individual capabilities and contributions."³¹ Discrimination in favor of citizens, they assert, is scarcely worse than discrimination on the basis of race, sex, or religion. The implication that rights of citizens in nonuniversal states are ultimately illegitimate would probably not be denied by the authors.

Van Dyke points out that in spite of the regnant universalizing assumptions, in many modern societies special group rights have been granted. Beginning with the distinctions accorded to citizenship, he goes on to consider ethnic decentralizations such as those in Canada, India, and the USSR. He points out that by law many countries must be ruled by persons in certain groups—from Scandinavia's requirement of Lutheran kings to Islamic state requirements that rulers be Muslims, often of particular sects. In Fiji most of the land is reserved for people of native Fijian ancestry (now in the minority), and in many areas of Malaysia land can only be acquired by Malays. Aaland Islanders in Finland, and the peoples of northern Nigeria can deny land to outsiders, while in the Americas special lands have been set aside for the exclusive use of particular aboriginal peoples. In Israel Arabs are excluded from the army. There are generally good historical reasons for such special rights or disabilities, but whatever the reasons the individuals involved are not treated simply as individuals in the eyes of the law.

Van Dyke also points out that there are many countries that legally or customarily enforce political or civil service quotas, and recently such quotas have again become common in education—from Kenya to the USA. Many countries have given special economic rights to particular peoples, generally their own ruling *Staatsvolk*, as in Malaysia or many black African states. In these terms it might be said that the special ethnic plans and regulations of the Rhodesians and South Africans have an implicit basis in the group rights concepts as accepted in practice in international law—however, the acceptability of the specifics of these group rights is, of course, another matter.

In spite of the general inattention to group rights, Rigo Sureda

argues that the UN has developed a new body of international law specifying the right of self-determination.³² Briefly, the right is that of a former overseas European colony to full independence from the colonial power. The state subsequently created should, in this body of law, be the same unit as was formerly administered as a unit by the colonial power. It is on this basis that Indonesia was able to successfully advance its claim to West Irian, while Katanga and Biafra failed to find acceptance under UN law. The UN position was spelled out most clearly in its rejection of the Belgian attempt to have the international organization extend the definition of nonself-governing territories to "subordinate peoples" within a metropolitan state, and in its acceptance of Resolution 1541 that specified that the right applied only to noncontiguous territories. This position can be seen as little more than an extension of the Aaland decision in the early twenties. In this case the League of Nations found that although the Aaland Islands were inhabited mostly by Swedes, previous administration by Finland's legal predecessor made the Swedish claim inadmissible. Too many states had too many analogous enclaves. However, it is important to note that the League added stipulations that would guarantee self-determination to the people of the Aaland Islands within the Finnish state. Specifically, Finland was enjoined from the too common practice of changing the ethnic composition of the islands to cement its claim. This concept is in accord with the idea of the "minorities regime" developed after World War I, a concept that unfortunately does not interest the anticolonialist UN.³³

The United Nations has, therefore, enunciated a theoretical or abstract right of all peoples (a term it has itself defined very broadly)³⁴ to self-determination, while creating through a body of legislative decisions international law that narrowly restricts the application of the right to the context of the struggle against Western imperialism.³⁵ It seems clear that for an American or West European the law produced in this manner does not exhaust the issue.

Potentially the principle of self-determination also implies the existence of political democracy.³⁶ It should be noted that while preferring total independence, the United Nations has accepted three definitions of self-determination: independence, free association with another state, and integration with another state.³⁷ In both the second and third cases the UN has been careful to note the people's right to later choose complete independence. This seems to imply that all peoples should have political and civil rights, for how else could they be said to choose? In the cases of the Fiji Islands and Rhodesia the General Assembly has insisted that rule should be on the basis of one man, one vote (in spite of the fact that most UN states do

not have free voting systems).³⁸ The United States suggested that such rights be placed at the core of the definition rather than on the periphery by proposing to the General Assembly:

The existence of a sovereign and independent state possessing an independent government, effectively functioning as such to all distinct peoples within its territory is presumed to satisfy the principle of equal rights and self-determination as regards those peoples.³⁹

This is the tradition of Woodrow Wilson by which self-government and self-determination were essentially synonymous; to Wilson they both meant the democratic governance by a people of its own affairs.⁴⁰ Thiirer suggests that the two concepts are essentially indistinguishable, for both are based on the realization of the danger and injustice inherent in suppressing minorities.⁴¹

BASIC PRINCIPLES FOR EXAMINING CLAIMS TO SELF-DETERMINATION

Definitions. Although the American proposal may have gone too far in identifying self-determination with constitutional democracy, it does offer a way around the theoretical extension of group rights that would promote unlimited subdivision if taken seriously. Borrowing from the individualistic American approach, but accepting the balancing legitimacy of group rights, I propose that the concept of self-determination should be subdivided as follows:

Self-determination may be verified (plebiscitary) or unverified. It can be expressed through independence, regional federalism, or democratically contingent acceptance of a centralized system of control. The definitions of the forms of self-determination are:

1. Verified self-determination is only possible where general political and civil rights exist. Where verified self-determination is achieved, the legitimacy of demands to convert a right to regional self-determination to a right to complete independence is greatly diminished, although not extinguished.

2. Contingent self-determination exists where a people has by democratic means accepted centralized rule by a state it does not rule, and remains able by the same means to reject such rule.

3. Unverified self-determination is assumed where the effective power in the government ruling over a people is in the hands of individuals identified as belonging to that people.

In defining self-determination we should remember that no people (or person) is completely self-determining. States and the people that control them vary widely in their ability to determine their own fate. Therefore, for a people to put forward a claim for self-determina-

tion means that it demands an increase in its power to influence its future. It cannot demand an annulment of the power relationships and contextual determinations that exist in the world independently of this demand.

Given these definitions, the claims of subnationalisms should generally be supported by those wishing to enhance political rights. But we should distinguish between those cases in which the aspiring people has a *prima facie* right to decide its fate separately from those around it and those in which this right is more questionable. A subnation with a *prima facie* right to self-determination may either be the *Staatsvolk* (ruling nationality) of an existing state (as the Poles in Poland), or a conquered people that was formerly the *Staatsvolk* of an internationally recognized state (as are the Lithuanians). If a subnation has been forced out of an original home territory into a foreign state, it may wish to determine the state to which it belongs and/or the degree of its dependence on a particular state's laws. A *Staatsvolk* may also want a smaller, more homogeneous state than the one it inherited (for example, the Turkish leaders in the Ottoman Empire after World War I wanted to exclude most areas inhabited by non-Turks from their new nation).

Returning to definitions, let us define a *homogeneous* state as one in which there are no subnationalisms or potential subnationalisms. *Heterogeneous* states may be pluralist, imperial, or transethnic. A *pluralist* state contains several subnationalities with rights to self-determination, all of which are met to some degree within a federal framework. An *imperial* state contains several subnationalities, generally including some with *prima facie* claims, but only one of which has had its claim fulfilled as the *Staatsvolk* or ruling nation (for example, Russians in the USSR). A *transethnic* state has been defined above as a compound state in which no peoples are granted group rights. In terms of our specifications homogeneous and pluralist states are generally acceptable responses to demands for enhanced self-determination, and transethnic states could be provisional political solutions.⁴²

The theoretical argument for self-determination. In order to get a better feeling for where injustice lies in those cases in which the right of self-determination is questionable, it is necessary to consider more carefully the theoretical underpinning of this right. The discussion must begin by considering the generally accepted right of states to preserve their territorial integrity. It will be recalled that the UN has also accepted the international law that all states have the right to self-defense, including that of defense against internal rights of secession. Paradoxically, in accepting this position the UN is accepting a tradition

of the colonialist era that rights to territory are confirmed by effective occupation and control over a period of time.⁴³ In speaking of Britain's rights to India, Burke tells us:

There is a sacred veil to be drawn over the beginnings of all governments. Ours, in India, had an origin like those which time has sanctified by obscurity. . . . But, whatever necessity might hide or excuse, or palliate in the acquisition of power, a wise nation, when it has once made a revolution upon its own principles and for its own ends, rests there. . . . By conquest, which is a more immediate designation of the hand of God, the conqueror succeeds to all the painful duties and subordination of the power of God, which belonged to the sovereign whom he has displaced, just as if he had come in by positive law or some election.⁴⁴

Burke tells us, then, that however a state may attain control, control implies responsibility. It is impossible for governments to meet all demands for self-determination, if they are responsibly to insure the safety and well-being of all the people in a given territory. The United Kingdom could grant self-determination to the peoples of Northern Ireland tomorrow, but in their present relationship the results could be even more tragic than the events of the last decade. Thus, unless they find a formula satisfactory to the major disputants, the British must stay and be vilified by all.

This is the right and duty of states in the colonialist, prepopulist era from which we have emerged.

However, since Burke's legitimization of imperialism is not acceptable today, it must be limited by the doctrine of self-determination. This, in turn, is based on the tradition exemplified by John Stuart Mill's classic statement of the rights of people to govern themselves:

A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a nationality if they are united among themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between them and others—which make them cooperate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire to be under the same government, and desire that it should be government by themselves or a portion of themselves exclusively.

* * *

Where the sentiment of nationality exists in any force, there is a prima facie case for uniting all the members of the nationality under the same government, and a government to themselves apart. This is merely saying that the question of government ought to be decided by the governed. One hardly knows what any division of the human race should be free to do if not to determine with which of the various collective bodies they choose to associate themselves⁴⁵

This seems to be an extreme doctrine. However, Mill goes on to qualify freedom in terms of utilitarianism and a scaling of peoples according to their presumed social evolution. On this basis his subsequent discussion modifies the requirements of self-determination. He argues, for example, that since the right to self-determination of a superior, more advanced people, whether majority or minority, is superior to that of a less advanced, it is advantageous for the Basques and Welsh to become assimilated to the French and English peoples, rather than develop their distinctive national cultures and polities. Mill thought that the British in India had a responsibility to raise the Indian people to a level at which they could determine their own affairs, and as long as the British were engaged in so raising the Indians, this responsibility was prior to that of the Indian desire for self-determination. For Mill the rights of small communities, such as Gibraltar, were nullified by the defense requirements of the large state that controls them. The right of self-determination through independence or federal arrangement is, then, limited through the utilitarian calculus to that of large communities of an equivalent level of civilization and capable of free democratic government.⁴⁶

What makes Mill's position seem stark today is that his justifications for exceptions to principle are so out of harmony with modern liberal thinking that they are ignored. Mill's patronizing of dependent peoples (reminiscent of the Soviet or Chinese elder brother attitude) is no longer officially acceptable in our culture. Although I would personally argue that the right to self-determination of a people not led democratically is a contradiction in terms, and that the rights of certain small communities might be sacrificed to the demands for defense of more inclusive democratic systems, neither of these views is commonly held in the liberal community. Mill's argument comes to our generation without its qualifications.

The argument suggests that the rights of the government of a homogeneous state are limited to those that the people have freely granted; the government should be the mechanism that a particular people has chosen to express its collective desires. If this is so, then the rights of the governments of heterogeneous states are restricted to those granted by the affirmation of their policies by the individuals of their subnationalities both separately and collectively. Vis-à-vis its peoples the legitimacy of a homogeneous or heterogeneous state is contingent upon the continued relative satisfaction of the peoples involved (and thus by definition the imperial state is illegitimate). A state's rule must bring more benefit than harm over a period of time to all of its constituent peoples, or they will have no reason but fear of repression to remain within. Therefore, a state can legitimately

preserve itself only when its constituent peoples want it to, and to the extent they do. It is, in this view, a contradiction for a government to attempt to preserve jurisdiction over a people that does not want its jurisdiction. It has no right to prevent escape from its rule (except for particular crimes) of persons not wanting its control, just as it has no right to control peoples living in territory it took possession of by force, or that it forced onto its territory.

But how do we know what a particular subnationality wants in a heterogeneous state? We can distinguish three types of situations. In the first, there is tight state control over the territory and people and a lack of reasonably democratic procedures. In this case, for any people that is not dominant in the government of the state a small disaffected elite may temporarily be regarded as representing the desires of the people. Outside observers have no reliable way of knowing what the people desire, but they do know that the people in the name of which its disaffected speak have not been given any substantial opportunity to know what it wants. The second situation is one where there are, or have been, democratic procedures that give us a good idea that a people wishes enhanced self-determination. Finally, there are situations, such as that of Puerto Rico, where the majority has repeatedly expressed disinterest in further self-determination, but the world continues to hear from a disaffected minority. Outside support for enhanced self-determination in this case is inappropriate until such time as its advocates change the judgment of their own people.

There is, of course, a principled argument against supporting demands for enhanced self-determination. The balance of recent thinking by political scientists and economists has been integrative, planning oriented, and thus hostile to the fragmentation that would often result from attempts to meet subnational demands. From this viewpoint small countries are seen as unfortunate anachronisms, and federal systems as inefficient compromises with political reality. In recent years this professional consensus has weakened somewhat,⁴⁷ but it persists in the face of evidence that small countries are by no means less likely to offer their citizens economic development, justice, or political and civil rights than larger states. It is true that everything else being equal small states are weaker militarily than larger states, but for most of the world such weakness remains inconsequential (except perhaps in Western Europe where continued political division results in unnecessary weakness).

A recent study of the formation of centralized nation states in Europe emphasizes the high cost of state building in terms of death, suffering, and loss of rights.⁴⁸ It is my suspicion that the desire to

construct or maintain large unitary states in many parts of the world today has not been well advised. In particular, the centralizing, state-forming trend has not allowed for the natural evolution of democratic polities. It is not simply chance that European democracy developed in small states and thrives best in either small states or federal unions. Too often, placing an arbitrary, originally foreign structure over a variety of competing groups has led to an appeal to force, and thus to administration by the least common denominator. For example, in Uganda the most advanced and ordered part of the pre-independence colony, the Kingdom of Buganda, was forced through the process of national integration to submit to increasingly harsh rule by outsiders with which its people had little in common.⁴⁹ One recent student of Benin suggests that instead of the solution of imposed dictatorship that eventually resulted, even this relatively small country should have been made into a loose confederation of three states. He believes that this would have been more meaningful to the largely illiterate peasantry, and that it might have prevented the imposition of military rule that resulted from the difficulties of imposing centralization patterned on the French model.⁵⁰ In part, Burmese democracy was choked by the military dominance of a society eternally at war with its non-Burmese periphery. Similarly, managing the enterprise of Indonesia has required the suppression of small subnational groups with no noticeable gain to the majority.

In supporting self-determination as an ideal, it should be repeated that this does not imply that a balancing of the rights of states and their peoples will always lead to advocacy of complete independence. Echoing the Aaland Islands decision of the League, and the official American position, if a state meets its obligations to a people in terms of economic, cultural, and political equality under democracy, other factors may place a legitimate limit on the potential demand for self-determination, or as Cobban puts it:

Although in (some) cases independent statehood may be out of the question, all nations or subnations, should exercise self-determination within the limits of what is practicable, in the form of regional autonomy.⁵¹

The rights to self-determination of territorial minorities. A right to self-determination may exist in a complex union for a people that is not the majority population in any particular area. Two arguments support this right. First, many peoples have been overrun by others, and in some cases it has been deliberate state policy to change population balances by bringing in outside or Staatsvolk colonists (for example, in China, the USSR, and Israel). While no definition of a

people's rights can undo history, their definition should at least not encourage deliberate attempts to change population balances of a particular people in an area. Secondly, peoples such as Gypsies, Jews, Parsis, Chinese, and Armenians have developed in some countries a strong ethnic pattern combined with a tendency to diffused "micro-" rather than "macro-territoriality." More recently the same pattern has developed for American blacks as a result of their urbanization. Mill's dictum of the rights of groups to self-rule should apply to such groups to the extent that there are practical ways to express this desire that do not seriously infringe on the rights of other peoples.

For nonmajority peoples that have been overrun, the self-determination demand will legitimately include the right to carve out a territorial base that can achieve the desired level of self-government. This must, of course, be done without violence to the rights of other peoples. For while in Millsian terms conquering states do not acquire rights over conquered peoples, the new peoples that follow on the heels of conquest soon acquire rights equivalent to the rights of those they dispossess—in spite of the historical injustice. How soon the successor people achieves such "squatter rights" is, of course, a critical issue. The general rule is that all peoples are groups of individuals and, as individuals, they are as historically determined into their present situation as all other peoples, including those they may have dispossessed. The solution may be for the peoples concerned to establish a transethnic state in which the several peoples cooperate on the basis of equality until such time as a new resolution is demanded.

For a people that has never had a territorial majority in a country, such as the Jews in most of the world, such a resolution might be achieved through a state structure modeled on that suggested by Renner and Bauer for the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and more recently by Uri Ra'anan.⁵² The concept is that subnationalities should be granted special voting rolls, taxation systems, and personal laws analogous to those under the millet system of the Ottoman Empire where law was the separate responsibility of each religious community. In part, the millet system worked because of a highly developed micro-territoriality (ghettos), and such territories might be the basis for nonterritorial systems. In the Renner-Bauer form, rights to self-determination would remain imperfect, and could not lead to complete independence. However, at least in a pluralist state formed on what is in effect a people's pact, a system of this kind might offer the highest degree of group freedom that is available in a complex state. Before we dismiss this alternative the reader should reflect that in medieval Europe territory was only one among several bases for establishing legal boundaries between peoples.⁵³

If the rights to self-determination of a minority people without a macro-territorial base are limited on practical grounds, so may be those of very small peoples. In the early 1970's a few thousand Haida Indians in British Columbia laid claim to the Queen Charlotte Islands, their ancient homeland.⁵⁴ They are said to wish independence. The two most salient reactions are to accept the Haida claim as a logical development of principle, or simply to rule it out on the grounds of practicality and the larger interests of Canadian society. A compromise between these positions would be to grant internal autonomy without rights of secession or control of foreign affairs to the Haidas—this would be analogous to the British relation to the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man. It could be argued that to go beyond this would lead ultimately to a multitude of independencies that would harm the interests of all Canadians. The Haidas would not be granted complete independence because this could be achieved only at the risk of the dissolution of Canada and consequent loss to all its peoples. But this would be a difficult case to make in the specific case of the Queen Charlotte Islands. The desire for complete micro-independence might practically be controlled by making clear that once independent, a people such as the Haida would not have the right to call on their former state for financial or other help. However, economic arguments against small states are not conclusive,⁵⁵ and practical arguments against establishing small states become weaker as we consider peoples numbering over 100,000; the arguments fail at one million, for many self-sustaining members of the United Nations are no larger.

Another example of theoretical interest is the recent absorption of the Kingdom of Sikkim by the Indian state.⁵⁶ The historical background is a common one of the succession of peoples. In the seventeenth century the Bhutias left Tibet and conquered the Lepchas of Sikkim, and today the two peoples are closely aligned. However, in the nineteenth century the British encouraged the immigration of Nepalese. By 1970 the Bhutia-Lepcha people upon which the king depended for support were greatly outnumbered by the Hindu Nepalese whose more natural allegiance was to an Indian state. Therefore, in spite of the irregularities of the process, the Indian intervention in the early 1970's was initially a gain for self-determination, as well as for democracy. Yet the rights of the Bhutia-Lepcha, now a minority in their own country, should be considered. These rights might have been preserved by preventing the immigration of non-Buddhist peoples in the past (as in the Aaland Islands decision). In the future they might be preserved by establishing an autonomous area under the old Bhutia system, or through a nonterritorial alternative.

The case of Sikkim raises the more general problem that if we are

to recognize rights to self-determination, then we must also recognize the right of a people to prevent large-scale movement of other peoples into the land. Academics have always contemptuously denigrated the activities of "Know-nothings" and other exclusionists in the United States. Yet recent studies suggest that as a result of immigration, WASP's may have become a minority in the United States they supposedly dominate.⁵⁷ Certainly, when a foreigner visits New York today, he does not visit a WASP city, no matter what power Edith Wharton's aristocracy may retain. Perhaps, if given a choice the resulting American mosaic is what most WASP's of the nineteenth century would have wanted. But if not, then they were justified in supporting exclusionary laws. Similarly, the friends of self-determination must not carelessly condemn recent attempts to restrict nonwhite immigration to England, or the "Überfremdungsinitiativen" in Switzerland.⁵⁸ For there is a great deal of difference between the prejudice that unfairly ascribes evil to another group and the considered judgment that customs and traditions are sufficiently different that one group should not allow the other to take away through demographic movement its right to determine its own fate.

This point of view should be especially appealing to those who, like myself, feel that democracy is easier to achieve and maintain in small homogeneous states than in larger ones. George Kennan, for example, sees democracy as largely restricted to countries of "small size and cultural cohesion."⁵⁹ Although a recent study concludes that small homogeneous states have less conflict partly because such states more easily suppress dissent,⁶⁰ the relation between conflict and the subsequent suppression of dissent, and ultimately the loss of rights, seems related to large size and heterogeneity in several states.

SELF-DETERMINATION: A CONTRAST OF TWO CASES

What would the world look like if the present and potential claims to self-determination of the Haidas, Nagas, and Tadzhiks were taken seriously? One country that has long accepted the principle of self-determination of peoples organized territorially has been Switzerland. Both local and cantonal governments have important residual rights, and civil and political rights are granted on all levels. Switzerland does not accept the right of its parts to leave the state, yet the granting of high levels of autonomy to its constituent peoples greatly reduces any further demands they might make. In this regard it may be useful to consider a recent process of perfecting the Swiss structure that has resulted from the persistent demand of the Jura separatists for a separate canton of 130,000 (or fewer) inhabitants.⁶²

At the Congress of Vienna the principality of the Bishop of Basel, comprising land southwest of Basel that had come under French rule after the Revolution, was ceded to Canton Bern as compensation for losses elsewhere. Bern was the largest canton of the loosely organized Swiss Confederation. Unfortunately, while Bern had been a Protestant and distinctively Swiss-German canton, the people in its new Jura districts were French speaking and Catholic.

During the nineteenth century Protestant Bern clashed repeatedly with the northern Jura. In the first World War a movement for separation developed on the basis of the antagonism between Swiss-French and Swiss-Germans that accompanied the war. After World War II the demand for autonomy was raised more seriously, leading to a revision of the Bernese constitution in 1950 granting the Jura people special rights, especially in regard to representation in the cantonal parliament and the official use of French. As is so often the case, this led to further agitation under the auspices of more radical groups. Nevertheless, in a cantonal plebiscite in 1959 the division of the canton was overwhelmingly defeated, and it lost even in the old principality—although not in its northern districts.

After this defeat the actions of the "rassemblement jurassien" became more extreme, and occasionally violent, and their leaders began to identify their cause with that of Frenchmen everywhere, and especially the Quebec nationalists. As a result, in 1969 the Bernese parliament recognized the right to self-determination of the people of the Jura. There were three successful referenda in 1974-1975.⁶³ In the first the Jura as a whole opted for separation. In the second the three French Catholic districts in the Jura that rejected autonomy in the first poll were repolled, voting not to join the new canton.⁶⁴ In the third, communities along the border of the proposed canton were given the choice between Jura or Berne. The final step will be a revision of the Swiss constitution and ultimately a national referendum that would allow the new canton to come into existence.

The Swiss hope that a stronger state will emerge through expanding regional self-determination.⁶⁵ If it emerges, it will be in the face of pressures for greater centralization that are as active in Switzerland as elsewhere. But a new canton is preferable to the breakup of the state, and it is the minimum that a state committed to self-determination must grant to a group whose elite has convinced it that they are a people that should have more control over their own affairs. As an addendum it is important to note that the appeal of the Jura separatists has been ostensibly in terms of history and common interest more than ethnicity. As such it is little different than the argument of Justice Potter Stewart that the people of upstate New York had a

right to escape from the "one man-one vote" rule because of geographically distinct interests from those of the megalopolis.⁶⁶

Switzerland's willingness to grant self-determination to the Jura people largely satisfies legitimate concern for their self-determination; however, within a different context granting a degree of legal existence to a people may only further increase our concern. The history of the Tadzhiks of Central Asia provides an example.⁶⁷ Central Asia, like so much of the world, was highly complex both politically and ethnically. Although there were a number of khanates in the region, the political authority of their rulers was vague outside of the cities; most of the people gave their allegiance primarily to tribes that crosscut the formal political groupings. The people were grouped ethnically into detribalized Tadzhiks (Persian speaking) and Sarts, and tribal groups such as the Uzbeks, Kazakhs, and Turkmens. Tribal people were primarily Turkish, but while all Turks spoke Turkish, many of the detribalized people, including some Tadzhiks, also spoke Turkish. Although city people were commonly bilingual, the majority of the people of Central Asia spoke a Turkish language. Political rule had been in Turkish hands for centuries, yet the court language, and the common written language, remained Persian. There were also more primitive, less historical peoples in the high mountains—Kazakh Turks to the north and ancient Iranians to the south. In the early nineteenth century the situation was further complicated by the Russians, advancing through armed conquest and colonization. In a way the coming of the Russians reduced ethnic confusion by providing local peoples with a common enemy; for the next century Central Asians expressed desires for self-determination primarily in terms of the opposition of all Muslim peoples to encroaching Christians.

Slowly the Russians extinguished independence. In the 1860's the requirement for higher cotton production, occasioned by the American Civil War, led to a final drive. In 1868 the Emirate of Bukhara became a protectorate, followed by Khiva in 1873. By 1884 the Turkmen were subdued and the Russians could proceed with colonialization and economic development. With the new contacts opened up by this advance, and the humiliation of living under foreign rule, there developed in Central Asia, as in most areas of the non-Western world, movements of young educated men directed against both the remnants of the old dynasties and the invading foreigners. The "Young Bukharan" movement of the early twentieth century included both Persian and Turkish-speaking intellectuals, and they added to their Muslim identity a new Bukharan identity. This was not an "ethnic nationalism." However, there also began to develop a sense of belonging to an international Turkish people. Yet, here was an inherent conflict, for the

Persian language was the bearer of the proud and ancient urban culture, and the Turkish majority was imbibing pan-Turkish ideas that must eventually, displace Persian from its leading position. With the coming of the Russian Revolution, both conservatives and liberals revolted against the Russians. By 1920 the Bukharan Republic had been established with Soviet help, and Uzbek Turkish was made its official language. For a few years the young liberals of the Republic struggled to develop a truly independent state, but by 1925 they had been forced to accept complete Soviet control.

In the Soviet mold there was room for linguistic states rather than states based upon historical continuity, such as the Bukharan Republic. So partly for reasons of state (divide and rule) and partly for reasons of ideology, the Soviets proceeded to divide Central Asia into a variety of linguistic republics. Both Turkish dialects and languages were used to form the basis of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kirghizistan, and so on. On the other hand, the term "Tadzhik" was now more precisely identified with Persian speech and the Tadzhiks were given their own SSR over the objection of the Uzbek nationalists of the old Bukhara.

It is important to look more closely at the goals of Soviet linguistic policy. The first goal was to separate Central Asia from its past, and from influences stemming from the non-Soviet states to the south. This was accomplished by introducing Latin alphabets in the twenties (forbidding the importation of materials in Arabic script), and subsequently by replacing Latin scripts with Cyrillic alphabets in the 1930's. In both cases an effort was made to reduce the similarities of the Turkic languages with one another and with Ottoman Turkish. The reforms also served to divorce Tadzhik from standard Persian. (The Tadzhiks had seen no need for a new literary language or script—the Arabic script fits Persian much better than it does Turkish, written Persian in Central Asia had been essentially identical with that elsewhere, and Persian had a substantial literature.) The reforms did, however, make possible a rapid increase in literacy, and with the change to Cyrillic also eased the acquisition of Russian.

Tadzhikistan was formed from that rural eastern half of the Bukharan Republic whose majority had been Persian speaking, as well as the mountainous area of primitive peoples east of the Republic that spoke related Iranian dialects. Because of the interpenetration of peoples, hundreds of thousands of Tadzhiks continued to live in Uzbekistan, and equal numbers of Uzbeks in Tadzhikistan. While the Persian-speaking elite had been city people, Tadzhikistan was cut off from the region's urban centers, Bukhara and Samarqand; previously insignificant Stalinabad (Doshumbe) became its capital.

Because of its location and the conservatism of its peoples, the area of the future Tadzhik Republic was the scene of Central Asia's most vigorous resistance to the Soviets, and the fiercest repression.⁶⁸ Fought primarily by Uzbek tribesmen, but centering in Tadzhikistan, the "Basmachi Rebellion" went through several stages. First, in the Russian controlled areas of Turkestan, the khanates supported anti-Soviet forces in 1917-20. Secondly, after his overthrow in 1920, the Emir of Bukhara maintained resistance for a time in the eastern part of his state. Then, after the Red army had rampaged through the Tadzhik area, the people revolted against the Reds, and many of the Young Bukharan leaders of the new Republic fled to join the Basmachi under Enver Pasha in 1921. Abetted by the people the Basmachi guerrillas of Ibrahim Bek continued in existence through 1926, and then again returned during the early part of the collectivization campaigns in 1929 and 1931. But by 1931 the people were too discouraged to offer help. Nevertheless, bitter struggle against change continued in the early 1930's, often aided by Tadzhik and Uzbek communist officials. Loss of property and life during this time was staggering, with perhaps a fourth of the people of the Republic migrating to Afghanistan. The purges of the 1930's wiped out most of the Tadzhik communists, leaving open positions that increasingly had to be filled by Russians.⁶⁹

Since World War II Tadzhikistan has developed steadily in population, wealth, literacy, and health standards. While Tadzhiks are not as well off in these dimensions as the Soviet people as a whole, or as Russians and other Slavs in Tadzhikistan, still they are better off than similar peoples below the border, and the Tadzhik elite knows it. Whether this wealth compensates for foreign domination and totalitarian rule is a question both Tadzhiks and the Russians must ask.

In laying an economic and educational basis for a modern sense of Tadzhik peoplehood the Soviets have created a Persian-speaking people more fully aware of its identity than it was in the 1920's. Recent studies show that in general the Soviets have not been successful in sharpening the distinctions among Turkish peoples in Central Asia, or in assimilating non-Russian peoples to the Russian Staatsvolk through language reform and the settling of Slavs in non-Slav Republics. While, for a time resettlement was successful, between 1959 and 1970 the percentage of indigenous people rose in all Central Asian Republics. Among the Turkish speakers of Central Asia there is at least as great a sense of unity as in 1920, with some Turks regarding Tashkent as a central city for all Turks.

The Tadzhiks, however, are likely to have diverged from their fellow Central Asians since 1920. They now emphasize a cultural tradition

that has somewhat less in common with other Central Asians than the tradition of the Tadzhik elite of the 1920's. Their literary heroes are Rudaki, Firdowsi, Omar Khayyam, and most recently Hafez, all specifically Iranian rather than Islamic authors in the broadest sense (however well known and loved they may be by other Central Asians). In taking over Firdowsi's *Shahname* as their national epic Tadzhiks revive the ancient opposition of Iran and Turan (that is, of Persian and Turk). The success of this Iranicization of the Tadzhiks creates a new problem for the Soviets as a more powerful Iran develops nearby, an Iran that preserves more fully than the Tadzhiks the language and script of these heroes.

To a remarkable degree, the Tadzhiks have stayed out of the new cities: while they make up seventy percent of the population of their Republic, they account for only fifteen percent of the population of the capital city. They have relatively little higher education. Since this is partially because so few Tadzhiks have a working knowledge of Russian (fifteen percent), in an effort to increase Tadzhik enrollment in the sciences the government has announced recently that Tadzhiks need no longer be fluent in Russian for admission to scientific and technical courses at the university.⁷⁰

Do the Tadzhiks determine their own affairs? In one sense they do: there is a Tadzhik Republic (formally equivalent to a state in the United States), and most of its leaders are Tadzhiks. Yet, within the communist world this is a very low level of control. It has not, for example, the independence of the national communist states in the Soviet sphere, such as Rumania, or even Bulgaria. There is considerable party autonomy in these states, with only foreign relations and acceptance of Soviet-type communism of direct interest to Moscow. Peoples such as the Czechs, who have been more recalcitrant, have less room for maneuver. Within the Soviet Union, Republics such as the Armenian or Georgian apparently are guided primarily by local communists in their internal affairs. But in Central Asia, and especially Tadzhikistan, Russians are found in both the party and state bureaucracies in important positions of guidance. Withal, continued complaints of the inability of the system to stamp out Islam or other archaic customs and attitudes, even among native communist officials, indicate at least a passive ability of the people to successfully stand in the way of assimilation. One concludes that the Tadzhiks have some degree of national self-determination, but it is not comparable to the power of the Navahos within their "autonomous area" in the American southwest (although similar to the power of most American Indian groups fifty years ago).

BALANCING SELF-DETERMINATION
AND OTHER VALUES IN FUTURE POLICY

Looking toward the future it may be predicted that the self-determination of peoples defined by previous colonial boundaries, or the natural boundaries of islands, will proceed toward general realization almost everywhere. This will be a verifiable self-determination in all those countries in which democratic institutions are well established through local traditions or massive outside influence. For example, although few inhabitants are of European background, the people of tiny Anguilla have apparently both the formal and informal traditions necessary for a democratic polity.⁷¹ In many cases a verifiable initial phase of self-determination can occur in such instances even when the prior situation is not supportive of democratic forms. For example, the UN investigations in Bahrain that established the desire of the people to be free of both Arab and Iranian outside rule offers a recent model of independent verification of the desires of a people.⁷²

The outlook for subnationalities within organized states is much poorer. Their demands will fester, for most states will not grant rights of self-determination until both internal and external pressures become very high. Exceptions may be found in those instances such as Belgium, where the competing peoples make up most of the population and there is no defined *Staatsvolk* or strong national ideology. In Canada the federal heritage, the strength of the French minority in Quebec, weak Canadian nationalism, and the commitment of the *Staatsvolk* to liberal democratic principles make it impossible for the state to ignore subnationalist demands, however far they may be pushed. India has shown itself willing and able to grant important autonomy within a federal framework to a variety of peoples, but the precariousness of the position of the Hindi *Staatsvolk* makes it unwilling to countenance secession—indeed India's tendency has been to accrete peoples and territories at the margin into its system. In the long term this may be both morally and practically an insufficient response, but if the Indian state can prove itself to its constituent peoples, they may continue to accept membership in the pluralist state even as subnational self-consciousness grows in intensity.

An obstacle to general acceptance of self-determination in many democracies is that they lack experience in decentralizing power to constituent peoples. Another obstacle is the current socio-economic planning ideology that sees populations organized primarily in economic relationships, and regards even present international boundaries as artificial. Given this ideology, it has been hard to accept the reasonableness of Scottish or Welsh aspirations for self-determination even

within a liberal British society closely attuned to the legitimacy of a wide variety of demands for other human rights at home and abroad.⁷³ But change is occurring here while it is not in states such as the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia where the goal of the state remains the eventual assimilation of all peoples to one, secular, mass society with a more or less set ideological schema. Self-determination in these states has been promoted primarily as a transitory means of mobilizing the population.⁷⁴

Where democracy persists, the liberal beliefs of elites will ultimately force acceptance of demands of constituent peoples upon reluctant centralizers. However, in some liberal states a further recognition and acceptance of people-related regionalism may be able to preserve the general state structure as well as a sense of state nationalism transcending lesser affiliations. In imperial states, self-determination, if and when it comes, will probably mean complete breakdown of central state authority, together with rejection of the state nationalism that formerly went with it. In these states change is unlikely to be easy, or without violence.

Given this prospect, how does a well-intentioned public develop a principled rather than merely adjustive policy toward subnational demands? In a recent paper Alois Riklin suggested four goals for a less nationalistic Swiss foreign policy: peace, independence, individual rights, and equality (justice). In Riklin's view all four goals must be balanced, for no one goal can have an absolute claim on Swiss attention. From our perspective Riklin's "independence" may be thought of as self-determination, or more generally "group rights," while equality or justice would seem to imply both justice between individuals and between groups. At first sight it would appear that to promote self-determination as supported or subordinated by concern for peace, individual rights, and justice should become the legitimate goal of the liberal state and its supporting public wherever these are found. But what guidance does this offer?

Looking at the Tadzhik example discussed above it seems clear that the Tadzhiks potentially have a good claim to the support of world public opinion if they wish enhanced self-determination. Should a disaffected Tadzhik elite or Tadzhik emigrés ever make an issue of their independence, theirs would be a cause with which most liberals should sympathize. The land involved is a unit of sufficient size and antiquity, the one million Tadzhiks within its borders are enough, and Russian claims are no better than the British had in India. Yet there are practical reasons to hesitate. Although there seems to be a basis for the development of a Tadzhik movement, it is not now an issue in the public awareness. In regard to a previous

separate existence as a state the Tadzhik claim is weak—but this only raises the question of an alternative right of a more inclusive "Central Asian people" rather than a Soviet right. (And for their own purposes the Soviets have allowed Tadzhiks to see their SSR as a successor state to the culturally significant Samanid state of the Middle Ages.)

The overwhelming practical consideration is the unlikelihood that future Tadzhik hopes for self-determination could be realized given the strength and repressiveness of the USSR, the danger to world peace that support for independence movements within the Soviet Union would entail, and finally the loss of life that even successful independence movements in this area might involve. On this ground it would fail to pass Riklin's test. As we found out in the Hungarian experience of 1956, Euro-Americans have a moral responsibility to not encourage independence movements that we are likely to be unable to support in the crunch.

However, are we not planting seeds of disaster in our own society if we hypocritically worry about the demands of Irish Catholics and British Protestants in Northern Ireland simply because they are faced with a liberal British government that might give in to their demands, while preparing to ignore the prospective demands of peoples with at least equal claims to self-determination? How can we convince oncoming generations of the absolute value of certain freedoms unless we take seriously their infringement everywhere?

Given our definition of verified self-determination, only if a state is democratic and its peoples have accepted its rule by democratic procedures do its leaders have an obvious right to speak for its peoples. Thus, our interest in the right of self-determination extends also to the Staatsvolk or ruling people of a nondemocratic state. Mill's point was that rights of individuals and groups to political freedom were closely related. In this sense the lesser peoples of an imperial state have a double claim on our attention, for they are deprived of both freedom as individuals and freedom as members of those groups with which they identify.

Yet we know that policy support of demands for greater self-determination, including independence, may be dangerous to peace, increase inequalities, and reduce individual rights. We are concerned here especially with the latter. The extent to which achieving group self-determination may lead to the loss of individual rights is suggested by the fact that at least half of the former European colonies have less freedom today than immediately before independence. Certainly self-determination for the American South in the nineteenth century might have meant less individual freedom. Theoretically a study comparing large with small democracies suggests that the larger

offer more individual freedom, for people with different ideas than the majority are more able to find allies in the larger societies.⁷⁶ Group self-determination may also be used to force essentially assimilated persons into identities and allegiances they do not want. A right to choose one's group identity is essential, yet for practical or other reasons this is often hard to guarantee. The balance between individual and group rights, then, would seem to lie in regarding group self-determination as one among many political and civil rights. As such it is a right with relatively little claim on our attention when there is a strong case that other rights are likely to be lost in its pursuit.

With the foregoing exception, I conclude that as principled policy the informed public should support subnationalisms wherever they occur, and expect and welcome the development of new subnationalisms. This support should not, however, go so far as to identify independence as a necessary or desirable goal for all subnationalisms, particularly those in democracies where the majority of a people has expressed itself against independence. Subnational demands are especially worthy of support in the absence of political rights and civil liberties, and particularly suspect where it appears that granting such demands would reduce these rights and liberties. Before supporting a self-determination movement, opinion leaders should inquire as closely as possible into the actual size of the group making the demand and the degree of self-consciousness of the people in whose name the demand is made. These principles should not lead us to oppose "nation-building" in highly fragmented societies, for all nations and subnations are to some extent artificial. However, they should lead us to oppose all nation-building that relies on the suppression of subnationalities or other group identifications. Pluralist states, or transethnic states supportive of lesser identifications, may be more difficult to rule, but then any claims to rights and liberties are likely to complicate the lives of our governors.

After examining the current state of self-determination, and developing some conceptual tools, this essay examined the implications of the Millsian belief that the most basic right of both individuals and groups is the right to decide what state should administer their government. Carrying this view to its logical conclusion has raised many issues of application and conflicting rights. These may not be resolved without ultimately restricting the extent of our concern with the rights of peoples, nations, or nationalities considered separately from those of individuals *qua* individuals.⁷⁷ We cannot judge other people only as individuals and remain very concerned with the rights of

peoples; nor can we be interested in the rights of peoples and condemn their desire to treat individuals at times as members of groups rather than as individuals. This essay has not resolved these dilemmas; it has suggested the implications of taking seriously a belief in the right of all peoples to self-determination.

NOTES

1. Alfred Cobban, *National Self-Determination* (London: Oxford University Press, 1945).
2. Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying," *World Politics*, 24 (April 1972): 319-55.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 350.
4. For example, Walker Connor, "The Politics of Ethnonationalism," *Journal of International Affairs*, 27 (1973): 1-21. Also, Rupert Emerson, "Self-Determination," *American Journal of International Law*, 65 (1971): 459-75.
5. Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying," pp. 332-36. See also Uri Ra'anani, "The Multi-Ethnic State: Some Concepts of Conflict Resolution," unpublished paper (Seattle: Battelle Seattle Research Center, 1974).
6. Connor, "The Politics of Ethnonationalism," especially pp. 5-6.
7. See Edward Allworth, ed., *The Nationality Question in Soviet Central Asia* (New York: Praeger, 1973). Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, *Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia: The Case of Tadzhikistan* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970).
8. For a recent usage of "subnationalism" compare Crawford Young, *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976), p. 231.
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 163-215, 216-73.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 171-213, 229-30, 346-47.
12. See especially Stephanie Neuman, ed., *Small States and Segmented Societies* (New York: Praeger, 1976).
13. E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *The Nuer* (London: Oxford University Press, 1940), pp. 139-91.
14. Young, *Politics of Cultural Pluralism*, pp. 95-97, 506.
15. See Emerson, "Self-Determination." The right is spelled out most clearly in the *International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights*, Part 1, passed in 1966 by the General Assembly and repeated in the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*.
16. See Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union* (New York: 1968). Also Laszlo Revesz, "Sowjetische Streiflichter: Juden und andere Minderheiten," *Schweizer Monatshefte*, 54 (1974): 10-14.
17. See Walker Connor, "Self-Determination: The New Phase," *World Politics*, 20 (1967): 30-53. For a full account of the UN position see A. Rigo Sureda, *The Evolution of the Right of Self-Determination: A Study of United Nations Practice* (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1973).

18. See the discussion in R. D. Gastil, "Comparative Survey of Freedom V, *Freedom at Issue*, no. 29 (January-February 1975): 3-9.

19. Compare Robert Osgood and Robert Tucker, *Force, Order and Justice* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1967), pp. 273-77; D. P. O'Connell, *International Law* (2nd ed.; London: Stevens and Sons, 1950), pp. 315-20.

20. Compare Philip Agee, *Inside the Company: CIA Diary* (New York: Stonehill/Bantam, 1975-76); John Barron, *KGB* (New York: Readers Digest Press/Bantam, 1974).

21. This is characteristic of "praetorian societies." See Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

22. Compare Allen Goodman, *Politics in War* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973).

23. Ved P. Nanda, "Self-Determination in International Law: The Tragic Tale of Two Cities—Islamabad (West Pakistan) and Dacca (East Pakistan)," *American Journal of International Law*, 66 (April 1972): 321-36.

24. See Karl Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1953).

25. O'Connell, *International Law*, pp. 422-28.

26. See Paul Lucas, "Edmund Burke's Doctrine of Prescription," *The Historical Journal*, XI, no. 1 (1968): 35-63.

27. Compare *Latin America*, 19 October 1973, p. 336, and 21 June 1974, p. 189. The government of Belize does not wish complete independence before it is confident that it will not be absorbed by Guatemala, a nation dominated by different races and cultures.

28. Osgood and Tucker, *Force, Order and Justice*, p. 231, note 16. The authors appear to define totalitarian narrowly to include only authentic fascist and communist states.

29. See Paul Ramsey, *War and the Christian Conscience* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1961); also his *The Just War* (New York: Scribners, 1968), pp. 356-57. According to the doctrine it is wrong to commit suicide, or to cause the death of another, unless there is a reasonable chance of achieving a justifiable goal.

30. Vernon van Dyke, *Human Rights, the United States and the World Community* (New York: Oxford, 1970), pp. 77-102, and his "Human Rights and the Rights of Groups," *American Journal of Political Science*, 18, no. 4 (November 1974): 725-42.

31. M. McDougall, H. Lasswell, and Lung-chu Chen, "The Protection of Aliens from Discrimination and World Public Order," *American Journal of International Law*, 70, no. 3 (1976): 432-69, especially 432-33.

32. Sureda, *The Evolution of the Right to Self-Determination*; also van Dyke, *Human Rights, the United States, and the World Community*.

33. Sureda, *Evolution of the Right to Self-Determination*, pp. 100-110, 149, 32-34, 111-18, 23.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 100.

35. This is also the conclusion of Daniel Thürer, *Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker* (Bern: Stampfli, 1976), especially pp. 190-206.

36. *Ibid.*

37. Emerson, "Self-Determination," especially p. 470.

38. Sureda, *Evolution of the Right of Self-Determination*, p. 180. Thürer, *Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker*, p. 204.
39. *Ibid.*, quoted p. 468.
40. Michla Pomerance, "The United States and Self-Determination: Perspectives on the Wilsonian Conception," *American Journal of International Law*, 70, no. 1 (1976): 1-28.
41. Thiirer, *Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker*, pp. 204-6.
42. Homogeneity and heterogeneity are, of course, in terms of "peoples," and not in the degree of structural differentiation, as in the famous distinctions of Tonnies and Durkheim. In the modern language of anthropology or sociology the preferable terms might be "monistic" versus "pluralistic." In the special language of M. G. Smith the imperial society is referred to as a plural society with "differential incorporation," a pluralist society as one of "consociation," and apparently a homogeneous society as one of "uniform incorporation." See Pierre van den Berge, "Pluralism," in J. J. Honigmann, ed., *Handbook of Social and Cultural Anthropology* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1973), pp. 959-78. Consociation as "consociational democracy" has received a good deal of attention in the recent political science literature, for example, Arendt Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," *World Politics*, 21 (January 1969): 207-75, and James A. Dunn, "Consociational Democracy and Language Conflict," *Comparative Political Studies*, 5 (April 1972): 3-39.
43. O'Connell, *International Law*, pp. 403-44.
44. Edward Burke, *Works*, VII (London: George Bell, 1890): 60, 100.
45. John Stuart Mill, *Representative Government*, in Everyman Edition, J. S. Mill, *Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government* (New York: Dutton, 1951). See also the discussion in Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 218-19.
46. Mill, *Representative Government*, pp. 487-94, 508-32.
47. For the range of positions in the current professional discussion, see David and Audrey Smock, *The Politics of Pluralism* (New York: Elsevier, 1975), pp. 1-23.
48. Charles Tilly, ed., *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 71-72.
49. Young, *Politics of Cultural Pluralism*, pp. 216-73.
50. Dov Ronen, *Dahomey: Between Tradition and Modernity* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975), especially pp. 244-45.
51. Cobban, *National Self-Determination*, p. 174.
52. Ra'anan, "The Multi-Ethnic State"; also Emerson, *From Empire to Nation*, p. 111.
53. See Jean Gottman, *The Significance of Territory* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1973), pp. 27-36.
54. *Seattle Times*, 28 August 1974.
55. A reasoned discussion of the problems and possibilities is J. J. Spengler's "Small Island Economies: Some Limitations," *South Atlantic Quarterly*, 70 (1971): 48-61. See also William J. Brisk, *The Dilemma of the Ministate: Anguilla* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1969), and Burton Benedict, ed., *Problems of Small Territories* (London: University of London, 1967).
56. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 1973, p. 25909; 1974, pp. 26555, 26636; *New York Times*, September 5, 1974.

57. See Andrew Greeley, "The Demography of Ethnic Identification," unpublished paper, National Opinion Research Center, March 1973 (especially Table 16).

58. See Benjamin Barber, *The Death of Communal Liberty* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 252-57.

59. See George Urban, "From Containment to ... Self-Containment: A Conversation with George F. Kennan," *Encounter* (September 1976), pp. 10-43, especially p. 22.

60. Robert Dahl and Edward Tufte, *Size and Democracy* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973).

61. See Klaus Schumann, *Das Regierungssystem der Schweiz* (Köln: Carl Heymann, 1971). Hans Kohn, *Nationalism and Liberty: The Swiss Example* (New York: Macmillan, 1956).

62. The following account is based on Jean Rohr, *La Suisse Contemporaine* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1972), pp. 87-97, 103-9; and Peter Forster and others, *Schwierige Selbstbestimmung im Jura* (Zurich: Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 1974).

63. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 1975, pp. 27169, 27404.

64. The Swiss are thus explicitly following Sureda's suggestion that: "... the smaller the units into which the territory is divided for the popular consultation, the nearer we are to a perfect self-determination." *The Evolution of the Right of Self-Determination*, p. 162.

65. Roberto Bernhard, "Der 23 Kanton," *Schweizer Monatshefte*, 54, no. 5 (August 1974): 312-15.

66. Gottman, *The Significance of Territory*, p. 146.

67. In addition to Allworth, *The Nationality Question in Soviet Central Asia*, Rakowska-Harmstone, *Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia: The Case of Tadzhikistan*, and Revesz, "Sowjetische Steiflichter," see Elizabeth Bacon, *Central Asians Under Russian Rule: A Study in Culture Change* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966).

68. See especially Rakowska-Harmstone, *Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia*, pp. 18-45.

69. *Ibid.*, pp. 29, 39-43.

70. Allworth, *The Nationality Question in Soviet Central Asia*, pp. 64, 98.

71. Compare Brisk, *The Dilemma of a Ministate*, pp. 63-78. See also *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 1977, pp. 28267-68.

72. See Rouhollah Ramazani, *The Persian Gulf: Iran's Role* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1972).

73. On current trends in Europe, see James Cornford, ed., *The Failure of the State: On the Distribution of Political and Economic Power in Europe* (London: Coom Helm, 1975).

74. Roman Szporluk, "Nationalities and the Russian Problem in the USSR: An Historical Review," *Journal of International Affairs*, 27, no. 1 (1973): 22-40; also Allworth, *The Nationality Question in Central Asia*, and Lyman Legters, "Ideology and Integration, Marxism in Yugoslavia," in Neuman, *Small States and Segmented Societies* [Note 12], pp. 139-53.

75. Alois Riklin, "Schweizerische Unabhängigkeit heute," *Schweizer Monatshefte*, 54, no. 3 (1974): 163-73.

76. Dahl and Tufte, *Size and Democracy*.

77. This was also van Dyke's conclusion (*Human Rights, the United States, and the World Community*, pp. 101-2).

PART III

Country Summaries

Introduction

The following country descriptions summarize the evidence that lies behind our ratings for each country. They first bring together for each country the tabular material of Part I. Then, political rights are considered in terms of the extent to which a country is ruled by a government elected by the majority at the national level, the division of power among levels of government, and the possible denial of self-determination to major subnationalities, if any. While decentralization and the denial of group rights are deemphasized in our rating system, these questions should not be ignored. The summaries also contain consideration of civil liberties, especially as these include freedom of the media and other forms of political expression, freedom from political imprisonment, torture, and other forms of government reprisal, and freedom from interference in nonpublic group or personal life. Equality of access to politically relevant expression is also considered. In some cases the summaries will touch on the relative degree of freedom from oppression outside of the government arena, for example, through slavery, labor bosses, capitalist exploitation, or private terrorism; this area of analysis is little developed at present.

At the beginning of each summary statement the country is characterized by the forms of its economy and polity. The meanings of the terms used in this classification may be found in Part I, "The Relation of Political-Economic Systems to Freedom," and its accompanying Table 7. The classification is highly simplified, but it serves our concern with the developmental forms and biases that affect political controls. The terms employed in Part I and Table 7 differ from those used in the following summaries only in that the capitalist-socialist term in the former discussion is divided into two classes in the summaries. *Mixed capitalist* systems, such as those in Israel, the Netherlands, or Sweden, provide social services on a large scale through governmental or other nonprofit institutions with the result that private control over property is sacrificed to egalitarian purposes. These nations still see capitalism as legitimate, but its legitimacy is accepted grudgingly

by many in government. *Mixed socialist* states such as Iraq or Poland proclaim themselves to be socialist but in fact allow rather large portions of the economy to remain in the private domain.

The discussions in Part I, "Peoples Without National Rights" (Tables 8 and 9), and Part II, "Self-Determination, Subnationalities, and Freedom," are reflected in the summaries by a new set of terms. Each state is categorized according to the political position of the national or ethnic groups it contains. Since the modern political form is the "nation-state," it is not surprising that many states have a *relatively homogeneous population*. The overwhelming majority in these states belong to roughly the same ethnic group; people from this group naturally form the dominant group in the state. In relatively homogeneous states there is no large subnationality (that is, with more than one million people or twenty percent of the population) residing in a defined territory within the country. Austria, Costa Rica, Somalia, and West Germany are good examples. States in this category may be ethnically diverse (for example, Cuba or Colombia), but there are no sharp ethnic lines between major groups. These states should be distinguished from *ethnically complex states*, such as Guyana or Singapore, that have several ethnic groups, but no major group that has its historical homeland in a particular part of the country. Complex states may have large minorities that have suffered social, political, or economic discrimination in the recent past, but today governments in such states treat all peoples as equals as a matter of policy. In this regard complex states are distinguishable from *ethnic states with major nonterritorial subnationalities*, for the governments of such states have a deliberate policy of giving preference to the dominant ethnic group at the expense of other major groups. Examples are Burundi or Rhodesia.

Another large category of states is labeled *ethnic states with (a) major territorial subnationalities(y)*. As in the homogeneous states there is a definite ruling people (or *Staatsvolk*) residing on its historic national territory within the state. But the state also incorporates other territories with other historic peoples that are now either without a state, or the state dominated by their people lies beyond the new border. As explained in Part II, to be considered a subnationality a territorial minority must have enough cohesion and publicity that their right to nationhood is acknowledged in some quarters. Events have forged a quasi-unity among groups only recently quite distinct—as among rebels in northern Chad or the Southern Sudan. Typical countries in this category are Burma and the USSR; more marginally states such as Peru or Laos are also included. *Ethnic states with major potential territorial subnationalities* fall into a closely related category.

In such states—for example, Morocco or Bolivia—many individuals in the ethnic group have merged, with little overt hostility, with the dominant ethnic strain. The assimilation process has gone on for centuries. Yet in many countries the new consciousness that accompanies the diffusion of nationalistic ideas through education may be expected to reverse the process of assimilation in the future, especially where the potential subnationality has preserved a more or less definable territorial base.

There are a few truly *multinational states* in which ethnic groups with territorial bases coexist in one state without a clearly definable ruling people or *Staatsvolk*. In such states the several "nations" each have autonomous political rights, although these do not in law generally include the right to secession. Yugoslavia, India, and possibly Nigeria are examples. A few *binational* and one *trinational* (Switzerland) states complete the categories of those states in which several nations coexist.

The distinction between truly multinational states and ethnic states with territorial subnationalities may be made by comparing two major states that lie close to the margin between the categories—ethnic Russian USSR and multinational India. In the USSR, Russian is in every way the dominant language. By contrast, in India English remains a unifying lingua franca, the languages of the several states have not been forced to change their script to accord with Hindi forms, and Hindi itself is not the distinctive language of a "ruling people"—it is a nationalized version of the popular language of a portion of the population of northern India. (The pre-British ruling class used a closely related language with Arabic, Persian, and Turkish infusions; it was generally written in Persian-Arabic script.) Unlike Russians in the non-Russian republics, Hindi speakers from northern India do not have a special standing in their own eyes or those of other Indians. Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras are non-Hindi speaking cities, and their pride in their identities and culture is an important aspect of Indian culture. By contrast, many Soviet republics are dominated by Russian speakers, a situation developing even in Kiev, the largest of the non-Russian centers.

Finally, the *transethnic heterogeneous states*, primarily in Africa, are those states in which independence found a large number of ethnically distinct peoples grouped more or less artificially within one political framework. The usual solution was for those taking over the reigns of government to adopt the colonial approach of formally treating all local peoples as equal, but with the new objective of integrating all equally into a new national framework (and new national identity) as and when this would be possible. Rulers of states such as Senegal or Zaire often come from relatively small tribes, and it is

in their interest to deemphasize tribalism. In some cases the tribes are so scattered and localistic that there is no short-term likelihood of secession resulting from tribalism. However, in other cases portions of the country have histories of separate nationhood making the trans-ethnic solution hard to implement. In a few countries recent events have placed certain ethnic groups in opposition to one another or to ruling circles in such a way that the transethnic state remains only the *formal* principle of rule, replaced in practice by an ethnic hierarchy, as in Uganda or Sierra Leone.

The descriptive paragraphs for political and civil rights are largely self-explanatory. Subnationalities are generally discussed under a subheading for political rights, although the subject has obvious civil liberties aspects. Discussion of the existence or nonexistence of political parties may be arbitrarily placed in one or the other section. These paragraphs only touch on a few relevant issues, especially in the civil liberties discussion. An issue may be omitted for lack of information, because it does not seem important for the country addressed, or because a particular condition can be inferred from the general statement of a pattern. It should be noted that we have tried to incorporate the distinction between a broad definition of political prisoners (including those detained for violent political crimes) and a narrow definition that includes those arrested only for nonviolent actions—often labeled "prisoners of conscience." At the end of each country summary we have included an overall comparative statement that places the country's ratings in relation to those of others. Countries chosen for comparison are often neighboring or similar ones, but juxtaposing very different countries is also necessary for tying together the system.

The following summaries take little account of the oppressions that occur within the social units of a society, such as family and religious groups, or that reflect variations in the nonpolitical aspects of culture. In particular the reader will note lack of reference in the following summaries to the relative freedom of women. This may be a serious gap in the Survey, but with limited resources we felt that it was better to omit this range of issues than to only tangentially include it. We suspect that including the freedom of women would not affect the ratings a great deal. Democracies today have almost universally opened political and civic participation to women on at least a formal basis of equality, while most nondemocratic societies that deny these equal rights to women also deny effective participation to most men. In such societies granting equal rights may be meaningless. It is little gain for political and civil rights when women are granted equal participation in a totalitarian society.

A F G H A N I S T A N

Economy: preindustrial capitalist-
statist **Political Rights: 6**
Polity: nationalist one-party **Civil Liberties: 6**
Population: 20,000,000* **Status of Freedom:** not free

An ethnic state with major territorial subnationalities

Political Rights. Afghanistan has neither parties nor parliament, although a traditional assembly is occasionally convened. However, since the ruler is a prince of the deposed royal family, well-liked among the Pathan tribes that make up the majority ethnic group, and his violent seizure of power met with little opposition, we can assume considerable consensus support. In many tribal areas and villages there is a measure of de facto self-rule.

Subnationalities. The largest minority is the Tadjik (thirty percent), the dominant people of the cities and the western part of the country. Essentially lowland Persians, their language remains the lingua franca of the country, although it has been government policy to require equal use of the language of the Pathan majority, especially by the bureaucracy. About ten percent of the population belong to Uzbek and other Turkish groups in the north.

Civil Liberties. The press is little developed, and is now government owned. Expression of differing opinion through the press, by demonstration, and probably in private conversation is less free than in the previous period of democratic experimentation. The continuing strength of Islam in law and society mitigates the absolutism of the central government. There is little information on torture; there probably are political prisoners. Travel is restricted. Within the limits of traditional society, there is freedom to change occupation, choose educational experiences (if available), and develop private property. However, because of official ideology, traditional paternalism, and the traditional weakness of business, most modern development is in government hands. Laws against Muslim apostasy and non-Muslim proselytizing restrict religious freedom. Independent labor and peasant organization are forbidden; feudal chiefs, landlords, bureaucrats, and bosses remain very powerful.

Comparatively: Afghanistan is as free as Saudi Arabia, freer than Iraq, less free than Iran.

* Population estimates for all countries are generally derived from the 1977 World Population Data Sheet of the Population Reference Bureau, Washington, D.C.

A L B A N I A

Economy: socialist	Political Rights: 7
Polity: communist one-party	Civil Liberties: 7
Population: 2,500,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Albania has been a communist dictatorship under essentially one-man rule since 1944. While there are a number of elected bodies, including an assembly, the parallel government of the communist party (three percent of the people) is decisive at all levels, and elections offer only one list of candidates. Candidates are officially designated by the Democratic Front, to which all Albanians are supposed to belong. In the 1970's several extensive purges within the party have apparently been designed to maintain the power of the top leaders.

Civil Liberties. Press, radio, and television are completely under government or party control, and communication with the outside world is minimal. Media are characterized by incessant propaganda, and open expression of opinion in private conversation is rare. Political imprisonment is common; torture is frequently reported. All religious institutions were abolished in 1967; religion is outlawed; priests are regularly imprisoned. Apparently there are no private organizations independent of government or party. Economic disparities are comparatively small: all people must work a month a year in factories or on farms, and there are no private cars. Private economic choice is minimal.

Comparatively: Albania is as free as Kampuchea, less free than Yugoslavia.

A L G E R I A

Economy: socialist	Political Rights: 6
Polity: socialist one-party	Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 17,800,000	Status of Freedom: not free

An ethnic state with a potential subnationality

Political Rights. Algeria has combined military dictatorship with one-party socialist rule. Elections at both local and national levels are managed by the party; they allow no real opposition to the system, although individual representatives and specific policies may be criticized. Recent elections resulted in highly questionable percentages (over ninety-nine percent). (In some areas these results appear to have been simply fabricated.) However, the pragmatic, puritanical,

military rulers are probably supported by a fairly broad consensus. *Subnationalities*: About twenty percent of the people are Berbers: revolt in their areas in the Kabylia (1963-64) suggests continuing desire to run their own affairs.

Civil Liberties. All media are government controlled, and no opposition voice is legally allowed. Although not independent, the regular judiciary is unlikely to be capricious. There are political prisoners, and no appeal from the decisions of the special Revolutionary Courts for crimes against the state; there are reports of torture. Land reform has transformed former French plantations into collectives. Although government goals are clearly socialist, many small farms and businesses remain. Eighty percent of the people are illiterate, many are still very poor, but extremes of wealth have been reduced. Islam's continued strength provides a counterweight to governmental absolutism, but there is little religious freedom beyond Islam.

Comparatively: Algeria is as free as Mauritania, freer than Iraq, less free than Morocco.

ANGOLA

Economy: preindustrial socialist	Political Rights: 7
Polity: socialist one-party	Civil Liberties: 7
Population: 6,250,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A transethnic heterogeneous state with major subnationalities

Political Rights. Angola is ruled by a communist-style socialist party, although recent events suggest the military commanders in the several regions may wield considerable power. The ruling party relied heavily on Soviet equipment and Cuban troops in winning the recent civil war, and still relies on the Cubans to stay in power. In 1977 a serious revolt within the top level of the ruling party decimated its leadership. *Subnationalities*: The party is not tribalist, but is opposed by groups relying on particular tribes or regions—especially in Cabinda, the northeast, and the south central areas. The UNITA movement among the Ovimbundu people actively controls much of the south and east of the country.

Civil Liberties. There is no constitution; the nation remains in a state of war, with power arbitrarily exercised, particularly in the countryside. The media in controlled areas are government owned and do not deviate from its line. Private medical care has been abolished, as has much private property—especially in the modern sectors.

Comparatively: Angola is as free as Vietnam, less free than Zambia.

A R G E N T I N A

Economy: capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 6
Polity: military nonparty	Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 26,100,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Ruled today by a military junta, Argentina oscillates between democracy and authoritarianism. The military's last intervention probably had initial popular support because of the high level of both right- and left-wing terrorism, and the corrupt and ineffective regime it replaced. But the continued use of violence by the regime and its supporters to silence opposition has eroded this support. The regions are now under direct junta control.

Civil Liberties. Private newspapers and private broadcasting stations still operate, although the government has recently taken over one of Argentina's most respected papers. Both self-censorship and newspaper closings are standard. Censorship of media and private expression also occurs informally through the threat of terrorist attacks from radical leftist or rightist groups (with the latter apparently supported by, or associated with, elements of the military and police). Nevertheless, the media continue to report unfavorable events and to criticize the government. The independence of the universities has been nullified. While the courts retain some independence, thousands of cases of arbitrary arrest, torture, and unexplained execution occur. The church continues to play a strong opposition role, as do the trade unions.

Comparatively: Argentina is as free as Uruguay, freer than Germany (East), less free than Brazil.

A U S T R A L I A

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: decentralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 13,970,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population with small aboriginal groups

Political Rights. Australia is a federal parliamentary democracy with strong powers retained by its component states. With equal representation from each state, the Senate provides a counterbalance to the nationally representative House of Representatives. There have been recent changes in government, with the Labour Party gaining control in 1972 only to lose it again in 1975. As shown by recent events, the British appointed Governor General retains some power

in constitutional deadlocks. Trade unions (separately and through the Labour Party) and foreign investors have great economic weight. The states have separate parliaments and premiers, but appointed governors.

Civil Liberties. All the newspapers and most radio and television stations are privately owned. The Australian Broadcasting Commission operates government radio and television stations on a basis similar to BBC. Although Australia lacks many formal guarantees of civil liberties, the degree of the protection of these liberties in the common law is similar to that in Britain and Canada. Freedom of choice in education, travel, occupation, property, and private association are perhaps as complete as anywhere in the world. Relatively low taxes are suggestive of this freedom. However, there are no doubt political inequalities stemming from differences in economic power, particularly in rural areas and for aborigines.

Comparatively: Australia is as free as the United Kingdom, freer than Italy.

A U S T R I A

Economy: mixed capitalist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 7,500,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Austria's parliamentary system has a directly elected lower house and an upper (and less powerful) house elected by the provincial assemblies. The president is directly elected, but the chancellor (representing the majority party in parliament) is the center of political power. The two major parties have alternated control since the 1950's. Provincial legislatures and governors are elective, but they are not independently powerful. *Subnationalities:* Fifty thousand Slovenes in the southern part of the country have been granted rights to their own schools at Yugoslav insistence.

Civil Liberties. The press in Austria is free and varied, while radio and television are under a state-owned corporation that by law is supposed to be free of political control. Its geographical position and neutral status by treaty places its media and government in a position analogous to Finland, but the Soviets have put less pressure on Austria to conform to Soviet wishes than on Finland. The rule of law is secure, and there are no political prisoners. Banks and heavy industry are largely nationalized.

Comparatively: Austria is as free as Belgium, freer than Greece.

although union organization is restricted. Many free social services are provided. Citizenship is very hard to obtain and there is a good deal of antipathy to foreign workers (but unlike neighboring shaikhdoms most people in the country are citizens).

Comparatively: Bahrain is as free as Kuwait, freer than Saudi Arabia, less free than Turkey.

BANGLADESH

Economy: preindustrial capitalist-statist **Political Rights:** 6
Civil Liberties: 4
Polity: military nonparty **Status of Freedom:** partly free
Population: 83,300,000

A relatively homogeneous population with a Hindu minority

Political Rights. Following a series of coups and countercoups, Bangladesh was in 1977 under the interim control of self-appointed but moderate military-civilian rulers. The recent referendum giving ninety-nine percent of the vote to the military president casts more doubt on the election process than it indicates support. Some local elections have been held successfully; the resulting local institutions represent at least a slight devolution of power. *Subnationalities:* Fighting with minor tribal groups along the border continues.

Civil Liberties. The press is private, government, and party. Although operating under the restrictions of the present martial law regime, there is considerable freedom of expression. Radio and television are government controlled. Freedom of assembly is restricted, but the continued existence of a broad spectrum of political parties allows for the regular organization of dissent. There have been numerous arrests and executions following coup attempts during recent years. Evidence suggests the courts decide against the government in many cases; yet there are thousands of political prisoners, and torture is reported. In spite of considerable communal antipathy, religious freedom exists. Travel is generally unrestricted; labor unions are active but do not have the right to strike.

Comparatively: Bangladesh is as free as Pakistan, freer than Burma, less free than India.

BARBADOS

Economy: capitalist **Political Rights:** 1
Polity: centralized multiparty **Civil Liberties:** 1
Population: 250,000 **Status of Freedom:** free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Barbados is governed by a parliamentary system, with a ceremonial British Governor General. Power alternates between the two major parties. Local governments are also elected.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers are private and free of government control. There are both private and government radio stations, but the government-controlled radio station also controls the only television station. There is an independent judiciary, and general freedom from arbitrary government action. In spite of both major parties relying on the support of labor, private property is fully accepted.

Comparatively: Barbados is as free as the United Kingdom, freer than Jamaica.

BELGIUM

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: decentralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 9,950,000	Status of Freedom: free

A binational state

Political Rights: Belgium is a constitutional monarchy with a bicameral parliament. Elections lead to coalition governments, generally of the center. *Subnationalities:* The rise of nationalism among the two major peoples—Flemish and Walloon—has led to increasing transfer of control over cultural affairs to the communal groups. However, provincial governors are appointed by the national government.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers are free and uncensored. Radio and television are government owned, but the director of each station is solely responsible for programming. The full spectrum of private rights is respected.

Comparatively: Belgium is as free as Switzerland, freer than France.

BENIN

Economy: preindustrialist socialist	Political Rights: 7
Polity: socialist one-party	Civil Liberties: 7
Population: 3,300,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Benin is a military dictatorship. Although theoretically a one-party socialist state, it is doubtful that party organization is very substantial. Regional and tribal loyalties may be stronger than national. Elections and parliament do not exist.

Civil Liberties. All media are rigidly censored; most are owned by the government. Opposition is not tolerated; criticism of the govern-

of political interests. Parliamentary elections are planned for 1978. Provincial and local government is controlled from the center, but there are strong labor, peasant, and religious organizations in many areas that exert quasi-governmental power. *Subnationalities*: Over sixty percent of the people are Indians speaking Aymara or Quechua; these languages have recently been given official status alongside Spanish. These peoples remain, however, more potential than active nationalities.

Civil Liberties. Although the press and most of the radio and television network are private, the government frequently interferes, and self-censorship is widely practiced. Yet an organized private group fights human rights violations. Freedom is also restricted by the climate of violence, both governmental and nongovernmental. (Early 1978 saw a general liberalization in response to a hunger strike.) Normal legal protections have often been denied during frequent states of siege, but it is possible to win against the government in the courts. In spite of political imprisonment, torture, and the exiling of political opponents, opposition groups commonly hold political assemblies. The people are overwhelmingly post-land-reform, subsistence agriculturists. The major mines are nationalized; for the workers there is a generous social welfare program, given the country's poverty.

Comparatively: Bolivia is as free as Pakistan, freer than Paraguay, less free than Colombia.

B O T S W A N A

Economy: preindustrial capitalist **Political Rights:** 2
Polity: decentralized multiparty **Civil Liberties:** 3
Population: 750,000 **Status of Freedom:** free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. The republican system of Botswana combines traditional and modern principles. The assembly is elected for a fixed term and appoints the president who rules. There is also an advisory House of Chiefs. There are nine districts, led either by chiefs or elected leaders, with independent power of taxation, as well as traditional power over land and agriculture. Elections continue to be won overwhelmingly by the ruling party as they were even before independence, yet there are opposition members in parliament, and electoral processes appear reasonably fair. There is economic and political pressure from both black African and white neighbors. *Subnationalities*: The country is divided among several major tribes belonging to the Batswana people, as well as minor or refuge peoples on the margins. The latter include a few hundred comparatively wealthy white farmers.

Civil Liberties. The radio and most newspapers are government owned; however, there is no censorship, and South African media present an available alternative. Rights of assembly and expression are respected. Judicially, civil liberties appear to be guaranteed, although on the local scale the individual tribesman may have considerably less freedom.

Comparatively: Botswana is as free as Colombia, freer than Zambia, less free than Fiji.

B R A Z I L

Economy: capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 4
Polity: decentralized multiparty (military dominated)	Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 112,000,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

A complex but relatively homogeneous population with many small territorial subnationalities.

Political Rights. Brazil has been governed by a president, essentially elected by the military, and a popularly elected but weak assembly in which the opposition party participates. Recent elections have shown strong support for the opposition, but new obstacles are continually placed in its way. An opposition candidate may run in a forthcoming presidential election; but should he win, it is doubtful that the military would allow the opposition to take office. There are independently organized elected governments at both state and local levels, though the army has interfered a good deal at these levels in recent years. *Subnationalities:* The many small Indian groups of the interior are under both private and public pressure. Some still fight back in the face of loss of land, lives, and culture.

Civil Liberties. The media are private, except for a few broadcasting stations. The powerful press has been censored and self-censored in recent years, but retains its independence. Leading newspapers have won censorship cases in the courts. Opposition figures have frequently been imprisoned, tortured, and killed by both legal security forces and paralegal forces; such events were much less frequent in 1977. Private violence against criminals and suspected communists continues outside the law. Some opposition voices are regularly heard—including parliamentarians, a few journalists, and officials of the church—but students and professors seem effectively muzzled. There is considerable large-scale government industry, but rights to own property, to religious freedom, to travel, and education of one's choice are generally respected.

Comparatively: Brazil is as free as Lesotho, freer than Uruguay, less free than Jamaica.

is explained by the almost continuous warfare the government has had to wage since independence against both rebellious subnationalities and two separate communist armies. This state of war has been augmented since the 1960's by the attempts of civilian politicians to regain power by armed force or antigovernment demonstration, as well as recent plots within the army itself. There are probably thousands of political prisoners. The regular court structure has been replaced by "people's courts." Religion is free; union activity is not; emigration is difficult. Although the eventual goal of the government is complete socialization and there are to be steady moves toward agricultural collectivization, an official announcement in 1977 temporarily reserved significant portions of the economy for private enterprise.

Comparatively: Burma is as free as Chad, freer than Kampuchea, less free than Thailand.

BURUNDI

Economy: preindustrial mixed
capitalist

Political Rights: 7

Civil Liberties: 6

Polity: socialist one-party
(military dominated)

Status of Freedom: not free

Population: 3,900,000

An ethnic state with a majority, nonterritorial subnationality

Political Rights. At latest report Burundi was ruled by a Supreme Revolutionary Council led by a military officer, with the former one-party government temporarily in abeyance. The stated intention is to follow a period of military rule by another period of one-party socialist rule; there are now no parties, elections, or assemblies. *Subnationalities:* The rulers continue to be all from the Tutsi ethnic group (fifteen percent) that has traditionally ruled; their dominance was reinforced by a massacre of the repressed majority Hutus (eighty-five percent) after an attempted revolt in 1973.

Civil Liberties. There are both government and church newspapers, and radio is government controlled. There is no freedom of political speech or assembly. Members of the previous government remain in prison. Under current conditions there is little guarantee of individual rights, particularly for the Hutu majority. In recent years Hutu have been excluded from the army, secondary schools, and the civil service. There are no independent unions. Traditional group and individual rights no doubt persist on the village level: Burundi is not a highly structured modern society. Travel is relatively unrestricted. Although officially socialist, private or traditional economic forms predominate.

Comparatively: Burundi is as free as Burma, freer than Uganda, less free than Kenya.

CAMBODIA

(See Kampuchea)

CAMEROON

Economy: preindustrial capitalist **Political Rights: 6**
Polity: nationalist one-party **Civil Liberties: 5**
Population: 6,700,000 **Status of Freedom:** not free

A transethnic heterogeneous state with a major subnationality

Political Rights. Cameroon is a one-party state ruled by the same person since independence in 1960. The government has steadily centralized power. Referendums and other elections have little meaning; all candidates to the weak elective assembly must be party approved. Provincial governors are appointed by the central government. An attempt has been made to incorporate all elements in a government of broad consensus. *Subnationalities:* The most significant opposition has come from those opposing centralization, particularly movements supported by the country's largest ethnic group, the Bamileke (twenty-six percent). Other ethnic groups are quite small.

Civil Liberties. The media are government controlled. Although newspapers are occasionally outspoken, they must run the hurdles of a double censorship. Freedom of speech, assembly, and union organization are limited, while freedom of occupation, education, and property are respected. In early 1977 there were one hundred or more political prisoners, often ill-treated and detained without trial. Many were released later in the year. Allegations have been made that political prisoners were tortured, but in general the regime does not have a reputation of maintaining itself by terror. Internal travel and religious choice are unrestricted. The government has supported land reform; although still relatively short on capital, private enterprise is encouraged wherever possible.

Comparatively: Cameroon is as free as Iran, freer than Niger, less free than Nigeria.

CANADA

Economy: capitalist **Political Rights: 1**
Polity: decentralized multiparty **Civil Liberties: 1**
Population: 23,500,000 **Status of Freedom:** free

A binational state

Political Rights. Canada is a parliamentary democracy with alternation of rule between leading parties. The provinces have their own democratic institutions with a higher degree of autonomy than the American states. *Subnationalities:* In an attempt to prevent the breakup of Canada, the government has moved toward granting French linguistic equality; French has become the official language in Quebec. In addition, Quebec has been allowed to opt out of some national programs and maintains its own representatives abroad.

Civil Liberties. The media are free, although there is a government-related radio and television network. The full range of civil liberties is respected. There has been evidence of the invasion of privacy by security forces in recent years, much as in the United States. The judicial and legal structures have borrowed from both the United Kingdom and the United States, with consequent advantages and disadvantages.

Comparatively: Canada is as free as United States of America, freer than Italy.

CAPE VERDE ISLANDS

Economy: preindustrial socialist

Polity: socialist one-party

Population: 330,000

Political Rights: 6

Civil Liberties: 6

Status of Freedom: not free

A relatively homogeneous state

Political Rights. The party ruling the Cape Verde Islands also rules Guinea-Bissau. Established and originally led by Cape Verdeans, the party achieved its major preindependence success on the mainland. Its secretary-general is president of the Cape Verde Islands, and a key political issue is how soon the two states will merge. Only this party has taken part in recent elections; other parties are banned.

Civil Liberties. Both private and government media avoid criticism. Prisoners of conscience are held, often without trial; rights to organized opposition, assembly, or political expression are not respected. For its region Cape Verde's seventy-five percent literacy is very high. The Islands' plantation agriculture has been largely nationalized, but endemic unemployment continues to lead to emigration.

Comparatively: Cape Verde Islands is as free as Tanzania, freer than Ethiopia, less free than Seychelles.

CENTRAL AFRICAN EMPIRE

Economy: preindustrial capitalist **Political Rights:** 7
Polity: nationalist one-party **Civil Liberties:** 7
Population: 1,900,000 **Status of Freedom:** not free

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. The Central African Empire is ruled as a military dictatorship, although it has incorporated the single party of the previous regime in its political structure. There are at present no representative institutions. Prefects are appointed by the central government in the French style. The country is heavily dependent on French economic and military aid.

Civil Liberties. All media are government or party controlled; there is no legal opposition voice. Freedom of political expression is denied even for the use of the mails. Brutal treatment of prisoners and arbitrary arrest have been common features of the administration. Political trial procedures offer the defendant no protection. Independent unions are not allowed. Since there is no state ideology religious freedom is generally respected, as are other personal and economic freedoms.

Comparatively: Central African Empire is as free as Mali, less free than Cameroon.

CHAD

Economy: preindustrial capitalist **Political Rights:** 7
Polity: military nonparty **Civil Liberties:** 6
Population: 4,200,000 **Status of Freedom:** not free

An ethnic state with a major territorial subnationality

Political Rights. Chad is a military dictatorship. Provincial governors are centrally appointed. *Subnationalities:* Ethnic struggle pits the ruling southern Negroes (principally the Christian and animist Sara tribe) against a variety of northern Muslim groups (principally nomadic Arabs). The government of Chad has remained in power with French military help, while the rebels receive Libyan support.

Civil Liberties. The media are controlled by the government. Anyone writing an article thought to damage Chad's relations with its allies may be imprisoned. The rule of law appears more secure under the military than under the preceding more erratic civilian rule. There are political prisoners. Religious freedom is respected and labor unions have limited autonomy. Not an ideological state, traditional law is still influential.

Comparatively: Chad is as free as Haiti, freer than Central African Empire, less free than Sudan.

CHILE

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 7
Polity: military nonparty	Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 11,000,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Chile is ruled as a military dictatorship, although much of the former judicial structure also remains. (The January plebiscite will slightly raise Chile's rating this year.) All power is concentrated at the center, and there are no elective positions. There is, however, an appointive Council of State representing many sectors of society.

Civil Liberties. All forms of media have both public and private outlets, but newspapers are primarily private. The media, although censored and often threatened with closure, express a considerable range of opinion, occasionally including direct criticism of government policy. While one can win against the government in the courts, there have in the last few years been hundreds of political executions and "disappearances." Many persons have been imprisoned, and apparently torture has been commonly employed. In the last year there has been considerable improvement in both arbitrary arrest and treatment, and there may be more than propaganda significance in the fact that the most hated security organization has been disbanded. Rights to private property have been greatly strengthened both in the country and city, with government control of the economy now being limited to copper and petroleum.

Comparatively: Chile is as free as Cuba, freer than Czechoslovakia, less free than Hungary.

CHINA (Mainland)

Economy: socialist	Political Rights: 6
Polity: communist one-party	Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 930,000,000	Status of Freedom: not free

An ethnic state with peripheral subnationalities

Political Rights. China is ruled as a one-party communist state, with power concentrated in the higher echelons of the party, and possibly the army. At the top is the collective leadership of the Politburo. A National Peoples Congress was elected in 1974; it met in 1975 (and 1978), but there is little information on the method of election or its accomplishments (before 1978). Actual power is diffused among several factions in both the party and the army. *Sub-*

nationalities: The several subnationalities on the periphery, such as the Tibetans, Uighurs or Mongols, are allowed some separate cultural life. Only a few million, they are gradually being extinguished by the settlement of Chinese in their midst, until they become minorities in their own lands.

Civil Liberties. The media are all rigidly controlled. There are no rights separate from the rights of the state and party. Rights to choose one's occupation, religion, or education are not acknowledged; even the right to be silent is often denied. Still, a limited underground literature has developed. All court cases are explicitly decided in political terms (there is no legal code); decisions are often capricious. There may be millions of political prisoners, including those in labor-reform camps. Although the numbers may not now be large, political executions were still reported in 1977. Thirty million Chinese are systematically discriminated against because of "bad class background." Nevertheless, poster campaigns, demonstrations, and evidence of private conversation shows that pervasive factionalism allows elements of freedom and consensus into the system. (In early 1978 there was official talk of personal human rights and of eliminating discrimination based on class background.)

Comparatively: China (Mainland) is as free as Tanzania, freer than Mongolia, less free than Korea (South).

CHINA (Taiwan)

Economy: capitalist-statist **Political Rights: 5**
Polity: centralized dominant-party **Civil Liberties: 4**
Population: 16,600,000 **Status of Freedom: partly free**

A quasi-ethnic state with a majority nonterritorial subnationality

Political Rights. Taiwan is ruled by a single party organized according to a communist model (although anticommunist ideologically). There is a parliament to which representatives from Taiwan are elected in fairly free elections; a few members oppose the regime and a small opposition party is tolerated. However, most parliamentarians continue to be persons elected in 1947 as representatives of districts in China where elections could not be held subsequently. Important local and regional positions are elective, including those in the provincial assembly, and these are held by Taiwanese. *Subnationalities:* Ninety percent of the people are native Taiwanese (speaking two Chinese dialects), and an oppositionist movement to transfer control from the mainland immigrants to the Taiwanese has been repressed. Since nearly all Taiwanese are also Chinese, it is difficult to know the extent to which non-Taiwanese oppression is felt.

Civil Liberties. The media include government or party organs, but are mostly in private hands. Newspapers and magazines are subject to occasional censorship or suspension, and practice self-censorship, but the climate of independent expression in public and private contrasts markedly with that on the mainland. Rights to assembly are limited. There are several hundred political prisoners, but there have been no political executions and reports of torture are now rare. Union activity is restricted; strikes are forbidden. Private rights to travel, property, education, and religion are generally respected.

Comparatively: China (Taiwan) is as free as Egypt, freer than China (Mainland), less free than Malaysia.

COLOMBIA

Economy: capitalist

Political Rights: 2

Polity: centralized multiparty

Civil Liberties: 3

Population: 25,200,000

Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population with scattered minorities

Political Rights. Colombia is a constitutional democracy. The president is directly elected, as are both houses of the legislature. Although campaigns are accompanied by both violence and apathy, there is little reason to believe they are fraudulent. By agreement members of the two principal parties must be included in the government and the list of departmental governors. Both of the leading parties have well defined factions. There is one major third party; among the minor parties several are involved in revolutionary activity. The provinces are directly administered by the national government.

Civil Liberties. The press is private, with some papers under party control, and quite free. Radio and television include both government and private stations. Personal rights are generally respected; courts are relatively strong and independent. Riots and guerrilla activity have led to periodic states of siege in which these rights are limited. Assemblies are often banned from fear of riots. In these conditions the security forces have violently infringed personal rights, especially those of peasants or Amerindians in rural areas. Although many persons are rounded up in antiguerrilla or antiterrorist campaigns, people are not imprisoned simply for their nonviolent expression of political opinion. Accusations of torture have been made in recent years; at least psychological pressure has been regularly used to extract information. The government encourages private enterprise where possible; a large proportion of the population lives by subsistence agriculture.

Comparatively: Colombia is as free as Turkey, freer than Ecuador, less free than Venezuela.

COMORO ISLANDS

Economy: preindustrial mixed **Political Rights:** 4
Polity: centralized (multi) party **Civil Liberties:** 4(?)
Population: 300,000 **Status of Freedom:** partly free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Comoro is ruled by a union of parties that recently ousted by armed coup the constitutionally appointed prime minister. The party leaders now rule extralegally without parliament, but they collectively represent a good share of the electorate in the last election. In late 1977 the ruler had his tenure confirmed by a plebiscite which gave him a fifty-five percent to forty-three percent margin. (The island of Mayotte has opted out, and although this is not accepted by the Comoro government, we do not include Mayotte here.) There are district assemblies on each island. Destruction of the civil service and reliance on "people's committees" has led to widespread confusion.

Civil Liberties. Radio is government controlled; we have no information on the press. The suppression of political opposition has led to political imprisonment and reports of torture, but the plebiscite results suggest a relatively free society. No one is allowed to leave the country without designating a hostage for his good conduct. The poor population depends almost entirely on subsistence agriculture and emigration.

Comparatively: Comoro Islands appears to be as free as Maldives, freer than Seychelles, less free than Mauritius.

CONGO

Economy: preindustrial mixed **Political Rights:** 7
Polity: socialist one-party **Civil Liberties:** 6
(military dominated) **Status of Freedom:** not free
Population: 1,380,000

A formally transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Congo is ruled as a one-party military dictatorship. After the assassination of the president this spring a ruling military committee suppressed the previous constitution, including the assembly and regional government. *Subnationalities:* Historically the country was established out of a maze of ethnic groups, without the domination

of some by others. However, the army that now rules is said to come from tribes with not more than fifteen percent of the population.

Civil Liberties. The news media are heavily censored. Executions and imprisonment of political opponents occur; it is most unlikely their trials are fair. Only one union is allowed and even it is not allowed to strike. At the local and small entrepreneur level private property is generally respected; many larger industries have been nationalized.

Comparatively: Congo is as free as Haiti, freer than Uganda, less free than Cameroon.

COSTA RICA

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 2,070,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. A parliamentary democracy, Costa Rica has a directly elected president and several important parties. This structure is supplemented by an independent tribunal for the overseeing of elections. Elections are fair, although there may have been large-scale contributions by foreigners in recent elections. Provinces are under the direction of the central government.

Civil Liberties. The media are notably free, private, and varied, and serve a society ninety percent literate. The courts are fair, and private rights, such as those to movement, occupation, education, religion, and union organization are respected.

Comparatively: Costa Rica is as free as Ireland, freer than Colombia.

CUBA

Economy: socialist	Political Rights: 6
Polity: communist one-party	Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 9,600,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A complex but relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Cuba is a one-party communist state on the Soviet model. Real power lies, however, more in the person of Fidel Castro and in the Russian leaders upon whom he depends than is the case in other noncontiguous states adopting this model. Popular election at the municipal level has recently been introduced. Provincial and national assemblies are elected by municipalities but can be recalled by popular vote. The whole system is, however, largely a show. Political opponents are excluded from nomination by law, many others

are simply disqualified by party fiat, no debate is allowed on issues, and once elected there is no evidence the assemblies will be allowed to oppose party decisions.

Civil Liberties. The media are state controlled and heavily censored. There are thousands of political prisoners. Although torture has been reported only in the past, hundreds who have refused to recant are held in difficult conditions. There are hundreds of thousands of others who are formally discriminated against as opponents of the system. There appears to be some freedom to criticize informally. Freedom to choose work, education, or residence is greatly restricted; the practice of religion is discouraged by the government.

Comparatively: Cuba is as free as Tanzania, freer than Czechoslovakia, less free than Mexico.

CYPRUS

Economy: capitalist

Political Rights: 3

Polity: decentralized multiparty

Civil Liberties: 4

Population: 600,000

Status of Freedom: partly free

A binational state (no central government)

Political Rights. At present Cyprus is one state only in theory. Both the Greek and the Turkish sectors are parliamentary democracies, although the Turkish sector is in effect a protectorate of Turkey. Elections have seemed reasonably fair in both sectors, but in the violent atmosphere pressure has been applied to all nonconforming groups or individuals. *Nationalities:* Greeks and Turks now live almost exclusively in their own sectors. Eighty percent of the population is Greek, sixty percent of the land is in the Greek sector.

Civil Liberties. The newspapers are free and varied in both sectors, with the constraints mentioned above. Radio and television are under the respective governments or semigovernmental bodies. The usual rights of free peoples are respected in each sector, including occupation, labor organization, and religion. Because of communal strife and invasion, property has often been taken from members of one group by force (or abandoned from fear of force) and given to the other. Under these conditions rights to choose one's sector of residence or to travel between sectors are denied.

Comparatively: Cyprus is as free as Malaysia, freer than Syria, less free than Turkey.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Economy: socialist	Political Rights: 7
Polity: communist one-party	Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 15,000,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A binational state

Political Rights. Czechoslovakia is a Soviet-style one-party communist state, reinforced by the presence of Soviet troops. Elections are noncompetitive and there is essentially no legislative debate. *Sub-nationalities:* The division of the state into separate Czech and Slovak socialist republics has only slight meaning since the Czechoslovak communist party continues to run the country (under the guidance of the Soviet Communist Party). Although less numerous and poorer than the Czech people, the Slovaks are probably granted their rightful share of power within this framework.

Civil Liberties. Media are government or party owned and rigidly censored. However, some private and literary expression occurs that is relatively free. Rights to travel, occupation, and private property are restricted. Heavy pressures are placed on religious activities, especially through holding ministerial incomes at a very low level and the curtailing of religious education. There are a number of political prisoners; exclusion of individuals from their chosen occupation is a more common sanction. The beating of political suspects is common.

Comparatively. Czechoslovakia is as free as Rumania, freer than Germany (East), less free than Poland.

DENMARK

Economy: mixed capitalist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 5,075,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Denmark is a constitutional monarchy with a unicameral parliament. Elections are fair. Since a wide variety of parties achieve success, resulting governments are based on coalitions. Districts have governors appointed from the center and elected councils; local officials are under local control.

Civil Liberties. The press is free (and more conservative politically than the electorate). Radio and television are government owned but relatively free. All other rights are guaranteed, although the very high tax level constitutes more than usual constraint on private property in a capitalist state. Religion is free but state supported.

Comparatively: Denmark is as free as Norway, freer than Finland.

DJIBOUTI

(formerly the French Territory of the Afars and Issas)

Economy: preindustrial capitalist **Political Rights:** 3
Polity: centralized multiparty **Civil Liberties:** 4
Population: 115,000 **Status of Freedom:** partly free

Independence led initially to a Somali majority ruling over a territorial Afar minority

Political Rights. Djibouti is a parliamentary democracy under French protection. In the elections of 1977, only one list of parliamentary candidates was presented, a list dominated by the majority Somali people. The opposition (Afar) party encouraged the casting of blank ballots. The resulting government included representatives of all political parties and ethnic groups, but in late 1977 leading Afars resigned claiming tribal repression.

Civil Liberties: Law is based on French codes and modified overseas French practice. The media are very limited and apparently apolitical. Continuing violence between Somali and Afar has led to many arrests, particularly of Afars, and the banning of a radical Afar party. By the end of the year movement within the country was dangerous outside of an individual's own tribal area.

Comparatively: Djibouti is approximately as free as Lebanon, freer than Somalia, less free than Israel.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Economy: capitalist **Political Rights:** 4
Polity: centralized multiparty **Civil Liberties:** 2
Population: 5,000,000 **Status of Freedom:** partly free

A complex but relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. The Dominican Republic is a presidential democracy on the American model. The party in power in both the presidency and legislature has won fair elections in recent years, but in the last election it won only after opposition parties withdrew because of alleged (and probable) irregularities. Provinces are under national control, municipalities under local.

Civil Liberties. The media are privately owned and free. Public expression is generally free, and the spokesmen of a wide range of parties openly express their opinions. The communist party was recently legalized, but in some rural areas opposition meetings continue to be harassed. In the recent past guerrilla activity has led to government violence in which rights have not been respected. Torture and

beatings in the prison system and semigovernmental death squads have been reported. However, such events have not happened recently. There are now only a few prisoners that should be classified as political. Labor unions operate under constraint.

Comparatively: Dominican Republic is as free as Western Samoa, freer than Guatemala, less free than Jamaica.

ECUADOR

Economy: preindustrial capitalist **Political Rights:** 6
Polity: military nonparty **Civil Liberties:** 4
Population: 7,500,000 **Status of Freedom:** partly free

An ethnic state with a potential subnationality

Political Rights. Ecuador is governed by a military junta passively accepted by a number of the political parties. The legislature has been dissolved for many years, and the provinces are under military governors. The country is preparing for multiparty elections in late 1978. *Subnationalities:* Perhaps forty percent of the population is Indian and many of these speak Quechua. However, this population does not at present form a conscious subnationality in a distinctive homeland.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers are under private or party control and quite outspoken, although there is some self-censorship. Radio and television are mostly under private control. Although often repressed, unions remain powerful and independent. Leaders of a broad range of parties continue their publications and indoor meetings; they hold outdoor rallies, though not in the streets. Such freedoms are best guaranteed in the cities and may at times be inconsistently denied. Recently all political prisoners were declared free. The court system is not strongly independent, and political imprisonment for belief can be expected to recur. Accusations of torture have been made in the past. Although there are state firms, particularly in major industries, Ecuador is essentially a capitalist and traditionalist state.

Comparatively: Ecuador is as free as Kuwait, freer than Argentina, less free than Mexico.

EGYPT

Economy: mixed socialist **Political Rights:** 5
Polity: centralized dominant-party **Civil Liberties:** 4
Population: 38,900,000 **Status of Freedom:** partly free

A relatively homogeneous population with a communal religious minority

Political Rights. Egypt is a controlled democracy. Within limits political parties may organize; communists and religious extremist parties are forbidden, and there is an umbrella organization within which most of the major parties group themselves. The recent presidential election was an uncontested referendum, but parliamentary elections were contested by three competing lists, formed out of the former single party, and independents. The president's centrist faction won nearly all seats, but there was a contest, and it was over policy rather than personalities (unlike analogous elections in one-party states). In 1977 parliament expelled a member for criticizing the president, with the vote 281 to 28; again a level of contest unknown in one-party states. Since the elections a nationalist party outside these limits has been reestablished, and several members of parliament have joined it. *Subnationalities:* Perhaps two million Coptic Christians live a distinct communal life.

Civil Liberties. The Egyptian press is mostly government owned; partially successful efforts have been made recently to eliminate censorship, allow freedom to newspaper editors, and develop party organs. Radio and television are under government control. A fairly broad range of literary publications has recently developed. Severe riot laws have led to large-scale imprisonment, but the independence of the courts has been strengthened recently. There are probably no prisoners of conscience. In both agriculture and industry considerable diversity and choice exists, although loosely within a socialist framework. Unions have developed some independence of the government. Travel and other private rights are generally free.

Comparatively: Egypt is as free as Nigeria, freer than Saudi Arabia, less free than Cyprus.

EL SALVADOR

Economy: capitalist

Political Rights: 4

Polity: centralized multiparty

Civil Liberties: 4

(military dominated)

Status of Freedom: partly free

Population: 4,270,000

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Formally, El Salvador is a constitutional democracy on the American model, with a directly elected president. Although there are several parties and the opposition has won power in the capital, in at least the last two elections the government has interfered quite blatantly in national elections. (Since the opposition's power is concentrated in the capital, it might lose a fair election.) As a result

ETHIOPIA

Economy: preindustrial mixed	Political Rights: 7
Polity: military nonparty	Civil Liberties: 7
Population: 29,400,000	Status of Freedom: not free

An ethnic state with major territorial subnationalities

Political Rights. Ethiopia is ruled by a military committee (the Dergue) that has successively slaughtered the leaders of the *ancien régime*, and then many of its own leaders. A variety of "parties" have been formed, but they are more accurately described as revolutionary factions with rapidly shifting, generally leftist, ideologies. Popular control in the villages may be significant. By 1977 the country was in an advanced state of anarchy, even at times in the capital. Eritrea was largely under control of antigovernment groups, as was an undetermined amount of the rest of the country, and Somali troops (guerillas and invading regulars) controlled a section of the southeast. (Most Somali forces were expelled by foreign troops in 1978.)

Subnationalities: The heartland of Ethiopia is occupied by the traditionally dominant Amhara and acculturated portions of the diffuse Galla people. In the late nineteenth century Ethiopian rulers united what had been warring fragments of a former empire in the heartland, and proceeded to incorporate some entirely new areas. At this time the Somali of the south came under Ethiopian rule; Eritrea was incorporated as the result of a UN decision in 1952. Today Ethiopia is crosscut by linguistic and religious divisions, but most important is separatism due to historic allegiances to ancient provinces (especially Tigre), to different experiences (Eritrea), and to a foreign nation (Somalia).

Civil Liberties. Personal rights as we know them are unprotected under conditions of despotism and anarchy. Political imprisonment, execution, and torture are common—by the government, its supporters, and, no doubt, some of its opponents. What independence there was under the Ethiopian monarchy (of the churches, the media, and unions) has been largely lost, but lack of centralized control has led to some pluralistic freedom in expression and to increased local control, benefits supported in some degree by the land reform the revolution has accomplished. The words and actions of the regime indicate little if any respect for private rights in property.

Comparatively: Ethiopia is as free as Kampuchea, less free than Sudan.

FIJI

Economy: preindustrial capitalist **Political Rights:** 2
Polity: centralized multiparty **Civil Liberties:** 2
Population: 590,000 **Status of Freedom:** free
 A binational state

Political Rights. Fiji has a complex political structure designed to protect the interests of both the original Fiji people and the Indian people, who are now in a slight majority. The Lower House is directly elected on the basis of both communal and national rolls. The Upper House is indirectly elected by a variety of electors (including the council of chiefs, the prime minister, and the opposition leader). Local government is organized both by the central government and by a Fijian administration headed by the Council of Chiefs. In 1977 the opposition won its first election, but was unable to hold together a majority that could rule. This inability led to its decisive defeat in a subsequent election later in the year.

Civil Liberties. The press is free and private, but radio is under government control. The full protection of the rule of law is supplemented by an ombudsman to investigate complaints against the government. Right to property is limited by special rights of inalienability that are granted to the Fijians and cover most of the country. The nation may be about evenly divided between a subsistence economy based on agriculture and fishing and a modern market economy.

Comparatively: Fiji is as free as Gambia, freer than Tonga, less free than New Zealand.

FINLAND

Economy: mixed capitalist **Political Rights:** 2
Polity: centralized multiparty **Civil Liberties :**2
Population: 5,100,000 **Status of Freedom:** free
 An ethnic state with a small territorial subnationality

Political Rights. Finland has a parliamentary system with a strong, directly elected president. Since there are a large number of relatively strong parties, government is almost always by coalition. Elections have resulted in shifts in coalition membership. Soviet pressure has influenced the maintenance of the current president in office for over twenty years; by treaty foreign policy cannot be anti-Soviet. The provinces have centrally appointed governors. *Subnationalities:* The rural Swedish minority (seven percent) with its own political party is an important political force. The Swedish-speaking Aland Islands have local autonomy and other special rights.

Civil Liberties. The press is private. Most of the radio service is government controlled, but there is an important commercial television station. Discussion in the media (and to a lesser extent in private) is controlled by a political consensus that criticisms of the Soviet Union should be highly circumspect. Those who cross the line are often admonished by the government to practice self-censorship. There is a complete rule of law.

Comparatively: Finland is as free as Greece, freer than Turkey, less free than Sweden.

FRANCE

Economy: capitalist

Political Rights: 1

Polity: centralized multiparty

Civil Liberties: 2

Population: 53,400,000

Status of Freedom: free

An ethnic state with major territorial subnationalities

Political Rights: France is a parliamentary democracy. However, the directly elected president is now more powerful than the premier and assembly. There is also a constitutional council that oversees elections and passes on the constitutionality of assembly or executive actions on the model of the United States Supreme Court. The multiparty system ensures that governments are generally coalitions. *Subnationalities:* Territorial subnationalities continue to have few rights as ethnic units and have little power under a rigidly centralized provincial administration. However, the recent election of a Paris mayor for the first time in a century and hesitant steps toward regionalization has slightly improved the situation. At present the Alsatian minority seems well satisfied, but there is a strong demand for greater autonomy among many Bretons, Corsicans, and Basques.

Civil Liberties. The French press is free, although often party-related. The news agency is private; radio and television is divided into a variety of theoretically independent companies under indirect government control. In spite of recent changes there is still an authoritarian attitude in government-citizen relations, publications may be banned at the behest of foreign governments, and arrest without explanation still occurs, particularly of members of subnationalities. Among other nationalistic restrictions is that forbidding Bretons the use of the Breton language in family or given names. France is, of course, under the rule of law, and rights to occupation, residence, religion, and property are secured. Nevertheless, both through extensive social programs and the creation of state enterprises France is quite far from a pure capitalist form.

Comparatively: France is as free as Germany (West), freer than Spain, less free than the United Kingdom.

G A B O N

Economy: preindustrial capitalist **Political Rights:** 6
Polity: nationalist one-party **Civil Liberties:** 6
Population: 535,000 **Status of Freedom:** not free

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Gabon is a moderate dictatorship operating in the guise of a one-party state, with noncompetitive elections characteristic of this form. Candidates must be party approved. Major cities have elected local governments; provinces are administered from the center.

Civil Liberties. All media are government controlled, and no legitimate opposition voices are raised. There is no right of political assembly, and political opponents may be imprisoned. Only one labor union is sanctioned. The authoritarian government generally does not care to interfere in private lives, and respects religious freedom and private property.

Comparatively: Gabon is as free as Jordan, freer than Angola, less free than Upper Volta.

G A M B I A

Economy: preindustrial capitalist **Political Rights:** 2
Polity: centralized multiparty **Civil Liberties:** 2
Population: 600,000 **Status of Freedom:** free

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. There appears to be a fully functioning parliamentary democracy, although the same party and leader have been in power since independence in 1965. In the last election (1977) the ruling party won twenty-five seats and the opposition parties seven, an increasing but still very small share. Yet there is no evidence of serious irregularities. There is local, mostly traditional, autonomy, but not regional self-rule. (The maintenance of the system may be partly explained by the small size of the government and the lack of an army.)

Civil Liberties. There are both private and public newspapers and radio stations. Although the most important corporations are government owned, the media are relatively free. An independent judiciary maintains the rule of law. The agricultural economy is largely dependent on peanuts, but remains traditionally organized. The illiteracy rate is very high.

Comparatively: Gambia is as free as Papua New Guinea, freer than Senegal, less free than Barbados.

GERMANY, EAST

Economy: socialist	Political Rights: 7
Polity: communist one-party	Civil Liberties: 7
Population: 16,700,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. East Germany is a one-party communist dictatorship. Elections allow slight choice and no competition is allowed that involves policy questions. In addition, the presence of Soviet troops and direction from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union significantly reduces the sovereignty (or group freedom) of the East Germans.

Civil Liberties. Media are government owned and controlled. Dissidents are repressed by imprisonment and exclusion; the publication of opposing views is forbidden. Among the thousands of political prisoners, the most common offense is trying to leave the country illegally (or in some cases even seeking permission to leave), or propaganda against the state. Political reeducation may be a condition of release. The average person is not allowed freedom of occupation or residence. Once defined as an enemy of the state, a person may be barred from his occupation and his children denied higher education. Particularly revealing has been the use of the "buying out scheme" by which West Germany has been able to obtain the release of prisoners in the East through delivering goods such as bananas or coffee. Religious freedom is not totally absent, and within the family there is apparently some freedom.

Comparatively: Germany (East) is as free as Mongolia, less free than Poland.

GERMANY, WEST

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: decentralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 61,200,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. West Germany is a parliamentary democracy with an indirectly elected and largely ceremonial president. Both major parties have ruled since the war. The weak Senate is elected by the assemblies of the constituent states and loyally defends states' rights. Successive national governments have been based on changing party

balances in the powerful lower house. The states have their own elected assemblies; they control education, internal security, and culture.

Civil Liberties. The papers are independent and free, with little governmental interference by European standards. Radio and television are organized in public corporations under direction of the state governments. Generally the rule of law has been carefully observed, and the full spectrum of private freedoms is available. Recently jobs have been denied to many with radical leftist connections; and terrorist activities have led to tighter security regulations, invasions of privacy, and less acceptance of nonconformity. Arrests have been made for handling or producing inflammatory literature, or for calling in question the fairness of the courts. Government participation in the economy is largely regulatory; in addition, complex social programs and worker participation in management has limited certain private freedoms while possibly expanding others.

Comparatively: Germany (West) is as free as France, freer than Italy, less free than the United States of America.

GHANA

Economy: industrial capitalist-statist

Political Rights: 6

Civil Liberties: 5

Polity: military nonparty

Status of Freedom: partly free

Population: 10,400,000

A transethnic heterogeneous state with subnationalities

Political Rights. Ghana is ruled by a military junta under the moderate leadership of a general. While the government has done away with political parties and other aspects of the normal functioning of the political system, it has not tried to seriously interfere with the traditional system below this level, and is working toward a restoration of democracy. A considerable degree of consensus appears to underlie political actions at both national and local levels.

Subnationalities. The country is composed of a variety of peoples, with those in the south most self-conscious; they are the descendants of a maze of traditional kingdoms, of which the Ashanti was most important. A north-south, Muslim-Christian opposition exists but is weakly developed, primarily because of the economic and numerical weakness and the incomplete hold of Islam in the north. In the south and center of the country a sense of Akan identity is developing among the Ashanti, Fante, and others; since they include forty-five percent of the people, this amounts to strengthening the ethnic core of the nation. The leaders of the one million Ewe in the southeast

(a people divided between Ghana and Togo) have on occasion asked for separation or enhanced self-determination.

Civil Liberties. The critical press is both government and private, and there is some autonomy to the government-owned radio and television systems. Although occasionally critical, the press can be effectively muzzled. Private opinion is freely expressed on most matters, and freedom of assembly is honored. Recent political trials and new security laws show that the system does not yet guarantee freedom of public expression. The judiciary has preserved a degree of independence and there are very few political prisoners. There were reports of torture in the earlier 1970's. Private business and independent organizations such as churches and labor unions thrive. There has been a great deal of government control in some areas—especially in cocoa production, on which the economy depends, and in modern capital-intensive industry. Like Senegal, Ghana has a relatively highly developed industry and its agriculture is highly dependent on world markets.

Comparatively: Ghana is as free as Nepal, freer than Togo, less free than Nigeria.

G R E E C E

Economy: capitalist

Political Rights: 2

Polity: centralized multiparty

Civil Liberties: 2

Population: 9,100,000

Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous state

Political Rights. Greece is a parliamentary democracy with a theoretically strong, but indirectly elected, president. The stabilization of free institutions is proceeding rapidly: recent elections have been competitive and open to a wide spectrum of parties. Provincial administration is centrally controlled; there is local self-government.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers are private and the judiciary is independent. Because of the recent revolutionary situation all views are not freely expressed (a situation similar to that in post-fascist Portugal). One can be imprisoned for insulting the authorities. Private rights are respected.

Comparatively: Greece is as free as India, freer than Turkey, less free than France.

GRENADA

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 2
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 3
Population: 100,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Grenada is ruled as a parliamentary democracy within the British Commonwealth. In recent elections the opposition significantly increased its power; the electoral process seemed to function acceptably.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers are largely private, but radio is government controlled. In the recent past, pressures have been brought against the press, magistrates have been dismissed for opposing the government, and a progovernment "goon squad" has been allowed to beat up and otherwise terrorize the opposition. However, today the judiciary seems relatively independent, and the use of violence for government support has greatly diminished.

Comparatively: Grenada is as free as Turkey, freer than Guyana, less free than Bahamas.

GUATEMALA

Economy: preindustrial capitalist	Political Rights: 3
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 4
Population: 6,000,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

An ethnic state with a major potential territorial subnationality

Political Rights. Guatemala is a constitutional democracy on the American model. Recent elections have demonstrated voter support for a wide variety of party positions, but not all potential parties legitimately participate. In 1977 the parliamentary parties demonstrated so much independence that the government was no longer clearly supported in parliament. The 1974 presidential election results were apparently altered in favor of the ruling coalition's candidate (in 1978 counting irregularities had led to an impasse as this went to press—this was at least a gain for democracy). The provinces are centrally administered. *Subnationalities:* Various groups of Mayan and other Indians make up half the population; they do not yet have a subnationalist sense of unity.

Civil Liberties. The press and a large part of radio and television are privately controlled. The press is generally free, although rural journalists have been harassed by the police. In the cities, at least, opposition political activity is open and active. However, the continuing operation

of death squads on both the right and left inhibits discussion and expression. The struggle against rural guerrillas has led to frequent denial of rights in rural areas by security forces. The judiciary is not entirely free of governmental pressures in political or subversive cases, but some members of rightist death squads have been tried. Official political imprisonment and torture occur, but the main problem is that illegal armed groups associated with the government are responsible for thousands of deaths. Unions are intimidated, but other private rights seem fairly well respected by the government. Largely an agricultural country, fifty percent of those in agriculture own their own farms.

Comparatively: Guatemala is as free as Mexico, freer than Nicaragua, less free than Jamaica.

GUINEA

Economy: preindustrial socialist **Political Rights:** 7
Polity: socialist one-party **Civil Liberties:** 7
Population: 4,700,000 **Status of Freedom:** not free

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Guinea is a one-party socialist dictatorship. Elections for president and parliament are uncontested. Provincial and local governments are highly centralized.

Civil Liberties. All media are government or party owned and censorship is rigid. Ideological purity is demanded in all areas except religion. There are many political prisoners and political executions. Everyone must participate in guided political activity. There are few recognized private rights, such as those to organize unions, develop property, or choose one's education. Private lawyers are not permitted. Movement within the country or over the border is restricted. In an attempt to encourage the more capable among the million people who have fled the country since independence to return, in 1977 the government granted them special tax exemptions, and reintroduced capitalism in small industries, agriculture, and many services. This policy is very much in flux, and fundamental change is unlikely.

Comparatively: Guinea is as free as Ethiopia, less free than Liberia.

GUINEA - BISSAU

Economy: preindustrial capitalist **Political Rights:** 6
Polity: socialist one-party **Civil Liberties:** 6
Population: 560,000 **Status of Freedom:** not free

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Guinea-Bissau is administered by one party; all other parties are illegal. Constitutionally the secretariat of the party is the highest organ of the state; the party is recognized as the expression of the "sovereign will" of the people. Recent elections suggested limited opposition: when party lists were rejected in some areas or large-scale abstentions invalidated the vote, the party proposed and secured public approval of new lists. Local economic control under party guidance is emphasized.

Civil Liberties. The media are government controlled, and criticism of the system is forbidden. There are political prisoners in the aftermath of the struggle for independence, although the remaining death sentences for such prisoners were recently commuted. Union activity is government directed. All land has been nationalized: rights of private property are minimal. As the system develops, many other personal rights are likely to be sacrificed, but whether a strict attempt will be made to adhere to a communist model is still unclear.

Comparatively: Guinea-Bissau is as free as Tanzania, freer than Guinea, less free than Senegal.

GUYANA

Economy: mixed socialist

Political Rights: 3

Polity: centralized multiparty

Civil Liberties: 3

Population: 822,000

Status of Freedom: partly free

An ethnically complex state

Political Rights. Guyana is a parliamentary democracy. However, in the last two elections the government has been responsibly charged with irregularities that resulted in its victory. The ruling party has been coopting the position of the opposition communist party and may be headed toward a one-party state as it moves to the left. Administration is generally centralized but there are some elected local administrations.

Civil Liberties. The media are both public and private (including party). Several opposition newspapers have been nationalized and the editors of an opposition underground paper have been arrested. All private schools have recently been nationalized, and the government has interfered with university appointments. It is possible to win against the government in court. Private property (as distinct from personal property) is no longer considered legitimate.

Comparatively: Guyana is as free as the Dominican Republic, freer than Panama, less free than Surinam.

HAITI

Economy: preindustrial capitalist **Political Rights:** 7
Polity: nationalist one-party **Civil Liberties:** 6
Population: 5,000,000 **Status of Freedom:** not free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Haiti is a dictatorship with an ephemeral ruling-party. Elections allow no opposition; the assembly is merely for show.

Civil Liberties. The media are both private and public but are firmly under government control. Political gatherings are not permitted. A government sponsored militia suppresses all opposition; political murders, imprisonment, exile, and torture have been common. An acceptable rule of law has been in abeyance during a prolonged "state of siege." Many people attempt to flee the country illegally every year. Union activity is restricted. In 1977 there were reported improvements in the freedom of the media, and many political prisoners were released, but by year's end these improvements had largely been erased.

Comparatively: Haiti is as free as Togo, freer than Mali, less free than Panama.

HONDURAS

Economy: preindustrial capitalist **Political Rights:** 6
Polity: military nonparty **Civil Liberties:** 3
Population: 3,000,000 **Status of Freedom:** partly free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Although the government is a military dictatorship, the continued presence of two civilian political parties suggests a significant degree of consensus behind the leaders. Advisory councils involving several political parties and pressure groups assist the government. Provincial government is centrally administered.

Civil Liberties: The media are largely private and free of prior censorship. There is considerable discussion of alternatives; militant peasant organizations and political parties continue to function outside government control. Partisan political demonstrations are not allowed, but other forms of party activity are. The government has imprisoned some of the peasants' most violent oppressors. Most private rights are respected—insofar as government power reaches. Labor unions organize freely, especially in plantation areas. There is freedom of religion and movement.

Comparatively: Honduras is as free as Seychelles, freer than Cuba, less free than Mexico.

HUNGARY

Economy: socialist	Political Rights: 6
Polity: communist one-party	Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 10,700,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Hungary is ruled as a one-party communist dictatorship. Although there is an elective national assembly as well as local assemblies, all candidates must be approved by the party and the party's decisions made at the top by the politburo are decisive. Within this framework recent elections have allowed at least a restricted choice among candidates. The group rights of the Hungarian people are diminished by the government's official acceptance of the right of the Soviet government to interfere in the domestic affairs of Hungary by force.

Civil Liberties: Media are under government or party control. However, some scope for criticism is allowed in papers, plays, and books, especially through the importation of foreign productions. Prisoners of conscience continue to be detained. There has recently been a relaxation of control over religious affairs. Although private rights are not guaranteed, in practice there is considerable private property, and permission to travel into and out of the country is easier to obtain than in most of Eastern Europe.

Comparatively: Hungary is as free as Yugoslavia, freer than Czechoslovakia, less free than Egypt.

ICELAND

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 223,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Iceland is governed by a parliamentary democracy. Recent years have seen important shifts in voter sentiment, resulting successively in right- and left-wing coalitions. Although a small country Iceland has pursued a highly independent foreign policy. Provinces are ruled by central government appointees.

Civil Liberties. The press is private or party and free of censorship. There are no political prisoners and the judiciary is independent. Private rights are respected; few are poor or illiterate.

Comparatively: Iceland is as free as Norway, freer than Portugal.

INDIA

Economy: preindustrial capitalist-statist **Political Rights:** 2
Polity: decentralized multiparty **Civil Liberties:** 2
Population: 623,000,000 **Status of Freedom:** free

A multinational and complex state

Political Rights. India is a parliamentary democracy. The strong powers retained by its component states have been compromised in recent years by the central government's frequent imposition of direct rule. After several years of decline Indian democracy was reinstitutionalized both at the regional and federal level by the 1977 success of the Janata Party in winning the first opposition victory since independence. The depth of mass interest in democracy was established by the victory, although the doubtful legality of calling immediate elections in the states where the Janata party appeared assured of victory, and an understandable mood of reprisal against those who misused power in the previous administration, may set dangerous precedents even while the return to constitutionality and the independence of the courts is hailed.

Subnationalities: India consists of a diverse collection of mostly territorially distinct peoples united by historical experience and the general predominance of Hinduism. The dominant people of India are those of the north central area who speak as a first language either the official language, Hindi (Hindustani), or a very closely related dialect of Sanskrit origin. The other major subnational peoples of India may be divided into several groups: (1) those peoples with separate states that are linguistically and historically only marginally distinct from the dominant Hindi speakers (for example, the Marathi, Gujerati, or Oriya); (2) those peoples with separate states that are of Sanskrit background linguistically, but have a relatively strong sense of separate identity (for example, Bengalis or Kashmiris); (3) those people with separate states that are linguistically and to some extent racially quite distinct (for example, Telegu or Malayalam); and (4) those peoples that do not have states of their own and are often survivors of India's pre-Aryan peoples (for example, Santali, Bhuti-Lapcha, or Mizo). With the exception of the last group, the Indian federal system accords a fair amount of democratic rights to all peoples. Several peoples from groups (2), (3), and (4) have shown through legal (especially votes) and illegal means a strong desire of a significant part of the population for independence or greater autonomy (notably Kashmiris, Nagas, and Mizos). This accounting leaves out many *non-territorial* religious and caste minorities, although, here again, the

system has granted relatively broad rights to such groups to reasonable self-determination.

Civil Liberties. Recent events have shown the surprising strength of Indian attachment to civil liberties. The Indian press is strong and independent. The fact that radio and television are not, however, in a largely illiterate country must be disquieting. Although there have been illegal arrests and reports of torture in the recent past, in general the police and judiciary are now thought to be responsive, fair, and independent. By the end of 1977 there remained few, if any, prisoners of conscience, but there were a number of persons imprisoned for political violence. Due to the decentralized political structure there was a great deal of regional variation in the operation of security laws. Kashmir had especially repressive security policies in relation to the press and political detention; Sikkim was reported to be treated as an Indian colony, and the same might be said for other border areas. Most Indians enjoyed freedom to travel, to worship as they pleased, and to organize for mutual benefit, especially in unions. Lack of education, extreme poverty, and surviving traditional controls certainly reduce the meaning of such liberties for a relatively large number of Indians.

Comparatively: India is as free as Portugal, freer than Malaysia, less free than Japan.

INDONESIA

Economy: preindustrial capitalist-statist

Political Rights: 5

Civil Liberties: 5

Polity: centralized dominant-party

Status of Freedom: partly free

Population: 137,000,000

A transethnic heterogeneous state with active and potential sub-nationalities

Political Rights. Indonesia is a controlled parliamentary democracy under military direction. Recent parliamentary elections showed the ability of the rather tame opposition parties to gain ground at the expense of the governing party, but the government's majority is still overwhelming. The number and character of opposition parties is carefully controlled, parties must refrain from criticizing one another, candidates of both government and opposition require government approval, and opposition activities in rural areas are restricted. In any event parliament does not have a great deal of power. Provincial governors are appointed by the central government; local assemblies are elected.

Subnationalities: Indonesia includes a variety of ethnic groups and is divided by crosscutting island identities. Although the island of Java is numerically dominant, the national language is not Javanese, and most groups or islands do not appear to have strong subnational identifications. Both civilian and military elites generally attempt to maintain religious, ethnic, and regional balance. Some small groups that have demanded independence exist in Sulawesi, the Moluccas, Timor, West Irian, and northern Sumatra, and continue to mount revolts against the government.

Civil Liberties. Most newspapers are private, but since all are subject to fairly close government supervision, criticism of the system is muted by self-censorship. (In early 1978 the major papers were suspended by government order.) Radio and television are government controlled. Freedom of assembly is restricted, but citizens are also not compelled to attend meetings. There are twenty to fifty thousand political prisoners in Indonesia; in 1977 there were relatively few arbitrary arrests. Very few of those detained have ever been brought to trial. In this area the army rather than the civilian judiciary is dominant. Torture of those detained by the army is frequently reported; the army has been responsible for many thousands of unnecessary deaths in its recent suppression of revolt in East Timor. Union activity is closely regulated; movement, especially to the cities, is restricted; but other private rights are generally respected. The Indonesian bureaucracy has an unenviable reputation for arbitrariness and corruption, practices that must reduce the effective expression of human rights.

Comparatively: Indonesia is as free as Nicaragua, freer than Burma, less free than China (Taiwan).

IRAN

Economy: preindustrial capitalist-statist **Political Rights:** 6
Civil Liberties: 5
Polity: nationalist one-party **Status of Freedom:** not free
Population: 35,000,000

An ethnic state with major territorial subnationalities

Political Rights. Iran is ruled essentially as an absolute monarchy. The bicameral parliament contains no organized opposition; all candidates in the recent election had to be members of a newly organized government party. Some choice is allowed within this framework. Lack of consensus is suggested by the repression even of widely revered religious leaders. Provinces are under centrally appointed governors. *Subnationalities:* Among the most important non-Persian peoples are

the Kurds, the Azerbaijani Turks, and a variety of other (primarily Turkish) tribes. Many of these have striven for independence in the recent past when the opportunity arose.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers are private, but continual government pressure makes for a controlled press. Criticism is largely confined to the details of policy implementation. Newspapers and periodicals with small circulations are banned. A broad spectrum of foreign publications are available. Radio and television are largely government owned. The right of assembly is frequently abridged; unions are government controlled. There are many prisoners of conscience; the secret police operate outside the normal control of a judicial system that does not, in any event, have a strong reputation for independence. It is doubtful that anyone could win a case against the government that involved imputed danger to national security. Detention and trial procedures appear to have improved in 1977. Religious and other private freedoms are generally respected, and the power of landlords to coerce their subjects in rural areas has largely been broken by governmental reforms. Economic growth that has moved half of the population into the industrial world has increased individual choice by greatly changing both access and power balances.

Comparatively: Iran is as free as Yugoslavia, freer than Iraq, less free than Egypt.

IRAQ

Economy: preindustrial socialist	Political Rights: 7
Polity: socialist one-party	Civil Liberties: 7
Population: 11,800,000	Status of Freedom: not free

An ethnic state with a major territorial subnationality

Political Rights. Iraq is governed by a combination of the ruling party and military leaders. The communist party is now officially recognized as a part of the ruling front, but because of the present lack of elective and legislative mechanisms it appears to operate more as a faction than a political party. Provinces are governed from the center. *Subnationalities:* The Kurds have been repeatedly denied self-determination, most recently through reoccupation of their lands and some attempt to disperse them about the country.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers are largely public or party and are closely controlled by the government. Radio and television are government monopolies. Political imprisonment, execution, and torture are common, particularly for the Kurdish minority. All rights seem largely de facto or those deriving from traditional religious law. Iraq has a

dual economy, with a large preindustrial sector. The government has largely taken over the modern petroleum-based economy and, through land reform leading to collectives and state farms, has increasingly limited private economic choice.

Comparatively: Iraq is as free as Laos, less free than Syria.

I R E L A N D

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 3,200,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Ireland is a parliamentary democracy which successfully shifts national power among parties. The bicameral legislature has an appointive upper house with powers only of delay. Local government is not powerful, but is elective rather than appointive.

Civil Liberties. The press is free and private, and radio and television are under an autonomous corporation. Strong censorship has always been exercised over both publishers and the press, but since this is of social rather than political content, it lies within that sphere of control permitted a majority in a free democracy.* The rule of law is firmly established and private rights are guaranteed, although in connection with a recent antiterrorism campaign suspects have been roughly handled and their rights curtailed.

Comparatively: Ireland is as free as Canada, freer than France.

I S R A E L

Economy: mixed capitalist	Political Rights: 2
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 3,600,000	Status of Freedom: free

An ethnic state with microterritorial subnationalities

Political Rights. Israel is governed under a parliamentary system. Recent elections have resulted in major shifts of power among the many political parties. Provinces are ruled from the center, although there are important local elective offices in the cities. *Subnationalities:* National elections do not involve the Arabs in the occupied territories; Arabs in Israel proper participate in Israeli elections as a minority. Arabs both in Israel and the occupied territories must live in their

*For further discussion of this distinction see Part II, "Freedom and Democracy: Definitions and Distinctions," and the references cited.

homeland under the cultural and political domination of twentieth-century immigrants.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers are private or party, and free of censorship except for restrictions relating to the always precarious national security. Radio and television are government owned. In general the rule of law is observed, although Arabs in Israel are not accorded the full rights of citizens, and the Orthodox Jewish faith holds a special position in the country's religious, customary, and legal life. Because of the war, the socialist-cooperative ideology of its founders, and dependence on outside support, the role of private enterprise in the economy has been less than in most of Euro-America. Arabs are not allowed to buy land from Jews, and Arab land has been expropriated for Jewish settlement. Freedom House's rating of Israel is based on its judgment of the situation in Israel proper and not that in the occupied territories.

Comparatively: Israel is as free as Portugal, freer than Egypt, less free than France.

ITALY

Economy: capitalist

Political Rights: 2

Polity: centralized multiparty

Civil Liberties: 2

Population: 56,500,000

Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population with small territorial sub-nationalities

Political Rights. Italy is a bicameral parliamentary democracy. Elections are generally free, but the political process is not free of corruption on both right and left. Since the 1940's governments have been dominated by the Christian Democrats, although with coalitions shifting between dependence on minor parties of the left or right. Referendums are occasionally used for major issues. Opposition parties gain local political power, but regional and local power is generally quite limited.

Civil Liberties. Italian newspapers are free and cover a broad spectrum. Radio and television are both public and private and provide unusually diverse programming. Freedom of speech is inhibited in some areas and for many individuals by the violence of both right- and left-wing extremist groups. Since the bureaucracy does not promptly respond to citizen desires, it represents, as in many countries, an additional impediment to the full expression of the rule of law. Detention may last many years without trial. Since major industries are managed by the government, and the government has undertaken major reallocations of land, Italy is only marginally a capitalist state.

Comparatively: Italy is as free as Greece, freer than Spain, less free than France.

IVORY COAST

Economy: preindustrial capitalist **Political Rights:** 6
Polity: nationalist one-party **Civil Liberties:** 5
Population: 7,000,000 **Status of Freedom:** not free

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Ivory Coast is ruled by a one-party, capitalist, dictatorship. Under these constraints elections for president and assembly are held but have little meaning. For example, in the most recent election there was no choice and the president received ninety-nine percent of the vote. Organized in the 1940's, the ruling party incorporates a variety of interests and forces. Provinces are ruled directly from the center.

Civil Liberties. Although the press is mostly party or government controlled, it presents at least a limited spectrum of opinion. While opposition is discouraged, there is no ideological conformity. Radio and television are government controlled. There has been evidence of taking political prisoners and using brutality in the recent past; today there may be no prisoners of conscience. Unions are controlled by the party. Travel is generally free. Economically the country depends on small private farms; in the modern sector private enterprise is encouraged.

Comparatively: Ivory Coast is as free as Iran, freer than Niger, less free than Kenya.

JAMAICA

Economy: mixed capitalist **Political Rights:** 2
Polity: centralized multiparty **Civil Liberties:** 3
Population: 2,100,000 **Status of Freedom:** free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Jamaica is a parliamentary democracy in which power has recently changed from one party to another. However, political life has become increasingly violent: the last election was accompanied by murders, a state of siege, bans on political rallies, and government supervision of publicity. Regardless of who is to blame, and both sides may be, this degrades the meaning of political rights. Regional and local administrations do not have independent power.

Civil Liberties. The free press is endangered, but restrictions under a state of siege accompanying the elections of 1977 were short-lived. The government has recently eliminated private ownership from radio and television in an ominous move apparently meant to counter the influence of an antisocialist newspaper. Freedom of assembly has been curtailed. The rule of law and respect for rights remain, yet in many districts a climate of fear inhibits their expression. Aside from the media, nationalization of the economy has emphasized so far the takeover of foreign companies.

Comparatively: Jamaica is as free as Colombia, freer than the Dominican Republic, less free than Surinam.

J A P A N

Economy: capitalist

Political Rights: 2

Polity: centralized multiparty

Civil Liberties: 1

Population: 114,200,000

Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Japan is a bicameral, constitutional monarchy with a relatively weak upper house. The conservative to centrist Liberal Democratic Party ruled with solid majorities from independence in the early 1950's until the mid 1970's. Although the Liberal Democrats have lost considerable support in recent elections, through coalitions with independents they have maintained control at the national level, and have recently showed increased strength at the local level. Concentrated business interests have played a strong role in maintaining Liberal Party hegemony through the use of their money, influence, and prestige. In addition, a heavy weighting of representation in favor of rural areas tends to maintain the Liberal Party position. Opposition parties are fragmented. They have local control in some areas, but the power of local and regional assemblies and officials is limited. Since electoral and parliamentary procedures are democratic, we assume that Japan's system would freely allow a transfer of national power to an opposition group should the majority desire it, but as in Italy this is not yet proven by events.

Civil Liberties. News media are generally private and free, although many radio and television stations are served by a public broadcasting corporation. Courts of law are not as important in Japanese society as in Europe and America; both the courts and police appear to be relatively fair. Travel and change of residence are unrestricted. The public expressions and actions of many people are more restricted than in most modern democracies by traditional controls and Japanese

style collectivism that leads to strong social pressures, especially psychological pressures, in many spheres (unions, corporations, or religious-political groups, such as Soka Gakkai).

Comparatively: Japan is as free as West Germany, freer than Italy, less free than the United Kingdom.

JORDAN

Economy: preindustrial capitalist **Political Rights:** 6
Polity: traditional nonparty **Civil Liberties:** 6
Population: 2,900,000 (including **Status of Freedom:** not free
the Israeli-occupied
West Bank)

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Jordan is an absolute monarchy in the guise of a constitutional monarchy. There are no parties and parliament provides little or no check on the king's broad powers. Parliament did not meet in 1977; scheduled elections have been repeatedly postponed. Provinces are ruled from the center and local governments have very limited autonomy. The king is regularly petitioned by his subjects.

Civil Liberties. Papers are private but censored and occasionally suspended. Television and radio are government controlled. Under continuing emergency laws normal legal guarantees for political suspects are suspended, and organized opposition is not permitted. There are political prisoners and perhaps instances of torture. Private rights such as those to property, travel, or religion appear to be respected.

Comparatively: Jordan is as free as Saudi Arabia, freer than South Yemen, less free than Syria.

KAMPUCHEA (Cambodia)

Economy: socialist **Political Rights:** 7
Polity: communist one-party **Civil Liberties:** 7
Population: 8,000,000 **Status of Freedom:** not free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Kampuchea is a one-party communist dictatorship with the trappings of assemblies and elections. There may be some contest among carefully picked candidates in the assembly elections, but in any event all power is in the hands of the party leaders. The tightly knit nature of the small communist elite is suggested by the fact that wives of the few known leaders also serve as government ministers.

Civil Liberties. The media are completely controlled by the government. Revolutionary law offers little security to life or property; party objectives determine private residence or occupation more than private desire. There continue to be many political executions. Since 1974 hundreds of thousands or even millions have been killed as the result of brutal government policy, especially in relocation. The extreme application of ideology has led to communal kitchens in villages, work teams that divide population by sex and age, and the abolition of wages. In 1977 Kampuchea was perhaps the world's most complete tyranny.

Comparatively: Kampuchea is as free as Ethiopia, less free than Thailand.

KENYA

Economy: preindustrial capitalist	Political Rights: 5
Polity: nationalist one-party	Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 14,400,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

A formally transethnic heterogeneous state with active and potential subnationalities

Political Rights. Kenya is a one-party capitalist state. Although the party is dominated by the Kikuyu tribe, it contains an amalgam of different tribal groups. Elections allow only the ruling party to compete. A few individuals are elected within this format that are publicly critical of the government; several of these have subsequently been imprisoned. Because of intraparty conflict, scheduled party elections were cancelled in 1977. The administration is generally centralized, but elements of tribal and communal government continue at the periphery. *Subnationalities:* Comprising twenty percent of the population, the Kikuyu are the largest tribal group. In a very heterogeneous society, the Luo are the second most important subnationality.

Civil Liberties. The press is private. It is not censored but under strong government pressure to avoid criticism: critical journalists have been jailed. Radio and television are under government control. Rights of assembly are limited. In spite of these limitations and occasional political murders, the government's critics and opponents speak out. The courts have considerable independence. Unions are active, and private rights are generally respected. Land is gradually coming under private rather than tribal control.

Comparatively: Kenya is as free as Nicaragua, freer than Tanzania, less free than Mauritius.

K O R E A (N O R T H)

Economy: socialist	Political Rights: 7
Polity: communist one-party	Civil Liberties: 7
Population: 16,700,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A relatively homogeneous state

Political Rights. North Korea is a hard-line communist dictatorship in which the organs and assemblies of government are merely a facade for party rule. National elections allow no choice. The politburo is under one-man rule; the dictator's son was his expected successor until recently. Military officers are very strong in top positions.

Civil Liberties. The media are all government controlled, with glorification of the leader a major responsibility. No private or public rights appear to be inviolable. There are political prisoners, and torture may be assumed to be common. However, the severity of its controls offers a considerable propaganda advantage. How little unauthorized news finds its way out of the country may be indicated by quoting in full Amnesty International's most recent report:

Amnesty International has carefully monitored all available information from North Korea and can only report that it contains no detailed evidence whatsoever regarding arrests, trials and imprisonment in that country. Furthermore, there appears to be a complete censorship of news relating to human rights violations. Despite its efforts Amnesty International has not been able to trace any information, even positive, on the subject of such rights in North Korea.*

Comparatively: North Korea is as free as Albania, less free than South Korea.

K O R E A (S O U T H)

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 5
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 35,900,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

A relatively homogeneous state

Political Rights. South Korea has a strong presidential system. The president is indirectly elected by a special elective body, and he appoints one-third of the assembly. Some recent elections for the remainder of the assembly seats have been hotly contested, but martial law and other restrictions have severely hampered the opposition. It is

**Amnesty International Report: 1977* (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1977), p. 192.

possible that the government's strong rural support would allow it to win even a fully free election. Provinces are headed by national government appointees.

Civil Liberties. Most newspapers are private, as are many radio stations and one television station. However, because of heavy government pressure, strict self-censorship is the rule. Special laws against criticizing the constitution, the government, or its policies have resulted in many prisoners of conscience; torture is used. The resulting climate of fear in activist circles is sharpened by extra-legal harassment of those who are not imprisoned; and the inability of the courts to effectively protect the rights of political suspects or prisoners. Yet there continue to be more demonstrations and expressions of open dissent than are found in not free states. Outside of this arena private rights are generally respected. Unions are free to organize, but not to strike. Religious freedom and freedom of movement within the country are acknowledged. Rapid capitalistic economic growth has been combined with a relatively egalitarian income distribution.

Comparatively: South Korea is as free as Indonesia, freer than China (Mainland), less free than China (Taiwan).

K U W A I T

Economy: mixed capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 6
Polity: traditional nonparty	Civil Liberties: 4
Population: 1,110,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

The citizenry is relatively homogeneous

Political Rights. Kuwait is a traditional monarchy in retreat from an experiment in constitutional monarchy. The recent monarchical succession was uneventful. More than half the population are immigrants; their political, economic, and social rights are much inferior to those of natives.

Civil Liberties. The press has been relatively free, but threats of suspension now cause editors to avoid many political questions. Radio and television are government controlled. In 1977 a political discussion club was disbanded. However, private discussion is open and few, if any, political prisoners are held. Private freedoms are respected, and there is a wide variety of enabling government activity in fields such as education, housing, and medicine that is not based on reducing choice through taxation.

Comparatively: Kuwait is as free as Ecuador, freer than Saudi Arabia, less free than Lebanon.

LAOS

Economy: preindustrial socialist **Political Rights:** 7
Polity: communist one-party **Civil Liberties:** 7
Population: 3,500,000 **Status of Freedom:** not free

An ethnic state with active or potential subnationalities

Political Rights. Laos has established a traditional communist party dictatorship in which the party is superior to the external government at all levels. There is continuing subservience to the desires of the North Vietnamese party and army, upon which the present leaders must depend.

Civil Liberties. The media are all government controlled. There are many political prisoners; large numbers have been subjected to re-education camps of varying severity and length. There are few accepted private rights. It is probable that the precommunist way of life is preserved in many parts of the country.

Comparatively: Laos is as free as Vietnam, less free than China (Mainland).

LEBANON

Economy: capitalist **Political Rights:** 4
Polity: decentralized multiparty **Civil Liberties:** 4
Population: 2,800,000 **Status of Freedom:** partly free

A complex, multinational, microterritorial state

Political Rights. In theory Lebanon is a parliamentary democracy with a strong but indirectly elected president. In spite of the calamities of the last few years the constitutional system still functions to a degree under the protection of the Syrian army. Parliament met sporadically in 1977. *Subnationalities:* Leading administrative and parliamentary officials are allocated among the several religious or communal groups by complicated formulas. These groups have for years pursued semi-autonomous lives within the state, although their territories are often intermixed.

Civil Liberties. The private and party press has been renowned for its independence. Some papers were suspended under Syrian control, but by the end of 1977 censorship was confined to relatively few subjects. Radio is government owned; television has been in private hands. Widespread killing during recent fighting inhibited the nationwide expression of most freedoms and tightened communal controls on individuals. Nevertheless, private freedoms are now reviving (except

by lack of opposition and the easy election of the party's candidates. Although attempts are made to increase the participation of the native population, the country is still ruled by the very small Americo-Liberian community.

Civil Liberties. The press is private but consists primarily of the organs of the ruling party. Radio and television are partially government controlled. Pressure is brought against those who become too critical either through the media or other channels. The government generally acts under special "emergency powers" suspending many constitutional guarantees, yet there are few, if any, political prisoners. Travel and other private rights are generally respected. Only blacks can become citizens.

Comparatively: Liberia is as free as Swaziland, freer than Gabon, less free than Senegal.

LIBYA

Economy: capitalist-statist

Political Rights: 6

Polity: socialist one-party
(military dominated)

Civil Liberties: 6

Status of Freedom: not free

Population: 2,700,000

A relatively homogeneous state

Political Rights. Libya is a military and party dictatorship apparently effectively under the control of one person. The place of a legislature is taken by the direct democracy of large congresses. Whatever the form, no opposition is allowed on the larger questions of society. Institutional self-management has been widely introduced in schools, hospitals, and factories. Sometimes the system works well enough to provide a meaningful degree of decentralized self-determination.

Civil Liberties. The media are government controlled. There are many political prisoners; the use of military and people's courts for political cases suggest little respect for the rule of law. Torture and mistreatment are alleged. Although ostensibly a socialist state, domination of oil and oil related industry is the major government industry—even some of the press remains in private hands. Respect for Islam provides a check on arbitrary government.

Comparatively: Libya is as free as China (Mainland), freer than Iraq, less free than Egypt.

LUXEMBOURG

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 337,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous state

Political Rights. Luxembourg is a constitutional monarchy on the Belgian model, in which the monarchy is somewhat more powerful than in the United Kingdom or Scandinavia. The legislature is bicameral with the appointive upper house having only a delaying function. Recent votes have resulted in important shifts in the nature of the dominant coalition.

Civil Liberties. The media are private and free. The rule of law is thoroughly accepted in both public and private realms.

Comparatively: Luxembourg is as free as Iceland, freer than France.

MADAGASCAR

Economy: preindustrial mixed socialist	Political Rights: 5
Polity: nationalist one-party (military dominated)	Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 7,900,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Madagascar is a modified military dictatorship. In 1977 the parliamentary election was restricted to candidates selected by parties grouped in a "national front," a government sponsored coalition. The parties represented in the front cover a broad spectrum, and their leaders are included in the governing council. One party quit the front and asked for a boycott, and there has been some opposition in local elections. Those elected do not gain much power in any event, as that is still held by military leaders or a parallel ruling body that they appoint. Primarily, the system reflects a desire for consensual government that is more authentic in Madagascar than in most one-party states. Emphasis has been put on developing the autonomy of local Malagasy governmental institutions, but the restriction of local elections to approved front candidates belies this emphasis.

Civil Liberties. Both privately and governmentally owned, the media are under heavy pressure, including threat of indefinite suspension. Movie theatres have been nationalized. The government has recently replaced the national news agency with one which will "disregard

information likely to be harmful to the government's socialist development policies." Right of assembly is limited; private conversations are relatively free. Today there is little political imprisonment, torture, or brutality. Many former leaders continue to speak up against the government—as after the last election. Labor unions and the judiciary are not strong, but religion is free and most private rights respected. While still encouraging private investment, the government intends to control all major sectors of the economy—it is heavily involved in industry and distribution—and to achieve a more equitable land distribution.

Comparatively: Madagascar is as free as Singapore, freer than Tanzania, less free than Egypt.

MALAWI

Economy: preindustrial capitalist	Political Rights: 7
Polity: nationalist one-party	Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 5,300,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Malawi is essentially a one-man dictatorship with party and parliamentary forms. There seems to be arbitrary rule even within the party. Elections (when held) are noncompetitive and pro forma, and parliament ineffective. Administration is centralized, although the paramount chiefs retain power locally through control over land.

Civil Liberties: The press is private or religious but under strict government control. The semicommercial radio service is also not free. Private criticism of the administration has been dangerous. The country has been notable for the persecution of Jehovah's Witnesses (including a demand they join the ruling party), treason trials, expulsion of Asian groups, the detention of journalists, torture and brutality, and even an open invitation to the people to kill anyone who opposes the government. Fortunately in 1977 most political prisoners were released and pressures were relaxed on Jehovah's Witnesses. Traditional courts offer some protection against arbitrary rule, as do the comparatively limited interests of the government.

Comparatively: Malawi is as free as Niger, freer than Uganda, less free than Zambia.

MALAYSIA

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 3
Polity: decentralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 4
Population: 12,600,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

An ethnic state with major nonterritorial subnationalities

Political Rights. Malaysia is a parliamentary democracy with a weak, indirectly elected and appointed senate and a powerful lower house. The relatively powerless head of state is an elective monarch, rotating among the traditional monarchs of the constituent states. A multinational front has dominated electoral and parliamentary politics, and there is evidence that the opposition was not given an adequate opportunity to compete in the last election. The states of Malaysia have their own rulers, parliaments, and institutions, but it is doubtful if any of them any longer have the power to leave the federation. *Subnationalities:* Government economic, linguistic, and educational policy has been to favor the Malays (forty-four percent) over the Chinese (thirty-six percent), Indians (ten percent), and others. Traditionally the Chinese had been the wealthier and better educated people. Although there are Chinese in the ruling front, they may not question the policy of communal preference.

Civil Liberties. The press is private and highly varied. However, nothing that might influence communal relations can be printed, and editors are constrained by the need to renew their publishing licenses annually. Foreign journalists are closely controlled. Radio is mostly government owned, television entirely so. Universities have been put under government pressure and foreign professors encouraged to leave. There have been several reports of the development of an atmosphere of fear in both academic and opposition political circles, as well as widespread discrimination against non-Malays. Hundreds of untried political suspects have been detained for years, generally on suspicion of communist activity. In spite of all this, significant criticism appears in the media, and in parliament campaigns are mounted against government decisions. Unions are relatively free and have the right to strike. Economic activity is free, except for government favoritism to the Malays.

Comparatively: Malaysia is as free as Cyprus, freer than Indonesia, less free than Sri Lanka.

MALDIVES

Economy: preindustrial capitalist

Political Rights: 4

Polity: traditional nonparty

Civil Liberties: 4

Population: 140,000

Status of Freedom: partly free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. The Maldives have a parliamentary government in which a president (elected by parliament and confirmed by the people)

is the real ruler. The present ruler established this system by arresting and exiling the prime minister. He later had the position of prime minister abolished. Regional leaders are presidentially appointed. Both economic and political power are concentrated in the hands of a very small, wealthy elite of which the president is the leader. However, we are unsure of the extent to which the popular will may have been denied by the high-handed actions of the president.

Civil Liberties. The daily newspaper is published by the government, and the radio station is owned by the government. Law is traditional Islamic law; most of the people rely on a traditional subsistence economy; the small elite has developed commercial fishing and tourism.

Comparatively: Maldives is as free as Bhutan, freer than the United Arab Emirates, less free than Mauritius.

MALI

Economy: preindustrial mixed
socialist

Political Rights: 7

Civil Liberties: 7

Polity: nationalist one-party
(military dominated)

Status of Freedom: not free

Population: 5,950,000

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Mali is a military dictatorship with a recently constructed political party to lend support. The regime appears to function without broad popular consensus. *Subnationalities:* Although the government is ostensibly above ethnic rivalries, severe repression of the northern peoples has been reported.

Civil Liberties. The media are all government controlled. Antigovernment demonstrations are forbidden. There are a few political prisoners, and the rights of northern minorities appear to be ignored. Unions are closely controlled; travelers must submit to frequent police checks. Private economic rights in the modern sector are minimal, but collectivization has recently been deemphasized for the majority of the people who remain subsistence agriculturists.

Comparatively: Mali is as free as Benin, less free than Liberia.

MALTA

Economy: mixed capitalist-statist

Political Rights: 2

Polity: centralized multiparty

Civil Liberties: 2

Population: 322,000

Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Malta is a parliamentary democracy in which power has shifted between the major parties. The most recent election, maintaining the governing party in its position, was marked by violence. The government also altered the composition of a constitutional court in the middle of a case concerning alleged coercion of voters in a particular district.

Civil Liberties. The press is free. Broadcasting is under a licensed body; Italian media are also available. The government has concentrated a great deal of the economy in its hands, and social equalization programs have been emphasized.

Comparatively: Malta is as free as Italy, freer than Turkey, less free than the United Kingdom.

MAURITANIA

Economy: preindustrial mixed capitalist	Political Rights: 6
	Civil Liberties: 6
Polity: nationalist one-party	Status of Freedom: not free
Population: 1,400,000	

An ethnic state with minor territorial subnationalities

Political Rights. Mauritania is ruled as a one-party dictatorship. Elections offer a simple list composed exclusively of the candidates of the party. *Subnationalities:* There are important subnational movements in the portion of the Western Sahara that has been recently incorporated and in the non-Arab southern part of the country.

Civil Liberties. All media are government owned; opposition domestic literature is banned. Arrests for political reasons have occurred on several occasions, but there are few if any prisoners of conscience and private opinions are expressed fairly openly. Union activity is government controlled. There is religious freedom. Although private economic rights are respected in many areas, the government controls much of industry and mining, and has attempted to insure the livelihood of its citizens through taking over wholesale trade.

Comparatively: Mauritania is as free as Tanzania, freer than Iraq, less free than Morocco.

MAURITIUS

Economy: preindustrial capitalist	Political Rights: 2
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 900,000	Status of Freedom: free

An ethnically complex state

Political Rights. Mauritius is a parliamentary democracy. The last election showed an important gain for the opposition, but the government managed to retain power through coalition (and amidst controversy). A variety of different racial and religious communities are active in politics, although they are not territorially based. There are a number of semi-autonomous local governing bodies.

Civil Liberties. The press is private or party and without censorship. Broadcasting is under a single corporation, presumably private in form. The labor union movement is quite strong, as are a variety of communal organizations. There is religious and economic freedom—although taxes can be quite high.

Comparatively: Mauritius is as free as Fiji, freer than the Comoro Islands, less free than Barbados.

MEXICO

Economy: capitalist-statist

Political Rights: 4

Polity: decentralized dominant-party

Civil Liberties: 3

Status of Freedom: partly free

Population: 60,600,000

An ethnic state with potential subnationalities

Political Rights. Mexico is ruled by a governmental system formally modeled on that of the United States; in practice the president is much stronger and the legislative and judicial branches much weaker. The states have independent governors and legislatures. The ruling party has had a near monopoly of power on all levels since the 1920's. In the last election the president received over ninety-four percent of the vote, and the ruling party won all but one seat in the Congress. Political competition is largely confined to factional struggles within the ruling party—but unfortunately these are not struggles that the general public can use its vote to help resolve. New laws may foster greater political competition in the future by increasing the share of representation for smaller parties. *Subnationalities:* There is a large Mayan area in Yucatan that has formerly been restive; there are also other smaller Indian areas.

Civil Liberties. The media are mostly private. Although they have operated under a variety of direct and indirect government controls (including take-overs), newspapers are generally free of censorship. Literature and the arts are free. The judicial system is not strong. However, decisions can go against the government; it is possible to win a judicial decision that a law is unconstitutional in a particular application. The clergy are prohibited from political activity, but

religion is free. Widespread bribery and lack of control over the behavior of security forces greatly limits operative freedom. Disappearances occur, detention is prolonged, torture and brutality have been common. Private economic rights are respected, although government ownership predominates in major industries.

Comparatively: Mexico is as free as Morocco, freer than Nicaragua, less free than Colombia.

MONGOLIA

Economy: socialist	Political Rights: 7
Polity: communist one-party	Civil Liberties: 7
Population: 1,520,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. A one-party communist dictatorship, for many years Mongolia has been firmly under the control of one man. Power is organized at all levels through the party apparatus. Those who oppose the government cannot run for office. In the 1977 parliamentary elections, 99.9 percent of eligible voters participated; only two persons failed to properly vote for the single list of candidates. Mongolia has a subordinate relation to the Soviet Union, which it depends on for defense against Chinese claims. It must use the USSR as an outlet for nearly all of its trade, and its finances are under close Soviet supervision.

Civil Liberties. All media are government controlled, and apparently quite effectively. Religion is greatly restricted, Lamaism having been nearly wiped out. There is no reason to believe that civil rights are exercised more freely here than in other Soviet satellites such as East Germany.

Comparatively: Mongolia is as free as Bulgaria, less free than the USSR.

MOROCCO

Economy: preindustrial capitalist	Political Rights: 3
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 4
Population: 18,380,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

An ethnic state with a potential Berber subnationality

Political Rights. Morocco is a constitutional monarchy in which the king has retained major executive powers. Recent elections at both local and national levels were fair and well contested in most localities. Most parties participated (including the communist); inde-

pendents (largely supporters of the king) were the major winners. Opposition leaders were included in the subsequent government. There are local and regional elected governments, but their autonomy is limited. *Subnationalities*-. Although people in the newly acquired land of the Western Sahara participated in the electoral process, it also has an important resistance movement. In the rest of the country the large Berber minority is a potential subnationality.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers are private or party, and quite vigorous. Recently there has been no formal censorship, although there are other pressures, including the confiscation of particular issues. Both public and private broadcasting stations are under government control. Notwithstanding the progressive reconciliation of the king and the major opposition parties, a series of political trials extended into 1977. The trials often followed violent attempts to overthrow the government, although many of the arrested were not personally involved in violence. The use of torture has been quite common and probably continues; the rule of law has been weakened by the frequent use of prolonged detention without trial. There are strong labor unions; religious and other private rights are respected.

Comparatively: Morocco is as free as Malaysia, freer than Algeria, less free than Spain.

MOZAMBIQUE

Economy: preindustrial socialist	Political Rights: 7
Polity: socialist one-party	Civil Liberties: 7
Population: 9,500,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Mozambique is a one-party communist dictatorship in which all power resides in the party leadership. (The Liberation Front has now officially been converted into a "vanguard party.") A series of elections from village to national assembly levels were held in 1977: all candidates were selected by the ruling party at all levels. Regional administration is controlled from the center.

Civil Liberties. The press may not yet all be government owned, but broadcasting is; all media are rigidly controlled. No public criticism is allowed. The application of the law is capricious, antiforeign, and antibourgeois. There are no private lawyers. Secret police are powerful; up to 100,000 people are in reeducation camps. Police brutality is common. Independent unions are being replaced. Heavy pressure has been put on all religions and especially Jehovah's Witnesses. Villagers are being forced into communes, leading to revolts in some areas. The emigration of citizens is restricted.

Comparatively: Mozambique is as free as Angola, less free than Tanzania.

NAURU

Economy: capitalist-statist **Political Rights:** 2
Polity: traditional nonparty **Civil Liberties:** 2
Population: 8,500 **Status of Freedom:** free

An ethnically complex state

Political Rights. Nauru is a parliamentary democracy with a recent change of government by elective and parliamentary means. The country is probably under considerable Australian influence.

Civil Liberties. The media are free of censorship but little developed. The island's major industry is controlled by the government, but otherwise private economic rights are respected.

Comparatively: Nauru is as free as Fiji, freer than the Maldives, less free than New Zealand.

NEPAL

Economy: preindustrial capitalist **Political Rights:** 6
Polity: traditional nonparty **Civil Liberties:** 5
Population: 13,200,000 **Status of Freedom:** partly free

An ethnic state with active and potential subnationalities

Political Rights. Nepal is a constitutional monarchy in which the king has reserved nearly all the power. The national parliament is elected indirectly through a series of tiers of government in which the lower levels are directly elected. Elected representatives do not have a great deal of power except possibly at the village and town levels. In recent elections the government's movement has selected all those elected; no political parties are allowed. *Subnationalities:* There are a variety of different peoples, with only fifty percent of the people speaking Nepali as a first language. Hinduism is a unifying force for the vast majority of the people. The historically powerful ruling castes continue to dominate.

Civil Liberties. There is a highly varied press, both public and private; criticism is allowed of the government but not the king. Foreign publications are often banned. Radio is government owned. There have been political arrests, banishment from the capital, and possibly torture; in 1977 most political prisoners were released. The judiciary is not independent. Religious proselytizing and conversion is prohibited, and the emigration of those with valuable skills or education

is restricted. The population is nearly all engaged in traditional occupations; illiteracy levels are very high.

Comparatively: Nepal is as free as South Africa, freer than Burma, less free than Malaysia.

NETHERLANDS

Economy: mixed capitalist **Political Rights:** 1
Polity: centralized multiparty **Civil Liberties:** 1
Population: 13,900,000 **Status of Freedom:** free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Netherlands is a constitutional monarchy in which nearly all the power is vested in a directly elected legislature. The results of elections have periodically transferred power to coalitions of the left and right. There is some diffusion of political power below this level, but not a great deal. The monarch retains more power than in the United Kingdom both through the activity of appointing governments in frequently stalemated situations, and through the advisory Council of State.

Civil Liberties. The media are free and private, with broadcasting more directly supervised by the government. The courts are independent, and the full spectrum of private rights guaranteed. However, the burden of exceptionally heavy taxes limits economic choice.

Comparatively: The Netherlands is as free as Belgium, freer than Portugal.

NEW ZEALAND

Economy: capitalist **Political Rights:** 1
Polity: centralized multiparty **Civil Liberties:** 1
Population: 3,200,000 **Status of Freedom:** free

A relatively homogeneous state with a native subnationality

Political Rights. New Zealand is a parliamentary democracy in which power alternates between the two major parties. There is elected local government, but it is not independently powerful. *Subnationalities:* About eight percent of the population are Maori, the original inhabitants.

Civil Liberties. The press is private and free. Television and most radio stations are owned by the government. The rule of law and private rights are thoroughly respected. Since taxes (a direct restriction on choice) are not exceptionally high, and industry is not government-owned we label New Zealand capitalist. Others, emphasizing the government's highly developed social programs and penchant for controlling

prices, wages, and credit will place New Zealand further toward the socialist end of the economic spectrum.

Comparatively: New Zealand is as free as the United States, freer than Japan.

NICARAGUA

Economy: preindustrial capitalist **Political Rights:** 5
Polity: centralized dominant-party **Civil Liberties:** 5
(military dominated) **Status of Freedom:** partly free
Population: 2,275,000

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Since 1928 Nicaragua has been ruled directly or indirectly by the Somoza family. The current President Somoza was returned to power in 1974 after the constitution had been adapted to make that possible. Elections are manipulated in accordance with the government's wishes. For example, the latest legislative election produced an agreed upon 3/2 formula for representation between Somoza's ruling Liberal Party and the Conservative Party. Other parties exist but they are not recognized. Somoza's election in 1974 was certainly facilitated by the disqualification or withdrawal of the opposition candidates. Somoza control is based on economic power and control over the National Guard.

Civil Liberties. The media are private and often highly critical. Recognized and unrecognized opposition groups have the right of assembly. There have often been attempts to silence criticism, particularly through legal proceedings against the leading newspaper, *La Prensa*, and its editor. Prior press censorship was ended, at least for a time, in fall 1977; radio and television remain under restrictions. In the last few years large numbers have been detained for political opposition; torture, widespread killing, and brutality has occurred, especially in rural areas. The situation improved markedly in 1977. In common with several Central American countries, the independence of the judiciary is not well developed. Union activity is relatively free and varied. The combination of economic and governmental power in the hands of one family reduces economic freedoms in a society without as much of the cushion of preindustrial forms as its comparative poverty and agricultural base might indicate. How much lifting martial law and censorship in 1977 have affected these conditions is unclear. (The killing of *La Prensa's* editor—the leading opponent of the government—in early 1978 cast doubt on the reality of change.)

Comparatively: Nicaragua is as free as the Philippines, freer than Cuba, less free than Guatemala.

the freest in Africa. However, television and radio are now wholly government owned, as are all but two of the major papers; in part this is the result of a Nigerianization program. Foreign newsmen have been expelled recently. The universities, secondary schools, and the trade unions have also been brought under close government control or reorganization in the last few years. Apparently the judiciary remains strong and independent, including, in Muslim areas, sharia courts. Few, if any, prisoners of conscience are held; citizens can win in court against the government. For the time being political parties have been banned, but a wide range of political opinion continues to be expressed, even by former political leaders. The country is in the process of moving from a subsistence to industrial economy—largely on the basis of government-controlled oil and oil-related industry. Government intervention elsewhere in agriculture (cooperatives and plantations) and industry has been considerable. Since private business and industry are also encouraged, this is still far from a program of massive redistribution. General corruption in political and economic life has frequently diminished the rule of law. Freedom continues to exist in most areas of life, but the propensity of the government to intervene massively in economic or educational life has recently established dangerous precedents.

Comparatively: Nigeria is as free as Upper Volta, freer than Ghana, less free than Morocco.

NORWAY

Economy: mixed capitalist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 4,100,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population with a small Lapp minority

Political Rights. Norway is a centralized, constitutional monarchy. Labor remains the strongest party, but other parties have formed several governments since the mid 1960's. There is relatively little separation of powers. Regional governments have appointed governors; cities and towns their own elected officials.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers are privately or party owned; radio and television are state monopolies. This is a pluralistic state with independent power in the churches and labor unions. Relatively strong family structures have also been preserved. Norway is capitalistic, yet the extremely high tax burden, perhaps the highest in the noncommunist world, the government's control over the new oil resource, and general reliance on centralized planning reduce the freedom of economic activity.

an elected federal regime. *Subnationalities*: Millions of Pathans, Baluchis, and Sindhis have been represented since the origin of Pakistan as desiring greater regional autonomy or independence. Provincial organization has sporadically offered a measure of self-determination.

Civil Liberties. The press is private and independent; the occasional detention of journalists leads to some self-censorship. Radio and television are public and have recently been granted more freedom—yet their rights can as easily be withdrawn. Courts preserve considerable independence. Unions organize freely and have the right to strike. A renewed emphasis on Islamic conservatism curtails private rights, especially freedom of religion. Private property is respected, although many basic industries have been nationalized.

Comparatively: Pakistan is as free as the Philippines, freer than Afghanistan, less free than India.

PANAMA

Economy: capitalist-statist

Political Rights: 6

Polity: military nonparty

Civil Liberties: 5

Population: 1,800,000

Status of Freedom: not free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Panama is ruled by a National Guard general who came to power through a coup. Although there is an elected assembly, and this assembly confirmed the position of the "Supreme Leader" in 1972, the legitimation of the regime appears to be little more than a facade. There was essentially no opposition allowed in the elections, nor has there been in the pro forma meetings of the assembly. There is, however, some effort to achieve consensus through broad consultation. The plebiscite on the Canal Treaty in 1977 did allow opposition voices to be seriously raised. The provinces are administered by presidential appointees.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers are directly or indirectly under government control. Censorship has been quite thorough until recently, with critical radio stations or papers quickly closed. In connection with the Canal Treaty, in the latter half of 1977 the media presented opposition positions, and opposition assemblies were held. Political parties maintain their opposition role in spite of their illegality. The judiciary is not independent; the rule of law has not applied to political opponents of the government, nor to members of the National Guard. There have been political arrests and expatriation, and reports of torture and brutality. The government owns major concerns, but private property is generally respected. There is general freedom of religion.

Comparatively: Panama is as free as Cameroon, freer than Haiti, less free than El Salvador.

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Economy: preindustrial capitalist **Political Rights:** 2
Polity: centralized multiparty **Civil Liberties:** 2
Population: 2,900,000 **Status of Freedom:** free

A transethnic heterogeneous state with subnationalities

Political Rights. Papua New Guinea is an independent parliamentary democracy, although it remains partially dependent on Australia economically, technically, and militarily. Elections appear fair and seats are divided among two major and several minor parties—party allegiances are often vague or nonexistent. Because of its dispersed and tribal nature, local government is in some ways quite decentralized. There are nineteen provinces: in four, elected provincial governments with extensive powers have been established, and in the rest, constituent assemblies are at work. *Subnationalities:* Development of such decentralized power is meant to contain the strong secessionist movements in the Solomon Islands, Papua, and elsewhere.

Civil Liberties. The press is not highly developed but apparently free. Radio and television are government controlled; Australian stations are also received. The legal system adapted from Australia is operational, but a large proportion of the population lives in a preindustrial world with traditional controls, including violence, that severely limit freedom of speech, travel, occupation, and other private rights.

Comparatively: Papua New Guinea is as free as Portugal, freer than Malaysia, less free than Australia.

PARAGUAY

Economy: preindustrial capitalist- **Political Rights:** 5
statist **Civil Liberties:** 6
Polity: centralized dominant-party **Status of Freedom:** not free
(military dominated)
Population: 2,800,000

A relatively homogeneous state with small Indian groups

Political Rights. Paraguay has been ruled as a modified dictatorship since 1954. In addition to an elected president there is a parliament that includes members of opposition parties. Elections are regularly held, but they have limited meaning: The ruling party receives eighty

to ninety percent of the vote, a result guaranteed by direct and indirect pressures on the media, massive government pressure on voters, especially in the countryside, and interference with opposition party organization. The most important regional and local officials are appointed by the president. *Subnationalities*: The population represents a mixture of Indian (Guarani) and Spanish peoples; ninety percent continue to speak Guarani as well as Spanish. Several small tribes of primitive forest peoples are under heavy pressure from both the government and the public.

Civil Liberties. There is a private press, and a combination of private, government, and church radio and television. In spite of censorship and periodic suppression of publications, dissenting opinion continues to be expressed, especially by the church hierarchy and opposition newspapers. Torture, imprisonment, and execution of political opponents are reported frequently; they are an important part of a sociopolitical situation that includes general corruption and anarchy. Union organization is restricted. The government's brutal suppression of the Ache (Guayaki) people has received widespread publicity recently. Beyond the subsistence sector, private economic rights are restricted by government intervention and control. But perhaps a majority of peasants now own land.

Comparatively: Paraguay is as free as Panama, freer than Cuba, less free than Brazil.

PERU

Economy: preindustrial mixed capitalist

Polity: military nonparty

Population: 16,600,000

Political Rights: 6

Civil Liberties: 4

Status of Freedom: partly free

An ethnic state with a major territorial subnationality

Political Rights. Peru is ruled by a military junta of varying composition. The government responds to the pressure of a variety of organized groups, such as unions, peasants' organizations, and political parties. Elections are planned for this year. Provincial administration is not independent. *Subnationalities*: Several million people speak Quechua in the highlands, and it has recently become an official language. There are also other important Indian groups.

Civil Liberties. Daily newspapers are government-owned; weeklies and magazines are not, and by the end of the year were free of formal censorship. The existence of a variety of political parties allows diverse positions to be expressed; the parties have limited access

to the broadcasting services and have a limited right of assembly. Political prisoners are taken and union leaders are frequently detained; in some cases there is justification because of violence or threats of violence. There have been a number of reports of torture and death during interrogation. In the political arena it has been impossible to rely on the rule of law. Rights to religion, travel, and occupation are generally respected. There has been widespread land reform, nationalization, and experiments in compulsory worker control of factories or institutions in recent years; private property has regained governmental acceptance.

Comparatively: Peru is as free as Pakistan, freer than Paraguay, less free than Guyana.

PHILIPPINES

Economy: preindustrial capitalist **Political Rights:** 5
Polity: civilian nonparty **Civil Liberties:** 5
Population: 44,300,000 **Status of Freedom:** partly free

A transethnic heterogeneous state with active and potential sub-nationalities

Political Rights. The Philippines is ruled as a plebiscitory dictatorship under martial law. The present ruler was elected in a fair election, but more recent referendums affirming his rule, his constitutional changes, and martial law have not been conducted with the open competition, free discussion, or acceptable voting procedures that make elections meaningful. Previously legitimate political parties exist, but they have no part to play in current political life. (Controversial elections in April 1978 led to revived party activity in Manila.) There is some decentralization of power to local assemblies, but provincial and local officials are centrally appointed. *Subnationalities:* The Philippines includes a variety of different peoples of which the Tagalog speaking are the most important (although a minority). A portion of the Muslim (Moro) subnationality is in active revolt along the front of Christian-Muslim opposition. There are several major potential subnationalities that may request autonomy in the future on the basis of both territorial and linguistic identity.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers and broadcasting are largely private; no opposition papers or stations are allowed. Freedom of assembly for the opposition is restricted. The courts have retained some independence although it has been much reduced. Many political prisoners are held; torture is used but is sporadically condemned by the top levels of government—torturers have been brought before the courts.

The church still maintains its independence; private rights including that to religious choice are generally respected. The economy is only marginally capitalist and preindustrial: rapid growth in government intervention, favoritism, and direct ownership of industries may soon change our categorization.

Comparatively: The Philippines is as free as Singapore, freer than Vietnam, less free than Malaysia.

P O L A N D

Economy: mixed socialist

Political Rights: 6

Polity: communist one-party

Civil Liberties: 5

Population: 34,700,000

Status of Freedom: not free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Poland is a standard one-party communist dictatorship, with noncompetitive, one-list elections. However, a few non-party persons are in the assembly and recent sessions have evidenced more than pro forma debate. There are elected councils at provincial levels. The party apparatus operating from the top down is in any event the real locus of power. The Soviet Union's right of interference and continual pressure takes away from the state's independence.

Civil Liberties. The Polish press is both private and government, and broadcasting is government owned. The independent press occasionally differs cautiously with the government. There are political prisoners and there is no right of assembly or concept of an independent judiciary. Illegal attempts to leave Poland frequently lead to arrest. In spite of the theoretical model, strikes and demonstrations do occur, and nongovernmental organizations develop; most agriculture and considerable commerce remain in private hands. The church is an especially important alternative institution.

Comparatively: Poland is as free as Hungary, freer than the USSR, less free than Egypt.

P O R T U G A L

Economy: mixed capitalist

Political Rights: 2

Polity: centralized multiparty

Civil Liberties: 2

Population: 9,200,000

Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. At present Portugal is a parliamentary democracy with the military command playing a relatively strong role through the presidency and the Supreme Revolutionary Council. There is

white minority (five percent). Elections are vigorously fought. There are also African parties and some of these contest the small number of seats open to the African electorate. Black representatives have opposed the whites in parliament, and there are now black deputy ministers. (The system projected by the internal agreement reached in early 1978 would rapidly move the state toward freedom if fairly implemented.)

Civil Liberties. The press is private. It is under continual government pressure to conform, but still offers a spectrum of opinion within the white community. Broadcasting is government controlled. For whites, there is generally a fair application of the rule of law, freedom of residence and occupation (except for conscription). For blacks and those who deal with blacks, Rhodesia in 1977 was what might be called a liberal police state. Petty racial discrimination is less common than formerly in South Africa, but there is little freedom of residence, occupation, and organization. Opinions are not volunteered freely out of fear of government action. The forced movement of large numbers of blacks into fortified villages because of the security situation has been resented by many (although less extensive than the forced movement of people to new homes in Tanzania where there was not even the excuse of a security problem). There are many persons imprisoned in connection with the war and security situation. Black leaders, especially religious and tribal leaders, have a surprising ability to hold rallies within the country and publicly express opinions opposed to government policy. Both agricultural and nonagricultural economic development has moved Rhodesia most of the way toward an industrial society, while government restrictions on movement and activities of its black citizens have created a form of corporate state economy.

Comparatively: Rhodesia is as free as the Sudan, freer than Mozambique, less free than Kenya.

RUMANIA

Economy: socialist

Political Rights: 7

Polity: communist one-party

Civil Liberties: 6

Population: 21,700,000

Status of Freedom: not free

An ethnic state with territorial subnationalities

Political Rights. Rumania is a now-traditional communist state. Assemblies at national and regional levels are subservient to the party hierarchy. Elections involve only candidates chosen by the party; for some assembly positions the party may propose several candidates. Soviet influence is relatively slight. *Subnationalities:* The Magyar and

German minorities are territorially based. If offered self-determination one Magyar area would surely opt for rejoining neighboring Hungary; many of the Germans evidently wish to migrate to Germany, and this movement has been developing. In Rumania the cultural rights of both groups are narrowly limited.

Civil Liberties. The media include only government or party organs for which self-censorship committees recently replaced centralized censorship. Dissenters are frequently imprisoned or placed in psychiatric institutions. Treatment may be brutal. Many arrests have been made for attempting to leave the country or importing foreign literature (especially Bibles and material in minority languages). Religious and other personal freedoms are quite restricted. Private museums have recently been closed. Independent labor and management rights are essentially nonexistent.

Comparatively: Rumania is as free as the USSR, freer than Bulgaria, less free than Hungary.

R W A N D A

Economy: preindustrial mixed	Political Rights: 7
Polity: nationalist one-party (military dominated)	Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 4,500,000	Status of Freedom: not free

An ethnic state with a minority nonterritorial subnationality

Political Rights. Rwanda is a military dictatorship with an auxiliary party organization. There is no legislature and districts are administered by the central government. There are elected local councils. *Subnationality:* The former ruling people, the Tutsi, have been persecuted and heavily discriminated against, but the situation has improved.

Civil Liberties. The weak press is private or governmental; radio is government owned. Public criticism is not allowed; political prisoners are held. Considerable religious freedom exists, but domestic travel is restricted. There are no great extremes of wealth. The government is socialist in intent, but missionary cooperatives dominate trade, and private business is active in the small nonsubsistence sector. Traditional ways of life rather than government orders regulate the lives of most.

Comparatively: Rwanda is as free as Gabon, freer than Burundi, less free than Zambia.

SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE

Economy: preindustrial socialist **Political Rights:** 6(?)
Polity: socialist one-party **Civil Liberties:** 5
Population: 83,000 **Status of Freedom:** not free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Sao Tome and Principe are governed under strong-man leadership by the revolutionary party that recently led the country to independence. The degree of implementation of the post-independence constitutional system remains remarkably unclear.

Civil Liberties. The media are government controlled; opposition voices are not heard; there is no effective right of political assembly. The largely plantation agriculture has been socialized, as has most of the economy. On the other hand, there is an operating legal system, freedom of religion, and little evidence of brutality, torture, or political imprisonment.

Comparatively: Sao Tome and Principe appears to be as free as Iran, freer than Guinea, less free than Senegal.

SAUDI ARABIA

Economy: capitalist-statist **Political Rights:** 6
Polity: traditional nonparty **Civil Liberties:** 6
Population: 7,600,000 **Status of Freedom:** not free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Saudi Arabia is a traditional family monarchy ruling without assemblies. Political parties are prohibited. The right of petition is guaranteed. Regional government is by appointive officers; there are some local elective assemblies.

Civil Liberties. The press is both private and governmental; strict self-censorship is expected. Radio and television are mostly government owned, although ARAMCO also has stations. Private conversation is relatively free; there is no right of political assembly. Islamic law limits arbitrary government, but the rule of law is not fully institutionalized. Political prisoners and torture have been reported; there appear to be very few prisoners of conscience. Citizens have no freedom of religion—all must be Muslims. Private rights in areas such as occupation or residence are generally respected. Unions are forbidden. The economy is overwhelmingly dominated by petroleum or petroleum-related industry that is directly or indirectly under government control.

Comparatively: Saudi Arabia is as free as Algeria, freer than Iraq, less free than Syria.

SENEGAL

Economy: mixed capitalist **Political Rights:** 5
Polity: centralized dominant-party **Civil Liberties:** 3
Population: 5,300,000 **Status of Freedom:** partly free
 A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. After several years under a relatively benevolent one-party system, in 1977 multiparty activities were permitted in municipal elections. (Opposition parties contested 1978 general elections.) Decentralization is restricted to the local level. The government appears to be responsive to both left-wing and conservative Muslim opinion.

Subnationalities: Ethnically eighty percent are Muslims; the Wolof people represent thirty-six percent of the population, including most of the elite, the urban population, and the more prosperous farmers. However, regional loyalties, both within and outside of this linguistic grouping, seem to be at least as important as communal groupings in defining potential subnationalities. In addition, rapid assimilation of rural migrants in the cities to Wolof culture has reduced the tendency toward ethnic cleavage. The fact that the ruler since independence is a member of the second largest ethnic group (Serer) and minority religion (Catholic) also retards the development of competing subnationalisms.

Civil Liberties. The press is independent, but censorship and arrests for illegal publications have occurred. In 1977 major opposition papers appeared, one under the direction of the President's most important rival. Unions have gained increasing independence. However, in the recent past there have been repeated bannings of opposition groups, including union members, some arrests, and perhaps torture. Religion, travel, occupation and other private rights are respected. Although much of the land remains tribally owned, government-organized cooperatives and dependence on external markets has transformed the preindustrial society.

Comparatively: Senegal is as free as Maldives, freer than Ghana, less free than Malaysia.

SEYCHELLES

Economy: mixed capitalist **Political Rights:** 6
Polity: nationalist one-party **Civil Liberties:** 3
Population: 61,000 **Status of Freedom:** partly free
 A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Seychelles is ruled by decree after a coup that ousted the majority government. The leader of the former main op-

position party is now in charge of the government. Although not officially a one-party state the former ruling party is said to have "simply disappeared," There is no local government.

Civil Liberties. The press is private and governmental, and radio largely governmental. The courts apparently operate in comparative freedom. There is little right of assembly and the security services have broad powers of arrest. Private rights, including private property, are respected so far, despite the extensive government services of a largely urban, if impoverished, welfare state.

Comparatively: Seychelles is as free as Lesotho, freer than Tanzania, less free than Maldives.

SIERRA LEONE

Economy: preindustrial capitalist **Political Rights:** 5
Polity: centralized dominant-party **Civil Liberties:** 5
Population: 3,200,000 **Status of Freedom:** partly free

A formally transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Sierra Leone is a parliamentary democracy in which opposition candidates are often beaten up, arrested, or even killed. Opposition representatives continue to be elected and to function in parliament. The speaker of parliament has refused to recognize them as an opposition party that could replace the ruling party; several have been imprisoned and their seats declared vacant. A great deal of communal ill will expresses itself in this process. There is little independent local government.

Civil Liberties. The press is private and government; although generally under heavy government influence, there is at least one opposition paper. Radio is government controlled. The courts do not appear to be very powerful or independent: there are frequent states of emergency and many political prisoners. Identity cards have recently been required of all citizens. On the other hand, opposition continues to be expressed through demonstrations and noncooperation. Labor unions are relatively independent. The largely subsistence economy has an essentially capitalist modern sector. Corruption is pervasive.

Comparatively: Sierra Leone is as free as Nicaragua, freer than Gabon, less free than Senegal.

SINGAPORE

Economy: mixed capitalist-statist
Polity: centralized dominant-party
Population: 2,325,000

Political Rights: 5
Civil Liberties: 5
Status of Freedom: partly free

An ethnically complex state

Political Rights. Singapore is a parliamentary democracy in which the ruling party has won all of the legislative seats in recent elections. Reasonable grounds exist for believing that economic and other pressures against all opposition groups (exerted in part through control of the media) make elections very unfair. After the last election three opposition leaders were sentenced to jail terms for such crimes as defaming the prime minister during the elections. The opposition still obtains thirty percent of the votes. There is no local government.

Civil Liberties. The press is nominally private, but owners of shares in papers with policy-making powers must be specifically approved, and in some cases the government owns such shares. Broadcasting is largely a government monopoly. By closing papers and imprisoning editors and reporters, the press is kept under close control. University faculties are also under considerable pressure to conform. All opposition seems to be treated as a communist threat and, therefore, treasonable. Many political prisoners are held, and in internal security cases the protection of the law is weak. Here the prosecution's main task appears to be obtaining forced confessions of communist activity. Trade union freedom is inhibited by the close association of government and union. Private rights of religion, occupation, or property seem generally observed, although a large and increasing percentage of manufacturing and service companies are government owned.

Comparatively: Singapore is as free as Sierra Leone, freer than Vietnam, less free than Malaysia.

SOMALIA

Economy: preindustrial mixed socialist
Polity: socialist one-party (military dominated)
Population: 3,400,000

Political Rights: 7
Civil Liberties: 7
Status of Freedom: not free

A relatively homogeneous state

Political Rights. The Somali Republic is under essentially one-man military rule combining glorification of the ruler with the adoption

of revolutionary socialist legitimization. A one-party state was declared in 1976, but this does not essentially change the system. Ethnically the state is homogeneous, although until the military coup in 1969 the six main clan groupings and their subdivisions were the major means of organizing loyalty and power. While politics is still understood in lineage terms, in its centralizing drive the government has tried to eliminate both tribal and religious power, apparently with general success. Military needs led to ideological and economic dependence on the USSR; recent changes in this relation are yet to show up in the political system.

Civil Liberties. The media are under strict government control, private conversation is controlled, and those who do not follow the government are considered to be against it. Many political prisoners arrested in the coup have been released, some to government positions; others have received life sentences. There have been recent jailings for strikes and executions for religious propaganda against equal rights for women. Travel is restricted. Beyond the dominant subsistence economy, some individual freedoms have been curtailed by establishing state farms, state industries, and welfare programs. However, a definite private sector of the economy has also been staked out.

Comparatively: Somalia is as free as Mali, less free than Kenya.

SOUTH AFRICA

Economy: capitalist-statist

Political Rights: 5

Polity: centralized multiparty

Civil Liberties: 6

Population: 26,100,000

Status of Freedom: partly free

An ethnic state with major territorial and nonterritorial subnationalities

Political Rights. South Africa is a parliamentary democracy in which over eighty percent of the people are disenfranchised from participation in the normal national political process because of race. For the white population elections appear fair and open. There is, in addition, a limited scope for the nonwhites to influence affairs within their own communities. *Subnationalities:* In the several Bantustans that have not yet separated from the country, black leaders have some power and support from their people. Most black political parties are banned, but operating political parties among Indians and people of mixed blood work for the interests of their respective peoples. Regionally, government within the white community includes both central government officials and elected councils.

Civil Liberties. The white South African press is private and quite outspoken, although pressures have been increasing, especially on

reporters. Freedom for the nonwhite press was restricted but not eliminated in 1977. Broadcasting is under government control. The courts are independent, but do not effectively control security forces. There are political prisoners and torture—especially for black activists, who live in an atmosphere of terror. Private rights are generally respected for whites, and in some areas for nonwhites. Rights to residence of choice and to some extent occupation are quite restricted for nonwhites.

Comparatively: South Africa is as free as Syria, freer than Tanzania, less free than Morocco.

SPAIN

Economy: capitalist

Political Rights: 2

Polity: centralized multiparty

Civil Liberties: 3

Population: 36,500,000

Status of Freedom: free

An ethnic state with major subnationalities

Political Rights. Spain is in a state of transition from one-man rule to a constitutional monarchy in the European manner. The current parliament has been fairly elected from a wide range of parties. Recent elections have in effect given popular approval to the monarchy and to the prime minister whose party has received a popular mandate. However, on the other side, the people have not in fact elected the still powerful monarch and the prime minister remains for the time being responsible to this monarch instead of parliament. *Subnationalities:* The Basque and Catalan territorial subnationalities have had their rights greatly expanded in the last two years, but these rights are still not at the level they desire. Regional government remains in other respects quite centralized.

Civil Liberties. The press is private and is now largely free. The television network and some radio stations are government owned. Radio is no longer a state monopoly and television is controlled by an all-party committee. There are few prisoners of conscience, but imprisonment still threatens those who insult the security services. Police brutality and use of torture have been reported until very recently. The rule of law has been reestablished and private freedoms are respected. The Catholic religion maintains a favored position.

Comparatively: Spain is as free as Turkey, freer than Egypt, less free than France.

individuals of the major opposition front and taking into account their religious interests. *Subnationalities*: The Southern (Negro) region has been given a separate assembly, and its former guerrillas now form a part of the Southern army.

Civil Liberties. The press is weak and nationalized. Radio and television are government controlled. Limited criticism is allowed, especially in private. The university campus maintains a tradition of independence, but the courts are not strong. There have been political prisoners, reports of torture, and detention without trial. In 1977 ninety percent of these prisoners were released in accordance with a reconciliation policy. Sudan is socialist theoretically, but in business and agriculture the private sector has recently been supported by denationalizations.

Comparatively: Sudan is as free as Tunisia, freer than Ethiopia, less free than Egypt.

SURINAM

Economy: capitalist

Political Rights: 2

Polity: centralized multiparty

Civil Liberties: 2

Population: 440,000

Status of Freedom: free

An ethnically complex state

Political Rights. Surinam is a parliamentary democracy with authentic elections. Its two main parties represent separate ethnic groups. Although they are not as territorially distinct, negotiation between them results in a division of communal rights analogous to that in Belgium or Canada. There is no autonomous regional government.

Civil Liberties. The press and radio are free and varied. There is a rule of law and private rights are respected.

Comparatively: Surinam is as free as India, freer than Guyana, less free than Barbados.

SWAZILAND

Economy: preindustrial capitalist

Political Rights: 6

Polity: traditional nonparty

Civil Liberties: 4

Population: 500,000

Status of Freedom: partly free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Swaziland is ruled directly by the king with the aid of his royal advisors. The majority of the people probably support the king who is both a religious and political figure and has been king since 1900. South African political and economic influence is

extensive. *Subnationalities*: Nearly all the people are Swazi. Several thousand whites in the country and in neighboring Transvaal own the most productive land and business in the country.

Civil Liberties. Civil liberties were largely suspended in 1973. Opposition leaders have been repeatedly detained, and political activity is forbidden. Private media exist alongside governmental; there is censorship, but South African media present available alternatives. Public assemblies are restricted, unions forbidden, emigration difficult. Religious, economic, and other private rights are maintained. The traditional way of life is continued, especially on the local level.

Comparatively: Swaziland is as free as Kuwait, freer than Rhodesia, less free than Lesotho.

S W E D E N

Economy: mixed capitalist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 8,225,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Sweden is a parliamentary democracy in which power has recently passed to an opposition coalition. Although there are some representative institutions at regional and local levels, the system is relatively centralized. The tendency of modern bureaucracies to regard issues as technical rather than political has progressed further in Sweden than elsewhere.

Civil Liberties. The press is private or party; broadcasting is by state-licensed monopolies. Although free of censorship, the media are accused of presenting a rather narrow range of views. There is the rule of law. The defense of those accused by the government may not be as spirited as elsewhere, but, on the other hand, the ombudsman office gives special means of redress against administrative arbitrariness. Most private rights are respected. The national church has a special position. In many areas, such as housing, individual choice is restricted more than in other capitalist states—as it is of course by the very high tax load.

Comparatively: Sweden is as free as Denmark, freer than West Germany.

S W I T Z E R L A N D

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: decentralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 6,200,000	Status of Freedom: free

A trinational state

Political Rights. Switzerland is a parliamentary democracy in which all major parties are given a role in government determined by the size of the vote for each party. Parties that increase their vote above a certain level are invited to join the government, although such changes in party strength rarely occur. The lack of a decisive shift in power from one party to another in the last fifty years is the major doubt about the democratic effectiveness of the Swiss system. However, its dependence on the grand coalition style of government is a partial substitute, and the Swiss grant political rights in other ways that compensate for the lack of a transfer of power. Major issues are frequently decided by the citizenry through national referendums or popular initiatives. After referendums, in keeping with the Swiss attitude, even the losing side is given part of what it wants if its vote was sufficiently large. *Subnationalities:* Governments try to balance to some degree the representatives of the primary linguistic and religious groups; this is accomplished in another way by the upper house that directly represents the cantons (regions) on an equal basis. Regional and local elected governments have autonomous rights and determine directly much of the country's business.

Civil Rights. The high quality press is private and very independent. Broadcasting is government operated, although with the considerable independence of comparable West European systems. The rule of law is strongly upheld, and private rights are thoroughly respected.

Comparatively: Switzerland is as free as the United States, freer than Italy.

SYRIA

Economy: mixed socialist	Political Rights: 5
Polity: centralized dominant-party (military dominated)	Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 7,800,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Syria is a military dictatorship assisted by an elected parliament. The election of the military president was largely pro forma, but in recent assembly elections a few opposition candidates defeated candidates of the National Front, organized under the leadership of the governing party. The ruling Front includes several ideologically distinct parties, and cabinets have included representatives of a variety of such parties. Some authenticity to the election procedure is suggested by the fact that due to apathy and a boycott by dissident party factions in 1977 elections the government had such great difficulty

achieving the constitutionally required voter participation that it was forced to extend the voting period. Because of its position in the army the Alawite minority (ten percent) has a very unequal share of national power. Provinces have little separate power, but local elections are contested.

Civil Liberties. The press is primarily in the hands of government and closely controlled. Broadcasting services are government owned. However, political parties are able to articulate a variety of viewpoints, and individuals feel free to discuss politics. The courts are neither strongly independent nor effective in political cases where long-term detention without trial occurs. Political prisoners are often arrested following violence (most in 1977 were Palestinians). Torture has been generally employed in interrogation. Private conversation is fairly relaxed, and private rights, such as those of religion, occupation, or residence, are generally respected. Unions are government controlled. Recently the rights of the Jewish minority have been improved. Marginally industrial, Syria's economy is a mixture of socialist reorganization with governmental and private enterprise.

Comparatively: Syria is as free as Ghana, freer than Sudan, less free than Lebanon.

TANZANIA

Economy: preindustrial socialist

Political Rights: 6

Polity: socialist one-party

Civil Liberties: 6

Population: 16,000,000

Status of Freedom: not free

A transethnic heterogeneous nation in union with Zanzibar

Political Rights. Tanzania is a union of the paternalistic socialist mainland with the radical socialist Zanzibar. Although the governments are still not unified except in name, in late 1976 the single parties of each state were joined to form one all-Tanzanian party; it was announced that this party would have the ultimate direction of affairs in both states. Elections offer choice between individuals, but no issues are to be discussed in campaigns; all decisions come down from above, including the choice of candidates. *Subnationalities:* Ethnically, the country is divided into a large number of peoples (none larger than thirteen percent); most are not yet at the subnational level. The use of English and Swahili as national languages enhances national unity. Since the two subnations (Zanzibar and Tanganyika) are in a voluntary union at present, there is no question of dominance of one over the other.

Civil Liberties. Civil liberties are essentially subordinated to the goals

of the socialist leadership. No contradiction of official policy is allowed to appear in the government-owned media. Millions of people have been forced into communal villages; people from the cities have been abruptly transported to the countryside. In early 1977 there were two to three thousand people reported in detention for political crimes; torture and killing by the security services appeared to be common, although there has been an attempt to control the excesses of the security forces. Lack of respect for the independence of the judiciary and individual rights is especially apparent in Zanzibar. Neither labor nor capital have legally recognized rights—strikes are illegal. Nevertheless, most people may still follow preindustrial, traditional economic forms. Religion is free, at least on the mainland.

Comparatively: Tanzania is as free as Algeria, freer than Malawi, less free than Zambia.

THAILAND

Economy: preindustrial capitalist **Political Rights:** 6
Polity: military nonparty **Civil Liberties:** 5
Population: 44,400,000 **Status of Freedom:** not free

An ethnic state with a major territorial subnationality

Political Rights. Thailand is ruled by a military committee and a king. Political parties are officially illegal, but their leaders serve on a constitutional drafting committee. According to present plans democratic institutions are to be reestablished in 1979. Government is highly centralized. *Subnationalities:* There is a Muslim Malay community in the far south, and small ethnic enclaves in the north.

Civil Liberties. The press is private. Direct censorship was lifted in 1977; self-censorship is still significant. Broadcasting is military or government controlled. There are a small number of political prisoners. No members of the previous democratic or left-wing governments have been arrested. However, prisoners of conscience have been legally detained without trial; such laws greatly restrain public expression, if not private. Labor activity has been at least temporarily restricted. Private rights to property, choice of religion, travel, or residence are secure. Government enterprise is quite important in the basically capitalist modern economy.

Comparatively: Thailand is as free as Poland, freer than Vietnam, less free than the Philippines.

T O G O

Economy: preindustrial mixed	Political Rights: 7
Polity: nationalist one-party	Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 2,330,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Togo is a military dictatorship ruled in the name of a one-party state. In this spirit there is a deliberate denial of the rights of separate branches of government, including a separate judiciary, or even of private groups. Below the national level only the cities have a semblance of self-government. *Subnationalities:* The southern Ewe are culturally dominant and the largest group (twenty percent), but militant northerners now rule.

Civil Liberties. Most of the news media are government owned. There is little guarantee of a rule of law: people have been imprisoned on many occasions for offenses such as the distribution of leaflets. Religious freedom appears to exist. In this largely subsistence economy the government is heavily involved in trade, government enterprise, and the provision of services.

Comparatively: Togo is as free as Congo, freer than Equatorial Guinea, less free than Upper Volta.

T O N G A

Economy: preindustrial capitalist	Political Rights: 5
Polity: traditional nonparty	Civil Liberties: 3
Population: 105,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Tonga is a constitutional monarchy in which the king and nobles retain power. Only a minority of the members of the legislative assembly are elected directly by the people; in any event the assembly has little more than veto power. Regional administration is centralized.

Civil Liberties. The main paper is a government weekly and radio is under government control. There is a rule of law, but the king's decision is still a very important part of the system. Private rights within the traditional Tonga context seem guaranteed.

Comparatively: Tonga is as free as Maldives, freer than Seychelles, and less free than Western Samoa.

T R A N S K E I

Economy: preindustrial capitalist **Political Rights:** 6
Polity: centralized dominant-party **Civil Liberties:** 5
Population: 2,100,000 **Status of Freedom:** not free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. In form Transkei is a multiparty parliamentary democracy; in fact it is under the strong-man rule of a paramount chief supported by his party's unchallengeable majority. The meaning of recent elections was largely nullified by governmental interference, including the jailing of opposition leaders. Nevertheless, a small opposition party continues to function within parliament. Chiefs remain very important in the system, but beyond that there is little decentralization of power. South Africa has a great deal of de facto power over the state, particularly because of the large number of nationals that work in South Africa. However, Transkei has shown its independence on a number of issues, an independence greater than that allowed to most of the Soviet satellites.

Civil Liberties. The press is private; it supports opposition as well as government positions. Broadcasting is government controlled. Many members of the opposition have been imprisoned; new retroactive laws render it illegal to criticize Transkei or its rulers. Private rights are respected within the limits of South African and Transkei custom. Capitalist and traditional economic rights are diminished by the necessity of a large portion of the labor force to work in South Africa.

Comparatively: Transkei is as free as Panama, freer than Mozambique, less free than South Africa.

T R I N I D A D A N D T O B A G O

Economy: capitalist **Political Rights:** 2
Polity: centralized multiparty **Civil Liberties:** 2
Population: 1,100,000 **Status of Freedom:** free

An ethnically complex state

Political Rights. Trinidad and Tobago is a parliamentary democracy in which one party has managed to retain power since the 1950's. Elections have been boycotted in the past but now appear reasonably fair. A new opposition party has recently gained almost thirty percent of the assembly seats. There is local government.

Civil Liberties. The private or party press is generally free of restriction; broadcasting is under both government and private control. Opposition is regularly voiced. There are the full spectrum of private

rights, although violence and communal feeling reduce the effectiveness of such rights for many.

Comparatively: Trinidad and Tobago is as free as Surinam, freer than Grenada, less free than Bahamas.

TUNISIA

Economy: mixed capitalist

Political Rights: 6

Polity: socialist one-party

Civil Liberties: 5

Population: 6,025,000

Status of Freedom: not free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Tunisia is a one-party dictatorship that preserves alongside one-man leadership the trappings of parliamentary democracy. Pro forma elections are to an assembly containing members of the single party. Opposition within the party is now muted. Regional and local government is dependent on central direction.

Civil Liberties. The private, party, or government media have been heavily controlled. Private conversation is relatively free, but there is no right of assembly. Political prisoners are held; torture is reported. The courts demonstrate only a limited independence, but it is possible to win against the government. Unions are relatively independent—strikes are permitted. Most private rights seem to be respected, including economic rights since doctrinaire socialism has been abandoned. (In late 1977-early 1978 the government violently repressed the newly assertive labor movement and had to deal with a nascent opposition press.)

Comparatively: Tunisia is as free as Hungary, freer than Algeria, less free than Egypt.

TURKEY

Economy: capitalist-statist

Political Rights: 2

Polity: centralized multiparty

Civil Liberties: 3

Population: 41,900,000

Status of Freedom: free

An ethnic state with a major territorial subnationality

Political Rights. Turkey is a parliamentary democracy in which power has often shifted between the major parties or their coalitions. A marxist party has recently been legalized, but the communist party is still prohibited. The democratic system has been strongly supported by the military that has intervened against threats to the system from both the right and left. This leaves the military in a more powerful political position than is traditionally acceptable in a democracy, a

position symbolized by the fact that the largely ceremonial (except in crises) position of the president has come to be occupied by a military leader. Although there are elected councils at lower levels, power is effectively centralized. *Subnationalities*: Several million Kurds are denied self-determination: it is even illegal to teach or publish in Kurdish.

Civil Liberties. The press is private and free; the government controls the broadcasting system directly or indirectly. Although public expression and assembly cover a wide spectrum, there are laws against extremist publishing, assembly, and organization that are regarded as threats to the democratic order. Together with antigovernment violence this has led to frequent political imprisonment (commonly involving torture in the past). Government generally observes the law, but non-governmental extremists have been responsible for many deaths. Private rights are generally respected in other areas such as religion. Nearly fifty percent of the people are subsistence agriculturists. State enterprises make up more than one-half of Turkey's industry.

Comparatively: Turkey is as free as Spain, freer than Morocco, less free than Portugal.

UGANDA

Economy: preindustrial capitalist **Political Rights:** 7
Polity: military nonparty **Civil Liberties:** 7
Population: 12,400,000 **Status of Freedom:** not free

A formally transethnic heterogeneous state with major subnationalities

Political Rights. Uganda is ruled as a military dictatorship essentially unchecked by law or tradition. *Subnationalities*: The population is divided among a wide variety of peoples, some of which are subnationalities based on kingdoms that preceded the present state. The most important of these is Buganda, a kingdom with special rights within the state, that was suppressed in 1967 (sixteen percent of the people are Ganda). The president rules from a very small ethnic base in a Muslim group; his forces include many Muslim soldiers hired from across the border in the Sudan. Recent massacres have fallen especially heavily on the non-Muslim Acholi and Lango peoples.

Civil Liberties. The media are completely controlled. There are numerous reports of imprisonment, executions, and torture: as a result both of government policy and perhaps uncontrolled security forces. Essentially, there are no civil rights, with even the formerly powerful church hierarchies powerless. All small religious denominations have been banned. Avowedly the system is capitalist; yet the

expropriation of Asian businesses, handing them over to favored blacks, constituted a major government intervention. Recent anarchical conditions greatly reduce the rights of both capitalists and workers in what remains a primarily subsistence economy.

Comparatively: Uganda is as free as Equatorial Guinea, less free than Sudan.

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Economy: socialist	Political Rights: 7
Polity: communist one-party	Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 259,000,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A complex ethnic state with major territorial subnationalities

Political Rights. The Soviet Union is ruled by parallel party and governmental systems: the party system is dominant. Elections are held for both systems, but in neither is it possible for the rank and file to determine policy. Candidacy and voting are closely controlled and the resulting assemblies do not seriously question the policies developed by party leaders (varying by time or issue from one individual to twenty-five). The Soviet Union is in theory elaborately divided into subnational units, but in fact the all-embracing party structure renders local power negligible.

Subnationalities: Russians account for half of the Soviet population. The rest belong to a variety of subnational groupings ranging down in size from the forty million Ukrainians. Most groups are territorial, with a developed sense of subnational identity. The political rights of all of these to self-determination either within the USSR or through secession, is effectively denied. In many cases Russians or other non-native peoples have been settled in a subnational territory in such numbers as to make the native people a minority in their own land (for example, Kazakhstan). Expression of opinion in favor of increased self-determination is repressed at least as much as anti-communist opinion. Most of these peoples have had independence movements or movements for enhanced self-determination in the years since the founding of the USSR. Several movements have been quite strong since World War II (for example, in the Ukraine or Lithuania); the blockage of communication by the Soviet government makes it very difficult to estimate either the overt or latent support such movements might have.

Civil Liberties. The media are totally owned by the government or party and are, in addition, regularly censored. Elite publications oc-

asionally present variations from the official line, but significant deviations are generally found only in the underground press. There are very broad definitions of both crimes against the state and insanity (demonstrated by perverse willingness to oppose the state); as a result political prisoners are present in large numbers both in jails and insane asylums. It is important (and also frightening) that nearly all imprisonment and mistreatment of prisoners in the Soviet Union is now carried out in accordance with Soviet security laws—even though these laws conflict with other Soviet laws written to accord with international standards. Insofar as private rights, such as those to religion, education, or choice of occupation exist, they are de facto rights that may be denied at any time. Nearly all private entrepreneurial activity is outside the law; there are rights to nonproductive personal property. Other rights such as those to organize an independent labor union are strictly denied. Literacy is high, few starve, and private oppression is no more.

Comparatively: The USSR is as free as Burma, freer than East Germany, less free than Hungary.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Economy: capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 5
Polity: decentralized nonparty	Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 750,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

A relatively homogeneous citizenry

Political Rights. The UAE is a confederation of seven shaikhdoms in which the larger are given the greater power both in the assembly and the administrative hierarchy. There is a great deal of consultation in the traditional pattern. Below the confederation level there are no electoral procedures or parties. Each shaikhdom is relatively autonomous in its internal affairs. The majority of the people are recent immigrants and noncitizens.

Civil Liberties. The press is private or governmental; self-censorship allows only limited criticism of government. Broadcasting is under UAE control. There are no large political assemblies or labor unions, but there are also few, if any, prisoners of conscience. The courts dispense a combination of British, tribal, and Islamic law. Private rights are generally respected; religious freedom is limited. Many persons may still accept the feudal privileges and restraints of their tribal position. The rights of the alien majority are less secure. Private economic activity exists alongside the dominance of government petroleum and petroleum-related activities.

Comparatively: United Arab Emirates are as free as Bahrain, freer than North Yemen, less free than Tonga.

UNITED KINGDOM

Polity: mixed capitalist **Political Rights:** 1
Polity: centralized multiparty **Civil Liberties:** 1
Population: 56,920,000 **Status of Freedom:** free

An ethnic state with major subnationalities

Political Rights. The United Kingdom is a parliamentary democracy with a symbolic monarch. Fair elections are open to all parties, including those advocating secession. There are elected local and regional governments, but to date these are primarily concerned with administering national laws. The devolution of more substantial powers is currently under discussion and development. *Subnationalities:* Scots, Welsh, Ulster Scots, and Ulster Irish are significant and highly self-conscious territorial minorities. It is unclear whether current plans to enhance the self-determination of the Scots and Welsh through the devolution of power to regional parliaments will be sufficient—they will certainly still be far from the position of the Quebec French. The Ulster Scots and Irish live in intermixed territories in Northern Ireland. Both want more self-determination: the majority Ulster Scots as an autonomous part of the U.K., the minority Ulster Irish as an area within Ireland. There is reason to believe the U.K. would enhance self-determination for both groups if this dilemma could be solved.

Civil Liberties. The press is private and powerful; broadcasting has statutory independence although it is indirectly under government control. British media are comparatively restrained because of strict libel and national security laws, and a tradition of accepting government suggestions for the handling of sensitive news. Union refusal to print what they disagree with and union demands for a closed shop have recently been viewed by some as threats to freedom of the press. In Northern Ireland a severe security situation has led to the curtailment of private rights, to imprisonment, and on occasion to torture and brutality. However, these conditions have been relatively limited, have been thoroughly investigated by the government, and improved as a result. Elsewhere the rule of law is entrenched, and private rights generally respected. In certain areas, such as medicine, housing, inheritance, and general disposability of income, socialist government policies have limited choice for some while expanding the access of others.

Comparatively: The United Kingdom is as free as the United States, freer than West Germany.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: decentralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 216,700,000	Status of Freedom: free

An ethnically complex state with minor territorial subnationalities

Political Rights. The United States is a constitutional democracy with three strong but separate centers of power: president, congress, and judiciary. Elections are fair and competitive. Parties are remarkably weak: in some areas they are little more than temporary means of organizing primary elections. States, and to a lesser extent cities, have powers in their own rights; they often successfully oppose the desires of national administrations. Each state has equal representation in the upper house, which in the USA is the more powerful half of parliament.

Subnationalities: There are many significant ethnic groups, but the only clearly territorial subnationalities are the native peoples. The largest Indian tribes, the Navaho and Sioux, number 100,000 or more each. About 150,000 Hawaiians still reside on their native islands, intermingled with a much larger white and oriental population. Spanish-speaking Americans number in the millions; except for a few thousand residing in an area of northern New Mexico, they are mostly twentieth-century immigrants that live among English-speaking Americans, particularly in the large cities. Black Americans make up over one-tenth of the U.S. population; residing primarily in large cities they have no major territorial base. Blacks and Spanish-speaking Americans are of special concern because of their relative poverty, but their ethnic status is quite comparable to that of many other groups in America, including Chinese, Japanese, Filipinos, Italians, or Jews.

Civil Liberties. The press is private and free; both private and public radio and television are government regulated. There are virtually no government controls on the content of the printed media (except in nonpolitical areas such as pornography) and few on broadcasting. There are no prisoners of conscience or sanctioned uses of torture; some regional miscarriages of justice and police brutality have political and social overtones. Widespread use of surveillance techniques and clandestine interference with radical groups or groups thought to be radical has occurred; as a reduction of liberties the threat has remained largely potential; by 1977 these security excesses were greatly attenuated if not eliminated. Wherever and whenever publicity penetrates, the rule of law is generally secure, even against the most powerful. The government often loses in the courts. Private rights in most spheres are quite secure. Although a relatively capitalistic country,

the combination of tax loads with the decisive government role in agriculture, energy, defense, and other industries restricts individual choice as it increases majority power.

Comparatively: The United States is as free as Australia, freer than Italy.

UPPER VOLTA

Economy: preindustrial capitalist **Political Rights:** 5
Polity: military nonparty **Civil Liberties:** 4
Population: 6,400,000 **Status of Freedom:** partly free

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Upper Volta is under military strong-man rule and the normal parliamentary processes are in abeyance. Presidential and parliamentary elections will be held in 1978. The government now includes representatives of parties; labor unions or groups of government employees are able to exert influence on the government through demonstrations that mobilize public opinion. There is little official decentralization of power.

Civil Liberties. Media are both government and private. The major opposition paper is regularly critical of the government. There are no political prisoners. The rule of law seems fairly well established; within traditional limits private rights are respected. Trade unions are important. Travel is unrestricted. Essentially the economy remains dependent on subsistence agriculture, with the government playing the role of regulator and promoter of development.

Comparatively: Upper Volta is as free as China (Taiwan), freer than Ghana, less free than Botswana.

URUGUAY

Economy: mixed capitalist **Political Rights:** 6
Polity: military nonparty **Civil Liberties:** 6
Population: 2,800,000 **Status of Freedom:** not free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Uruguay is a military dictatorship supplemented by an appointed civilian head of state and appointed advisory council. In spite of this situation the personalities of the leading parties still play some role. The state is highly centralized.

Civil Liberties. The press is private, and broadcasting private and public. Both are under heavy censorship, threats of confiscation and closure, as are book and journal outlets. The right of assembly is

very restricted. The independence of the judiciary and the civil service has been drastically curtailed. There are thousands of political prisoners, many of which are prisoners of conscience. Torture has been routinely used; convictions are generally based on written confessions. Many parties have been banned, but there is still considerable room for political discussion of alternatives beyond the limits of the present system. Although restricted, nongovernment unions continue to function. Private rights are generally respected. The tax load of an overbuilt bureaucracy and emphasis on private and government monopolies have also restricted choice in this now impoverished welfare state.

Comparatively: Uruguay is as free as Tanzania, freer than Ethiopia, less free than Bolivia.

VENEZUELA

Economy: capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 12,700,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Venezuela is a parliamentary democracy in which power has alternated between major parties in recent years. Campaigns and voting appear reasonably fair. Regional and local assemblies are relatively powerful, but governors are centrally appointed. Each state has equal representation in the upper house.

Civil Liberties. The press is private and free; most broadcasting is also in private hands. Censorship occurs only in emergencies. The rule of law is generally secured, but in the face of guerrilla actions the security services have on occasion imprisoned persons, used torture, and even threatened the press for its antimilitary statements. Many persons have been detained for long periods without trial, and on rare occasions members of parliament have been arrested. However, there is little evidence that those detained have been prisoners of conscience, and the government has taken steps to prevent torture in the future. The court can rule against the government. Most private rights are respected; government involvement in the petroleum industry has given it a predominant economic role.

Comparatively: Venezuela is as free as France, freer than Italy, less free than Costa Rica.

VIETNAM

Economy: socialist	Political Rights: 7
Polity: communist one-party	Civil Liberties: 7
Population: 47,300,000	Status of Freedom: not free

An ethnic state with subnationalities

Political Rights. Vietnam is a traditional communist dictatorship with the forms of parliamentary democracy. Actual power is in the hands of the communist party; this is in turn dominated by a small group at the top. Officially there is a ruling national front as in several other communist states, but the noncommunist parties are essentially meaningless. Administration is highly centralized, with provincial boundaries arbitrarily determined by the central government. The continued stream of refugees in 1977 provided evidence that the present regime is very unpopular, especially in the South which is treated as an occupied country. *Subnationalities:* Continued fighting has been reported in the Montagnard areas in the South; combined with new resettlement schemes these non-Vietnamese people seem under as much pressure as before; the position of Montagnards in the North may be satisfactory.

Civil Liberties. The media are under direct government, party, or army control; only the approved line is presented. While the people do not suffer the fears and illegalities of anarchy, they have essentially no rights against the interests of the state. Severe repression of the Buddhist opposition has led to many immolations—pressure on the Hoa Hao and Catholics is comparable. Perhaps one-half million have been put through reeducation camps, hundreds of thousands have been forced to move into new areas, or to change occupations. Tens or hundreds of thousands remain political prisoners. By placing a trusted, usually Northern, leader over each group of ten families in the South, at least half of the country has been turned into a prison camp.

Comparatively: Vietnam is as free as Korea (North), less free than China (Mainland).

WESTERN SAMOA

Economy: preindustrial capitalist	Political Rights: 4
Polity: traditional nonparty	Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 165,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Western Samoa is a constitutional monarchy in which the assembly is elected by 9,500 "family heads." There have

been important shifts of power within the assembly as the result of elections, although there are no political parties. Village government has preserved traditional forms and considerable autonomy; it is also based on rule by "family heads."

Civil Liberties. The press is private; radio is government owned. There is general freedom of expression and rule of law. Private rights are respected within the limits set by the traditional system.

Comparatively: Western Samoa is as free as Guyana, freer than Malaysia, less free than Nauru.

YEMEN, NORTH

(Yemen Arab Republic)

Economy: preindustrial capitalist	Political Rights: 6
Polity: military nonparty	Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 5,550,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A complex but relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. North Yemen is a military dictatorship, most recently under collective rule. The tribal and religious structures still retain considerable authority, and the government must rely on a wide variety of different groups in an essentially nonideological consensual regime. Political parties are forbidden. The country is divided between city and country, a variety of tribes, and two major religious groupings.

Civil Liberties. The media are largely government owned, although there are apparently some private newspapers and limited freedom of expression. Proponents of both royalist and far left persuasions are openly accepted in a society with few known prisoners of conscience. Politically active opponents may be encouraged to go into exile. The traditional Islamic courts give some protection; private rights such as those to religion and property are respected. Economically the government has concentrated on improving the infrastructure of Yemen's still overwhelmingly traditional economy.

Comparatively: North Yemen is as free as Cameroon, freer than South Yemen, less free than Syria.

YEMEN, SOUTH

(People's Democratic Republic of Yemen)

Economy: preindustrial socialist	Political Rights: 7
Polity: socialist one-party	Civil Liberties: 7
Population: 1,780,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. South Yemen considers itself a communist country governed according to the communist one-party model. It is doubtful that the party retains the tight party discipline of its exemplars. The assembly is appointed, and there is no autonomous local authority.

Civil Liberties. The media are government owned and controlled; even conversation with foreigners is highly restricted. In the political and security areas the rule of law hardly applies. Thousands of political prisoners, torture, and hundreds of "disappearances" have instilled a deadening sense of fear in those who would speak up. Death sentences against protesting farmers have been handed down by people's courts. Independent private rights are few, although some traditional law and institutions remain. Industry and commerce have been nationalized.

Comparatively: South Yemen is as free as Kampuchea, less free than Oman.

YUGOSLAVIA

Economy: mixed socialist

Political Rights: 6

Polity: communist one-party

Civil Liberties: 5

Population: 21,800,000

Status of Freedom: not free

A multinational state

Political Rights. Yugoslavia is governed on the model of the USSR, but with the addition of unique elements. The unique elements are 1) the greater role given the governments of the constituent republics and 2) the greater power given the assemblies of the self-managed communities and industrial enterprises. In any event, the country is directed by the communist party, and our evidence suggests that in spite of some earlier liberalizing tendencies to allow the more democratic formal structure to work, Yugoslavia is now no more democratic than Hungary or Poland among the communist states in Eastern Europe. There continues to be no evidence of any opposition member being elected to state or national position, nor of any public opposition in the assemblies to government policy on the national or regional level—in spite of evidence that there is a good deal of dissatisfaction with the working of the federal system, especially in Croatia and the smaller republics.

Subnationalities: The several peoples of Yugoslavia live largely in their historical homelands. The population consists of forty percent Serbs, twenty-two percent Croats, eight percent Slovenes, eight percent Bosnian Muslims, six percent Macedonians, six percent Albanians, two percent Montenegrins, and many others.

Civil Liberties. The media in Yugoslavia are controlled directly or indirectly by the government, although there is ostensible worker control. A number of people have been imprisoned for ideas expressed in print that deviated from the official line (primarily through subnationalist enthusiasm, anticommunism, or communist deviationism). There are about 500 political prisoners now in Yugoslavia. As long as the issue is not political, however, the courts have some independence; there is a realm of de facto individual freedom that includes the right to seek employment outside the country. Although the economy is socialist or communalist in most respects, agriculture in this most agricultural of European countries remains overwhelmingly private.

Comparatively: Yugoslavia is as free as Iran, freer than Rumania, less free than Morocco.

Z A I R E

Economy: preindustrial capitalist-
statist **Political Rights: 6**
Civil Liberties: 6
Polity: nationalist one-party **Status of Freedom:** not free
Population: 26,300,000

A transethnic heterogeneous state with subnationalities

Political Rights. Zaire is under one-man military rule, with the ruling party essentially an extension of the ruler's personality. Elections in 1977 at both local and parliamentary levels were restricted to one party, but allowed for extensive choice among individuals. The majority of the party's ruling council was also elected in this manner. A subsequent presidential election offered no choice. Regions are deliberately organized to avoid ethnic identity: regional officers all are appointed from the center, generally from outside of the area, as are officers of the ruling party.

Subnationalities: There are such a variety of tribes or linguistic groups in Zaire that no one group has as many as twenty percent of the population. The fact that French remains dominant reflects the degree of this dispersion. Until recently most of the Zaire people have seen themselves only in local terms without broader ethnic identification. The revolts and wars of the early 1960's saw continually shifting patterns of affiliation, with the European provincial but not ethnic realities of Katanga and South Kasai being most important. The most self-conscious ethnic groups are the Kongo people living in the west (and Congo and Angola) and the Luba in the center of the country. In both cases ethnicity goes back to important ancient kingdoms.

Civil Liberties. Government has been arbitrary and capricious; censorship is pervasive. Individual names as well as clothing style have had to be changed by government decree. All ethnic organizations are forbidden. Arrested conspirators have been forbidden their own lawyers. The Catholic church has retained some autonomy, but independent churches have been proscribed. The state is not, however, socialist. Private newspaper ownership remains and there is some freedom to criticize. There is no right of assembly, and union organization is controlled. The extravagance and business dealings of those in high places when founded on government power reduces economic freedom. The nationalization of land has often been a prelude to private development by powerful bureaucrats, but there is also considerable government enterprise.

Comparatively: Zaire is as free as Gabon, freer than Benin, less free than Zambia.

Z A M B I A

Economy: preindustrial mixed

Political Rights: 5

Polity: socialist one-party

Civil Liberties: 5

Population: 5,180,000

Status of Freedom: partly free

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Zambia is ruled as a one-party dictatorship, although there have been considerable elements of freedom within that party. Party organs are constitutionally more important than governmental. Although elections have had some competitive meaning within this framework, recently the government has opposed opposition movements within the party. Expression of dissent is possible through the massive abstention of prospective voters.

Civil Liberties. All media are government controlled. A considerable variety of opinion is expressed, but it is a crime to criticize the president or his ideology, and foreign publications are censored. There is a rule of law and the courts have some independence: cases have been won against the government. Hundreds of political opponents have been detained, and occasionally tortured, yet most people talk without fear. Traditional life continues. Although the government does not fully accept private rights in property or religion and has nationalized important parts of the economy, a private sector continues and is even encouraged in some areas.

Comparatively: Zambia is as free as Madagascar, freer than Angola, less free than Morocco.

Index

For countries (and related territories), *see also* the Tables.

- Aaland Islands decision, self-determination and, 193, 199
Ache Indians, 164
Afghanistan: external ideas, role of, in establishing democracy in, 156-59; summary of, 223
Africa, people without national rights in, 56-58
Age of Democratic Revolution, 140
Albania, summary of, 224
Algeria, summary of, 224-25
Almond, Gabriel, 27
Amanullah, King (Afghanistan), 159
American Journal of International Law, 192
American Samoa, advance of freedom in, 35
Amini, Ali, 93, 100
Amnesty International, 9, 75; critique of, 28-30
Amnesty International Report: 1977, 27 In
anarchy, democracy and, 127
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), 89
Angola: loss of freedom in, 30; summary of, 225
apartheid, 32
Argentina: loss of freedom in, 31; summary of, 226
Aron, Raymond, 46, 172
Arsenjani, Hassan, 93, 99
Asia, people without national rights in, 58-59
assimilation of ethnic groups, 221; definition of, 180
Australia, summary of, 226-27
Austria, summary of, 227
authoritarian states, totalitarian states and, 119
autocracy, power and, 127
Bahamas, summary of, 228
Bahrain, summary of, 228-29
Bakhtiar, General Timur, 99
Bangladesh, summary of, 229
Banks, Arthur, 8, 23, 24, 26
"Bantu Humanism," 116-17
Baqai, Dr. Mozaffar, 89, 92
Barbados, summary of, 229-30
"Basmachi Rebellion," 206
Basque minority of Spain. *See* Spain
Belgium, summary of, 230
Belgrade Conference (1977), 83
Benin, summary of, 230-31
Berelson, B., 130
Bhutan, summary of, 231
Birmingham Caucus, suffrage and, 143
Blondel, J., 27, 28
Bolivia, summary of, 231-32
Botswana, summary of, 232-33
Brazil, summary of, 233
Brezhnev, Leonid, 66
Bukharan Republic. *See* Tadzhiks of Central Asia
Bulgaria, summary of, 234
Burma: loss of freedom in, 31; summary of, 234-35
Burke, Edmund, 190, 196
Burundi, summary of, 235-36
Cambodia. *See* Kampuchea
Canada, summary of, 235-36
Cameroon, summary of, 236
Cape Verde Islands, summary of, 237
capitalism/capitalist systems: "counter-

- vailing powers" and, 168-69, 175; economic inequality, as major defect of, 167-68; freedom under, 46-47, 166-69; government action and, types of, 167; mixed, 219-20; requirements, vs. socialist requirements, 175-77; types of, 46-47. *See also* political-economic systems; socialism
- Carter, Jimmy, 65, 66, 67, 71, 82, 83, 84, 100, 102, 103, 105, 107
- Catalan minority of Spain. *See* Spain
- Central African Empire, summary of, 238
- centralized multiparty system, 48
- Chad, summary of, 238
- Chile, summary of, 239
- China (Mainland): change in freedom rating, 35, 42; summary of, 239-40
- China (Taiwan): advance of freedom in, 32; summary of, 240-41
- choice (will): freedom of, 111; as essence of freedom, 116
- Chornovil, Vyacheslav, 78
- Chronicle of Contemporary Events* (Soviet underground journal), 81
- Civic Culture, The* (Almond and Verba), 27
- citizens: full, unimpaired opportunities for, 134; guarantees to, by social institutions, 134-35
- Citizens, Elections, Parties* (Rokkan), 27
- civil liberties: definition of, 7-8, 118; and free press, role of, 15-16; in liberal democracy, 119-20, 124; as measure of freedom in independent nations, 10-12; as measure of freedom in related territories, 14-15; and polyarchy, 141; ranking of nations by, 17. *See also* political rights; *names of forms of civil liberties* (e.g., press); *names of countries*
- Civil Rights Act (1964), 142
- Claude, Richard, 27
- Cobban, Alfred, 180, 181, 199
- Cold War, 75. *See also* ideology
- Colombia, summary of, 241-42
- communist states: one-party, 47; people without national rights in, 55. *See also names of countries*
- Comoro Islands, summary of, 242
- Comparative Human Rights* (Claude), 27
- Comparative Survey of Freedom. *See* Survey of Freedom, Comparative
- Congo: loss of freedom in, 31; summary of, 242-43
- Connor, Walker, 180, 181
- consciousness, national, of different peoples. *See* self-determination
- consociational democracy, 214n
- contestation, public, of elections, 136-37, 139
- contingent self-determination, 194
- Costa Rica: external ideas, role of, in establishing democracy in, 155-56; summary of, 243
- Cottam, Richard, 65, 69
- Council on Foreign Relations, 8
- "countervailing powers" under capitalism, 168-69, 175
- crimes of past, as criterion used by world elites, in assessing self-determination, 190
- Croce, B., 141
- Cross-Polity Survey, A* (Banks and Textor), 23
- culture, political, 147-51, 160
- Cuba: loss of freedom in, 31, 32; summary of, 243-44
- Cyprus, summary of, 244
- Czechoslovakia, summary of, 245
- Dahl, Robert A., 23, 24, 26, 112
- Daniel, Yulii, 78
- Daud, Prince (Afghanistan), 157, 158, 159
- decentralized multiparty systems, 47
- democracy: constitutional, 7; consensus, and, 128; continuum of public contestation and participation and, 136-37; as cooperative organization, 118-19, 125; definition of, 127, 134; and democratic rule, appraisal of (Sartori), 127-33; and democratization of society, 135-37; dimensions of, theoretical, 135-36; direct, 113; as distinct form, 119; elections and, 127-28; and external ideas, as diffusionary pressure, 149-51; freedom and, 113; guarantees by institutions to citizens in, 134-35; goals for introducing, 160; ideas and, importance of, 147-61; necessary conditions of, 134; and party competition, 132-33; as polyarchy, 134-46; preconditions of, 147; public opinion and, 128-29; representative, 113; requirements for (table), 135; and right to public participation, 136-37; self-determination and subnationalities, 180, 183, 193-94, 197, 198-99, 202, 208, 209, 210-11; and size of state, 202; socioeconomic preconditions of, 148-52;

- stability of freedom in, 150-51; voting and, 132. *See also* elections; liberal democracy
- "democratic centralism," Soviet concept of, human rights and, 72
- "Democratic Revolution," 5
- demos*, 127, 133
- Denmark, summary of, 245-46
- detente*, 71, 82
- Deutsch, Karl, 190
- diffusion, theories of, 161ns
- diffusionary pressure, as precondition of democracy, 148-52, 159-60; external ideas, efficacy of, 149-51; in U.S., 151
- direct democracy, 113
- Djibouti (formerly the French Territory of the Afars and Issas): change in freedom rating, 42; summary of, 246
- dominant party systems, 47
- Dominican Republic, summary of, 246-47
- Douglas, William A., 147
- Duff, Ernst, 26
- East Bengal, as example of self-determination, 188-89
- Ebtehaj, Abdul Hassan, 91, 95
- economic systems, freedom and, 43-47; capitalist, 43, 46-47; socialist, 43, 47; Third World, 46. *See also* capitalism; socialism
- Ecuador, summary of, 247
- Egypt, summary of, 247-48
- elections: consensus, as verification of, 128; democracy and, 127-28, 132-33; national, types and results of (tables), 36-40; *a parte ante* and *a parte post*, 131; party competition and, 132-33; public contestation and inclusiveness, 136-37; right to vote, public contestation of, 136; voter incompetency, 131-32. *See also* public opinion
- elites, 189
- Ellison, Herbert, 68, 69
- El Salvador, summary of, 248-49
- enabling freedom. *See* positive freedom
- equality, 6, 177-78n; as absolute goal, 123-24; as alternative value to freedom, 165. *See also* civil liberties; freedom; political rights; self-determination
- Equatorial Guinea: loss of freedom in, 31; summary of, 249
- Ethiopia: loss of freedom in, 31; summary of, 250
- ethnicity, as criterion for nation-state, 183, 185-86
- Euro-American type society, 42
- expression. *See* speech
- Feuer, Louis, 85
- Fiji, summary of, 251
- Finland, summary of, 251-52
- Firdowsi, 207
- Flynt, Larry, 29
- Food for Peace Program, 66
- Ford, Gerald, 82
- Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Tilly), 27
- France, summary of, 252-53
- Franco, Francesco, 141
- freedom: concept and definitions of, 6, 8, 111-12, 118, 124; comparative measures of, for independent nations, 10-12; comparative measures of, for related territories, 14-15; conclusions about, 124-25; essential issues, 117-18; map of, 20-21; and other changes in society, 120-24; and political-economic systems, 163-77; as private rights, 119-20; public opinion and, 128-29; requirements of, capitalist vs. socialist, 175-77; right-left dichotomy, as perspective on, 123; self-determination and subnationalities, 180-212; trends in particular countries, 22-23; value of, 163. *See also* negative freedom; positive freedom; survey of freedom; *names of countries*; *aspects of freedom*
- Freedom Front (Iran), 102
- Freedom House, 75
- Freedom of Information Center, 9
- Freedom at Issue* (Freedom House), 4
- Freedom of Press Committee of the Inter-American Press Association, 9
- French Canada. *See* Quebec
- Gabon, summary of, 253
- Gambia, summary of, 253-54
- Garibaldi, Oscar, 74
- general elections, 9
- "Geography of Human Rights, A" (Anderson), 26
- Germany, East, summary of, 254
- Germany, West: loss of freedom in, 31; summary of, 254-55
- Ghana: advance of freedom in, 32; summary of, 255-56
- Giscard d'Estaing, Valery, 66
- Goldstein, Al, 29

- government, as profit-making organization, 118-19, 125
- Grady, Henry, 100
- Grenada, summary of, 257
- Greece, summary of, 256
- groups: freedom of, 8; symbolic differentiation of, as criterion used by world elites, in assessing self-determination, 189
- Guatemala, summary of, 257-58
- Guinea, summary of, 257-58
- Guinea-Bissau, summary of, 258-59
- Gulag Archipelago* (Solzhenitsyn), 76
- Guyana, summary of, 259
- Haida Indians of British Columbia, and claim to Queen Charlotte Islands, as example of right to self-determination of territorial minority, 201
- Haiti, summary of, 260
- Haj Sayyid lavadi, Ali Asghar, 101
- hegemonic regimes, 137, 138-39; polyarchy, changing to, 140, 141, 142-43, 145-46; violence, use of, 145
- Helsinki Agreement (1975), 65, 71, 82, 83, 85
- Henderson, Loy, 90, 100
- Hitler, Adolf, 144
- Honduras, summary of, 259
- human rights: concept and implementation of (United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948), 71, 74-75; ideological conflicts over, 75-76, 84; interests and, types of, 68; public pressure, as tool in moving U.S. bureaucracy to support, 104-105, 107-108; U.S. Congress policy on, 64, 65; U.S.-Soviet relations and, 71, 82-86; ways of interpreting, 70n, 72-73. *See also* Iran; USSR
- , Carter administration's policy on, 64-69; co-national interest of, 68; effects of, 66-67; ethnic racism (culturalism) and, 67-68; flaws in, 67; reactions to, 65, 84; Soviet objections to, 82-84
- Hungarian Revolution (1956), 77
- Hungary: advance of freedom in, 32; summary of, 261
- Huntington, Samuel, 27, 121, 122
- Iceland, summary of, 261
- ideas, importance of, for establishment of democratic institutions, 147-61; in Afghanistan, 156-59; in Costa Rica, 155-56; as diffusionary pressure, 148-52; policy conclusions, 159-61; in Switzerland, 151-55
- ideology and human rights, 75-76, 84
- inclusiveness of elections, 136-37, 139
- independence. *See* self-determination
- independent nations, table of comparative measures of freedom, by political rights, civil liberties, status of freedom and outlook, 10-12
- India: advance of freedom in, 33; as multinational state, 221; summary of, 262
- Indonesia: change in freedom rating, 42; communist purges (1965), 145; summary of, 263-64
- industrial democracies, people without national rights in, 53-54
- information, public opinion and, 129-30
- initiative, as indicator of political freedom, 28
- interests, human rights and, 68, 126n
- International Court of Justice, 192
- International League for Human Rights, 75
- International Press Institute, 9
- Iran: advance of freedom in, 33; summary of, 264-65; Tadjik self-determination, Soviet relations and, 206-207
- , human rights in, American policy and, 89-90, 92-93, 96, 100-108; coercion and reform, as response to, 100-101, 102-103; dissident activity, as response to, 101-103, 105; and future of rights in Iran, 102-104, 107; meaning of, as interpreted by Iranian dissidents and royalists, 104; oil and, 106-107; U.S. interests and, 106; USSR as variable in, 106-107
- , human rights in, historical background, 88-95; American policy, 89-90, 92; British policy, 89, 90; economic crisis, post-coup, and consequences for freedom, 93-94; freedom in post-coup period (1953-61), 90-91; oil policy, post-coup, 91-92, 95; riots (June 1963), 94-95; SAVAK, formation and operation of, 90-91, 93-94, 98-99; White Revolution, 93-94
- , human rights in, in mid 1970's, 95-99; dissent, 98; groups opposing and supporting regime, 95-97; political prisoners and torture, 97; repression and terror, use of, 98-99
- , human rights in: national fronts, movements and parties, 92, 93, 94, 99, 102, 103, 107; women in, 94, 99

- Iraq, summary of, 265-66
 Ireland, summary of, 266
 Israel, summary of, 266-67
 Italy, summary of, 267-68
 Ivory Coast, summary of, 268
- Jackson, Senator Henry, 64
 Jamaica, summary of, 268-69
 James, Preston, 5
 Janata Party (India), 6
 Japan, summary of, 269-70
 Jefferson, Thomas, 114, 165, 166
 Jordan, summary of, 269
 Jura separatists, self-determination in
 Switzerland and, 202-204
 justice. *See* equality
- Kampuchea (Cambodia), summary of,
 270-71
 Kashani, Ayatollah, 89
 Kennan, George, 202
 Kennedy, John F., 64
 Kenya, summary of, 271
 KGB, 80, 82
 Khatemi, General, 99
 Khayyam, Omar, 207
 Khomeini, Ayatollah, 94, 103
 Khrushchev, N. S., 87n
 Kissinger, Henry, 64, 82, 83
 Kintner, William, 66, 68
 Kohn, Hans, 152
 Korea (North), summary of, 272
 Korea (South), summary of, 272-73
 Kuhn, Alfred, 118, 119
 Kuwait: advance of freedom in, 33;
 summary of, 271
- Latin America, people without national
 rights in, 55-56
 La Palombara, Joseph, 27
 Laos, summary of, 274
 law, as fundamental to constitutional
 democracy, 7
 leadership, political, polyarchy and,
 141-42
 League of Nations, and Aaland decision
 on self-determination, 193
 Lebanon, summary of, 274-75
 Lesotho, summary of, 275
 liberal democracy: artificially mobilized
 polities and, 120-24; conclusion
 about, 124-25; criticism of, 116-17;
 definition of, 115, 116; equality, de-
 mand for, 123-24; essential issues
 and, 117-18; as guarantor of free-
 dom, 115-18, 124; iterative processes
 and, external and internal, 148; and
 "manipulated will" of people, 115-
 16; modernization and, 149; and
 "operating political culture," 149,
 160; and political participation, 121-
 24; private rights in, 119-20. *See*
also democracy
 liberalism, history of, 114, 125n
 Liberia, summary of, 275-76
 liberty. *See* freedom
 Libya, summary of, 276
 Lippmann, Walter, 130
loya jirga (Afghanistan national coun-
 cil), 156, 157, 158
 Luxembourg, summary of, 277
- McCnamant, John, 26
 Madagascar: advance of freedom in,
 33; summary of, 277-78
 majority rule: freedom and, 113-14;
 limitations on, 120; and minority
 rights, 124; negative freedom and,
 113; as positive freedom, 113
 Malawi, summary of, 278
 Malaysia, summary of, 278-79
 Maldives, summary of, 279-80
 Mali, summary of, 280
 Malta: loss of freedom in, 32; sum-
 mary of, 280-81
 Mandelstam, Nadezhda, 77
 "manipulated will," democracy and, 115
 Mao Tse-tung, 36
 Marx, Karl, 119
 Maslov, Abraham, 164
 materialist views, freedom and, 5
 Mauritania, summary of, 281
 Mauritius: advance of freedom in, 33;
 summary of, 281-82
 Mexico, summary of, 282-83
 Middle East, people without national
 rights in, 58
 military nonparty systems, 51
 Mill, John Stuart, 160, 196, 197, 200,
 210, 211
 "minorities regime," concept of, self-
 determination and, 193
 minority rights, 124
 modernization, as precondition of lib-
 eral democracy, 147, 149
 Mongolia, summary of, 283
 Montesquieu, 114
 Morocco: advance of freedom in, 33;
 summary of, 283-84
 Mosca, Gaetano, 140, 141
 Mossadeq, Dr. Mohammad, 88, 89, 90,
 91, 93, 94, 95, 98, 100, 102
 Mozambique, summary of, 284-85
 multiparty systems, 47

- Nanda, Ved, 188, 189
 Nasser, G. A., 3, 94
 national consciousness, 52
 National Front (Iran), 102
 nationalism, 23; subnationalism and, 182. *See also* self-determination
 nationalist one-party states, 47
 Nationalist Party (Iran), 92, 93
 National Resistance Movement (Iran), 93, 94
 national rights, people without, 51-60; in Africa, 56-58; in Asia, 58-59; in communist states, 55; concept of, criteria for, 51-53; in industrial democracies, 53-54; in Latin America, 55-56; in Middle East, 58; in Quebec, 54-55; in Southeast Asia, 59-60
 nation-states. *See* self-determination
 Nauru, summary of, 285
 negative freedom (freedom from), 111-13, 166, 168; and government actions, 113; and majority rule, 113; as scope for comparative survey, 111
 Nelson, Joan, 121, 122
 Nepal: advance of freedom in, 34; experiment with democracy, 162n; summary of, 285-86
 Netherlands, summary of, 286
 New Iran (party), 93
 New Zealand, summary of, 286-87
 Nicaragua, summary of, 287
 Niger, summary of, 288
 Nigeria: advance of freedom in, 34; summary of, 288-89
No Easy Choice (Huntington and Nelson), 121
 Norling, R., 23
 Northern Marianas, advance of freedom in, 35
 Norway, summary of, 289-90

 Oman, summary of, 290
 one-party states, 47, 51
 "operating political culture," liberal democracy and, 149, 160
 opinion. *See* public opinion
 Oppenheim, Felix, 111, 112

 Pahlavi, Shah Mohammad Reza, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 106, 107
 Palmer, R. R., 140
 Pakistan: change in freedom rating, 42; summary of, 290-91
 Pakravan, General, 91

 Panama: advance of freedom in, 34; summary of, 291-92
 Papua New Guinea: change in freedom rating, 42; summary of, 292
 Paraguay, summary of, 292-93
 participation, political: defined, 121-22; vs. free speech, as dimension for ranking societies, by comparative survey, 123
 parties, political: competition among, as criterion of democracy, 132-33, 179n; competitive systems, 9; dominant-party systems, 47; multiparty systems, 43, 47; nonparty states, 51; one-party states, 47, 51; political-economic systems, by types of (table), 44-45; polyarchy and expansion of, 142-44; under socialism, 169-75
partiinost' (partisanship), Soviet dissent and, 73
 Pasha, Enver, 206
 people, as concept, 183, 184-85, 186; self-conscious people, 185
 Peoples Party (Iran), 92, 93, 99
 People's Republic of China. *See* China (Mainland)
 PEN, 29
 permissive freedom. *See* negative freedom
 Peru, summary of, 293-94
 "phantom public," public opinion and, 130
 Philippines, summary of, 294-95
 Plan Organization (Iran), 91
 pluralism, 214n
 plurality of publics, formation of public opinion and, 129-30
 Poland: advance of freedom in, 32; summary of, 295
 Polanyi, Karl, 174
 police, activities of, freedom and, 18
polis (Greek), 113
 "political development," as value-free concept, in making comparative judgments, 147
 political-economic systems, parties and (table), 44-45
Political Handbook of the World (Banks, ed.), 8
Political Order in Changing Societies (Huntington), 27
 political rights: defined, 7-8, 118; as measure of freedom in independent nations, 10-12; as measure of freedom in related territories, 14-15; ranking of nations by, 16; tabulated

- ratings, 9-15. *See also names of countries*
- political systems, freedom and, 47-51
- polyarchy, theory of democracy as, 134-46; and changing to hegemonic regimes, 139-40, 145-46; civil liberties and, 141; conditions and, 137-38; definition of, 134, 138; force, use of, in American South, 145; in government policies, 144-45; hegemonic regimes and, 137, 138-39; limitations of, 139; party politics and, 142-44; political leadership and, 141-42; public contestation and inclusiveness, definitions of, 137, 139; revolutions of 18th and 19th centuries and, 140; significance of, 140-46; suffrage, expansion of, 141-44
- population, size of, as criterion used by world elites, in assessing self-determination, 189
- Portugal, summary of, 295-96
- positive freedom, 112, 113, 166, 168; and other goals, 112-13
- power: anarchy and, 127; autocracy and, 127; among competing groups, 13; democracy and, 7; elite, democracy and, 115, 118, 122, 123, 125, 168. *See also* democracy
- precapitalist societies, freedom in, 165-66, 175
- press, freedom and, 15-18
- pressure group support or opposition, as criterion used by world elites, in assessing self-determination, 191
- prisoners, political, 222
- private rights. *See* civil liberties
- property rights, 114, 125n
- public opinion, 128-32; freedom and, 128-29; impotence of, 129-31; omnipotence of, 131-32; as pattern of attitudes and demands, 130-31; as "phantom public," 130; polycentric system of, information and, 129-30; types of, 128-29. *See also* elections
- Qatar, summary of, 296
- Quebec, 66; national rights and, 54-55; and self-determination, 208
- Ra'anana, Uri, 200
- Radical Movement (Iran), 102
- Radio Free Europe, 82
- Radio Liberty, 82
- Rawls, John, 164
- Reform Acts (1832, 1867, 1884), 143
- redistributive society, dangers to freedom in, 173-74
- referendum, as indicator of political freedom, 28. *See also* elections
- Renner-Bauer form of self-determination, 200
- representative democracy, 113
- Resolution 1541 of UN, on self-determination, 193
- resources of Comparative Survey, 8-9
- Resurgence Party (Iran), 99, 103, 107
- revolutions, and change to polyarchical regimes, 140, 141
- Rhodesia, summary of, 296-97
- rights, patterns of, 20-22. *See also* civil liberties; human rights; political rights, *etc.*
- Riklin, Alois, 209, 210
- Riklin test for self-determination in future, 209-10
- Rokkan, Stein, 27
- Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 152
- Rumania, summary of, 297-98
- Russian Revolution, 205
- Rustow, D., 24
- Rwanda, summary of, 298
- Sakharov, Andrei, 86n
- Sao Tome and Principe, summary of, 299
- Saudi Arabia, summary of, 299
- self-determination and subnationalities, freedom and, 180-212; and contiguous peoples, 187; criteria used in assessing claims of self-determination, by world elites, 189-91; definition and contexts of subnationalism, 182-86; demands for, pragmatic reactions to, 186-91; dilemmas of, 211-12; discrimination against non-citizens, 191-92; East Bengal, as example, 188-89; and ethnicity, 183, 185-86; and external control of country, 187-88; forms of self-determination, 194-95; freedom, consequences of independence for, 210-11; future policy and, balancing with other values, 208-12; heterogeneous states, identification of, 185-86; independence, right to, 186-87; international law and, 191-94; and national self-consciousness (table), 48-51; "nationalism," and, 182; people, concept of, 183, 184-85, 186; peoples separated from existing nation-states (table), 53; people without nation-states (table), 48-51; *prima facie* right,

- 195; principles for examining claims to, 194-202; quotas in political or civil service, 192; Renner-Bauer form of, 200; Riklin test for, 209-10; subnation, defined, 185; Switzerland and Tadzhiks of Central Asia, as contrasting cases of, 202-207, 209-10; territorial minorities, right to self-determination of, 199-202; theoretical arguments for self-determination (Burke and Mill), 196-99; United Nations on, 193-94
- self-government, as criterion used by world elites, in assessing self-determination, 190-91
- Senegal: advance of freedom in, 34; summary of, 300
- Seychelles: loss of freedom in, 32; summary of, 300-301
- Shariati, Ali, 98
- Sierra Leone: advance of freedom in, 34; summary of, 301
- Sikkim, Kingdom of, absorption by India, as example of right to self-determination of territorial minority, 201-202
- Singapore, summary of, 302
- Sino-Soviet type society, 43
- Sinyavsky, Andrei, 77, 78
- social democracy. *See* socialism, as multiparty system
- social freedom. *See* negative freedom
- socialism/socialist states, freedom and, 169-75; compulsion, inevitability of, 173-75; mixed states, 220; as multiparty system, 169, 171-75, 176; one-party states, 47; as one-party system, 169, 170-71, 175; requirements, vs. capitalist requirements, 175-77; types of economies, 47
- society and freedom, types of, 43
- socioeconomic preconditions of democracy, 147-52
- Solzhenitsyn, Alexander, 76
- Somalia, summary of, 302-303
- South Africa: loss of freedom in, 32; summary of, 303-304
- Southeast Asia, people without national rights in, 59-60
- Soviet Union. *See* USSR
- Spain: advance of freedom in, 34; summary of, 305
- speech, free, 5, 18
- "squatter rights," 200
- Sri Lanka: advance of freedom in, 34; summary of, 305
- Staatsvolk*, national rights and concept of, 52, 59, 190, 191, 192, 195, 199, 207, 210, 220, 221
- Stalin, Iosef, 76, 77, 79, 81, 144, 172
- states: binational, 221; complex, 185; complex ethnic, 220; compound, 185; ethnic, 185-86; heterogeneous, 185-86, 195, 197; homogeneous, 195, 197, 220; imperial, 195; with major ethnic nonterritorial subnationalities, 220; with major ethnic potential territorial subnationality, 220; with major ethnic territorial subnationality, 220; multinational, 221; pluralist, 195, 211; transethnic, 186, 195, 211; transethnic heterogeneous, 221-22; trinational, 221. *See also* capitalism; socialism
- Stewart, Justice Potter, 203
- subnationalism. *See* self-determination
- Sudan: advance of freedom in, 33-35; summary of, 305-306
- suffrage. *See* elections; voting
- Sullivan, William, 103
- Sumner, William Graham, 175, 176
- Sureda, Rigo, 192
- Surinam, summary of, 306
- Survey of Freedom, Comparative, 3-60; approach to, 4-7; advances, major, 32-35; changes in rating or freedom, other, 35-42; civil liberties, 7-8, 15-20; comparison of surveys (table), 25; conclusion, 60; criticism of, 163; definitions and methods, 4-7; economic systems, freedom and, 43-47; elections and referenda, 36-40, 42; free speech vs. political participation, as dimension for ranking societies, 123; in independent nations (table), 10-12, 23; liberal democracy, as guiding value judgment of, 116; losses, major, 30-32; nature of freedom, 111; and other surveys, 23-30; people without national rights, 48-60; political-economic systems, by types of parties (table), 36-41; political rights, 7-8, 9-15; political systems, 47-51; purpose of, 4-5; ranking of nations (table), 16, 17; in related territories (table), 14-15; resources of, 8-9; scope of, 111-12; trends, 22-23. *See also names of countries*
- Swaziland, summary of, 306-307
- Switzerland: external ideas, role of, in establishing democracy in, 151-55; self-determination and, 202-204; summary of, 307-308

- Syria: advance of freedom in, 35; summary of, 308-309
- Tadzhiks of Central Asia,- self-determination and, 204-207, 209-10
- Taleqani, Ayatollah, 102
- Tanzania, summary of, 209-10
- territories: related, table of comparative measures of freedom, by political rights, civil liberties, status of freedom and outlook, 14-15; size and distinctiveness of, as criterion used by world elites, in assessing self-determination, 189
- Textor, Robert, 23, 24, 26
- Thailand: advance of freedom in, 35; summary of, 310
- Third World, economic freedom and, 46
- Thiirer, Daniel, 194, 213n
- Tilly, Charles, 27
- Titmuss, Richard, 174
- Togo, summary of, 311
- Tonga, summary of, 311
- totalitarian states, authoritarian states and, 119
- traditional nonparty system, 51
- traditional type society, 43
- Transkei, summary of, 312
- Trinidad and Tobago, summary of, 312-13
- Tunisia, summary of, 313
- Turkey, summary of, 313-14
- Uganda, summary of, 314-15
- United Arab Emirates, summary of, 316-17
- United Kingdom, education in, 179n; summary of, 317
- United Nations, 51
- United Nations Charter, 186, 191
- United Nations Human Rights Committee, 74, 75
- United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), 71, 74, 79, 83, 191
- United Nations Resolution 1541 on self-determination, 193
- United States: and external diffusionary pressures, 151; summary of, 318-19
- U.S. State Department, 9, 64, 67
- universal self-determination, defined, 194
- Upper Volta: advance of freedom in, 35; summary of, 319
- Uruguay, summary of, 319-20
- U Thant, 186
- USSR: change in freedom rating, 35, 42; collectivization, forced (1931-32), 144; *detente* and, 7, 82-84; future of, 80-81; ideological conflicts with U.S. and, 84; as multinational state, 221; national rights and, 78-83; summary of, 315-16; and Tadzhik self-determination, 204-207, 210
- , human rights in, 71-86; censorship, 77-78; as challenge to Soviet system, 80; during Cold War, 75, 76; Constitution (Soviet) and, 72-73; dissident movements and, 76-87; general nature of, 71-73, 75-76; Helsinki Agreement and, 82-83; and information from West, 81-82, 85-86; national rights as expression of human rights, 78-79; religious rights, 79-80; *samizdat*, use of, 78; during Stalin years, 76
- van Dyke, Vernon, 191, 192
- Venezuela, summary of, 320
- Verba, Sidney, 27
- verified self-determination, 194-210
- Vietnam, summary of, 321
- Voice of America, 82
- voting: percentages and results, national elections (table), 36-41; polyarchy and, 141-44; right to vote, 5
- Western Samoa, summary of, 321-22
- will, free. *See* choice
- Williams, M. F., 23
- Wilson, Woodrow, 187, 194
- women, freedom of, 222; in Iran, 94, 99
- Worldmark Encyclopedia of Nations*, 8
- Yemen, North (Yemen Arab Republic), summary of, 322
- Yemen, South (People's Democratic Republic of Yemen), summary of, 322-23
- Yost, Charles, 163
- Young, Andrew, 64, 65, 67
- Young, Crawford, 62-63ns, 185
- "Young Bukharan" movement, 204
- Yugoslavia: advance of freedom in, 33; summary of, 323-24
- Zahedi, General Fazlollah, 90
- Zaire, summary of, 324-25
- Zambia, summary of, 325

